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Abstract

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULIST-NATIONALISM IN ARGENTINA, 1943-55:
PERONISM AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A DEPENDENT INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY
by

•

THOMAS M. H. KAPPNER
Advisor: Professor Kenneth Paul Erickson
Focusing on the Peronist period from 1943 to 1955 as the highpoint
of a transitional process between two patterns of dependency on foreign
capital, the study explores the dynamics underlying the pendular cycle
so characteristic of Latin American political life— the dialectical
movement between some variant of populist rule and that based on military
power as a means of repressing popular aspirations.

Peronism emerged

in the context of contradictions within a developmental pattern based
on an alliance of the export producing, landowning oligarchy with foreign,
primarily British, commercial and financial groups.

The developmental

model promoted by the Peron government^in turn, was geared principally to
urban labor and local capitalists producing

for the domestic market.

The coalition Peronism was based on could only be held together
under conditions allowing for increased wages along with higher profits
for national capitalists.

In the absence of such advantageous conditons,

a populist-nationalist regime is driven by its commitment to pursue

development within the framework of capitalist social relations to cut
back on the consumption levels of its popular base.

Such policies

result in increased working class militance which undermines capitalist
accumulation-.

This brings the military to power.

The military rulers then use the coercive power of the armed
forces to back up an economic project serving the interests of the
oligarchy and multinational industrial and financial capital.

Whereas

populist-nationalism used material incentives to gain stable labor rela
tions, the military enforces labor peace through intimidation, torture
and murder.

This forceful restructuring of the foundation of the nation's

economic life not only harms the working class and popular sectors, but
also erodes the position of bourgeois sectors based on the production and
distribution of wage goods.

The stage is set for the reemergence of some

variant of populist-nationalism as a formula for exercising state power.
Finally, military repression will return once the new regime is
unable is unable to provide material benefits for its popular base while
also meeting the increased demand from foreign capital for whatever surplus
the Argentine economy is able to generate.
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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND FINDINGS

Theories of Modernization and Development
This study evolved as an effort to understand the significance
of changes which took place during the Peronist years between 1943 and
1955.

It soon became apparent that their implications went beyond

the study of Argentine politics.

Argentina represents an early exam

ple of what many Third World nations have attempted to achieve.

With

the First Five Year Plan of 1947-51, the Peron government announced
a concerted and systematic, nationalist and non-socialist program of
industrialization designed to lead to self-sustaining and autonomous
growth for the Argentine economy.

Argentina of the Peronist period

had the desire and seemed to possess the conditions necessary for
rapid and self-sustaining growth.

Yet, in spite of manifesting the

conditions and relationships held in the development/modernization
literature to be essential for achieving economic development and
political modernization, the Argentine case did not show these results.
It is interesting to note that the early formulators of the
development/modernization literature did not view Latin America as
their major research area.

As Alfred Stepan pointed out in his arti

cle on the subject*, this neglect was "due, in part, to the underlying

*Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin
American Experience," Journal of International Affairs 20 (1966):22334.

assumptions of much of the work on development.

The literature reveals

a strong bias toward an almost unilinear, mechanistic view of history—
society moves from traditional, to transitional, to modern stages."^In extrapolating an idealized version of liberal-democratic components
from the Western experience and presenting it either as a goal toward
which "developing" societies automatically tended or one they must
strive for because it embodied humanity's highest political achieve
ment, the literature proceeded ahistorically and served an ideological
function.

It proceeded ahistorically because in reifying selective

components of the Western tradition, they loose all connections to
the social and economic processes from which they emerged.

An in-depth

analysis of these processes would have negated the literature's ideal
ized, one-sided characterization.

It would have led to a dialectical

treatment of, for example, the relationships between political democ
racy

and the exploitative mechanisms of the emerging capitalist sys

tem.

Such a dialectical

treatment would have contradicted the litera

ture's ideological function.
Rather than contributing to the explanation of cases like the
Argentine, the conventional theories of modernization and development
have essentially served to justify the relations between the centers
of international capitalism and its peripheral areas.

In avoiding an

analysis of the oppressive and exploitative mechanisms on which the
power and privilege of those who benefit from the ongoing social relations
rests, mhe literature served to justify their position.

The ideological

function performed by the mainstream literature can be seen by the
way

its various

conceptual frameworks and methodologies

^Stepan, p. 293.
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deny, minimize, or obscure the negative features of social reality:
the posture of value-neutrality with its implicit espousal of exist
ing arrangements in the distribution of power as legitimate; behavioralism with its focus on observed behavioral regularities abstracted
from the socio-economic context within which they took shape; func
tionalism with its concern for existing relationships as the "natural"
means for performing the function in question; the fetishism of sta
tistics which treats its units of analysis as separate and distinct,
having no connections other than their numerical relationships; the
consideration of the political dimension as an independent variable
in and of itself, not as the outcome of particular social processes;
not to mention such concepts as "social mobility," "openness of
elites," "transitional societies," and so on, which remove the onus
for those benefitting from conditions of economic exploitation and
political dominations and counsel the victims to bear their burden
because of the transience of their situation.*-

The critique of the modernization/development literature is
well known. The earlier examples are still among the better ones:
Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1958) and C. Wright Mills, The Sociological
Imagination (New York: Grove Press, 1961). The best single article
is probably Mark Kesselman's "Order or Movement? The Literature of
Political Development as Ideology," World Politics 26 (October 1973):
139-54. For numerous citations of the literature showing its orienta
tion aimed at aiding those in power retain it, see pp. 144-5. Kesselman remarks: "My objection is not to describing how authorities
attempt to maintain dominance, but rather to the implicit espousal
of their cause: the literature of political development might be
assigned reading in Silone's school for dictators."
(p. 144)
Another excellent work on this subject is the book edited by Robin
Blackburn, Ideology in Social Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1973)
which reprints articles from the New Left Review.
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In assessing the utility of the modernization/development
literature for analyzing the Argentine case, I found it particularly
deficient in two major areas of inquiry.

On the one hand, in mini

mizing or avoiding any analysis of dependency altogether, the litera
ture neglected an integral component in the functioning of the inter
national order.

On the other hand, its treatment of economic factors

was also deficient.

The economic dimension is either absent from the

analysis or it tends to be "inverted." That is, instead of analyzing
material elements as-a principal aspect in the determination of
social reality, they are seen as dependent variables determined by,
rather than determining cultural patterns, norms and values.
Only an analysis that is squarely based on both the economic
and dependency dimensions can unravel the complexities and paradoxes
that have characterized Argentine development.
basic theoretical premise pursued in this study:

To summarize the
from the very

beginning to the present, the patterns underlying Argentine economic,
social, and political life have been determined by the particular
structural links between the national groups controlling the pre
dominant forms of productive activity and the major foreign groups
most closely tied to these productive processes.

Dependency Theory
In analyzing the Argentine case I adopt the dependency
theory framework because it most adequately addresses the shortcomings
in the development/modernization theories.

Dependency theory focuses

on the external conditioning of local history, but at the same time
lends itself to a dialectical approach that emphasizes the inter-

5
relationships between the external and the internal.

Thus it also

addresses one of the weaknesses in Marxist theories of imperialism.
Too frequently there has been a tendency to analyze Third
World development as simply a kind of reflex action caused by imperial
ism.

To be sure, international capitalism shaped local class struc

tures, but the course of the international system, in turn, has been
affected by the specific ways in which these societies developed in
the areas to which capitalism spread.
In this study I apply the Cardoso and Faletto version of
the dependency theory framework because it best encompasses the
needed dialectical approach.

Their formulation is specifically

geared to avoid the twin interpretive fallacies that arise from "the
belief in the mechanical conditioning of the national politicosocial situation by external domination amd the opposite idea that all
situations are historically unique."*- Cardoso and Faletto's theoreti
cal framework also links the economic, social and political components
of development.

In analyzing the relationships among groups comprising

the social structure, the key, according to Cardoso and Faletto, lies
in the control of production and consumption.

Cardoso and Faletto*s

version thus avoids one of the major errors Marxist critics have
faulted dependency theory for.

Earlier formulations, particularly

Andre Gunder Frank's, traced the causes for underdevelopment to the
systematic siphoning off of economic surplus from the satellite areas
to the metropolis through the mechanisms of international trade.

Such

■^Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y desarollo en
America Latina (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972) p. 162.
My translation.

an approach, confined to the sphere of circulation, results in an
analysis whose units are exploited and exploiting nations.

Moreover,

as the critics correctly pointed out, a dependency theory confined to
the sphere of circulation necessarily avoids analyzing social rela
tions of production and hence class structures.^
Unfortunately, there was a tendency, particularly on the part
of the more sectarian Marxist critics, to proceed from this justifiable
criticism to the "straw man technique" in order to dismiss dependency
theory as a whole.

Equating the whole of dependency theory with the

Frank type of formulation allows John Weeks and Elizabeth Dore,

2

for

example, to overlook dependency theory formulations, like Cardoso and
Faletto*s, which proceed from the sound Marxist premise of commodity
production.

As Karl Marx demonstrated in Capital, the development

of capitalism— i.e., the process whereby commodity production takes
over the provision of the goods and services necessary to sustain
social life— cannot be properly understood without analyzing the
various interrelationships between production and circulation that
it gives rise to.

Indeed, Volume II of Capital largely concerns itself

with the implications of the factthat, though surplus value arises in
the sphere of production, it must be realized in the sphere of circula
tion.

Just as an analysis confined to circulation fails by avoiding

class structure, so too an analysis restricted to the realm of

^Emeste Laclau(h) in "Modos de production y sistemas
economicos y poblacion excedente: aproximacion historica a los casos
argentine y chileno," Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologxa 5 (July
1962): 276-317, is the earliest and one of the most cogent exponents
of this critique,
o
John Weeks and Elizabeth Dore, "International Exchange and the
Causes of Backwardness," Latin American Perspectives 6 (Spring: 1979) 6287.

production fails equally because it neglects the importance of
commercial and trade relations.

It is inconceivable to analyze the

functioning of the world economic system without taking this dimension
into account.

A sound analysis is one that proceeds from a more com

plex but also more accurate perspective of the nature of contemporary
global capitalism.

"The capitalist world economy is an articulated

system of capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of
production, linked to each other by capitalist relations of exchange
and dominated by the world capitalist market."^
An even more unfortunate use of the "straw man technique" is
the reasoning of those Marxist sectarians who dismiss dependency
theory out of hand as a bourgeois construct.

2

It is of course quite

true that the impetus for the originators of the dependency theory
/
framework, Raul Prebisch and those grouped around him in the United

3
Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),

was nationalist

and sometimes anti-imperialist, but certainly non-Marxist.

Yet the

Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 48-9.
See also Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist
Analysis (London: n.p., 1974) which emphasizes the specific weight and
role of merchant capital in colonies and semi-colonies for any explana
tion of backwardness.
Mandel presents a very useful formulation of Marx's method
which corresponds with the procedure that evolved In the present
study. See especially pp. 16-7 of Mandel's book.
^For example, Raul A. Fernandez and Jose^F. Ocampo, "The Latin
American Revolution: A Theory of Imperialism, Not Dependence," Latin
American Perspectives 1 (Spring 1974): 4-29.
3
The concepts of "center" and "periphery" were already
clearly formulated in ECLA's Estudio economico de America Latina
(New York: United Nations, 1949).

fundamental premise on which ECLA based its analysis incorporated
the Marxist "law of unequal development under capitalism."

ECLA

saw the international system as one entity composed of industrial
centers and primary producing peripheries, with the former dominating
the latter.

Prebisch had already applied the concept of unequal ex

change to the Argentine situation in a 1934 article for the Revista
de econom^a argentina (Ano 17, nos. 193 and 194, July and August).

He

noted that in that year Argentina had to sell 73 percent more than
before the Depression in order to obtain the same quantity of manufac
tured goods and "in the previous year the nation had to pay double the
amount in terms of gold on its fixed foreign debt obligations as it
did in 1928."*

Thus in dismissing dependency theory as a bourgeois

construct, the sectarian Marxist critics fail to take into account the
Marxist underpinnings even in the bourgeois version.
Stressing the ways in which Latin American productive
structures were shaped in accordance to their insertion into the
international division of labor emerging in the nineteenth century,
the ECLA analysis provided a powerful explanation for the region's
contemporary problems: persisting dependence on agro-mineral experts,
weak and underdeveloped industrial sectors, and as a corollary, the
lack of self-sufficient, autonomous national economies.

On the other

hand, the ECLA analysis' almost exclusive focus on trade relations
(leaving productive relations outside its purview) and its neglect of
the internal social structures of peripheral areas and their points

*Joseph L. Love, "Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doc
trine of Unequal Exchange," Latin American Research Review 15 (1980):
50. Pages 52-60 present a good summary of Prebisch1s analysis of the
functioning of the international system.
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of connection with the advanced industrial areas, also accounted for
the shortcomings in the earlier dependency theory formulations.
Because the early formulators neglected the sphere of pro
duction and therefore failed to develop an adequate class analysis,
does not mean that this deficiency is intrinsic to dependency theory
itself.

Cardoso and Faletto's version for example, which begins with

analyzing the predominant forms of economic activity and the social
groups who control the "productive processes" and the "structures of
distribution" involved, incorporates the Marxist synthesis between the
two spheres.

Thus when left sectarians equate Cardoso and Faletto's

construction with the bourgeois version, they conveniently ignore
the Marxist content in Cardoso and Faletto's work.
John Myer's critique of Cardoso.

An example is

He faults Cardoso's formulation

of dependency theory for the very point that constitutes one of its
strengths.

He objects that Cardoso's focus is on process, on the

dynamic interrelationship which obtains between politics and economics,
and not on class, and that it thereby deviates from Marxist analysis.
Cardoso's unit of analysis, Myer argues, is by its very definition
dynamic and "cannot be given a complete definition in strictly econ
omic t e r m s . M y e r ignores two basic points.

First, Cardoso's

analysis focuses on the developmental process involving shifting rela
tionships between social groups within a theoretical framework that
begins with system of production and its relations of production.
Second, the strength of Marxist analysis lies precisely in its ability

*John Myer, "A Crown of Thorns: Cardoso and Counter-Revolution,"
Latin American Perspectives 2 (Spring 1975): 41.

10
to relate the economic to the political.

Taking Marx's theory as a

whole, there is no such thing as "a complete definition in strictly
economic terms."
Rather than constituting an antithesis to Marxist theories of
imperialism, when properly constructed, dependency theory represents a
a necessary supplement.

As Barbara Stallings put it, "dependency

theory can be seen as an attempt to look at imperialism from the
bottom up rather than from the top down."*

Being concerned with the

functioning of the international system as a whole, theories of
imperialism tend to concentrate on the advanced capitalist areas as
the centers of gravity.

Dependency theorists, on the other hand, tend

to turn their attention to effects of imperialism, to the specific
ways in which international capitalism has had an impact on an area
over time.

A specific instance of dependency cannot be properly

understood in isolation from the world system in which it developed
and in which it functions.

At the same time, each particular set of

relationships between advanced capitalist centers and a dependent area
has its own history and its own peculiar manifestations.

It is in

analyzing concrete instances that dependency theory has a contribution
to make

Cardoso and Faletto's Contribution
I extrapolated the theoretical model applied to the Argentine
case from Cardoso and Faletto's version of dependency theory,
elaborating on their basic framework and the relationships they

^Barbara Stallings, Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin
America (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972) p. 5.
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single out as significant and determinative.

Four aspects of Cardoso

and Faletto*s formulation make theirs' a superior version of dependency
theory for unravelling the complexities of the dependent world:
1.

Their theoretical framework links economic, social and political
factors and it provides a handle for getting to the key of the
endeavor, the analysis of class structures

2.

They provide for a dialectical conception of the external/internal
nexus

3.

Their analysis focuses on historical process and on the dynamic
which accounts for movement and change, the contradictions under
lying the relationships of the groups comprising the class
structure

4.

Their analysis incorporates the very important consideration of
the transitional period between one pattern or modality and
another

It must be pointed out that in singling out these four aspects and
in their elaboration which follows, I have been selective and
extrapolated from Cardoso and Faletto*s formulations, and I have re
formulated and sharpened those components from their analysis which I
feel provide the most useful approach.

However, while it reorders

and shifts the emphasis somewhat, this interpretation does not violate
the implicit thrust of their arguments.
Cardoso and Faletto*s theoretical framework views society as com
posed of groups having diverse and conflicting interests.

At each

point in time there are unstable compromises which resolve some
conflicts while generating new ones.

Thus, in a fundamental sense,

the process of competition and struggle between groups with diverging
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interests constitutes the dynamic element within any given social
system.

These interests, and the values and norms that express them,

do not exist in a vacuum; they arise from the manner in which social
groups are related to the structures involved in the production and
distribution of material necessities and rewards.

Power, according

to this perspective, involves the use of the state and its institutions
by some groups, and not others, to control the structures of production
and distribution.

Hence social change is the process which brings

about redistributions in the power relationships of groups whose
interests are at stake.

And such "changes in the social system of

domination always imply a redefinition in the forms of the control
and organization of production and consumption."*
The second aspect of Cardoso and Faletto's formulation that
makes it so appealing is the stress they lay in their framework on
the global context within which national class structures develop and
to which its constituent groups are linked.

Consequently the analysis

must incorporate such relationships as those which determine the
economics of the world market and the international balance of power.
In this endeavor they argue against a focus that separates factors
labelled external from those categorized as internal.

"What is being

proposed is to find the characteristics that the national social system
assumes and within them, their relationship to the external."

2

*Cardoso and Faletto, "Dependencia y desarollo en America
Latina" in La dominacion de America Latina (Lima: Francisco Monchoa
Editores, 1968), p. 191. My translation.
2Ibid., p. 196.
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The third aspect of the Cardoso and Faletto approach that I
found valuable is its "dynamic" content.

Cardoso and Faletto empha

size that the analysis must be historical.

In my view, the focus

must be on the process whereby the contradictions underlying the
relationships between groups comprising a particular class structure
develop.

Thus, if in the course of analyzing a particular develop

mental pattern— in specifying its underlying structures and the links
within and between national and foreign groups exhibited in these
structures— one must employ a procedure which provides a kind of snap
shot (frozen in time) of the constellation of socio-economic forces
operative at that particular historical moment, then this procedure
must be a means, a heuristic device

and not an end.

Its purpose is

to underscore theoretical points and it must transcend a mere idealtypical formulation of a given reality.

This procedure should serve

as an analytical tool with which to delineate possible outcomes
within the dependent pattern being analyzed.
The analysis must be such that in specifying the develop
mental pattern characteristic of the given historical stage, it
states relationships exhibited in the "snapshot" of social forces in
a manner that rules out some links between social groups and points
to others likely to emerge as dominant within the modality charac
teristic of the next stage.

Thus, though this procedure used to

analyze the relationships underlying a given historical moment may
not predict specific contents of the developmental pattern operative
at the next historical moment, it should aim to at least narrow down
options and provide clues for the types of social constellations most
likely to prevail.
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In making these points I have elaborated on Cardoso and
Faletto's formulations where they emphasize historical process and
stress dynamic tensions between groups as the analytic tool.

In their

view, analyzing a given historical moment requires specifying the
social groups that make up the dominant set, since the particular ways
in which they promote their interests defines the developmental process
operative at the time.

In this sense these relationships among and

between national and foreign groups are presented as momentarily
frozen.

But, at the same time, they must be characterized within a

dynamic context, as part of the process of change.

In other words,

the analysis of a given historical content must be able to take into
account its fluidity.

The analysis should not present a finality of

results, but instead a process of becoming.
It is within this context that Cardoso and Faletto stress
their point about dynamic tensions between groups.*
underline two facts.

With it they

First, that a particular ruling coalition con

tains within it groups with varying degrees of actual or potentially
conflicting interests.

The cohesion and stability of a dominant set

of groups depends on the types and intensity of such conflicting
interests and on the manner in which they are resolved.

On the other

hand, the dominant configuration must also contend with the interests
of the national and foreign groups excluded from representation within
it.

Thus, the degree and form whereby excluded groups express their

opposition, constitutes a second limiting factor on a ruling coalition's
staying power.

*For reasons that will be explained shortly, I prefer the
concept of "contradiction."
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Calling attention to the importance of transitional periods
represents Cardoso and Faletto's fourth major contribution to dependency
theory.

They note that these dynamic tensions between groups become

most acute and are therefore manifested most visibly during the
transitional period between one pattern of dependency and another.

In

their writings a transitional period emerges as a result of an inter
national crisis that disrupts the ongoing pattern of relationships
between internal and external groups.

Much of what they say about

transitional periods is treated implicitly in the two cases they cite.
The first is "the rupture of the colonial pact" which resulted in
various types of the "externally oriented growth model."

Externally

oriented growth— economic growth based on the production of agricul
tural or mineral primary goods for export— defined and determined the
development of most Latin American societies from the colonial period
until the Great Depression of the 1930's.*

The second transitional

period, which is the important one for our purposes, resulted from the
1929 crash.

Cardoso and Faletto term it "the crisis in the externally

oriented growth model."

It was marked by policies aimed at the

consolidation of "internally oriented growth"— the expansion of
nationally-owned manufacturing for domestic consumption.

Eventually,

it led to variations of "dependent industrialization" or the control
of the local industrial sector by multinational capital.
The international economic collapse of 1929 exacerbated, and
brought to a head, shifts in the relationships among and between the

*Mexico, which experienced the first social revolution of
the twentieth century, is an important exception.

national and foreign groups comprising the dominant set, and shifts in
their relationships to excluded and opposing groups.

These shifts pro

vided the content of "the crisis in the externally oriented growth
model" of the thirties. These shifts came about as a result of factors
which undermined the position of groups linked to the export of mineral
and agricultural primary goods and the factors which made industrial
activity increasingly important.

The process set in motion resulted

from the interplay of these external and internal factors and it was
the manner in which they were linked that determined its results. Con
sequently, as Cardoso and Faletto point out, in tracing the origin of
the stimuli and mechanisms that may result in an industrialization that
restructures the economic and social system, the analysis must incor
porate, on the one hand, the transformations or conditions on the
international scene and, on the other hand, the elements favorable
to this type of development within the interplay of the politicosocial forces in the dependent nation.

These internal forces, linked

to particular configurations of interests in the metropolitan centers,
produce the policies that take advantage of these new conditions and
opportunities for economic growth, and thereby define the direction
and reach of the social and political changes being generated.
This formulation represents a useful contribution because,
as Cardoso and Faletto note, though the transitional period of the
thirties responded to essentially the same external stimuli, it
resulted in diverse social arrangements taking shape in the various
Latin American countries.

In some cases the traditional ruling

groups resisted any displacement of their control over the power
structures.

For example, in Argentina until the advent of Peronism,
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the crisis resulted in strengthening the domination of the agro
exporting oligarchy through military-authoritarian forms, thereby
repressing social turmoil and postponing the demands of excluded
groups.

In other cases however, the power of ruling groups diminished

as the process of industrialization developed beyond their control.
In ascertaining possible outcomes of the transitional process, Cardoso
and Faletto stress the importance of analyzing the degree to which, and
the manner in which, prior conflicts within the ruling coalitions and
with opposing groups have been resolved in the preceding stage.
In calling attention to the importance that the analysis of
transitional periods deserves, Cardoso and Faletto offer an extremely
useful addition to dependency theory.

Understanding the dialectical

process that occurs during a transitional period provides a unique
opportunity for clarifying complex interrelationships that take shape
into the trends determining the pattern of dependent relationships
that emerge as dominant in the next stage.
A transitional period involves a dialectical process because,
on the one hand, it implies more autonomy and less dependence for
national groups.

At a time when prior links with external groups are

weakening, they have more room for maneuver and more options in re
structuring their internal and external alliances.
times that progressive changes are most likely.

It is at such

However, developments

of this type depend on the presence of internal groups ready and
willing to take advantage of the favorable international context.
There must either be a new coalition, representing a wider popular
base, strong enough to offset the traditional groups, or the elite
groups must be willing to widen their power base.

On the other hand,
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a transitional period is also one in which the options of national
groups become successively narrowed.

The process which transpires is

one in which the new arrangements are gradually solidified and con
solidated; as each link between groups becomes established, it elimi
nates the possibility for others and the room for maneuver grows
increasingly smaller.

Theoretical Model Applied in This Study
The model sketched above served me as a guide with which to
organize and attach significance to the manifold events comprising
Peronism, my aim being to see if I could "make sense" out of the
totality.

The particular formulation of dependency theory I chose

stresses the connections among and between internal and foreign
groups as a determining factor in the process of economic development.
The analysis must specify the ways in which foreign and national groups
interconnect through their relationships to the predominant forms of econo
mic activity. The interests of both of these groups arise from their
connections to the structures of production and distribution involved.
Their interests, in turn, are the source for both the alliances and coali
tions forged among and between these groupings as well as the source for
the contradictions among them.
It follows then, that the analysis must delineate the com
ponents operative in a given pattern of dependency:

the groups, their

interests, the orientations that flow from them, and the relationships
formed between these groups.

In practice, this raises many problems

and involves innumerable complexities particularly as concerns the key
problem, that of relating groups to interests.

In spite of these dif

ficulties, I nevertheless propose to make general statements based on
empirical data.

The type of economic activity which predominates at
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the given time, provides the clue for the first step in this endeavor.
To find the predominant forms of economic activity I will use such
indicators as percentages contributed by sectors to the Gross Domestic
Product, the proportion of the total economically active population in
each sector, and the relative volumes in the types of goods exported
and imported.

The next step is to locate the significant actors by

singling out the groups "tied" to those processes found to encompass the
largest shares of the totals.

It is the structural ties of these

groups to the predominant forms of economic activity— ownership of
means of production, part played in the labor process creating value
and in the distribution thereof; in other words, the social relations
of production— that determine their interests and thus condition the
relationships they forge among and between them.
Next comes an even more difficult step in the proposed pro
cedure— one that, in the end, can only be justified by the results
the analysis yields.

Though necessary, it is clearly insufficient

to merely enumerate the relationships between internal and external
groups comprising a matrix of dependency.

The procedure outlined so

far does not get beyond a static picture; it lacks the vital element
that accounts for change.

If a particular modality or pattern of

dependency is conceived as a stage, then the analysis must specify
those elements that make for movement within it.
within it the next stage.

Each stage contains

Consequently, rather than seeing it stat

ically, as an outcome of processes, the analysis must deal with the
dynamic elements inside these processes themselves.

The key to

this task lies in uncovering the conflictual tensions or contradic
tions implicit in the particular ways that connections among and
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between the significant actors are structured.

Each stage is in a

constant state of flux— whereby relationships are solidified, altered,
and undone— with continual readjustments that result from the contra
dictions within it.

Thus in analyzing the process whereby a particu

lar set of relationships between groups takes shape, the focus must
be on what holds these relationships together and what drives them
apart.

What holds them together is the common purpose the members

of the coalition controlling the mechanisms of power have in using
that power to pursue their interests.

Likewise, opposing sets of

groups have a common purpose in seeing their interests promoted.

In

what drives them apart, we get to the concept of contradiction.
There are, on the one hand, contradictions between the interests of
the ruling and opposing groups.

Simultaneously, each of these

groupings also contain varying degrees of contradictory interests
within them.
I use "contradiction" in contradistinction to "opposition,"
"contrary," or "conflicting"— all of which are meanings encompassed
by the concept*-— because "contradiction" calls attention to 1) the
systemic nature of the opposition involved, and 2) its dynamic
nature as a source for movement and change.

As to the first point,

groups with contrary interests are not atomized units which can
choose to avoid the conflict between them.

What drives them apart

is at the same time what holds them together.

In other words, they

are integrally related and connected by virtue of their common ele-

*Tt does not however, include the meaning of "untruth" or
"false" prevalent in the everyday usage of "contradiction."
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merits within the same system.

For example, proletariat and bour

geoisie in a capitalist system are ultimately tied together and
driven apart by their relationship to the process of commodity pro
duction.

The second point has already been mentioned: a contradiction

involves more than just opposition arising from differing interests.
The opposing interests are connected in a way that makes tension and,
ultimately, conflict unavoidable.

A contradiction involves opposing

interests which become active and the resulting conflict is the source
of change.

A contradiction cannot remain a contradiction indefinitely.

It must eventually lead to change and thus be reformulated on a new
basis.

Finally, it is important to note that the conflicting demands

posed in a contradiction can be resolved in either direction.

If

there is a causal model in this dialectical mode of analysis, it is
not the unilinear one of "a" causes "b."

The contradiction between

"a" and "b" can be reformulated in either direction.

The causality

is one of a narrowing down the range of possible outcomes while,
simultaneously, the scope is also widened as the new combinations in
turn, create the possibility of yet unforeseen reformulations.
I noted that there are contradictions between the interests
of the ruling and the opposing groups, and that, simultaneously, each
of these groupings also contain contradictory interests within them.
Applying this step of the proposed analytic procedure requires imagi
nation and creativity, intuition and common sense associations, and
just plain knowledge of the subject matter.

In this endeavor the

theoretical framework offers no fast and firm, mechanical rules to
be applied.

All it offers is the awareness that each pattern of

dependency should be conceived as a stage in a dynamic and dialectical
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sense, with each set of relationships between groups in a constant
state of flux containing contradictory interests which set the limits
for the next pattern of arrangements (which, in turn, contain their
own contradictions).

Moreover, the logic is not a deterministic one.

Rather, each set of arrangements contains a number of possible
patterns, with each one implying a different field of options for
succeeding patterns.
Having delineated a dependent pattern in terms of the signif
icant groups tied to the predominant forms of economic activity, the
methodology which proved useful in ascertaining the determinative
contradictions among and between these groups was to analyze the con
tinuities and divergences with the developmental policies of the
adjoining time periods.

Each stage is the product of the previous

stage and contains within it the next stage.

Hence a thorough analysis

of one stage, particularly focusing on the basic continuities of its
developmental policies with those of the preceeding stage and on the
ways in which they diverged, brought out the contradictions within
that stage whose reformulation, in turn, determine the contents of
the following stage.

Specifying and clarifying the contradictions

within one stage in this way provided an understanding of the manner
in which these contradictions might be reformulated in the next stage.
Developmental policies were chosen as the focus for comparison
because they provide a useful handle for analyzing the interrelation
ship between the economic and the political.

A developmental policy

is the medium through which the state as the institutional expression
of the configuration of dominant groups mobilizes resources that
reinforce some relationships among these groups and undermine others,
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as well as developing links to previously excluded groups, by pro
moting some modes of economic activity and some features of the class
structure while attacking others.
The most important stage to analyze is the transitional
period.

It is during transitional periods that shifts in the patterns

of dominance become most discemable, and it is during such periods
that the process of combinations of groups vying with each other to
impose their aims assumes particular intensity.

It is also in the

transitional period that one of these begins to consolidate its posi
tion vis-a-vis the others.

Consequently, in focusing on relative

shifts in the influence and power of local and foreign groups during
the period of transition, the analysis provides a means for ascer
taining its likely outcomes and thus also a means for narrowing down
the variety of developmental patterns that could result.
A

How can one distinguish between a transitional period and a
stage?

It was stated that the lines are blurred, that change occurs

constantly.

Yet one must be able to specify at what times this

process assumes particular intensity and, thus, becomes more visible.
What then, sets a transitional process apart?

Implicit in the fore

going discussion there are at least four conditions which must be
operative for a transitional process to take place.

These general

criteria are offered in a preliminary, and not in a definitive sense.
They were found useful in this endeavor and, it is hoped, they can
be refined and sharpened in order to aid in the analyses of other
transitional periods.
The following are these four conditions.

First, there must

be a crisis on the international scene severe enough to disrupt the
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ongoing developmental process.

In particular, the internal reper

cussions of this crisis must be profound enough to throw into temporary
disarray the alliance of domestic and foreign groups controlling the
productive and marketing structures.

This creates the vacuum which

the competing sets of groups try to fill.

Second, the basic elements

that provide the infrastructure for the new pattern must be at hand.
That is, even if in a subordinated capacity, the new pattern must
have been developing within the prior stage.

In our case, the transi

tion between externally oriented growth and a dependent industrial
economy, the industrial plant necessary for the production of con
sumer goods must already exist.

Such an infrastructure is a pre

requisite for the physical and technological requirements of the new
pattern.

In addition, the groups tied to this infrastructure are

the actors pushing for the expansion of the "new" pattern.

Third,

the alliance of groups on which the alternative developmental pattern
is based, must possess and mobilize a coercive power strong enough to
offset the political power of the groups comprising the traditional
alliances.

That is, for the goals of the new developmental program

to be implemented, the mobilization must produce a political force
strong enough to determine the use of available resources.

Fourth,

the realization of an alternative developmental program depends on
adequate material conditions; that is, the necessary resources must
be available before they can be utilized.

In the case examined here,

the transition from externally oriented growth to dependent indus
trialization depends on the export of primary goods in order to

obtain capital goods.
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This means that the demand for the nation’s

major products must secure sufficient revenues to cover the costs
of industrialization.

Summary of Analysis
Applying the theoretical framework and methodology out
lined here yielded an analysis that brings out the significant fac
tors and determinative interrelationships necessary for a deeper under
standing of Argentine economic and political development.
This analysis enabled me to identify the key actors and time
periods in the course of Argentine development. It will be recalled
that each stage is conceived of as a pattern of dependency defined by
the relationships forged among and between the national and foreign
groups tied to the predominant forms of economic activity.

I noted

each stage must be analyzed not in a static, but rather in a dynamic
sense as a process whose components are constantly evolving.

The

dynamic element in this process is the constant reformulation of
contradictions arising out of the nation’s structures of production
and distribution and their insertion into the global capitalist economy.
Such an approach focues on the shifts within a pattern of dependency that
become determinative in leading to modifications or alterations in the
predominant forms of economic activity.
Which are the key actors and the significant stages in the
course of Argentine economic and political development?

This study

analyzes the roles of British, continental European and North American
capital (the external pole) and their shifting relationship with
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the landowning oligarchy and diverse sectors of the bourgeoisie, as
well as the part played by the industrial working class and the popu
lar sectors in these shifts (internal pole).

The analysis traces the

roles of these groups and their shifting relationships through the
externally oriented growth pattern up to 1930, its modified version
from 1930 to 1943, the period of Peronism's achievements from 1943 to
1950, that of its limitations from 1950 to 1955, the period of the
dependent industrial economy from 1955 to 1973, the second Peronist
period of 1973 to 1976, and the attempt to reinstitute a new modified
basis for externally oriented growth thereafter.

As a means of

highlighting the contradictions which underlay shifts in the relation
ships among and between national and foreign groups dominant within
each stage, I applied the methodology of analyzing continuities and
divergences in the developmental patterns defining adjoining stages.
The resulting analysis revealed a process wherein, more often than
not, these determinative shifts turned out to be a case of quantita
tive change leading to qualitative change.

This analysis developed

in the remaining chapters can be presented schematically here.
Until 1930, Argentina exhibited the classical features of an
externally oriented growth model.

The economy developed on the

foundation of agro-pastoral goods for export: first mutton, then beef,
and later cereals and wheat, were raised and grown primarily for over
seas markets.

This predominant form of economic activity developed

to the extent that Argentina practically became industrialized
Europe's breadbasket.

Between 1911 and 1934, 95 percent of Argentina's

total exports were agro-pastoral goods and Argentina supplied more
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than half of the world’s total beef exports.

In 1925, Argentina

occupied first place in the world's exports of corn, oats and flax
seed, and second or third in those of wheat and flour.*

As a by

product of this pattern, manufacturing remained relatively underdeveloped
and subordinated to the requests of agricultural production.

Local

industry was constrained so as not to compete with the importation
of industrial commodities from Argentina's major market, Great
Britain.

In turn, agro-pastoral exports became all the more essential

since they provided the foreign exchange needed to purchase products
not produced locally, both necessities and luxury goods.
Along with the centrality of agro-exports for the developing
Argentine economy, a ruling class based on the ownership of the vast
tracts of land used in raising or cultivating these commodities arose
and solidified its hold over the evolving social and political struct
ures.

An increasingly sophisticated state apparatus with the capa

bility for effective administration and regulation also developed in
the context of this growing export trade.

From the beginning, the

landowning ruling class, or oligarqu^a. as it is popularly known in
Argentina, used its economic power to control the state and, at the
same time, the state played a key part in consolidating the oligarchy's
economic and social position.

Indeed, the state was instrumental in

conferring ownership over thousands of acres of land to the handful of
families comprising the oligarchy.

^Vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position of
Argentina (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938),
pp. 134-6, 141.
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The state was also Instrumental In cementing the relationships
between the locally dominant groups and the representatives of foreign
capital which provided the foundation for the externally oriented
growth pattern.

The strategic structures channeling the circuits in

the accumulation of capital were established with regulations that
guaranteed monopoly conditions for foreign, mostly British, investors
over export and finance: thus the British owned railroads, meat packing
plants, port facilities, and their preponderant influence in banking.
In Argentina externally oriented growth took a form best described as
the "Anglo-oligarchic connection."

It was based on the exchange of

commodities: foodstuffs for manufactures.

The oligarchy viewed manu

factures which competed with British imports as a threat to the
trade arrangements guaranteeing them wealth.

On the other hand,

British investors concentrated on the export of finished consumer
goods from England and on controlling the financing and transportation
of rural commodities from the Argentine countryside.

The ideology of

free trade and laissez faire expressed the mutual self-interest of
these two elites in the continued dependence of the Argentine economy
on exporting agro-pastoral goods.
Along with the crisis and reordering of the global economic
order that began with World War I, the dominant relationships among
and between national and foreign groups shifted in conjunction with
the prevalent modes of economic activity.

Externally a triangular

pattern was taking shape within the traditional two-way flow of
exchanging rural commodities for industrial imports that linked
Argentina through her ruling class to the United Kingdom's finance
and industrial capital.

Gradually, the United States began to dis-
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place Great Britain as the major source for imports.

Argentina had to

realize a favorable balance in her exports to Europe to cover the
deficits in the trade with North America.

Internally, North American

groups took advantage of the corollary of externally oriented growth:
an underdeveloped local manufacturing sector.

It was in the industrial

area that North American investors began to make their presence felt
in Argentina.

In so doing, U.S. groups enjoyed a competitive edge over

their English counterparts.

Their greater proximity to the domestic

market allowed them greater flexibility in responding to and creating
local demand, they had the capacity to use cheaper labor power, and
their operations were not disrupted by an economy placed on a war
footing.
These shifts did not proceed far enough to undermine the
externally oriented growth pattern.

With the end of the disruptions of

the First World War, they were arrested and in many instances even
reversed in the decade of the twenties.

However, the trends of the

World War I period reemerged much more strongly with the world crisis
of 1929.

This time their impact was powerful enough to modify ex

ternally oriented growth which, in turn, eventually led to a new
developmental pattern.

The contraction of production in the advanced

industrial nations and Argentina's inability to sell agro-pastoral
goods meant a drastically reduced volume of imported manufactures.
The oligarchy

responded to this crisis threatening to undermine

externally oriented growth by using the state to promote an import
substituting industrialization to fill the gap left by the lack of
imported manufactured goods.

The policies of the thirties

succeeded in revitalizing the Anglo-oligarchic connection, but on a
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modified basis.

These modifications gave rise to contradictions that

provided the conditions that made Peronism viable.
The basic contradiction in the oligarchy’s modified model was
that it depended on a certain degree of internal industrial develop
ment in order to salvage the basic structures of externally oriented
growth based on agricultural production.

Though import substituting

industrialization was clearly restricted and subordinated to main
taining the primacy of rural production as the axis of the nation’s
economic life, the policies of the 1930-43 period nevertheless ex
panded industrial activity considerably.

The result was a submerged

industrial sector threatening to break out of the confines of its
functional subordination, which generated a host of postponed demands
and unfulfilled expectations on the part of industrialists and workers.
These were the sectors that Peron built his winning coalition on.

He

held out the promise of expanded production to the capitalists and he
built a mass movement by meeting the demands of labor which had been
suppressed, at times brutally, by the oligarchic regime of the
thirties.

Peronism resolved the contradictions arising from the

limited import substituting industrialization of the thirties
through a full-scale import substituting model of internally oriented
growth in the forties.
Analyzing the basic continuity of Peronist policies and the
way they diverged from those of their oligarchic predecessors reveals
the contradictions within Peronist development.

The continuity

results from the fact that Peronist policies promoted a basically
import substituting industrialization with a capitalist frame
work, centered principally on

industry

with

a lower

organic
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composition of capital (i.e., more labor intensive).

The degree

of industrialization promoted represents the basic departure of
Peronist policies from those of the thirties.

The impact of Peronist

policies was such as to transform existing contradictions through a
process of quantitative leading to qualitative change, and in this
process creating the contradictions that led to the disintegration of
the Peronist developmental model.

The Peronist developmental pattern

diverged qualitatively from that of the thirties in these respects:
1. Peronism used agriculturally generated surplus to promote indus
trialization thereby reversing the traditional subordination of
industrial development to agriculture as the foundation of the
economy
2. Breaking sharply with the policies of the previous period, Peronism
dismantled the British presence

within the

Argentine economy

3. From the supplying of external markets with agro-pastoral goods,
industrial production for the. domestic market became the predomi
nant form of activity
These achievements were possible because Peronism benefited
from an extremely favorable confluence of external and internal con
ditions in the World War II and immediate post-war period.

The

regime spurred on the most rapid development of the industrial sector
in Argentine history, elevating manufacturing for the domestic market
to the primary form of economic activity.

At the same time, it

instituted the most equitable distribution of wealth Argentines had
ever experienced.

Workers made their largest wage gains; for the

first time millions of Argentines were covered by extensive social
security, unemployment, retirement, health and other benefits; the
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cost of food was kept down; rents were frozen; thousands of housing
units were erected for workers; and the universities were opened
to their children.
The externally and internally favorable conjuncture made these
impressive achievements possible, but it also obscured the contra
dictions within Peronism.

Externally, the wartime conditions in

creased the demand for Argentina's traditional exportables, thus
making for an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, while the
lack of competition from foreign producers allowed Argentine manufac
turers to increase production.

Internally, the traditionally power

ful socio-economic groups were in disarray which made the political
pressure generated from Peronism's mass mobilization more effective,
thereby making the regime's social and sectoral redistributive
policies possible.
Populist-nationalism was the doctrine Peronism used in its
mass mobilizing efforts.

It was especially suited for this task

in that it perceived the root cause of Argentina's problems to
lie in the alliance of the rural oligarchy with the foreign (mostly
British) imperialists.

By calling on all sectors of the population

to rally against the tiny minority of those who had sold out the
nation's interests, and by calling on capitalists and workers alike
to cooperate in the task of national reconstruction, populistnationalism simultaneously provided a sense of dignity and purpose
for the proletariat which had always been held in disdain by the
nation's rulers, and a crusade within which the bourgeoisie could
legitimately pursue its corporate interests.

The inclusiveness

of Peronism's populist and nationalist orientation was the positive
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side that allowed the regime to undertake a broad-ranging mass
mobilization which proved an effective tool with which to counter
the power of the traditionally dominant interests.

At the same time

however, this glossing over of class distinctions was the negative
side that prevented Peronism from confronting its contradictions at a
time when the conditions were most advantageous for such a reckoning.
Consistent with its populist-nationalist doctrine which viewed
industrial development as in and of itself leading in a spontaneous
manner to economic liberation, the Peronist program aimed at and suc
ceeded in strengthening the manufacturing sector under the control of
national capitalists.

Peronism remained a bourgeois doctrine in that

it saw no need for, and indeed strongly opposed, altering capitalist
relations of production.

A major preoccupation behind Peronist redis

tributive measures was to prevent class struggle over the distribution
of wealth from undermining the authority of the groups controlling
production.

A major concern of Peronist policies in other words, was

to confine the class struggle to the sphere of circulation and pre
vent it from spilling over into that of production.

Peron often

justified social welfare measures undertaken by his regime as a means
of giving the workers a stake in the new system.
The period of Peronism’s greatest achievements coincided
roughly with the First Five Year Plan (1947-51), which was officially
formulated as the government's instrument for achieving the liberation
of the economy from imperialist domination.

Essentially,the First

Five Year Plan (FFYP) aimed at creating consumer demand through higher
wages and a more equitable distribution of wealth.

This demand was

to be satisfied by domestic production, thereby releasing foreign
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exchange for the purchase of commodities essential for economic
development.

Peronism1s developmental program thus rested on simul

taneously providing benefits to social sectors with fundamentally
opposed interests in the distribution of value created through the
productive process.

This contradiction within the Peronist develop

mental model was obscured by the exceptionally favorable external and
internal circumstances for the Argentine economy prevailing at the
time.
A crucial feature of the FFYP's strategy for industrialization
was the reversal of the traditional subordination of manufacturing
activity to agricultural production.

With the creation of the Insti-

tuto Argentino para la Promoci^n del Intercambio (I.A.P.I.), Peron
channeled the surplus generated by the rural sector into industrial
production.

Because it had moved to monopolize the export structures

for rural commodities, the Peronist state reaped the benefits of the
favorable conjuncture for the Argentine economy, in contrast to the
past when the oligarchy would have further enhanced its position.

How

ever, though it resorted to indirect political control, the Peronist
state stopped short of a direct assault on the oligarchy’s material
base, thus leaving the foundation of its major internal opposition
intact.

The failure to expropriate large landed property flowed from

Peronism's populist-nationalist doctrine.

While some of the oli

garchy's wealth was redistributed, its class position and the social
relations on which its power rested were not attacked.
In accordance with populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronist
policies promoted economic development within the framework of the
private ownership of the means of production.

The state reserved the
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right to interfere in those properties that "served a social function,"
but this potentially far-reaching formula was never applied system
atically, serving more as an admonition to political enemies than any
thing else.

Capital was supposed to "humanize itself," to see its own

self-interest, with some prodding from a popular government; but only
Evita Peron seemed determined to force it in that direction.

Economic

privileges were decried rhetorically, but the class struggle was not
advocated as a means to rectify injustices.

In fact, it is here that

Peronism drew its clearest line of demarcation from Marxism: it advocated "social justice," not class struggle.

One of Peron*s frequently

cited statements from his May Day speech in 1944, makes this point:
"We seek to suppress the struggles between classes, and to supplant
them by a just agreement between workers and employers— that is to
say, the people— under the sheltering justice that emanates from the
state."

The mobilization of labor as a pressure group was actively

pursued, but leadership of the developmental process by the working
class was out of the question.
In accordance with the study's theoretical model, the analysis
of Peronism as a transitional period
of foreign and national interests

focused on shifts in the combination

promoted in the Peronist developmental

pattern as decisive in shaping the outcome of the process.

One of the

shifts taking place during the Peronist period was highly visible while
another was obscured by the degree of independence, both from national
and foreign economic groups, enjoyed by the Peronist state as a result of
the favorable wartime conditions.

Peronism*'s nationalist and anti

imperialist policies clearly dismantled the structures of British
influence; less clear was the movement resulting in their replacement
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by North American interests.
Peronist industrializing policies initially promoted the
interests of national capitalists who were principally manufacturers
of consumer goods.

The foreign groups benefiting from the substitu

tion of imported manufactured consumer goods with local production were
primarily U.S. companies, particularly in the area of capital goods
and technology, at the expense of British economic interests.*

The

net result of the Peronist program was the replacement of an oligarchic-British based pattern of externally oriented growth resting on
rural production by an internally oriented growth pattern resting on
manufacturing and dependent on imported capital goods, primarily from
U.S. sources.

Due to an insufficiently developed capital goods sector

and the lack of a concerted program for its development, Peronist
industrialization fostered an indirect form of dependency.
To accumulate revenues needed to cover the vastly increased
demand for machinery and parts, Argentina depended on the export of
rural commodities.

This dependence made for continuity in the

Peronist developmental pattern with the prior pattern.

However,

benefits derived from Argentina's external links were now used to

*The largest deficit in U.S.-Argentine trade for the period
between 1946 and 1952 coincided with the year in which the output of
the industrial sector was the highest. Argentina's imports from the
United States in 1948 amounted to 2,286 million pesos, while her
exports to the United States for the year amounted to 537 million
pesos. Roughly half of the total imports for 1948 were in the
category of machinery and vehicles. Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos,
El intercambio con los Estados Unidos (Buenos Aires, 1951) and Sintesis estadfstica mensual de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires,
July 1953).
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promote the interests of groups whose economic activity was essentially
contradictory to externally oriented growth.

For this reason the

Peronist pattern is conceptualized as indirect dependency: the
interests promoted by the state, although dependent on surplus derived
from economic activities oriented to external markets, were nonetheless
tied to productive activity oriented to the internal market.
The analysis shows indirect dependency to have been a
transitional form which resulted in the more direct form conceptualized
as dependent industrialization.

The deterioration of the favorable

conjuncture for the Argentine economy in the initial Peronist years
produced a crisis in the regime's import substituting policies.

The

second half of the Peronist period, from 1950 on, was characterized by
a gradual penetration of the capital intensive branches of the indus
trial sector by North American and Western European multinationals.
During its period of upsurge, as long as the favorable con
fluence of factors for the Argentine economy held until about 1950,
the regime’s policies seemed forceful and clear.

However, once the

favorable context deteriorated, the contradictions within Peronism’s
class harmonizing formulas, which remained submerged in the prior
period, now presented increasing difficulties for the regime.

As the

postwar recovery of Europe and the increasing vigor of the U.S.
economy, now entering its phase of global preeminence, began to be
felt, the Peronist government was increasingly forced to opt for one
or another of the various socio-economic groups encompassed in its
populist-nationalist coalition.

Attempting to postpone a final

reckoning, which would have involved a heavy political price, the
regime vacillated and seemed hesitant.
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Nevertheless, though incrementally and with much Wavering
the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) instituted in 1952 but never allowed
to run its full course, did reveal the programmatic direction of the
regime's intended socio-economic readjustments to the crisis.

Essen

tially, the proposed program for economic recovery was formulated
within a

capitalist framework and, as such, it consolidated the trend

toward a

dependent industrial economy wherein the weight

of foreign

interests assumed a central position within the manufacturing sector.
After 1950, Peronist policies increasingly favored private interests
controlling large industrial companies, and the gains made by the
workers and popular sectors in the earlier period began to erode.
Using the methodology outlined above,^ the significant shifts
within Peronist policies of the 1945-55 decade that show how important
this period was in determining the subsequent developmental pattern,
were ascertained by compaing the regime's two Five Year Plans.
of the FFYP showed it to be a
forge an

Analysis

programmatic expression of

the attemptto

alliance between the industrial proletariat and

bourgeoisieat

the expense of the agro-exporting sector.

With the favorable conjuncture

gone, this attempt no longer proved tenable and the Second Five Year Plan
(SFYP) expressed the regime's intended readjustments.

The SFYP began to

formulate a new relationship toward the landowning oligarchy and the bour
geois sectors involved in the production of durable and capital goods at
the expense of the workers.
The policies of the fifties showed four determinative shifts
which revealed the direction of the outcome of the transitional process
under scrutiny:

^See pp. 17-25 above, especially p. 22.
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1.

The cost of development shifted from the surplus generated by the
rural sector to that created by urban labor

2.

In addressing the dual contradictory development of industry, the
nascent heavy and capital goods branches were favored over the
light non-durable goods producing sector

3.

Agricultural output was now promoted by providing material incen
tives to the oligarchy

4.

There was movement away from the pursuit of economic independence
and toward a greater role for foreign capital
In the industrial area the SFYP shifted priorities in economic

policies away from promoting and catering to consumer aspirations to
those emphasizing capital accumulation.

The attempt was to develop

productive forces within capitalist relations of production.

Since

the profit motive was recognized as the economic propellant, the gains
of private owners were not held back while those made by the workers in
the previous period of prosperity were reversed.

By cutting back the

acquisitive power of the workers, the domestic market for non-durable
consumer goods contracted; and this spelled disaster for hundreds of
marginally operating national enterprises fostered by Peronism in its
ascendancy.
In its orientation toward foreign economic interests the SFYP
prepared the ground for the entry of capital that was to lead to a
dependent industrial economy a decade later.

While it announced its

continuity with the FFYP in its commitment to the liberation of the
economy from the domination of external interests, the SFYP also called
for an increased role for foreign capital, especially in the area of
technology.
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It Is the permanent objective of the nation to favor the
international exchange of technical knowledge and to stimulate
the entry of productive capital that desires to cooperate in
the economic development of the country.1
By the mid-sixties, industrial activity was almost completely
cominated by multinational corporations.

This process had begun

with the penetration and virtual take-over of the more technologically
advanced and capital intensive branches of these firms.

Moreover,

it was the bourgeoise in this sector which provided the backbone
for the "internationalized national bourgeoisie," the social
foundation of the dependent industrial economy.
This analysis of the Peronist decade shows that populistnationalism provided for the opening to foreign capital which sub
sequently reversed Peronism's efforts to free Argentina from dependence
on external economic interests.

The FFYP promoted the growth of

industries under control of national capitalists.

Economic policies

never deviated from their commitment to development within the frame
work of capitalist social relations.

The FFYP also promoted increased

consumer demand by raising the acquisitive power of workers through
redistributive measures.

This increased demand was to be supplied

by the expanding production of national capitalists.

With an undeveloped

capital goods sector, the immediate result was a tremendous rise in the
volume of imported machinery and other inputs (mostly from the U.S.)
needed for the production of consumer goods.

The contradictions within

the indirect dependency fostered by the FFYP could be contained so long
as the favorable international context allowed the Peronist state's

^Camara de Senadores de la Nacion, Diario de Sesiones, die. 20,
1952, 41a Reunion (continuacion de la Primera Sesion Extraordinaria),
p. 833.
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I.A.P.I. to realize surpluses in the export of agro-pastoral commodities.
But when the propitious conditions no longer held, it was not possible
to both expand consumer demand as well as increase the volume of im
ported capital goods.

The regime could no longer benefit both wings of

the coalition it was attempting to forge.

Being fundamentally committed

to maintaining capitalist relations of production, the regime was com
pelled to opt for the bourgeois pole in its populist-nationalist formula.
Though it sought to postpone a final reckoning, the thrust of the SFYP's
policies amounted to restricting consumer demand and enlisting foreign
capital in developing the capital and durable goods branches.

The ulti

mate result was disastrous for national capitalists based in light con
sumer goods production; meanwhile multinational corporations came to
dominate the capital intensive branches producing commodities for the
upper income market and inputs for industrial production.
Peronist policies of the fifties showed an increasing affinity
towards the interests of big capital and a willingness to sacrifice the
interests of labor.

Gains made by the working class in the first half

of the Peronist decade began to erode.

The cyclical downward trend in

real wages and the upward trend in the cost of living can be traced to
the second half of the Peronist decade.
to note that though

Nevertheless, it is important

leaning in the direction of capitalist interests,

Peron did his best to postpone a fundamental reckoning on the nature of
his regime's social base.

Indeed, the regime's indecisiveness preci

pitated its overthrow by the anti-lahor components of the coalition
Peronism was attempting to forge and hold together.

The fact that the

material gains made by the working class component of the Peronist
coalition began to dissipate accounts for the growing disenchantment of
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the proletarian sector and its unwillingness to rally to the regime’s
defense at its critical hour of need.
throw Peron turned down an

Just ten days before his over

offer made by trade union

leaders

to

convert the national labor organization— the. Confederacion General
del Trabajo (CGT)— into a civilian militia.

Accepting this offer would

have led the government in the direction of basing its power on the
armed working class. Peron’s rejection and his increasing warmth to
the imperialist interests

2

he had branded as enemies of the movement

for economic independence and social justice were important factors in .
the workers' lack of enthusiasm in supporting "their" government.

There

is little doubt that a massive display of popular support as the coup
against him began to falter, would have maintained Peron in office.
At the same time, the ambiguity and indecisiveness in Peron's
stand towards labor and the fact that Peronism had to be overthrown
to remove the remaining populist-nationalist encumbrances from policy
making, enabled Peron to retain his mystique as labor's champion.
Policies attacking the workers' living standards and . reversing
their rising importance as a power factor within the institutions
of the Argentine body politic, were not pursued unambiguously
until after Peron's overthrow.

It is important however, to note that

*To have opted for a workers' militia would most likely have
precipitated the final coup ten days early. Perhaps Peron would have
been ousted from power at that point. However, the fact is that he was
overthrown anyway. Given the initial faltering when the final coup did
come, there is at least th^ possibility that decisive action at this
point might have saved Peron^ See pp. 324-8 , above for more detailed
discussion.

2

As evidenced by the. contract negotiated with
Standard Oil of California.in 1955. Previously, the state-owned Y.P.F.
had enjoyed a monopoly on the extraction of oil from Argentine soil.
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these.trends were already discernible in the last years of Peronist
rule.

In this study’s terms, it was a case of moving from quantitative

to qualitative change.
Similarly, though the SFYP announced a more favorable orienta
tion towards foreign capital, its massive penetration of the industrial
sector was not fu-lly consummated until the next period after the populist
and nationalist vestiges had been forcefully removed.

This too was a

case of intensifying a policy direction to the extent that it redefined
the relationships among and between local and foreign interests deter
mining the subsequent developmental course.

The close interconnection

between the movement away from centering policy on labor's interests
and towards one designed to attract foreign capital thus became clearer
in the decade after Peron’s overthrow.

Paradoxically therefore, though

the process commenced during the Peronist period, the fundamental link
in Peronist doctrine between economic independence and social justice
was fully confirmed by the experience of the workers in the following
stage when the process of denationalization of the manufacturing sector
assumed full force and the pattern of relationships providing the base
for dependent industrialization was consolidated.

The events following

Peron s overthrow provided fertile ground for the nourishing of the
Peronist mystique.

Alternating bourgeois-military regimes were deter

mined to keep the working class movement in line and systematically re
pressed any expression of its interests, whether political or economic.
Strikes, which at times were frequent and intense, were put down by the
army.

Peronist candidates were not allowed to run for office, or when

allowed to do so and elected, had the results of their election nulli
fied.

People remembered' the "good old days" when their man was in the

44
Casa Rosada looking out for their interests, when one could easily find
employment and make a decent wage.'
The violent suppression of the interests of the working class
also undermined one of the essential conditions for dependent indus
trialization, namely a certain degree of industrial peace and political
stability, thereby leading to a fundamental contradiction within this
stage.

The militant tradition of the working class and the fact its

former bourgeois allies joined in the ruling post-Peronist coalition,
led the Justicialist (as the Peronist movement came to be known) move
ment in an increasingly revolutionary direction.

Stripped of its

bourgeois and military components, the Peronist movement turned into a
workers movement.

Left to their own resources, being the only signi

ficant opposition to the process of denationalization, and having to
face the bourgeoisie economically and politically, the workers turned
away from those aspects of populist-nationalism stressing the coopera
tion of all classes against the foreign-oligarchic enemy and towards an
increasingly Marxist direction.

Revolutionary Marxism began to make

significant inroads into the Peronist movement.

The concerted attack

on the movement and the repression it was subjected to only strengthened
it further as the only alternative to Argentina's profound crisis.
This is one of the key paradoxes this study seeks to elucidate:
how the Peronist regime which in the fifties promoted a program in con
tradiction to its overwhelmingly working class social base, in the
sixties turned into a vehicle for mobilizing the working class' opposi
tion during the next developmental stage.

Thus, even though the Peronist

state acted as a kind of surrogate or substitute for a weak and non- selfconscious national bourgeoisie, it did so in contradictory ways as a
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result of conflicting tendencies.inherent in the regime's populistnationalist doctrine.
Analysis undertaken in this study finds that Peronism’s
contradictory tendencies deriving from the class harmonizing thrust
in its populist-nationalist doctrine^ constituted the regime' s major
flaw.

In assessing the shortcomings in the Peronist developmental

model, these were not found to lie in the steps the regime took to con
front the external pole in Argentina's dependency.

Given the limited

control it had over this area, the Peronist government moved about as
effectively as it could.

Indeed, the creation of I.A.P.I., liquidating

the foreign debt and minimizing financial dependency, eliminating foreign
control over the internal transportation network with the nationalization
of the railroads and port facilities, the building of a strong Argentine
merchant marine, all represented major achievements in the quest for
economic independence.

Argentina had never had greater control over

its export structures.

Peronism's basic weakness lay in its neglecting

to alter the internal relations over which it could- have wielded greater
control.
This failure to decisively address the internal pole of Argen
tine dependency constituted the central contradiction in the Peronist
developmental pattern.

What began as a reformist attempt to set Argen

tina on the road to economic liberation, social justice, and political
sovereignty, ended up with an Argentina even more closely integrated
with the external economic interests it was supposed to free itself
from.

Though Peronism never lacked for revolutionary rhetoric, this

analysis shows that its program, especially the readjustments signalled
in the SFYP, proved inadequate in bringing about the internal trans
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formations which would have given the regime a better chance to with
stand the outside pressures the Argentine economy was subjected to.
The final segment of the study applies the insights derived
from the analysis of the Peronist period of the forties and fifties.
According to the theoretical model from which I derived the analysis,
unravelling the contradictions within Peronist development should pro
vide an understanding of the particularities of the post-Peronist de
velopmental pattern.

Indeed, looking at the Peronist period as a transi

tional stage and analyzing the significant shifts among and between
national and foreign groups encouraged by Peronist developmental
policies reveals a process wherein the takeover of the industrial sec
tor by foreign capital in the sixties is a logical outgrowth of the
changes instituted in the earlier period.

This study thus presents a

picture which contrasts sharply with the commonly held view that consi
ders the 1955 coup ousting General Peron as a watershed event in Argen
tine economic and political history.
The Peronist period contained within it both the material and
social foundations for the next developmental pattern, the dependent
industrial economy.

A dependent industrial economy is defined as one

in which 1) manufacturing is the predominant form of economic
activity and 2) the industrial sector gravitates around the presence of
monopolistic multinational firms.

Implicitly, the function of a depend

ent industrial economy requires several conditions.

Among the most

important are:
1.

Development of the industrial sector

2.

Consolidation of a viable domestic market for consumer goods

3.

Development within the framework of the private ownership of the
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means of production and the social relations underlying it ^
4.

The general prevalence of industrial peace and a certain degree of

political stability
The Peronist policies of the 1943^-55 period succeeded admirably in
achieving these results.
More specifically, comparing the interests promoted in the
FFYP with those supported in the SFYP, the analysis found four deter
minative shifts in deciding the outcome of the transitional process
toward dependent industrialization.

2

The study proceeds to show how

these trends were consolidated in the decade following Peron*s over
throw.

The extent to which the directions already implicit in Peronism* s

policies of the fifties and the intensity with which these aims were
pursued in the late fifties and sixties, represents another instance of
quantitative change leading to qualitative change.

The end result was

a developmental pattern qualitatively different from that which pre
vailed in the Peronist years.

The Argentine economy now gravitated

around the activities of multinational corporations occupying the pivotal
positions within the industrial sector.
Four factors were found to be critical during the transitional
process in laying the foundations for the denationalization of the
industrial sector.

First, the capital goods sector assumed a central

role in the industrial economy.

Second, the extensive concentration of

capital required to operate heavy industries made it difficult for

^There may be, indeed more often than not there is, as the
Argentine Case illustrates, a significant state sector; but it is
subordinated to the requirements of the private sector.

2

See p. 39 above.
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national groups to control the basic sector.

Third, and most important,

was the advanced technology required for producing sophisticated mach
inery and equipment.
Increasingly, since 1950 Argentine industry has become tech
nologically dependent on U.S. corporations.

It was through the more

modern industrial sector that U.S.-based multinational interests began
their extensive penetration of the Argentine economy, and it was the
bourgeoisie in this sector who provided the backbone for the "inter
nationalized national bourgeoisie."

In this respect the Argentine

case foreshadowed the experience of other Third World nations.

Tech

nological inadequacy has presented a formidable barrier less developed
nations have had to confront in their efforts to break out of dependent
relationships.

As in the Argentine case, it has led to a restructuring

of dependency rather than a radical change toward a developmental pat
tern based on the interests of the poorest sectors of the population.
These three factors should be conceived as necessary but not
sufficient in leading to the denationalization of the industrial sector.
This analysis found

a

fourth factor, the social relations promoted

by Peronist policies, to have played the key role in undermining the
Peronist program for the liberation of the economy from foreign interests.
The cases of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and others have
shown the tremendous difficulties encountered in promoting a progressive
growth model from an undeveloped or underdeveloped technological base.
In this effort, in order to achieve the maximum degree of maneuverability
and the greatest possible resistance to external influences, it was
necessary to radically alter the social relations in the process of pro
duction.

In the case of Peronist Argentina, by stressing the coopera
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tion of social sectors with diverging interests in the distribution
of surplus value, the regime left the economic base of its enemies
intact and it severely circumscribed its options by hesitating to
mobilize its popular and working class base for the decisive confronta
tions which an alternative developmental strategy would have required.
The analysis of the process whereby the multinationals in
alliance with domestic monopoly capitalists in the industrial area
established themselves as the dominant presence within Argentina's economy
shows that it was not without its own contradictions.

The process was

accompanied by a massive reallocation of income away from the lower
income groups undertaken by the state.

The workers reacted by clinging

to Peronist doctrine as their link with the past when the government pro
moted their interests in its policies.

The severe repression directed

against Peronism backfired; it served to cement the workers' adherence
to Justicialismo and to increase their combativeness.
On the other hand, the state's policies, particularly during the
Ongania regime in the mid-sixties, succeeded in eventually driving sec
tors of the bourgeoisie back into the Peronist fold, thereby setting the
stage for the brief return of populist-nationalism to state power in the
seventies.

Initially, in the 1955 coup the military had acted as an

instrument of a bourgeois-oligarchic alliance against the working class
side of Peronism's populist-nationalism.

Though united in opposition

to the industrial proletariat, the agrarian and industrial, and the
national and internationalized sectors of the bourgeoisie also had
diverging interests.

Once the.working class' interests were removed

from official policy, their alliance fell apart on these internal con
tradictions in the course of the sixties.

Particularly significant were
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the policies favoring foreign capital which also hurt national entre
preneurs, finally driving them back into coalition with the workers
in demanding the return of Peronism.
The contradictions in the process of dependent industrial
development had left Argentina in a state of turmoil by the late
sixties.

Discontent was rampant and strikes, factory occupations, and

urban riots were everyday occurences.

The intensity of the economic

and political struggles undermined the continuation of dependent indus
trialization.

The industrial peace and political stability needed for

this developmental pattern to function were being systematically eroded.
Even the military was unable to achieve "normalcy.”

The social unrest

the nation was experiencing seemed to everyone to be leading Argentina
in a revolutionary direction.

The need of the ruling groups to displace

or reformulate the contradictions they could no longer contain was so
great that they were willing to take a chance on Peron.

"Peron is the

only one who can quiet things down," was the statement heard frequently
in business circles before 1973.

In the end, after eighteen years of

exile, Peron was called back as the only figure possessing sufficient
legitimacy to reestablish order out of chaos.
The hopes that Peronism would bring labor acquiescence and
political tranquility were short lived.

The Peronist movement mirrored

the contradictions in Argentine society and they were much too great
even for Peron*s consummate skills at incorporating conflicting sectors
under the mantle of his mystique.

The left of the movement had pro

gressed increasingly in a Marxist direction and called upon Peron to
lead the transition towards the

patria socialists.

The right, repre

senting the movement’s petty bourgeois sectors and comprising careerists
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and political opportunists, seized upon the more class conciliationist
elements in Justicialist doctrine--the "Third Position," the "Social
Pact," and so on.

The right, under the slogan of

patria peronista.

claimed it could achieve the transcendence of class differences, and
of course class struggle, by providing all Argentines the opportunity
to become "social entrepreneurs."
The second Peronist period, which lasted less than three years,
was doomed from the very beginning.

The events transpiring during the

first hours Peron was back in Argentine territory indicated the extent
to which the contradictions within Peronism had developed beyond the
ability of its aging leader to control them.

A jubilant crowd of

400,000 Peronists of all stripes had gathered at Ezeiza airport in June
of 1973 to celebrate the return of the
mass gathering in Argentine history.
mark Peron*s triumphant return

conductor.

It was the largest

The occasion which was supposed to

instead provided the background for a

bloody armed confrontation between Justicialism’s left and right wings.
The encounter produced more casualties than all those killed by the
repression between 1955 and 1973.

Peron who was to arrive at the

gigantic rally to a hero's welcome, instead had to have his landing
diverted to a military airport.
Analyzing the second Peronist period with the same approach
applied to analyzing the first period confirmed the validity of the
study's methodology.

The second period is analyzed as a modified ver

sion of the populist-nationalist formula promulgated in the forties and
fifties.

The attempt was to.recreate a coalition of class interests

around the regime similar to that which Peron had built! some thirty
years before.

But while the configuration of external and internal
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factors allowed Peron to balance-off contradictory interests for a
decade the first time around, the different context of the seventies
made the second attempt a more short-lived one, lasting from 1973 to 1976.
The analysis found two key factors which made the context which
populist-nationalism had to address in the seventies very different from
that which it confronted in the forties and fifties.

On the one hand,

the fact that the multinational corporate sector had become the dominant
presence within the Argentine economy meant that the impact of external
economic interests had been internalized much more directly and hence
was more immediate and decisive.

On the other hand, with a twenty-year

experience of rank and file militancy and a developing political con
sciousness that recognized the primacy of the contradiction between capi
tal and labor, the working class was a much more independent force and
no longer as easily subject to centralized control and direction by the
union bureaucracy.

Peron was dealing with a qualitatively different

working class from that of the forties when he tried to recreate in the
seventies the fundamental alliance on which populist-nationalism rests
or falls.

Just as in the first period, it was the basic aversion to

fundamental changes in the class structure that was responsible for
the regime's demise.
At first the Justicialist government sought to promote the
interests of the national bourgeoisie with its Three Year Plan (TYP).
But whereas the national bourgeoisie could be considered an embryonic
sector in the forties, by the seventies it was practically subordinated
to the multinational sector and rendered virtually impotent.

Thus while

the interests of national entrepreneurs gained the upper hand in the
policies of the regime for about the first half of the Peronist decade,
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their ascendancy in the seventies was compressed into one year.

The

same dynamic observed during the first period was repeated the second
time around.

As the contradictions in its populist-nationalist formula

intensified, the regime rapidly shifted its policies towards the
capitalist pole of its worker-national bourgeoisie "Social Pact."

The

greater weakness of the latter and the stronger and more central posi
tion of foreign capital within the industrial economy meant a correspond
ingly faster acceleration in the abanddnment of the measures protective
of national capital and hence a more rapid policy reorientation towards
the interests of the monopoly-multinational sector.
The comparative analysis concluded that the fundamental differ
ences between the two periods involved the role of the working class
both before the regime came to power and once it was in power.

In the

first period, Peron built and cultivated his ties to labor by using the
resources at his disposal as Minister of Labor and Social Welfare.

The

workers played the key role in keeping Peron in power, as the events of
October 17, 1945 dramatically illustrated; but they were not a factor
in his original ascent to power.

In the second period, the workers'

struggle was the main force behind Peron's return to power; and their
militance also provided the chief source for the undoing of the
Peronist regime.
As the regime moved to promote the interests of the monopoly
multinational sector,

working

class

living standards declined.

The workers responded with increased strikes and job actions.

Though it

had depended on the workers' militance to get back into power, maintain
ing its ties to the bourgeois sectors now meant that the Peronist gov
ernment had to suppress, the left and the more revolutionary-inclined in
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its own movement.

In

the three.years it held power, the Peronist regime

was responsible for killing more than twice as many leftist militants
that were killed in the eighteen'years of Peron’s exile.

However,

.•

rather than diminishing, the influence of the Marxist and Peronist left
among rank and file workers reached new heights.

Instead of minimizing

class struggle though conciliation and harmony, as it had done during
the first period, the regime instituted a vicious campaign of repression
which, though it failed to stop the left, succeeded in isolating the
regime from its strongest base of support.
Unable to stem the wave of strikes and job actions, or to
erode the growing Marxist orientation among workers, the Peronist
regime became superfluous and the military intervened to block the left
from making further inroads into the working class.

It was therefore

Peronism's inability to control the actions of its working class sectors—
which had taken the initiative in pushing Peronism1s ambiguities in a
socialist direction— that led to the decisive removal of populistnationalism from the Argentine scene.

While they had been passive par

ticipants in the regime's vacillating responses to the economic crisis
of the fifties, it was the attempt of Peronism's proletarian militants
to push the regime in a revolutionary direction that prompted the
military to seize direct control on March 24, 1976.
The study concludes with a brief evaluation of the policies
pursued by the military junta after 1976.

Using the same conceptual

and analytic categories applied throughout, this evaluation establishes
the context within which Argentina's current democratic experiment is
being conducted.

Without pretending to offer predictions, the analysis

aims to identify the key factors and significant issues in the present
situation.
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Immediately after the take-over, the junta announced a program
which represented a clear rejection of the policy orientation intro
duced by Peronism which had predominated since 1943.

Representing

the traditional agro-based oligarchy, Economic Minister Martinez de Hoz
sought to return Argentina to the role it played in the international
system prior to the crisis of the thirties.

In what amounted to the

reintroduction of a modified externally oriented growth pattern, the
principal axis of the nation's economic life was to be agricultural
production for export and the chief beneficiaries were to be large land
owners and, secondarily, foreign and domestic monopoly interests
in the industrial sector.

Indeed, for the first time since the forties,

agriculture again represented the largest proportion of the Gross Domes
tic Product.
Naturally, such a major economic reorganization could not be
carried out without drastic socio-political consequences.

The junta's

policies had a devastating impact on the popular sectors.

In a half a

decade the cost of living went from one end of the spectrum to the
other, from being one of the cheapest in Latin America in the Peronist
years, to being one of the most expensive.

The social costs of its

economic policies made the military dictatorship's campaign of annihila
tion against the left and its efforts to subjugate labor all the more
necessary and ferocious.
Intending to bury all vestiges and encumbrances from previous
developmental models in order to make a clean break and unambiguously
institute the economic project .of the landed oligarchy, the pursuit of
whose interests was deemed to hold the key to viable economic growth,
the military underwent the same experience it had gone through almost
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exactly a decade earlier.

Then it was the project of the multinational

sector under the Ongania regime, but the contradictions set in motion
had essentially the same result: the socio-political costs were so high
that the regime soon found itself completely isolated without any base
of support other than the harrow social layers whose interests were
being doggedly enforced by the sword.
It was this extreme isolation, and the desperation it led to,
that drove the Military into the ill-fated Malvinas episode.

Sovereignty

over the Malvinas is an issue close to every Argentine's heart since
childhood.

The generals reckoned that if they could succeed at what

they thought they were best at, they could win the support for the
regime that they were unable to gain any other way.

When their crass

attempt to manipulate patriotic symbols ended in ignominious defeat, not
only had they lost their last desperate gamble, but they also squandered
what little they had achieved economically by mortgaging the nation's
resources to pay for the weapons of modern warfare.
Though the Malvinas were the final straw, it was the junta's
economic policies which produced the social equation that eventually
forced it to relinquish control to a civilian government.

The dynamic

paralleled that of the previous decade which had led to Peron's return
to power.

Though the bourgeoisie as a whole acquiesced in the severe

repression of the working class, except for a narrow stratum, it soon
found that its interests were being hurt by the developmental pattern
set in motion with the junta's policies.

Thus, once again all the

significant social sectors stood on the outside available for mobiliza
tion against the regime.
what it had been in 1973.

The outcome however, was very different from
The weakness and internal divisions among
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the Peronists resulted in the election of the candidate of the progress
ive middle sectors.

Though by a relatively narrow margin, Raul Alfonsfn

of the Radical Party emerged victorious as Argentina’s new

president

in December of 1983.
Who then are the major actors and what are the significant
issues in the current drama?

There is the traditional oligarchy which,

though it has had its economic project discredited, still controls the
means of production for what remains practically Argentina's only
source for revenues on the world market.

There is the multinational

corporate sector which, though not as strong as in its heyday of the
sixties, continues to be the major presence in the industrial sector.
There are the foreign financial interests which have a gargantuan
claim on any future prosperity Argentina might be able to muster.
Though of negligible importance during the first Peronist period,
foreign banks and international financial institutions have become a
factor none of the other participants in Argentina's economic and poli
tical life can afford to ignore.

There is the bourgeoisie which, though

composed of diverse and often conflicting sectors, currently has more
influence that it has had since the late fifties with at least some
of its major interests being represented in the state.

There are the

Peronists who, though badly splintered, weakened, and lacking any
charasmatic figure that can bring them together, still hold the key to
the future viability of the Alfonsin government.
is made up of at least two wings.

The Peronist movement

One contains the sectors comprising

what can be termed "Official Peronism."

These include, the petty bour

geois elements, the professional politicians, and the trade union
bureaucrats.

The other wing is even more amorphous, but it is the heart
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and soul of Peronism: the workers, the youth, and the rank and file
militants.

Though it lacks organizational expression, this grouping

is not to be minimized as it continues to have the potential to make or
break any economic and political project.

Finally there is the military

which, though clearly on the defensive and in the background for the
moment, retains the capacity to impose its will through the force of
arms, and will continue to do so until it is disarmed.
There are basically two critical and one very important sub
sidiary issue to be confronted by the new regime.

The most basic issue

is what economic direction will the regime chart and whose interests
will receive primary consideration.

A subsidiary issue of obvious impor

tance is how will Argentina’s indebtedness be handled?

The other basic

issue is how Argentina's rulers propose to come to grips with the
legacy of the recent and not-so-recent past.

Who is to be held account

able, and in what way, for the thousands of victims of political repres
sion, is just the most dramatic manifestation of this issue.

It also

involves coming to grips with Peronism's contribution, past, present,
and future.

The relationships forged among and between the major

actors as they confront these basic issues will determine Argentina's
future course.
Many alignments among the major actors on these issues are
possible.

Though some may be more likely than others, it is impossible

to anticipate which will emerge.

At best, a detailed study of the type

undertaken in this analysis of Peronism could clarify and perhaps narrow
down possibilities.

Hopefully, this study contributed to laying the

necessary groundwork for such an endeavor.
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To begin to answer some of the questions involved, it is
necessary to work backwards.
in this chapter.

We inust fill in the outline presented

The analysis developed in the following chapters

aims to unravel the complexities and paradoxes of the Argentine case.
It offers

an interpretation

of Peronism

that sheds

light

on the dynamic elements operative in Argentina’s current drama.

The

best way to gauge the utility of the theoretical model applied here is
to show its results.

Let us see then, if this analysis of the contra

dictions within Peronist development succeeds in explaining the par
ticularities of post-Peronist development.

CHAPTER II

ARGENTINA PRIOR TO 1930: EXTERNALLY ORIENTED GROWTH
Introduction
Following the theoretical model outlined above, the analysis
begins with a brief examination of the externally oriented growth
model which characterized Argentine development from about 1880 to
1930.

The contradictions that evolved during this stage provided the

dynamic context within which the industrial development of the
Peronist period took shape.

In this chapter I lay the foundations for

the analysis undertaken subsequently by singling out the significant
and determinative interrelationships within and between the internal
and external groups most closely tied to the predominant types of
productive activity in the formative stage of Argentine development.
Remaining chapters will follow out the reformulation of these inter
relationships as the process of economic development unfolded in order
to show in what ways they shaped Argentine history.

The analysis will

concern itself primarily with how these interrelationships affected
industrial development and particularly with the problems arising from
the fact that industrialization took place in the context of an
economy based on agricultural production for export.

The result was

a socio-political structure containing conflicting class and sectional
interests.
In laying the groundwork for the analysis developed subsequently,
this chapter begins by tracing the material basis for the relationship
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between the landowning oligarchy and British commercial and financial
interests.

Referred to as the Anglo-oligarchic connection, this rela

tionship proved decisive in determining the nature of Argentine
economic and socio-political development during the first century of
the nation's existence.

This formative developmental pattern is

shown to be a classic example of externally oriented growth— that is,
development based on the export of rural commodities in exchange for
the importation of manufactured goods.
The analysis of the externally oriented growth pattern examines
the role of the state and the use of economic policy in consolidating
the relationship between

national

and foreign groups controlling

the predominant types of economic activity.

Control of the state enabled

these groups to formulate policies that further reinforced the ownership
of the key means of production (land) by local groups while also strength
ening the foreign, mostly British, domination of the economy's infra
structure— the structures involved on the one hand, in the processing,
transporting, and financing of exports and, on the other, those in the
importation, distribution, and sale of consumer goods.
The analysis shows the dependent features of the externally
oriented growth pattern.

There is first of all the direct correlation

between the level of demand in overseas markets and economic well-being:
the greater the demand, the healthier the economy and, conversely, a
drastic downturn in demand has serious repercussions.

Second, the

foreign control of the export-import sector's infrastructure meant that
development was guided and shaped by outside interests.

For example,

the British owned railroads were used to expand the market for English
produced goods which in many instances led to the dismantling of local
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industry.

Another important aspect of externally oriented growth was

the dependence arising from'the reliance on external sources for
technology.

This factor played a key part in determining the outcome

of the transitional process during the Peronist period.
The chapter shows the impact of externally oriented growth on
Argentina's evolving class structure.

At the apex, commanding all

important economic, social, and political institutions, stood the
oligarchy and those associated with foreign capital controlling the
export-import, transportation, and financial sectors.

Next come the

middle layers of the social structure, shown to constitute a dependent
bourgeoisie.

With the availability of large surpluses realized during

boom periods, the middle sectors were by and large incorporated as
secondary beneficiaries of the externally oriented growth pattern.
Finally, there are the groupings whose interests were largely excluded
in official policy: on the one hand, a tiny, nascent national bour
geoisie centered around owners of establishments producing consumer
goods for the domestic market, and on the other hand, the urban and
rural working class along with the popular sectors in general.
Applying the theoretical model outlined in Chapter 1, this
chapter looks at the factors responsible for shifting relationships
between national and foreign groups which were subsequently decisive in
determining future developmental patterns.

The analysis traces the

erosion of British hegemony and the growing influence of U.S. based
interests to changes within the international system of the World War I
era.

The ability of U.S. heavy industry to technologically outstrip

its English counterpart eventually altered the nature of the Argentine
manufacturing sector.

This chapter examines the manifestation of this
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process in a the shifting pattern exhibited by Argentina1s ^'foreign
trade.

Instead of a two-way flow in the exchange of rural exports for

industrial commodities, a three-way flow developed whereby Argentina
had to realize surpluses in her trade with the United Kingdom in
order to cover the deficits incurred with the growing volume of imports
from the United States.

This pattern became most pronounced during the

Peronist period of the late forties and early fifties and had crucial
consequences, as will be seen further on.

It is important here to

note the theoretical point that patterns which subsequently become
determinative, take shape within the prior stage.

In tracing the im

pact of changes on the international scene on the Argentine manufacturing
sector, this chapter shows: 1) that the growing share of the U.S. in
Argentina’s imports was accompanied by expanding U.S. investments in
industry, and 2) discusses the process whereby U.S. interests moved
from being suppliers of imported vehicles and machinery as well as dur
able consumer and capital goods to becoming major‘.producers within
Argentina itself.
Finally, this chapter's analysis establishes another point of
decisive importance in determining the outcome of Peronism as a
transitional stage.

The industrialization that took shape in the first

decades of the twentieth century was one wherein two diverse sectors
developed.

The more modern branches using more sophisticated and tech

nologically advanced machinery and requiring larger concentrations of
capital per worker employed were those in which foreign interests took
root.

On the other hand, national entrepreneurs owned the many estab

lishments producing with less machinery and capital per worker, indeed
often approximating the artisan variety, with an output tending to con
sist of non-durable consumer and other wage goods.
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Externally Oriented.Growth in Argentina
From the beginning of Argentina’s history as an independent
nation, British interests played a central role.

Earlier, Britain

had attempted to supplant Spanish rule directly.

The abortive capture

of Buenos Aires was repulsed by a hastily thrown together Creole
militia in 1806-07.

This successful experience, without the aid of

Spanish regulars, gave Portenos— as the inhabitants of the port city
of Buenos Aires came to be known— the morale and confidence they
needed to militarily defeat their Spanish rulers a few years later.
Having failed to take over directly, the British shifted to indirect
means to destroy Spain's hegemony in Latin America by aiding and
abetting separatist forces financially and by providing them with war
material.
The junta which took control represented the consolidation
of the interests of Buenos Aires merchants over those of the producers
from the interior.

While the activities of the largely artisan and

handicraft manufacturers of the interior were artifically shored up
and depended on an elaborate system of imperial regulations and on the
markets of Upper Peru, those

of the Porteno groups tied to overseas

trade had been ascendant and

barely held in check by the

cials.

Crown'soffi

They had circumvented prohibitions through smuggling to the

extent that it assumed major

proportions in the economic

Viceroyalty in the last decades of colonial

life ofthe

rule.

The conflict between the groups whose interests were tied to
producing for internal markets.and those linked to external trade, played
a key part in the upheavals .of the first half of the nineteenth
century.

The years between 1810 and 1880, often referred to by histor-
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ians as "the period of a n a r c h y c o n t a i n e d intense and frequently
bloody struggles in which catidillos:with bands of followers confronted
each other in loose and shifting alliances, grouping and regrouping
into confederations that vyed for national power.

Nevertheless, with

ups and downs, the externally oriented growth pattern was b'ing
gradually but steadily consolidated.
The material interests of the groups comprising the emerging
ruling class were oriented to the exterior.

On the one hand, there

were those whose position rested on ownership of vast tracts of land
which produced raw materials for export, first livestock and later
wheat, corn and flaxseed.

There were also those whose positions de

pended on the commercial structures of the export-import trade, who
consequently favored the increased exchange of products from the pampas
for commodities from the countries where the industrial revolution had
taken root.

Being intermediaries, merchant groups benefited from the

lucrative trade which developed as a result of the fact that produc
tion cost advantages enabled European capitalists to undersell Argen
tine producers, in spite of the aided costs of having to ship their goods
for thousands of miles.
After 1810 the externally oriented growth pattern gained
momentum with the expansion of trade based on the export of cattle for
salted meat and hides.

Foreign traders hastened this process through

their incursions into export trade in the 1810's which eased out
many of the native merchants.

"Old merchant families, therefore, shifted

their assets into land and cattle for the first time.

Sons of colonial

66

merchant families became the new estancieros of the 1820's and 1830's."
According to James Scobie, the yearly slaughter of cattle for salted
meat increased "from 7,000 head in the 1790's, to 60,000 in 1822, and
to 350,000 by 1827."

And, "in the decade following 1810 the revenues

from the export of a million-odd hides had tripled."

2

From this period on, the state became the pivot with which the
emerging ruling class of landowning oligarchy and porteno merchants
sought to consolidate their material position.

For example, the gov

ernment centered in Buenos Aires enacted regulations which confined the
importation of goods to that port and its environs. The government also
became an instrument

used to promote the monopolization of landownership.

Once they gained control of the state, the estancieros used it to award
each other more land, thereby securing the sources of their power even
more.

In the 1820's for example, title to some twenty-one million acres

^■Jonathan C. Brown, A Socio-Economic History of Argentina, 17761880. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 147.

2

James Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p. 78. This section relies on Scobie's work. It
provides a concise yet broad-ranging treatment that nevertheless does
justice to the complexities of Argentine history. The following can be
consulted on the rural sector and the role of agriculture in promoting
the dependence of Argentina's economy on production for external markets:
Miguel Carcano, Evolucion historica del regimen de la tierra publics,
1810-16 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1925).
H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the 19th Century (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960).
Horacio Gilbert!, Historia economica de la ganaderia argentina (Buenos
Aires: n.p., 1961).
Jacinto Oddone, La burguecia terrateniente argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Populares Argentinas, 1956).
Vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position of Argentina
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938).
Roberto Schopflocher, Historia.de la colonizacion agricola en Argentina
(Buenos Aires: n.p., 195577”
Peter H. Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and
Change (New York: Columbia University Press: 1969).
Juan Tenenbaum, Orientacion economica de la agricultura argentina (Buenos
Aires: n.p., 1946).
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of public lands was transferred.to about five hundred individuals.
The state thus gave away some 32,813 square miles, an area roughly
equivalent to the New England states excluding Maine and Rhode Island.
Juan Manuel de Rosas who as governor of Buenos Aires province became
Argentina's de facto ruler, "himself magnanimously turned down the
huge island of Choele-Choel in the

(remote) Rio Negro Valley, which was

offered to him by the Buenos Aires legislature after his Indian campaign,
and accepted instead four hundred thousand acres (about 625 square miles]
situated within sixty miles of Buenos Aires.
It was under Rosas' (according to many, tyrannical) rule that
the process of creating a landowning oligarchy and then converting it
into the ruling class was consolidated.

The loser

was the sector

among the Porteno mercantile elite which, like Bernardino Rivadavia, had
favored a project for creating the material base for a yeoman-type
democracy of small landholders through the distribution of parcels to
European immigrants.
The state was also used as a coercive instrument to ensure the
availability of the labor power needed by landowners.

As the value of

cattle increased, Argentina's legendary gaucho was transformed into a
peon through stiff vagrancy laws that subjected anyone without legitimate
employment on an estancia to imprisonment and a five year sentence at
a frontier detachment.

Interestingly, this process was carried on by

Juan Manuel de Rosas, himself owner of the vastest tracts of land in his
day.

He was feared and despised by the Porteno upper class and loved

and revered by the lower classes.

^Scobie, p. 79.

Rosas used populist.techniques to
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which Peron's efforts one hundred
been compared.

and twenty years later have often

Thus, the famous quote attributed to Rosas:

You well know the attitude of the have-nots against the wealthy
and powerful. I have always considered it very important to
acquire an influence over the poor in order to control and
direct them; and at great cost in effort, comfort, and money, I
have made myself into a gaucho like them, to speak as they
do, to protect them, to become their advocate, and to support
their interests.*
Shipping through the port of Buenos Aires in the nineteenth
century reflected the increased Argentine demand for European goods
as well as the growing volume of exports.

2

According to Scobie, the

total value of imports from Europe doubled from 1860 to 1880.
On the other side of the ledger, wool exports rose from an
average of 7,000 tons annually in the 1840's to over 100,000
tons per year by the 1880's, by the latter decade contributing
more than half of the value of Argentine exports. Cereals,
frozen mutton and beef, and on-the-hoof shipments of cattle
would soon swell this trade, but until 1880 the traditional
products of wool, hides, and salted meat constituted more than
90 percent of the value of exports.3
By 1880 the relationships between national and foreign groups
defining the externally oriented growth pattern had been firmly estab
lished.

Local capital was concentrated on land and national groups

thereby assured themselves ownership of the means of production for the
economy's key products.

By 1880 too, the role of foreign capital in

Argentine development had become clearly defined.

According to Jonathan

Brown, "the importation of foreign capital, a rare phenomenon prior to

As cited in Scobie, p. 78, who is also the source for the data
on land distribution and trade.

2

Ibid., p. 108. Scobie.states that 500 ships a year cleared
Buenos Aires for European ports in the mid 1850's, while that number
had increased to more than 4,000 by 1880.
3Ibid.

1860, became commonplace thereafter.

British, French, and American

financiers established themselves.in Argentine banks with connections
abroad."1

Along with financial control, strategic investments assured

foreign groups control over the nation’s economic infrastructure: its trans
portation and communication

network, the railroads-and port facilities,

the telephone and telegraph system, the electrical plants and gasworks.
By virtue of owning the railroad network, the port facilities,
and (along with U.S. capital) the meat packing plants, the British
controlled the base of the Argentine economy, the export sector.

The

fact that more than forty percent of all British investments before
World War I in Latin America went to Argentina, gives some idea of the
importance Argentina held for British investors.

2

The dominant presence of the British in the export structures
on which the Argentine economy rested does not convey the full extent
of the dependency built into the externally oriented developmental
pattern.

Though national groups owned the means of production, their

controlling position was undercut by their dependence on foreign sources
for m o d e m technology.

This is an important point because, from the

dependency theory point of view, the Argentine case represents the least
dependent situation, being at the opposite extreme from the "enclave
model" in which foreign groups own the means of production and control
the processing and distribution structures for the export commodities
on which the economy depends.

3

The fact that all modern technology was

1Jonathan Brown, pp. 227-8.
2Ibid.
3
Classic examples are copper in Chile, tin in Bolivia, oil in
Venezuela, and bananas in Honduras.
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in foreign hands played a key part in determining the course of
Argentine development.
Steam locomotives, rolling stock, and the iron rails over
which the trains traveled came from abroad. At the turn
of the century, Argentines'were importing all their farm
machinery, milling equipment, and steam engines. Natives
neither manufactured modern equipment nor had the operating
knowledge of the technical advances that stimulated their
economy. Foreign technicians ran most of the railways and
meat-packing plants.
Despite agreement on the strategic position of foreign,
primarily British, groups in its dynamic sector, there has been consid
erable debate on whether one should therefore consider the Argentine
economy dependent or not.

2

Jonathan Brown for example argues against

the applicability of dependency theory on the grounds that it was the
growth of the export sector which promoted the development of the
internal transportation network ("backward linkages") as well as the
processing plants, port facilities, and so on ("forward linkages").
For Brown the development of these structures as such is the determining
factor, not who controlled them or the fact that they were specifically
developed to meet the needs of external markets.

Similarly, the fact

that manufacturing grew out of activities complementary to the export
sector and that manufacturing therefore had its further development
constrained by the needs of the groups controlling the export structures,

^"Jonathan Brown, pp. 227-8.

2

Works applying dependency theory to Argentina are:
Jose Maria Rosa, Analisis historico de la dependencia argentina (Buenos
Aires: n.p., 1974).
Andres M. Caretero, Or^genes de la dependencia economica.argentina (Buenos
Aires: n.p., 1974).
Juan Eugenio Corradi in LatinrAmerica: The Struggle with Dependency and
Beyond (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), edited by Ronald Chilcote
and Joel Edelstein, pp. 305-408.
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does not present any fundamental problems for Brown.

While Brown’s

analysis is relevant to dispelling simplistic notions of dependency, his
failure to take into account the more sophisticated formulation of
dependency theory leads him to overlook the importance of the relation
ships his own work establishes.1

By applying the Cardoso and Faletto

version, this study contributes to the debate on the applicability of
dependency theory to the Argentine case by showing 1) that Peronism is
best understood as an outcome of the contradictions resulting from an
industrialization subordinated to the requisites of the export sector,
and 2) that problems of dependence on external sources for modern
technology played a key role in undermining the Peronist program for
liberating the Argentine economy from foreign domination.
In a study which contains valuable information on how the
United States deliberately set about to displace the United Kingdom as
the hegemonic foreign power in Argentina, Carlos Andres Escude specifi
cally rejects the applicability of even the "more refined and sophisti
cated" Cardoso and Faletto version of dependency theory to the Argentine
case.

He states that "these authors do not seem to understand or wholly

Another analysis which argues against the applicability of
the dependency theory framework to the Argentine case is that of
Laura Randall in her An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). For example,
she states that "since the domestic sector of the economy in the 1920's
was about three times bigger than the export sector, and rose to about
ten times bigger than the export sector in the post-war period, it would
take considerable ingenuity to show that any other nation determined
Argentine economic history during the past half century." (p. 5)
Randall's quantitative focus is such as to exclude analyzing the nature
of the relationships between the.two sectors and of the groups controlling
the predominant activities in each.
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perceive the magnitude of Argentina's development during this period
1860-1950."'*'

Unfortunately, in his haste to jump on the anti-depend

ency theory bandwagon, it is Escude who has not understood the contents
of Cardoso and Faletto's writings.

Like previous critics he has lumped

their formulation together with other versions of dependency theory
that do not account for "development."
element in Argentina's dependency.

Escude ignores the structural

It is the structures connecting the

locally dominant groups to foreign interests which insure external con
ditioning of the rate and direction of accumulation.
For Cardoso and Faletto the question is not whether
"development" (in the sense of economic and social growth), distorted
or otherwise, took pl^ce.

Rather the question is what are the relation

ships forged among and between the foreign and national groups
that in fact determined the type of development that did take place.
Escude faults dependency theory for not taking into account
such variables as "international politics, geography, market size,
international terms of trade, domestic policies," which, he says, "can
be responsible, in different situations, for a shift in the type of
peripheral insertion a given country is subject to."

2

Contrary to

Escude's assertion, Cardoso and Faletto are indeed careful to include
these variables in their analysis of shifts from one modality or
pattern of dependency to another.

As this study shows, far from an

*Carlos Andres Escude, "The Argentine Eclipse: The International Factor in Argentina’s Post World War II Decline, " Ph.D. dissertation
(Yale University, 1981), p. 29.
2Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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inability to explain or account for what Carlos Andres Escude refers
to as "the miracle of Argentine underdevelopment,"* only an application
of the Cardoso and Faletto model brings out the underlying process in
Argentina's failure to achieve self-sufficient growth, despite the
auspicious beginnings of the forties.
To answer the question of whether Argentina should be considered
an example of dependent development one .must analyze the actual role
played by foreign capital in Argentina's economic development.

When

foreign capital entered the Argentine economy it was not as much in a
competitive capacity as it was a means of monopolizing the particular
branch or sphere of economic activity in which it was invested.

More

over, this was usually accomplished with relatively minor investments
which were used strategically, with the help of the local government,
to incorporate national capital under the control of foreign concerns.
This procedure is exemplified by the way the British took over exist
ing railroad trackage built with Argentine capital and later obtained
rather generous governmental subsidies and regulations for expansion
which assured them a monopoly over the commercially profitable lines.

2

*This involves the dramatic decline from Colin Clark's 1942
projection wherein Argentina held the fourth highest per capita income
in the world.

2

This is the subject of Raul Scalabrini Ortiz's study, Historia
de los ferrocarriles argentinos. Scalabrini Ortiz was one of the
populist-nationalist ideologues whose polemics in the 1930's,had a wide
spread impact in preparing the intellectual climate for Peron's policies
a decade later. In his book he stresses how the British used the rail
roads as. an instrument of their economic policy.
It the English need flax, they will lower the rate for it and it
will be sown. Economically (Argentine producers) will not be
independent citizens; they will be colonial subjects of His
Britannic Majesty. . . . The English will impede our spontaneous
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The railroads played a key part in focusing the Argentine
economy on the production of agricultural raw materials for export and
in undermining national producers of manufactured goods by making
cheaper goods from Europe and the United States widely available.
"This competition forced local economies either to produce raw materials
or to face gradual stagnation, with the accompanying drift of population
toward the coast."1

Buenos Aires became the terminus for all major

railroad lines and thus secured its position as the center through which
all of the nation's economic intercourse moved.

By contrast with the

European and United States railroad networks,
the Argentine system developed without feeder lines or connecting
links. Frequently the only way to move cross-country was— and
sometimes still is— to take the train into the nearest port and
then come out again on another of they system's spokes. Yet,
since this method of transportation met the basic needs of an
export economy, few roads, buses, or trucks penetrated beyond
the urban radius until after 1930.^
The patterns of Argentine social and political life followed
these lines of economic movement.
undisputed center.

Politically Buenos Aires became the

After 1880 conflicts between social classes and

economic groups took the form of struggles to control the national
administration.

Even wealthy landowners "established their center of

operations, and often their homes, in Buenos Aires and soon lost touch

3
with their provincial origins."

development, foreclose industrial possibilities, and maintain
us in the state of agricultural and stock producers.
(4th edi
tion published in Buenos Aires in 1964, pp. 61-2)
As quoted by Mark Falcoff, "Raul Scalabrini Ortiz: The Making of an
Argentine Nationalist" in the Hispanic American Historical Review 52
(Feb. 1972): 92.

1

Scobie, pp. 137-8.
’

2

Tv.,
,
ibid., p. 137.

3T, ...
Ibid., pp. 146-7.
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Besides becoming the social and political center, and the indis
pensable link of the export-import trade upon which Argentina depended,
Buenos Aires also attracted most of the country's
ity.

manufacturing activ

The railroads continued to enlarge the internal market for all

sorts of imported goods, from shoes to machines; but, simultaneously,
a steadily growing portion of everyday needs were being supplied through
the output of factories in Buenos Aires and Rosario, again to the
detriment of local industries in the interior.
The rise of processing industries on the coast was reflected even
in .the special cases of flour, sugar, and wines. Tariff rates
helped the flour mills capture the internal market during the
1970's, and in the next decade sugar and wines gained similar
protection. By 1910, however, another trend was becoming notice
able. Not only had modern flour mills, located in the coastal
cities and controlled by European capital, put most of the small
mills of the interior out of business, but mills in the city of
Buenos Aires -were conquering the markets of Santa Fe, Cordoba,
and Entre Rios— all major wheat-producing provinces. In the
sugar industry, although cane mills producing raw sugar remained
clustered around the cane fields, the only major refinery was
located at Rosario. Even the final processing of wines from
Mendoza and San Juan was centered at Buenos Aires.*
It is important to keep in mind that industry in Argentina
developed as an appendage to the agricultural sector.

Raising cattle

and growing wheat for export provided the axis around which the nation's
economic life revolved between 1880 and 1930.

The meat-packing plants,

controlled by British and North American interests, and improved refrig
eration techniques..made possible the export of chilled beef— a product
far superior to frozen beef in approximating the taste of fresh beef.
With these improvements, cattle replaced sheep as the major livestock
raised on the pampas.

^Scobie, p. 146.
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Cereals, which had represented a negligible share of agricul
tural exports before 1880, rose to total 50 percent of export values
by 1900.

"Between 1882 and 1895 cultivated acreage on the pampas

increased fifteen times— to almost ten million acres."

The exploitation

of the pampas' resources was expanded and intensified such that "by
1910 the value of exports reached 390 million gold pesos, thirteen
times the export trade of 1870."^

The indelible stamp left by rural

production on Argentina's export trade can be seen in Table 1.
Apart from the overall picture— the insignificance of manufac
turing for external markets— two particularly striking contrasts emerge
from these figures.

The repercussions of the first— the dramatic decline

in the value of exports following the international economic collapse
of 1929— will be analyzed in the next chapter.

The second— the highest

percentage of non-rural exports taking place in the 1940-44 period— is
critical to the major hypotheses explored in this study and will be
covered in Chapter 4.
The extent to which the Argentine economy was centered on rural
production becomes clear from contrasting the percentage contributed to
the gross national product by agricultural activities, 37 percent by the
beginning of the twentieth century, to the 14 percent contributed by
manufacturing industries.

2

Moreover, as will be seen, the fact that

the industrial sector developed as an appendage to the rural sector
posed particular problems for the Argentine economy in confronting the
crisis of the depression in the 1930's and the war years of the 1940's.
"Industrial capital gravitated.toward the processing of raw materials;

Scobie, pp. 119-20.

2Ibid., p. 177.
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TABLE
Years

1.—

Argentine export trade by major products
Annual Average
Value
(In Millions of
Pesos)

1871-4

95

1875-9

Livestock
Products

Agricultural
Products

Othei

95%

- -

5%

106

93

2%

5

1880-4

139

89

7

4

1885-9

209

81

16

3

1890-4

233

66

29

5

1895-9

299

64

31

5

1900-4

499

49

46

5

1905-9

761

39

58

3

1910-4

980

45

51

4

1915-9

1,608

55

39

6

1920-4

1,897

37

58

5

1925-9

2,126

37

59

4

1930-4

1,340

35

60

5

1935-9

1,702

37

57

6

1940-4

1,847

56

26

18

1945-9

4,207

43

50

7

1950-4

6,077

48

43

9

1955-8

18,941

52

40

8

1959

78,377

53

43

4

1960

89,212

48

47.

5

1961

79.640'

54

40

6

45

50

5

1962

136,181

SOURCES: Direccion nacional de estadistica (Buenos Aires), Boletin
mensual; and FIAT, Oficiha tecnica. From Scobie, p. 277.
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materials; half the capital and production value was concentrated in
the food industries alone.

By 1914 Argentine plants supplied 37 per

cent of the processed food consumed in Argentina, but only 12 percent
of the metals and machinery and 17 percent of the clothing were locally
produced."^

Thus the production of such badly needed items as tractors,

trains, electric generators and machinery in general was neglected;
energy resources too, remained undeveloped.

This meant that Argentina

depended on her exports from the pampas in order to import not only
capital goods and machinery and luxury goods, but also consumer goods
which could have been produced locally.

"A quintupling of imports in

the two decades preceding World War I emphasized the degree to which
European factories were called upon to supply the country's rapidly

2
rising consumption."
Externally oriented growth in the Argentine case meant depend
ency and not, as is often alleged, an interdependence resulting from
Argentina's specialization and her role in the international division
of labor.

A North American observer, long before the advent of

dependency theory, used its terms to describe the situation prevailing
in the thirties.
A relatively small group of agricultural products is exported
to pay for a diversified list of imports. . . . When grains and
meat are in demand, Argentina is prosperous; a cessation of
this demand, and the effect is felt throughout the entire
Argentine economy. The country's entire economic life has
hinged upon the export trade; all branches of the national
economy have been organized to promote that trade and its
corollary, the import trade. Add to this the importance of
foreign loans to Argentina, with their accompanying debt service,
and the dependence of the Argentine economy upon international
forces is clearly depicted.

1

Scobie, pp. 177-8.

2

Ibid., p. 177.
2
Vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position of
Argentina (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938), p. 11.
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More specifically, externally oriented growth in the Argentine case
meant dependence upon the major external market for Argentine commo
dities, Great Britain.

Writing about a later period, another scholar

observed that
when considering Anglo-Argentine trade, it must be remembered
that the two countries have not suffered a mutual degree of
dependence. While, during the earlier period, Britain might have
been Argentina's major trading partner, Argentina never assumed
the same function for Britain. Argentina was but one of many—
admittedly an important one— of Britain's trading partners. For
one or two commodities Britain might depend upon the Argentine
source of supply, but in general she was less committed to one
market or source of supply. Although this dependency has been
reduced, Argentina still finds Britain a more important mhrket
for her produce than does Britain Argentina.
Argentina's role in the world economy, becoming the major

2
supplier of cereals and beef,

enabled her to become Latin America's

economic and cultural leader.

However, as Scobie notes, because of

the disadvantageous position arising from the dependency built into
Argentina's externally oriented growth pattern, she followed a very
different path from that of the United States, a country Argentina
resembled in many other ways.
The structure of national prosperity and the elite class
itself conspired to subordinate everything to the exploitation
of the pampas. Railroads radiating from the ports drew the
products of the pampas to the coast for rapid transit to Europe,
but construction of roads and connecting railroad links was

Colin Lewis, "Anglo-Argentine Trade, 1945-65," in Argentina
in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1975) edited by David Rock, pp. 118-20.

2

Phelps, pp. 134-6 and 141, offers these figures: between 1911
and 1934 Argentina supplied more than half of the world's total beef
exports and about 95 percent of her total exports were agro-pastoral
goods. In 1925 Argentina occupied first place in the world's exports
of corn, oats and falxseed, and second or third in those of wheat and
flour.
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neglected. One metropolis effectively monopolized all nego
tiations and decisions and served as the only connection to
Europe. Mining or manufacturing activities not directly related
to the pampas’ agricultural primacy were abandoned. It was as
if, long before the Civil War, the South had emerged as the
dominant and only area of United States expansion, with its
capital at Savannah or Charleston, an economy based entirely
on cotton exported to British mills, and an oligarchy composed
of plantation owners and merchants.!
Externally Oriented Growth and Argentina’s Ruling Class
On the superstructural level, Argentina's externally oriented
growth pattern took a form best described as the Anglo-oligarchic
connection.

The command posts of the nation's important economic and

social institutions were controlled by the landowning oligarchy, those
at the pinnacles of export-import structures, and British (and to a
lesser extent, continental European) financial interests.

The ideology

of free trade and laissez faire expressed the mutual self-interest of
these elites in the continued dependence on exporting agro-pastoral
goods.
On the level of political power,

the Anglo-oligarchic connec

tion meant that representatives of the landowning oligarchy, of exportimport groups, and lawyers for foreign enterprises occupied all important
governmental posts.

The pattern of foreign merchants establishing con

nections with influential Argentines had already been established since
the time when the Porteno elite were severing their colonial bonds.
For example,
David Curtis De F o r e s t a n American who gained his interest in
the Rio de la Plata while smuggling, formed a partnership with
Juan Larrea around 1810. Three years later his partner became
Minister for Finance. When De Forest then formed a company with
a close friend of Juan Martin de Pueyrrddon, he obtained protec
tion against Argentine merchants and received government contracts.

^Scobie, p. 222.
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De Forest left Argentina in 1818, taking with him accumulated
capital of 101,952 pesos, then equivalent to 27,84Q«8 in gold
sovereigns. De Forest's practices were not unusual.*
For its part, the landowning oligarchy had already firmed its
grip on the state apparatus during the first fifty years of the nation's
life to such an extent that the period from about 1880 until the advent
of Peronism, excepting the interlude from 1916 to 1930 when the Radical
Party controlled the government, is usually referred to by Argentines
as "the period of oligarchic domination."

Oligarquia in Argentine

popular and scholarly parlance refers to the landowning class and is
distinguished from burguesia nacional, the latter group's interests
being tied to manufacturing activity.
Ownership of the means of production in the rural area consti
tuted the oligarchy's base and they controlled the state.

"They appoint

ed presidents and congresses from their own ranks with only a pretense
at elections.

2

The major institution representing the agro-pastoral

exporting interests, the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), held a firm
grip over the most powerful branch of the government, the executive.
According to Peter Smith in his definitive study of the beef industry,
more than half of Argentina's presidents between 1910 and 1945 were
members of the highly elite SRA.

More than forty percent a£ all cabinet

posts were likewise held by influential SRA members.

Moreover, they

tended to control ministries of major importance, notably Foreign
Relations, Finance, and military posts. . . . Perhaps the most pro-

*Vera Blinn Reber, British Mercantile Houses in-Buenos Aires,
1810-80 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 64.
This book provides an in-depth.study of "the Anglo-oligarchic connection."

2

Scobie, p. 173.
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vocative finding is that the Rural Society generally survived
the vicissitudes of party politics.
It was strongly represented
in the cabinet before, during, and after the Radical administra
tion of 1916-30.
And the SRA even controlled 15 percent of ^
all the seats in the Congress' during these different periods.
The oligarquia was a small, exclusive, and extremely cohesive
group.

'In politics as well as in society, this elite was far more

united than any previous or subsequent ruling group."

Scobie puts

the composition of the oligarchy towards the end of the nineteenth
century at two hundred family names totalling far less than one percent
of Buenos Aires' population.

Scobie also points out that, though

landownership remained the economic base for the oligarchy's power, many
of its members were not in fact landowners and only a minority were
cattlemen.

"Commerce, banking, politics, and, increasingly, the pro

cessing industries built many family fortunes, and speculations during

3
two economic booms created more financial empires than they destroyed."
Significantly however, many of these individuals bought land for
its social prestige value.
Through its ownership of the land on which the major income pro
ducing exports were raised, government regulations in its favor, and
its members' influential connections with export-import companies and
banks, the oligarchy assured itself of the lion's share of Argentina's

Peter Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict
and Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 48. The best
data on the SRA's presence within the government is in Jose Luis de Imaz,
Los que mandan (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1968). On
the SRA itself see Jorge Newton's Historia de la Sociedad Rural Argentina
(Buenos Aires, 1966).
2

Others give differing estimates but they all agree on the oli
garchy's cohesiveness and that it represented a tiny fraction of the
nation's population. See Ortiz below.
3
Scobie, p. 172.
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lucrative trade relations.

The benefits were large enough :to be

spread to such groups within the middle sectors as the professional
classes, lower level managers, teachers, government workers, and white
collar employees in general.

Indeed, the fruits of externally oriented

growth were so plentiful in Argentina that its middle classes enjoyed
one of the highest living standards in the world of the 1920's.

Being

junior benficiaries, instead of gravitating towards the national bour
geoisie interested in expanding manufacturing activity, as their counter
parts did, for example, in the United States, these middle class ele
ments participated in the externally oriented growth pattern in a sub
ordinated capacity.

The losers were the rural and urban working classes,

tenant farmers, and small-scale industrialists and merchants.
According to Ricardo Ortiz, the relative proportions of the
significant groupings comprising Argentina's class structure in the
immediate pre-World War I period can be broken down as follows: the
oligarchy (large landowners, bankers, large industrialists and high
financiers) represented about 3.1 percent of the economically active
population; the middle sectors broken down into two groups made up
about 41.8 percent of the total— middle sized farmers, merchants, in
dustrialists, and public administrators representing 13.6 percent of
this figure and small and poor farmers, merchants, artisans and lower
echelon administrators the other 28.2 percent; the proletarian and semi
proletarian class (seasonally employed and rural-to-urban immigrants)
made up the remaining 55.1 percent of the economically active population.*

''■Ricardo M. Ortiz, Historia economics de la argentina, 1850-1930
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955), 2:191.
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The "Radical" .Period of 1916^-30
We have seen that the oligarchy’s economic and social position
as major landowner and the group at the apex of the social structure,
depended on the uninterrupted flow of agro-pastoral commodities to the
exterior and the corresponding reflux of manufactured goods.

It is

therefore not surprising that after two decades of pressure from the
middle sectors supported by a few abortive coups, the oligarchy moved
to coopt this potential threat at a time when its socio-economic posi
tion was most'secure and it could afford to share political power.

With

the ascent to the presidency in 1910 of the leader of its reform wing,
Roque Saenz Pena, the oligarchy laid the groundwork for this cooptation
of the middle class.

After a bitter fight in congress, Saenz Pena suc

ceeded in having the law which mandated the secret ballot and universal
male suffrage enacted in 1912.

This law, which subsequently bore Saenz

Pena's name, made possible the election to the presidency in 1916 of
Hipolito Yrigoyen, whose Radical Party had openly appealed to the
middle sectors for support.
The liberal-reform fraction of the oligarchy chose a propitious
time for its cooptation of the middle sectors.

On the one hand, the

oligarchy's control over the means of production (landownership) and its
linkages with the foreign interests participating in the exploitation of
Argentina's wealth were secure in the global order of the twenties.

On

the other hand,the middle sectors inducted into the state's machinery
did not represent dynamic groups pressing for changes in the relations
of production and thus posed no internal threat.

Rather than represent

ing an aspiring industrial bourgeoisie pitted against formerly dominant
rural barons, the Radical Party represented those who had a stake in
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preserving the on-going relations of production based on agro-pastoral
production for export.

The state became a vast patronage machine, a

source for income from thousands of bureaucratic jobs, and thus a means
for increasing the participation of'the middle sectors on the consumer
side, not the creation of wealth side of the reproductive cycle.
Opening the doors of political system to the middle class
reinforced its stake in the system.

At the time, the working class

was beginning to emerge as a significant factor.

Under the influence

of immigrant workers, a militant anarchist movement had led various
strikes.

And, while they had no intention of overhauling the system,

the middle sectors nevertheless wanted a larger share of the spoils de
rived from agricultural surpluses and expressed their dissatisfaction
by fomenting discontent :in the universities and the military.

A link

ing up of middle class discontent with the workers’ unrest might have
undermined the social relations on which the oligarchy's economic and
social position rested.

The Radical Party changed from being one of

the chief instigators of the political instability to being the main
instrument for curbing that instability.
Yrigoyen thus came to power with "a conditional mandate to rule
circumscribed by two central objectives: the preservation of the elite’s
economic position and the elmination of popular unrest which had led to
previous political instability.

He was thus to placate the middle class

and the working class, but at the same time to perpetuate the economic
system which underlay their expressions of discontent."'*'

The Radicals

were able, for the most part,-tP fulfill this contradictory mandate

^David Rock, "Radical Populism and the Conservative Elite,
1912-30," in Rock, p. 74.
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because of the exceptionally favorable circumstances for Argentina's ex
port oriented economy prevailing on the international scene from the
post-World War I years up until the 1929 crash.

In much the same way,

as will be shown subsequently, Peron was able to implement policies
containing implicit contradictions because of favorable international
/

conditions.

Another parallel between the Yrigoyen and Peron regimes

lay in their populism.

A contemporary newspaper account (La Epoca

on January 11, 1920) characterized Yrigoyen's style and impact in
these terms:
In assiduous and direct contact with the People, and with
the progressive activities of the Nation, President Yrigoyen,
the true democrat, has managed to win something which the presi
dents of the class (the Oligarch^) were never able .to win— the
love and confidence of the citizenry .1
Yrigoyen often projected himself as a symbol of national reconcilia
tion and he undoubted enjoyed widespread popular support.
showed these features some two decades later.

Peron too

In fact, on more than

one occasion he legitimated his rule by alluding to its being a direct
continuation of Yrigoyen's politics.
Though the use of populism to obscure class contradictions
and deflect conflicting interests within the movement itself were
common to both Yrigoyen and Peron, the class bases of these regimes made
them two very different and distinct phenomena.

In the first place,

Yrigoyen's populism towards the working class remained largely on the
level of rhetoric.

Though his government occasionally engaged in inter

ventions into strikes favorably towards the workers, and passed some
favorable

legislation,

working class interests.
did, rest on the working

it did not

go much further in protecting

It certainly
class as its

did not, as Peron's government
social base

^"Quoted in Rock's "Radical Populism," p. 74.

of

support.
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In fact, in January of 1919, during what became known as
tragica,

la semana

Yrigoyen's government participated in one of the bloodiest

massacres of working class militants in Argentine history.

In the

second place, the middle sectors tied to externally oriented growth in
a dependent capacity, constituted the Radical Party's social base and
were the same sectors that represented Perot's most vehement opposi
tion.

Whereas Yrigoyen's government represented the dependent middle

sectors, Peron's policies incorporated the interests of an emerging
national bourgeoisie.
Paradoxically, as will be shown in the next chapter, forced
to make adjustments in the face of the disruptive impact of the world
depression of the thirties on externally oriented growth, the oligarchy
increased the presence within the Argentine economy of industrialists
and other sectors oriented towards the internal market.

In sharp

contrast to the 1930-43 period when the oligarchy resumed its direct
control of the state, the Radical governments of 1916-30 which espoused
the interests of the middle and popular sectors, did almost nothing
to promote or even protect the position of the embryonic national
bourgeoisie.

In the 1920's tariff rates protecting national industry

declined to their lowest levels in half a century*- and this was also
the decade when the exportation of agricultural raw materials in ex
change for imported manufactures reached its zenith.

In fact, the

Radical Party's policies were quite consistent with, its social base—
middle sectors who had been incorporated into the externally•oriented
growth pattern as junior partners.

^Scobie, p. 182.
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The repercussions of the international economic crisis
ushered in with the 1929 collapse, as we shall see in more detail in
the next chapter, led the oligarchy to abandon the experiment with
free and honest, democratic government.

Though the severe interruption

in Argentina's external trade did not directly threaten the oligarchy's
ownership of the key means of .production, the internal impact

the cutting

back of production on the land and rising unemployment in the city
beginning with food processing related industry, as well as the falling
levels in the middle sectors' acquisitive power resulting from the
shrinking of the wealth available to be spread about— did threaten
the reproduction of traditional economic relationships.

The oligarchy's

response was to seize the state with the coup of 1930 and thus use
naked political power to protect and strengthen its position.

In the

period between 1930 and 1943 which became known in Argentine history
as "the infamous decade," the secret ballot was replaced by the stuffed
ballot box, as the fledgling democratic practices were thrown overboard
in favor of the time-tested techniques that guaranteed the oligarchy
control of the state.

These techniques are aptly conveyed with the

term coined by the oligarchy itself during those years , "the patriotic
fraud."

That is, there was only a pretense at elections and their

obvious rigging was justified with pride by saying this was necessary
in order to protect the best interests of the nation.

In much the same

way, far from being ashamed, Argentina's military rulers in the late
seventies justified the most brutal acts of repression as the carrying
out of their patriotic duty.
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British Hegemony Over Argentine Development and
the United States 1 Challenge
Up until World War I Great Britain was the center of the
world economy and, more than any other country,

it was the outside

pole in Argentina's externally oriented economic development.

Britain's

position rested on its role in the international division of labor
based en specialization and trade. England became the world s workshop,
specialization and trade.

England became the world's workshop,

importing raw materials and exporting manufactures.

Thus it has been

estimated that at the height of its supremacy, around 1870, British
industry produced one third of all manufactured goods in the world.
On the other hatid, as the factors of production were shifted from
agriculture to industry, Britain came to rely more and more on im
ported raw materials and foodstuffs.
after the abolition of the corn laws.

This became particularly evident
By 1870. half of the flour and

wheat consumed in England was imported, and beef commenced to be an
important import.
The material base that enabled Britain to achieve indisputable
preeminence in the international economy of the day also contained the
sources for its erosion.

Its industrial supremacy had rested primarily

on textiles (cotton based) and steel.

Around 1870 four fifths of

Britain's exports consisted of these types of goods.

After that date

British hegemony was increasingly squeezed by the newly rising industrial
powers, particularly Germany and the United States.

Faced with this

challenge, the English fell back on the economic links they had forged
with their colonial possessions and.other spheres of influence.

Thus

in 1913, Argentina and India alone bought more iron and steel from the
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English than all of Europe did.

The proportion of Britain's exports

to countries and territories within its imperial orbit shows how
important they were to the English economy.

This proportion rose from

25 percent in 1870 to about 40 percent in 1913.^
The relative descent of British exports and its rising imports
brought about a constantly growing deficit in its visible commerce.
These however, were more than compensated for by favorable balances in
its invisible commerce.

Incomes derived from shipping, insurance,

banking services, and above all dividends and interests on foreign
investments rose consistently throughout the nineteenth century until
the First World War.

The problems this might have caused the inter

national system were avoided through the increasing rhythm of foreign
loans.

Thus it was not so paradoxical that as the competitive capacity

of its exports fell, Britain's importance as the world's financial cen
ter grew.

Between 1870 and 1914 British investments overseas increased

from 700 million to 4 billion pounds.

London became the largest

source for finance capital in the world.

In 1914 these investments

were equivalent to the combined foreign investments of Germany, France,
Belgium, and the United States.

2

In the end what proved pivotal in Britain's displacement from
the center of the global economic order was the fact that it was out
stripped technologically in the capital goods sector.

^These figures are from the source this analysis paraphrases:
Pedro Skupch, "El deterioro y fin de la hegemonia britanica sobre la
economia argentina 1914-1947," in Estudios sobre losorfgenes del
peronismo (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1973), 2: 6 .

2

Ibid., pp. 8 & 5.
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In 1913 British exports of machinery represented 30 percent
of the total exported by the seven major exporting countries
in this category, those of Germany amounting to 32.5 percent
and those of the United States 25.9 percent. By 1926 her par
ticipation had fallen to 25 .6 percent as opposed to the 37.6
percent from the United States and the 23 percent from Germany.
The United States had displaced'Great Britain as the world's
foremost exporter of machinery.
It is not surprising that New York began to replace London as the
world's financial and commercial center during the 1920's.
Latin America played a crucial part in maintaining British
hegemony over the international order of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.

The United Kingdom's trade with the area never

fell below 10 percent of Britain's total overseas trade after 1840.
Moreover, from the end of the century until the First World War, Latin
America was one of the most important areas for English investors.

In

1913 Great Britain had one billion pounds invested in Latin America,
one fourth of all her foreign investments.

Compared to the 350 million

pounds in French investments that year and the 250 million in U.S. in
vestments, Britain easily occupied the foremost position among the
foreign investors in the area.

It can even be said that in the mid

nineteenth century, Latin American markets saved Britain's industry which
was based on the export of cotton textiles.

In 1840, Latin American

markets absorbed fully 35 percent of all British textiles shipped abroad.
Within Latin America, British interests were oriented towards
South America and focused particularly on Argentina, Brazil and Chile
which together in 1913 accounted for 67 percent of Britain's Latin
3
American investments and 72 percent of its trade with the area.
1
Skupch,

3Ibid.

p. 11. My translation.

2
Ibid., p. 13.

Of the

2
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three, Argentina held the most prominent position for British interests.
This is not surprising given that, until the thirties, Argentina took
up the lion's share of South America's economic activity, as Table 2.
shows.

TABLE 2.— Argentina's economic importance relative to the rest of
South America
Activity

Percentage of all South America

Exports, 1932
Imports, 1932

41
.

47

Total Foreign Trade, 1932

43

Railroads, mileage, 1930

40

"

, freight tonnage, 1930

40

"

, passengers carried, 1930

44

Automobile vehicles, 1935

55

Petroleum consumption, 1935

50

Telephones, instruments, 1930

49

Telephones, messages, 1930

35

Radios, 1930

66

Postal Service, pieces of mail, 1930

63

Educational expenditures, 1930

65

Print paper consumed, 1924

57

Telegrams sent, 1930

60

SOURCES: Revista de ecohbmia argentina (Buenos Aires) 35, (AprilJune 1936): 47^9. George Wythe, "Manufacturing Developments in Argen
tina j" Trade Information Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, p. 34): no. 820; U.K. Norton, The Coming of
South America (New York: n.p. ■> 1932) . From Phelps, p. .11.
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Argentina represented Great Britain’s most important market in
the Latin American area, absorbing in 1913 and 1927 44 and 46 percent
respectively, of its exports to the region.

Nevertheless, it is impor

tant to note that the overall trend was one of stagnation, with Great
Britain's exports increasing only 6 percent during these years while
those from the United States increased 142 percent.'*'

:

After World

War I, simultaneously as the United Kingdom became the critical market
for Argentine beef, Britain’s role as a provider of goods decreased
while imports from the United States were on the rise.

The European

conflagration of 1914-18 marked the beginning of the shift away from
England's hegemony over the Argentine economy towards that of the
United States, a shift which was not consolidated until the late 1950's.
The shift toward the growing importance of U.S

interests in

the Argentine economy began in World War I, gained momentum in the
twenties, suffered a setback in the thirties, and regained its momentum
in the post-World War II era.

In Argentina’s external commercial

relations this shift was manifested by the trend showing a growing pro
portion of exports to Great Britain while imports from the United King
dom declined and, simultaneously, those from the United States increased.
Analyzing a set of trade figures similar to those in Table 3,

Eduardo

Jorge concludes that before the First World War almost half of Argentina's imports came from continental Europe,

while 35 percent came from

^kupch, p. 16,

2

Interestingly, he points out that Germany alone surpassed the
United States in this respect.in the pre-World War I era, a position
it never recovered after its defeat.
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Great Britain and 15 percent from the United States.

TABLE 3.— Proportional participation by the United Kingdom and the
United States in Argentina's exports and imports
Exports to
(percentage
of total)

Imports from
(percentage <
total)

U.K.

U.S.

U.K.

1910

21.8

6.8

31.1

13.8

1919

28.7

18.4

23.6

35.5

1927

28.2

8.3

19.4

25.4

1936

35

12.2

23.6

14.4

U.S.

SOURCE: Revista de la economj^a argentina 39 (Oct. 1940): 304-5.
Colin Lewis in Rock, p. 115.

From

In the twenties, given the tremendous increase in the volume of Argen
tina's exports, her imports from all sources rose.

However, in 1929,

while imports from the United States quadrupled, those from the
European continent did not quite double and those from England in
creased by less than 40 percent.

Jorge estimates that immediately

prior to the international economic collapse of 1929, 26 percent of
Argentine imports came from the United States, 17 percent from Great
Britain and 30 percent from continental European countries.*
With the exception of the World War I and World War II years
and a short period between 1936 and 1938 when the U.S. market was briefly
opened to Argentine corn, Argentina has consistently realized deficits
in its trade with the United States.

The three-way trade pattern where

*Eduardo F. Jorge, Industria y concentracion economics (Buenos
Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1971), pp. 83-5.
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by Argentina had to realize favorable balances in her trade with
England in order to cover her deficits with the United States— a
pattern which as will be seen had a profound impact on Peronist indus
trializing efforts— became the most pronounced trend in Argentina's
external commercial relations in the decade of the twenties.

Thus

while Argentine exports complemented European needs, the United States'
agricultural sector was not only capable of satisfying its domestic
market but also competed with Argentina on the world market.

That is

why the United States' trade orientation towards Argentina has always
been one of a seller rather than a buyer.

Even in that brief period when

Argentina had a favorable balance of trade, it sent only 11 percent of
its thirteen principle exports to the United States in 1937-8.*
The tripartite trade pattern of the 1920's expressed Argentine
dependence on exports to the United Kingdom in order to cover growing
imports from the United States, as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4.— Balance of payments in commodity trade with U.S., U.K. and
other countries (millions of gold Pesos)
1919-20
U.S.
U.K.. .Others
993 1,733
2,375

Exports
Imports

1,077

885

U.S.
769

1,504 1,826

1921-30
U.K.
Others
3,000
4,644
1,618

4,253

U.S.
131
249

1913-34
U.K.
Others
1,161
1,041
409

1,111

Surplus:
exports(+)
imports(-)

+848
-144

+871

+1,391
-1,057

+391

+752
-151

SOURCE: Phelps, p. 190.

This shift toward the'increasing importance of the United States
in Argentina's external commercial relations was accompanied by the con-

Silvio Frondizi, La realidad argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Praxis, 1957), 1: 123.

-70
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sistent rise of U.S. investments within the Argentine economy during
the twenties.

Though Argentina was an important market for U.S. pro

duced goods prior to 1914,^ Argentina only absorbed about 3.2 percent
of the United States 1 Latin American investments before the First
World War.

2

By 1929 Argentina took in 11 percent of the United States'

investments in Latin America and registered the highest increase in
U.S. investments in the area after Venezuela.
investments

remained more or less stable.

3

Concurrently, British

Table 5

provides an idea

of the magnitudes involved.

TABLE 5 .— Foreign capital invested in Argentina (millions of U.S.
dollars)
1913

1918

1926

1939

1861

1900

2100

1698

France

450

400

425

250

Germany

220

250

375

350

40

100

600

619

Great Britain

U.S.A.

SOURCE: Luis Sommi, Los capitales yanquis en la argentina (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Monteagudo, 1949), as cited by Silvio Frondizi in La
realidad argentina (Buenos Aires: Empresiones El Sol, 1960), 1: 120.
Though comparatively less important than British investments, United
States investments showed the most dramatic increase in the twenties
and, significantly, were the only ones to increase between 1926 and
1939.

By excluding the British-owned railroad system, Table 6

shows

the comparative gain in U.S. investments even more dramatically.

According to Skupch, p. 25, 21.4 percent of the United States'
exports to Latin America found their way to Argentina.
2Ibid.

3Ibid., p. 26.
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TABLE 6.— British and U.S. investments in Argentina in branches other
than the railroads (millions of U.S. dollars)
1913

1917

1923

1927

1931

1934

1940

1945

U.K.

823

820

772

815

714

705

624

405

U.S.

39

82

193

487

654

743

629

565

SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America, "El desarrollo
economico de la Argentina" (Santiago, Chile: mimeographed version, 1958).
From Jorge, p. 91.

From this data Eduardo Jorge concludes that the pattern is one wherein
U.S. investments doubled through 1927 and by 1931 were practically
equal to England's.

Meanwhile, Britain's investments suffered declines

resulting from the impact of the war from which they recovered by 1927,
only to decline consistently after the 1929 crash.
In 1907 U.S. capital began to make its presence felt within
the Argentine economy in the meatpacking plants.

The real upsurge in

U.S. investments took place during the years of the First World War
and in the following decade.

Initially subsidiaries of U.S. firms were

established largely in the area of extractive activities; for example,
the International Cement Company and Standard Oil were set up in 1917.
In the next decade, along with the increase of machinery and automobile
exports from the United States, plants dedicated to the assembly of
these imported parts were founded: Ford Motors in 1922, General Motors
in 1925, Otis Elevator in 1927.

"By 1933 manufacturing and processing

facilities for some thirtyr-one enterprises had been established; among
them three of .the big meatpacking plants, the largest automobile and
tire companies, two major utility companies, and the biggest producers
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of petroleum, mineral, and farmaceutical products and materials for
cons tructlon."^
By concentrating on meeting a demand for goods which Britain
did not supply because it had been outstripped technologically in their
production, U.S. interests began to undercut the British position within
the Argentine economy.

North American companies made inroads through

the increased sale of products requiring some form of after-sales ser
vice, especially cars and other consumer durables.

This promoted direct

dealing between manufacturers and retail distributors and thereby under
cut the British monopoly based on export-import agencies.

U.S. firms

also advertised heavily to enlarge their market, something the British
had neglected because of their past secure position.

And, most signi

ficantly, U.S. interests began their assault on what had been the back
bone of Britain's position within the Argentine economy, their control
of the transportation network.2
U.S. investors began to buy shares in the British railroads.
This provoked a reaction from the directors who feared the loss of
control and who were also concerned that business might be diverted
away from the English companies providing material for the railroads.
In May of 1929 the British Ambassador made the following statement
about the railroads:
I look upon them as the mainstay, the backbone of our whole
position out here. If they go, we all go. Their loss would be
a death blow to us out here and a serious one to our industry
at home of which they are,loyal supporters.3

^Skupch, pp. 25-6. He cites Dudley Maynard Phelps, Migration
of Industry to South America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 293.

2

Paraphrased from A.G. Ford, "British Investment and Argentine
Economic Development, 1880-1914" in Rock, pp. 46-9.
3
Cited by Ford in Ibid., p. 51.
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Recognizing the threat of being taken over, in the same month of 1929,
the Buenos Aires and Pacific changed its by-laws so that non-English
or Argentine shareholders were not allowed to vote.

The other rail

ways soon followed suit, some allowing Argentines or non-English to
vote, but limiting the total number of shares they could hold to
20 percent.*
The most serious assault on Britain’s strategic position in
the transportation network took place with the massive influx of motor
vehicles which were soon to take an increasingly larger volume of
passengers and freight from the railroads.

Between 1920 and 1930 Argen

tina imported almost half a million vehicles, both cars and trucks.
Almost all of them, 95.8 percent, came from the United States.

Accord

ing to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 1929, the year which showed
the highest volume of exports for the decade, Argentina was the second
largest market for motor vehicles after Canada.

p

The process involving the automobile companies exemplifies the
pattern whereby United States groups challenged Britain's hegemony over
the Argentine economy.
did not supply.

First, they met a need which English imports

Second, their products required a servicing network

which only the U.S. parent company could furnish.

And, finally, the

transition from importation of the finished product to that of parts
and local assemblage was an easy one.

The increased presence of U.S.

interests in the Argentine economy was accompanied by the extension,
and gradual change in the nature of the manufacturing sector.

U.S.

interests thus increasingly undermined what had been the foundation of

1Skupch, pp. 26-7.

2Ibid., p. 28.
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the Anglo-oligarchic connection: a limited manufacturing sector'*'
and moreover, one tied to agricultural activity and relying primarily
on rural goods as the main inputs.
In that it promoted manufacturing geared to the domestic market
rather than export and, moreover, industrial activity not tied to
the agricultural sector, U.S. capital ran counter to, and threatened the
traditional arrangements which underlay the externally oriented growth
pattern.

By way of summary, the major factors involved in the displace

ment of Britain's hegemonic role by U.S. interests can be outlined in
the following manner.

2

The economic relations between British capital and the oligarchy
controlling rural production were based on the exchange of commodities:
foodstuffs in exchange for manufactures.

As this relationship matured,

British investors turned to activities that complemented the extraction
and transportation of the products Britain needed and which, at the same
time, facilitated an increase in the demand for manufactured goods, and
in the satisfaction of this demand.

Thus, the British-owned railroad

system, the meatpacking and freezing plants, streetcar repair shops,
port facilities, and public utilities such as electricity, gas, and
sanitation.

This process itself led to a greater demand for industrial

products, most immediately those required by the development of public

*"In the 1910-14 period, the contribution of the manufacturing
sector to the gross domestic product amounted to about 11.5 percent.
Ford in Rock, p. 33, citing figures from Diaz Alejandro.

2
The "ideal-type" paradigms that follow are paraphrased from
Silvio Frondizi, pp. 132-4. The author makes it clear that he is
extrapolating the principal features that distinguished British from
U.S. investments in their "pure form" from a complex reality.

101
works and utilities.

The process also produced a dependence on the

importation of coal and the materials required for the construction and
operation of the railroad network.

Additionally, the process involved

measures that favored the financial interests of British investors, for
example, their control of many of the major commercial and banking
institutions.
The solidity of this Anglo-oligarchic linkage began to be
shattered in the twenties and thirties as a result of a complex of
factors, among which was the fact that Great Britain was outstripped
technologically, losing thereby her global monopoly of heavy industry
and the production of machinery.

In addition, as a result of concen

trating on the export of finished consumer goods, British investors
paid little attention to the development of Argentine manufacture.
It was in this area that North American investors, concentrating
as they did on the migration of industrial plants, found the weak link.
Moreover, North American interests, in their corporate form, had certain
distinct advantages over their British counterparts: 1) proximity to
the domestic market and therefore greater flexibility in responding to
and creating local demand, 2) the capacity to use cheaper labor power
and, 3) during the war, a sanctuary from the ravages of the battlefield.
In brief, Britain's position suffered from the development of local
industry, while that of North American interests gained from a certain
type of industrialization.
Industrialization During Periods of International Crisis
In discussing the externally oriented growth pattern in Argentina
and the'contradictions developing within it, this chapter showed how
Argentina's class structure developed in the context of the nation's
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economy and its role of providing foodstuffs to major industrial
centers overseas.

The analysis also covered the changing economic

relationships on the international scene and the weaknesses within
Argentina's externally oriented growth pattern that led to the growing
shift from Great Britain to the United States as the dominant external
pole in Argentine development.
In accordance with the analytical framework of dependency
theory outlined at the end of the last chapter, this chapter has shown
shifts within one pattern which were to become decisive in determining
the next developmental pattern.

The next chapter will turn to the

first stage of the transitional process itself.

The point here is

that the shifts which became pronounced in the transitional process
between externally oriented growth and dependent industrialization,
were already taking shape within the prior period.
In discussing the growth of manufacturing activity during the
First World War and the twenties, this chapter covered another impor
tant theoretical point raised in the previous chapter.

It will be

recalled that the second of four conditions mentioned for the success
ful emergence of a transitional period was that the infrastructure
necessary for the new pattern must have been developing within the
prior stage.^
The next chapter focuses largely on the internal contradictions
following upon the international economic collapse of 1929.

Thus it

deals with the second part of the first condition for the emergence of
a transitional period: that the.repercussions of the crisis must be pro

^See p. 24 above.
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found enough to throw into temporary disarray the alliance of domestic
and foreign groups controlling the productive and marketing structures.
The first part of this condition, it will be recalled, was that there
must be a crisis on the international scene severe enough to disrupt
the ongoing developmental process.*

The decisive crisis which had

these profound ramifications was of course the Great Depression of the
thirties. ,It is for this reason that the transitional period is dated
from 1930.
In concluding this chapter I wish to note a point often made
in major works on the Argentine economy:

2

that historically, industrial

*See p. 24 above.

2

Some of these are:

Alejandro E. Bunge, La economjfa argentina (Buenos Aires: Agencia
General de Librerias y Publicaciones, 1928-30), 4 Volumes.
Dardo Cuneo, "Aspectos economicos de la historia argentina,"
C.uadernos americanos: 100 (July-Oct. 1958): pp. 385-99.
Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the
Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970)
Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarollo
economico (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1973).
Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1967).
Alcira Leiserson, Notes on the Process of Industrialization in
Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Berkeley: University of California, Institute
of International Studies, 1966).
Leopoldo Portnoy, La realidad argentina en el siglo XX (Mexico:
Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1961), 2: analisis critico de la economia.
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development has shown its highest growth rates during periods of
international crisis.

Table 7

illustrates this trend.

TABLE
7.— Percentage of total demand for manufactured goods supplied
through local production and importation, 1900-45
Period

Local
Production

Imports ■

Period

Local
Production

Imports

1900-04

41.4

58.6

1925-29

48.9

51.1

1905-09

40.2

59.8

1930-34

62.7

37-3

1910-14

42.0

58.0

1935-39

63.3

36.7

1915-19

53.7

46.3

1940-44

80.5

19.5

1920-24

50.8

49.2

SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America, "El desarrollo econqmico de la Argentina," mimeographed version (Santiago, Chile: United
Nations, 1958). From Jorge, p. 77.

The percentage of the total demand for manufactured goods supplied
through local production rose from 42 percent to almost 54 percent by
the end of the First World War.

After that, the percentages declined

although remaining above the pre-Wofrld War I level.

The next sharp

rise in the percentage of manufactured goods produced locally comes
with the Great Depression.

However, the really dramatic increase in

local production of manufactured goods occurs during the World War II
years.

Indeed, as following chapters will show, these figures reflect

a change in the role of the manufacturing sector that heralded a funda
mental changes in the Argentine economy and its relations to inter
national forces.

The Peronist period marked the high point in the trans

itional process that led to this new developmental pattern.
What lies behind these trends?

What does their.content reveal

about significant shifts in the relationships within and between
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national and foreign groups taking place at the time?

As already

indicated, the years of the First World War constituted the beginning
of the shift away from the predominance of British interests within
the Argentine economy and towards the preponderance of groups in
the North American orbit.

Another factor which played a key part in

shaping the outcome of the transitional process in Argentina had also
emerged with clarity by the time a major reordering on the international
scene was being fought out on the European battlefields during the
First World War.
The dual nature of the Argentine manufacturing sector that was
to affect Peronist policies so profoundly was already apparent at
this time.

Two types of manufacturing operations coexisted.

One segment was made up of large-scale establishments:
meat-packing plants, tanning factories, flour mills, elec
tricity and gas plants, sugar refineries, and some breweries,
wineries, paper and lumber mills, and textile plants. These
factories employed the most modern equipment, technical skills,
and accounting procedures, used a high ratio of horsepower to
laborers, and commanded outstanding entrepreneurial abilities.
Their labor force ranged from a few hundred to a few thousand
and their capital from one million to five million dollars. . . .
The other segment of industry was the myriad small factories
that numerically comprised almost the whole of Argentina's in
dustrial establishment but represented only tiny fractions in
capital, horsepower, or value produced. It was on these indus
tries that Argentina depended for its locally produced consumer
goods: shoes, bread, paints, hairbrushes, bricks, cigarettes,
macaroni, glass, blouses, hardward, furniture, matches, hats,
candies, liquors, butter, acids, suits, and grain sacks. Like
the large-scale processing industries, these small plants sprang
from the initiative of immigrants and continued under family
ownership. Few employed more than ten workers, and many artisan
^
shops depended only on family labor or at most a couple of helpers.
It was of course the modern sector which provided fertile ground for
the penetration and eventual domination of manufacturing activity by
foreign capital.
^Scobie, pp. 178-9,
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The impact of the international crisis during World War I was
to enlarge the scope of domestic production in general, but particularly
that of the less modern, small-scale sector.

The blockage of tradi

tional trade patterns due to wartime conditions, meant a sudden shortage
of manufactured goods that had been forthcoming from Great Britain and
Europe.

This had two immediate consequences.

On the one hand, mer

chandise from the United States partly filled the vacuum and the United
States temporarily replaced England as the principal foreign supplier
of goods during the wartime years.

On the other hand, the absence of

competition from more efficiently produced commodities, gave local pro
duction a tremendous boost.

Since capital goods were not produced in

Argentina, this expansion was largely confined to that area of manufac
turing activity that did not depend on large-scale, technologically
advanced machinery.

Even so however, "by 1918 importation of foodstuffs,

hardward, paper, metals, and clothing decreased 50 percent from prewar
levels."^
With the return of "normalcy" on the international scene follow
ing the war, the relationships determining Argentine economic development
moved toward the renewal of pre-World War I trends.

Agro-pastoral ex

ports reached an all-time high and much of domestic manufacturing that
had grown behind the protection of wartime conditions was dismantled.
The textile and metal industries were particularly affected.

As pre

viously noted, the Radical Party government of the dependent middle
sectors was not intent on challenging the foundations of externally
oriented growth.

During this golden decade for that pattern, Argentina's

^Scobie, p. 179.
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traditional orientation towards British interests reappeared in full
force.
Nevertheless, industrialization during the period of inter
national crisis of World War I gained sufficient momentum for the
trends of this earlier period to reeinerge with greater force in the
depression years of the thirties.

This time around their impact was

much more intense and this was even truer for the years of the Second
World War, as will be seen when we examine the Peronist period.

For

this reason the transitional process towards dependent industrializa
tion begins in earnest in the 1930's.

Peronism responded to the con

tradictions which emerged in the process of the oligarchy's attempt
to stem the shifts away from the externally oriented growth pattern.
Conclusions
This chapter analyzed externally oriented growth as the material
basis for the "Anglo-oligarchic" connection determining the course of
Argentine development.

The oligarchy owned the land and profited from

the production of agro-pastoral commodities for export.

They established

mutually beneficial relationships with the foreign, mostly British,
groups controlling the economy's infrastructure— the transporting, pro
cessing, distribution, and financing of exports and imports.

The role

of the state was seen as pivotal in consolidating the relationships un
derlying externally oriented growth through the enactment of policies
reinforcing the interests of the national and foreign groups involved.
The analysis concluded that contrary to the conventional interpretation»
this pattern promoted dependency and did not reflect the interdependency
that results from specialization in the international division of labor.
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The effects of externally oriented growth on the evolving class
structure were portrayed as leading to a pyramidical hierarchy.

At the

apex of the important economic, social, and political institutions
stood the tiny elite comprised of the landowning oligarchy and the
British, and to a lesser extent continental European and North American,
providers of imported manufactured goods as well as the groups con
trolling the financial and transportation systems involved.

Below

them were the dependent middle sectors— professional groups, state
functionaries, lower level managerial personnel, smaller scale commer
cial interests— who also benefited, though in a subordinated capacity,
from externally oriented growth.

Finally, the broad bottom base was

occupied by the largely excluded groups— the emerging national bour
geoisie and the urban and rural working class and the popular sectors.
The chapter also examined the process leading to the erosion of
British hegemony over Argentine development and the growing influence
of U.S. based interests.

This process resulted in increasing the weight

of manufacturing activity withinin the Argentine economy, producing an
industrial sector with more modern, capital intensive, foreign-owned
plants, alongside more labor intensive, smaller scale, nationallyowned enterprises generally producing non-durable consumer goods.

Re

maining chapters analyze the subsequent course of Argentine development
in terms of the contradictions implicit in a limited industrialization
taking shape within the context of an economy based on agricultural pro
duction for export.

These contradictions are traced as manifested in

the shifting relationships within and between national and foreign groups
tied to the predominant forms of economic activity.

Chapter 3 applies

this analysis to the transitional process leading away from externally
oriented growth.

CHAPTER III

BEGINNING OF TRANSITION TOWARDS DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIZATION:
OLIGARCHIC ATTEMPT TO SALVAGE EXTERNALLY
ORIENTED GROWTH, 1930-43
Introduction
In outlining the model of dependency theory applied in this
study, I stressed its dynamic character.

Each stage was not to be

conceived in a static, but rather in a fluid sense, containing within
it the elements for the next stage.

Accordingly, in analyzing how

the externally oriented growth pattern took shape in Argentina, I
focused on those shifts on the international and national scene which
were to become decisive in the transitional process.
In the last chapter, I examined the shift away from Great
Britain towards the centrality of the United States in the inter
national economic system.

I looked at the ramifications of this

trend within Argentina through the United States' challenge of
England's hegemony over Argentine economic development.

This process

was manifested in the growing importance of manufacturing activity
within the local economy geared to supplying the internal market for
consumer goods.

We saw how the growth of local manufacturing developed

in the context of the international crisis of the First World War.

We

saw also that the reestablishment of the traditional international
channels of trade in the 1920Ts led to the golden age for Argentina's
externally oriented growth pattern.-
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The trends of the First World War were repeated with even
more intensity after the 1929 crisis in the international order.

The

severity of this crisis and of its repercussions led representatives
of the oligarchy to introduce modifications in the externally oriented
growth pattern in an attempt to salvage it.

In the end these modifi

cations further intensified the shifts which characterized the transi
tional period between externally oriented growth and dependent indus
trialization in Argentina.

As noted in Chapter 2, the Radical Party

governments of 1916-30, integrating the dependent middle sectors, did
not seek to challenge an economy based on agricultural production for
export.

By contrast, in their attempt to save this economic pattern,

one segment of the oligarchy did initiate policies in the thirties
which increased the presence within the economy of industrialists
and other sectors oriented toward the internal market.
The oligarchy’s attempt to stem the shifts away from externally
oriented growth created contradictions which, in turn, were key in
Peronism's rise to power.

Just as the previous chapter laid the

groundwork for this one, a dependency theory analysis of the Peronist
period requires a two-fold focus on the immediately prior period.

On

the one hand it must focus on the external factors affecting Argentine
economic development.

Chapter 2 looked at this external pole by

examining the rivalry between British and North American interests.
On the other hand, the analysis must also focus on major modes of
economic activity and shifts therein, as these affect the local class
structure and the relationships within and between national and foreign
groups.

This chapter continues this discussion begun in the previous

chapter with the analysis of the contradictory development of the

Ill
manufacturing sector.

It must be mentioned however, that the distinc

tion between the focuses is purely for analytic convenience.

They are

in fact integrally interwoven and constitute in reality one process.
The transitional process between externally oriented growth
and dependent industrialization can also be conceptualized as "the
substitution of imports phase" which, in Argentina, began in 1930 and
was pretty much exhausted in the early years of the fifties.

The

Great Depression and then World War II produced, at first modifica
tions, and then profoundly altered the relationships among and between
internal and foreign groups.

Peronism was a response to the contra

dictions in the process that led to the disintegration of the hegemony
of the Anglo-oligarchic interests on which externally oriented
growth rested.

The ways in which Peronism sought to resolve these

contradictions were, in turn

to lead to its undoing.

This chapter examines how the policies formulated in the 193043 period intensified the economic and socio-political demands of the
groups that provided the base for Peronism. *
stated in summary form.

The argument can be

Confronted with the disruption of the tradi

tional trade patterns resulting from the 1929 crisis, the faction of
the rural oligarchy controlling the government essentially proposed
increased import substituting industrialization to compensate for
declining imports of European consumer goods.

The goal of these

policies was to preserve the traditional pattern of economic growth
based on agricultural production for external markets.

Nevertheless,

^For a more detailed treatment, see Prologue to Peron:
Argentina in Depression and War: 1930-43 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975), edited by Mark Falcoff and Ronald Dolkart.
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though designed merely to modify the existing relationships in order
to preserve them, these policies significantly affected the traditional
alliances within and between internal and external groups.

They ex

panded the manufacturing sector but kept it in a subordinated position;
and they vastly increased the labor force while suppressing and post
poning its demands.
sectors.

Peron based his bid for power on these social

He promised continued expanded production to industrialists

and built a mass movement on labor's demands.

These were the basic

elements in the winning formula with which he overcame his military
rivals between 1943 and 1945 and the civilian coalition confronting him
in the 1946 elections.
The Crisis and the Need for State Intervention
This chapter focuses on the first two of four conditions
specified previously* as having to be operative for a transitional
process to take place: firstly, a crisis on the international scene
with severe enough internal repercussions to throw into disarray the
alliance of domestic and foreign groups controlling the productive and
marketing structures; and secondly, the existence of the infrastructure
for the new pattern.

The crisis on the international scene which dis

rupted the ongoing developmental process was the depression that
followed the 1929 crash.

One of the immediate impacts of this crisis

was a drastic reduction in the volume of goods produced in the advanced
capitalist areas.

There was, on the one hand, a serious decline in

the availability of industrial goods that raw material producing areas
could import, and on the other, a lessening in the demand for their
exports.

*See pp. 23-24.
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Eduardo Jorge ^"estimates a 60 percent reduction in the
value of global trade between 1929 and 1933 and a diminution of 50
percent in Argentine exports for the same period.

He notes that

in the case of Argentina’s exports this reduction was in their values
alone, the physical volumes remaining more or less constant.

This

decline in the prices for Argentine exports in the world market
meant, of course, a reduced capacity for imports, their physical
volume shrinking by almost one half from 13 million tons in 1929 to
6.9 million in 19.33.
To grasp the meaning in these figures one should recall the
extent to which Argentina depended on importing manufactured goods
during its externally oriented growth phase.

Thus, while local pro

duction could satisfy about 95 percent of the demand for processed
foodstuffs and tobacco and these constituted only about 5.3 percent
of Argentina's total imports between 1925 and 1929, "metals" and
"machinery and vehicles" took up about 38 percent of all imports for
that period and local production could only satisfy between 30 and
40 percent of the demand for these types of goods.

Even in textiles,

only 25 percent were produced locally and their importation represented
about 22 percent of all the goods imported during those years.

2

^Jorge, p. 109.

2

Ibid., p. 133. Jorge cites Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Stages
in the Industrialization of Argentina (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato
Di Telia, 1966). Diaz Alejandro's sources are E.C.L.A.’s El desarrollo
economico de la Argentina (Santiago, Chile: 1958) and the Consejo
Nacional de Desarrollo's Cuentas nacionales de la Republica Argentina
(Buenos Aires, 1964).
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The internal repercussions of this crisis were indeed pro
found enough to throw into temporary disarray the existing alliance of
domestic and foreign groups controlling the productive and marketing
structures.

The immediate result was the military coup of 1930 led

by Jose^Uriburu which put an end to the experiment with democratic
procedures under the Radical Party.

A systematic response to the

crisis in the form of a coherent set of policies by representatives
of the ruling group within the oligarchy was not, however, immediately
forthcoming.

There followed a period when various approaches were

suggested and sometimes pursued at cross-purposes.

The direction of

the policies of the group within the oligarchy that won out emerged
gradually and reached its quintessential expression with the RocaRunciman Pact signed between Great Britain and Argentina in 1933.
In the chapter above, I pointed out that the Radical Party
governments of the 1916-30 period did not introduce any significant
departures from the free trade policies underlying externally oriented
growth.

On the contrary, protectionist measures for manufacturing

were at their lowest point and the export of agro-pastoral goods in
exchange for imported industrial commodities reached its high point
during those years.

It was therefore not the threat from a middle

class government representing an aspiring industrial bourgeoisie
which accounted for the 1930 coup.

In fact, the Radical Party took

the most reactionary position in the debate over the most appropriate
response to the crisis of the thirties, essentially calling for a
return to the status quo ante.
It was not the fear of an aspiring bourgeoisie, rather it was
the impact of the crisis of the thirties which threatened the ongoing
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relations of production, that convinced the dominant oligarchic fac
tion of the need to use the machinery of the state to strengthen its
position.

The danger to the established order as well as the futility

of laissez faire economics and the need for state intervention
became apparent as the level of production dropped some 40 percent,
salaries and wages 60 percent, and almost 13 million people were
thrown out of work in the expectation that the -economy would recover
spontaneously between 1930 and 1933.^
A more activist role for the state required increasing the
size and power of the state apparatus itself.

Between 1935 and 1941

the personnel employed by the state increased some 3.9 percent per
year.

This rate almost doubled between 1941 and 1950, reaching a 7.7

percent increase per year.

2

Thus the Peronist state not only continued,

but greatly expanded the trend toward more intervention and the cor
responding growth in the state bureaucracy.

Ironically, Peron further

strengthened the state in order to use it against the very sectors
that had set the process in motion.

However, as we shall see, the

state was not used to dismantle the oligarchy's power in the economic
realm.

Peronism neutralized the oligarchy politically and succeeded

in displacing it from its central position in the nation's economic
life.

But one of the Peronist regime's major flaws was that it did

not challenge the oligarchy's ownership of the means of production.
The fact that the large landed estates were never expropriated,

^Jorge, p. 108.

2

E.C.L.A., El desarrollo de la Argentina (Mexico: United
Nations, 1959), p. 82.
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enabled the oligarchy to be one of the principal participants in
Peron's overthrow in 1955 and in the subsequent attempt to eradicate
Peronism from the Argentine body politic.
Just as the Peronist state continued strengthening of the
state apparatus, so too did it continue the trend towards a more
autonomous role for the state, and for the same reasons.

As the

state moved away from laissez faire towards more active policy-making
in the thirties, its structures increased in number and complexity.
This growth and differentiation in state apparatus was both the result
of and, in turn, a further cause leading to increasingly complex
economic relationships.

On the one hand, the stronger and more

heterogeneous state reflected the greater complexity in the economic
and social structures that came about with the growing manufacturing
sector; and, on the other, the state's policies helpful to industriali
zation further eroded the greater homogeneity and simplicity of the
old economic and social structures resting on the clear-cut supremacy
of rural production for export.

This dialectic was also involved in

the tendency towards greater autonomy for the state.

That is, the

state became relatively more independent of unmediated class interests
as the socio-economic structure became more complex; and, at the same
time, this greater autonomy enabled the state to enact policies
accentuating the differentiation of economic interests.
The growth of the industrial sector reinforced the more
autonomous role for the state in that its principal role was no
longer to simply translate the ruling class' agrarian interests
into policies.

Now these policies had to be adjusted to take

into account the interests of other property owning sectors
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structured around the accumulation of industrial capital.

During

the thirties the state becomes more of a mediator, moderating within
an increasingly complex power block.

If the correlation of class

forces became more complex in the thirties, this was even truer in
the forties.

The Peronist state resolved contradictions in the

industrializing policies of the thirties in a direction which intensi
fied the growth rate of manufacturing activity even further.

With

greater economic and social complexity, came even more autonomy for
the state.*
It is important to keep in mind that though the policies of
the thirties did incorporate interests tied to the industrial sector,
these policies were nevertheless formulated under the sponsorship of
the dominant faction within the landowning oligarchy.

Their hegemony

over the decision making process confined policies within a framework
that sought to keep dependency on the traditional external links intact.
As we will see below, industrialization was kept within the limits
fixed by the system from which the ruling class derived its income.
Nevertheless, the process went far enough to substantially increase
the sector of manufacturers who stood to benefit from a popular
mobilization pushing for economic growth oriented towards the internal
market.

This was the context that made Peronism a viable response to

the contradictions arising from the policies of the thirties.
The state was strengthened in the thirties, it became more
autonomous, and its policies further intensified these tendencies by

^This analysis is paraphrased from Miguel Murmis and Juan
Carlos Portantiero’s "Crecimiento industrial y alianza de clases en la
Argentina (1930-40)" in Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo.
(Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1971), pp. 42-3.
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making the correlation of class forces more complex in promoting
the potentially conflicting interests of diverse sectors.

Thus when

the military seized control in 1943 it meant the opposite of what it
had meant in 1930.

It indicated the weakness and exhaustion of the

landowning oligarchy as the ruling class. "In assuming state control,
the armed forces filled a class vacuum and became the bulwark of the
system."^

It was during the Peronist period that the state achieved

its maximum autonomy wherein no one class controlled state power.

What

then were the policies of the 1930-43 period that led to this situation?

Oligarchic Response to the Crisis of the Thirties;
Modified Externally Oriented Growth
The impact of the world crisis on the Argentine economy led
the regime to shift away from the traditional free trade policies
towards measures benefiting many marginal domestic enterprises in the
industrial area.

The disruption of the trade of agro-pastoral goods

for manufactured commodities caused a change in the traditionally
aloof attitude towards domestic manufacturing.

The erection of

protective barriers became economic policy and such measures as
devaluation of the currency, multiple exchange rates, and import con
trols, measures which were also a fundamental part of Peronist economic
policy, made marginal local enterprises into profitable ventures.

In

essence, these policies addressed themselves to the lessons learned from
the disruptive impact of the First World War.

^Ed Daniels, "From Mercantilism to Imperialism: The Argentine
Case," Part II, N.A.C.L.A. Newsletter 4 (October 1970): 5.
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These industrializing policies were instituted under the
auspices of the dominant faction within the landowning oligarchy, and
they were designed to aid the agricultural sector.

Therefore, only a

limited and partial industrialization took place, one that remained
subordinated to maintaining agricultural production as the foundation
of the nation's economy.

The thrust of the regime's efforts at pre

serving the functional primacy of the agro-pastoral sector in the
economy during the "infamous decade,"* amounted to compensating for
the decreased role of agro-exporting economies in the world market
with a corresponding decrease in imports from the industrial nations.
Table 8 shows the drop in volume and value of imports during the
thirties.

TABLE 8.— Quantity and value of imports, 1928-40 (using the
base of 1910=100)
Year

Quantum of Imports

Real Value of Imports

1928

153.6

220.6

1930

136.9

194.8

1932

69.2

97.0

1934

83.1

128.7

1936

94.7

129.5

1938

115.8

169.4

1940

88.7

173.8

Source : Anuarios de comercio exterior de la Republics Argentina
Adapted from Jorge, p. 122.

Because of the widespread misery of the poorer sectors, the
blatant use of the "patriotic fraud" by the conservative regime to en
trench itself in power, and what the nationalist critics of the olig
archy of the period considered to be the scandalous subservience to
Britain and other imperialist powers, the thirties became popularly
known as la decada infame.
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Jorge notes that the slight increases registered for 1936
and 1938 were a corollary to increases in the level of exports for
those years.

He goes on to observe that if one keeps in mind that

national production continued to grow throughout the decade, then it
becomes evident that a drastic reduction in the coefficient of impor
tation took place in the thirties.^In promoting this strategy, the hegemonic group

within the

oligarchy showed a good deal of political sophistication.

The inter

national economic collapse of 1929 disrupted the traditional pattern
of exchanging foodstuffs for imported manufactured goods.

The

falling prices commanded by agro-pastoral goods in the advanced capi
talist nations meant a corresponding reduction in the volume of
goods Argentina could obtain.

Hence by promoting industrialization

but limiting it to filling the vacuum previously covered by the
importation of consumer goods, the dominant oligarchic group was able
to maintain its source of income and power intact.

If it had resisted

rather than promoting the needed readjustments, the ruling group with
in the oligarchy could have lost control of the key economic processes
and seen profound changes in the economic structures undermine its
social and political position.
The groups which benefited from the import substituting
industrialization of the thirties were the same ones whose positions
were protected by the Roca-Runciman Pact, as we shall see below.

The

modifications in the externally oriented growth pattern introduced in
the thirties reflected the realignment in the alliance of groups that

^Jorge, p. 123.
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emerged as dominant after the traditional configuration was thrown
into disarray by the impact of the crisis.

Of crucial significance

for the unfolding of the traditional process were the facts that the
landowning oligarchy no longer remained a homogeneous group,
and that the subordinated sector within it came to form a part of
the alliance of groups constituting the opposition.

Indeed, the

policies endorsed by the ruling faction exacerbated the split within
the oligarchy by causing the income of the subordinated group to
shrink further during the decade.
The split between the invernadores (cattle fatteners) and the
criadores (cattle breeders) which had been developing in the twenties
came to a head in the thirties.

The technological base for the pre

dominance of the invernadores came

about through the progress of the

meatpacking industry which permitted the export of chilled beef, a
far superior product to frozen beef because it is virtually equivalent
to fresh meat.

In the twenties chilled beef assumed the first position

in the export of meat products.

The production of chilled beef

requires animals of good stock and special preparation.

Furthermore,

since the product must be consumed within 45 days of slaughter, the
supply must be constant to meet the demand; in contrast to frozen beef
where a constant demand can be supplied with seasonal production.

The

production of chilled beef therefore, put a premium on having good
pasture land available, especially during the winter months.

For this

reason, the invernadores tended to be owners of large tracts of grazing
land within the province of Buenos Aires, while the criadores tended
to come from the interior.
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Their ability to provide a constant and voluminous supply of
cattle, thus having sole access to the meatpacking plants, assured the
invernadores a virtual monopoly over the trade with Great Britain while
other cattlemen found their interest subordinated.

The ascendancy of

the invernadores became formalized when one of theirs, Luis Duhau, be-r
came president of the powerful Sociedad Rural Argentina* in 1927.

The

hegemony of the invernadores was further consolidated when Duhau took
over the pivotal post of Minister of Agriculture in the thirties.

The

extent to which the interests of other cattlemen were subordinated is
revealed by the Roca-Runciman Pact which stabilized the annual export
of chilled beef at around 350,000 tons while the annual exports of
frozen beef declined from 269,000 tons between 1925-9 to 56,000 tons
between 1930-4.

2

While the invernadores found a limited form of import substi
tuting industrial development compatible with their orientation of
exporting to England, the subordinated pastoral groups found markets
for their exports of frozen and canned meats, lamb and beef, primarily
in the United States, Germany, and Italy.

They looked to the United

States, which forbid the import of chilled but not frozen beef, as a
source for the provision of manufactured goods.

They considered domes

tic industry to be artificial and a violation of the natural division
of international labor.

They saw protective barriers as leading first

*The Sociedad Rural was the institutional expression of the
traditional landed oligarchy. Its membership was restricted to the
most prestigeous ruling class families.

2
p. 27.

This analysis and data are taken from Murmis and Portantiero,
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to trade wars and ultimately to armed,conflict between nations.*
This orientation towards national industry and international trade
was also espoused by representatives of the Radical Party in the
Congress during the infamous decade.

Thus the most privileged

oligarchic group possessed a certain modernizing orientation while
the subordinated agrarian owners found an echo for their views among
the so-called progressive sectors in Congress.

It must be noted

however, that both groups still based their fundamental interests on
external commerce.^
With the policies of the thirties the dominant faction
within the oligarchy secured its traditional source of income and was
therefore in a position to favor a limited form of industrialization.
Industrializing policies produced, at least temporarily, a new equilib
rium that allowed the system to function without fundamental structural
change and thus preserved the hegemony of the privileged agro-pastoral
group.

These policies also had the advantage of producing new allies

among the manufacturers who could offset the pressures arising from
the agricultural groups whose interests were sacrificed.

Finally,

one should not overlook the impact these policies had on the financial
investments in the manufacturing sector held by members of the dominant
group within the landed oligarchy.
The policies of the thirties,therefore,led to a modified ver
sion of externally oriented growth which preserved the interests of
the dominant groups in the rural oligarchy and benefited manufacturers

1
Murmis and Pbrtantiero, pp. 30-31.

2
Ibid., p. 32.
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involved in import substituting production.

These policies were an

appropriate response to the economic and political repercussions of the
crisis.

On the one hand, they were designed to fill the vacuum in

the supply of manufactured goods that resulted from the difficulty of
obtaining them from the advanced industrial nations and, on the other,
they compensated for the split within the oligarchy with support from
new socio-economic groups.
It is important to keep in mind that because the policies of
the thirties were formulated within the constraints imposed by main
taining the material base on which the dominant faction within the
oligarchy rested, only a limited form of industrialization took place.
Though the regime had its self-conscious advocates of industrialization,
the policies which were finally adopted were more the outcome of fol
lowing the lines of least resistance than they were the product of a
coherent and comprehensive design.

Their basic aim was the maximum

utilization of existing plant and facilities without major investments
in machinery and equipment and without a coherent investment policy
to promote diversification.*
As Murmis and Portantiero point out,

2

two strategies were

proposed to confront the dilemmas posed by the profound economic crisis
of the thirties: either stabilize the changes which had occurred almost
spontaneously so as to maintain them under the hegemonic control of
the most powerful sectors of the oligarchy, or reject all changes and
promote a return to the situation prevailing before the crisis.

The

conservative elite attempted to implement the first alternative with

1

Murmis and Portantiero, p. 42.

2

Ibid., p. 12.
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great difficulty which, among other things, intensified the develop
ing split within the ruling class.

The second alternative was the

program espoused by the Radical Party.

A third alternative, that of

a program for autonomous industrial growth under the sponsorship of
an independent entrepreneurial bourgeoisie— the classical model of
capitalist industrialization— never achieved an institutional ex
pression.

Murmis and Portantiero perceptively note that this absence

was one of the chief factors leading to the realignment of socio
economic force's that emerged as dominant in the Peronist period a few
years later.
The Roca-Runciman Pact of 1933 represents the quintessential
expression of the policies of the period and of the interests they
encompassed.

The Roca-Runciman Pact took shape in the context of the

displacement of Britain’s hegemony over Argentina's economy by interests
centered around North American capital.

It was an attempt to stem the

tide of this shift and to recreate, on a modified basis, the links
between local producers and the British interests which had been so
central to economic life prior to 1930.
Ever since the First World War, Britain had been losing ground
as a provider of manufactured goods, primarily as a result of the
increasing importance of the United States as a supplier.

At the same

time, England's importance as a market for Argentine goods grew.^

In

1926 the United States prohibited the importation of Argentine meats
and in 1927 France, Belgium, and Italy began to increase their duties

^Recall last chapter's discussion of the tripartite trade
pattern developing in the twenties. See pp. 93-96 above.
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on imported chilled beef while Germany reduced her imports by
half.*

In the beginning of the thirties 99 percent of Argentina's

chilled beef went to England and meat exports accounted for one half
of her foreign exchange earnings.

2

Thus when Great Britain summoned

her dominions to the Ottawa Conference on Imperial Preference in 1932
and this conference resolved to replace Argentine wheat and meat with
imports from Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Argentina’s beef mag
nates went into a state of near-panic.

In 1933, General Augustin

Justo dispatched his vice-president Julio Roca to negotiate with the
president of the Board of Trade in London, Walter Runciman.

The

result was the Roca-Runciman Pact.
The Roca-Runciman Pact, mentioned above, was an expression of
the control excercised by the dominant group within the agrarian sector.
Its provisions indicated the extent to which this ruling sector of
landowners succeeded in orienting the nation’s economic life around
their interests by recreating, on a modified basis, the previously
successful Anglo-oligarchic connection.

The first clause recognized

the importance of exporting chilled beef for Argentina's economic life
and established a guaranteed quota to be imported by Great Britain— at
least 90 percent of the tonnage imported in the first trimester of
1932.

With this measure the beef "fatteners" secured their traditional

source of wealth and power.
The remaining clauses cemented the relationship of this leading
faction of the oligarchy with British commercial, financial, and manu
facturing interests.

1

These clauses guaranteed the consolidation of

Skupch, p. 17.

2

Falcoff, p. 82.
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the meatpacking trust, the configuration of financial and commercial
interests centered on it, and more.

The second clause stated that

after deducting a reasonable amount for payment of interest

on the

public debt, the remainder of the income generated by Argentine
imports must be spent in England.

Further, 85 percent of the im

porting licenses for Argentine meat in England were to be distributed
by the British government.

The remaining 15 percent of the quota

could be distributed by the Argentine government only to its nationals
if they had property, control or administration of enterprises (meat
packing plants) that did not pursue private profit.

Moreover, the

Argentine government agreed not to levy any duties on coal, a major
import from England since it was the primary source for energy.

No

new duties would be imposed on any other goods, nor existing ones
raised.

Additionally, with respect to imports on whose duties Great

Britain demanded a reduction, it was agreed to return to the duties
and tariffs prevailing in 1930.

When the Pact came up for renewal

in 1936 "England obtained further concessions for British goods in
Argentina, even to the extent of eliminating the private bus lines
that posed a threat to the British-owned transport system in the city
of Buenos Aires."^
While the Roca-Runciman Pact cemented the alliance between
British interests and the dominant group within the oligarchy, it
also widened the cleavage that had been developing in the ranks of
the landowning oligarchy.

In this sense too the Roca-Runciman Pact

expressed an important feature of the period: no homogeneous class

^Scobie, p. 183.
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interests prevailed.

Not only was the landowning oligarchy divided, the

industrial bourgeoisie too was split into fractions with diverging
interests.
The extent to which the policies of the thirties succeeded in
revitalizing the Anglo-oligarchic connection is evidenced by the
shifts in the trade patterns for the decade.
Imports from Great Britain rose from 17.5 percent to 22.2
percent of the total from 1929 to 1939. Exports to Great
Britain rose from 32.1 to 35.9 percent. The key item in
trade relations with Great Britain during this period is
that from 1934 to 1936, Great Britain purchased 98.6 percent
of Argentine exports of chilled beef, 77 percent of frozeijL
mutton and lamb, and 76.8 percent of frozen pork exports.
Not only did the Roca-Runciman Pact cement Britist interests with
those of the leading faction within the oligarchy, it also achieved
a partial reversal of the tripartite trade pattern that had been
developing in the twenties, reorienting the volume and flow of imports
away from the United States and towards Great Britain.

In 1929, 31

percent of Argentina's purchases were of continental European origin,
27 percent from the United States and only 17 percent were of English
origin.

By 1935 this pattern had changed so that 25 percent of

Argentina's purchases proceeded from Great Britain, another 25 percent
from continental Europe, and only 13 percent were of North American
origin.

For the decade of the twenties, Argentina's imports from the

United States exceeded her exports to the U.S. leaving a negative
balance of trade of some 275.6 million pesos.

For the decade of the

thirties, this figure had decreased to 54.2 million pesos.

2

^Laura Randall, An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 228.
2
Jorge, p. 124.
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By favoring British imports to the detriment of those from the
United States, the policies of the period reinforced the efforts of
North American groups investing in subsidiaries producing or assembling
goods within Argentina.

In this way they accentuated the trend ob

served for the twenties of U.S. investments oriented towards manufac
turing and they hastened the transitional process leading to dependent
industrialization.

The policies of the thirties represented a tempor

arily successful attempt to recreate the Anglo-oligargic connection on
a modified basis.
the tide

In the end however, it was a vain attempt to stem

eroding the traditional linkages.

The branches in which U.S. investments increased in the thirties
were those that subsequently benefited from Peronist industrialization.
In their results, the policies of the thirties produced the second of
the conditions enumerated for the emergence of a transitional period.'*'
That is, these policies rapidly buttressed the infrastructure, the
industrial plant and equipment, necessary for the new pattern.

Manu

facturing became the fastest growing sector in the Argentine economy
during this period.

2

"In the ten year period, 1935-44, total indus3

trial employment almost doubled, salaries more than doubled,

and the

estimated value of total industrial production nearly tripled."^

*See pp. 23-24 above.

2

Guido DiTella and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarollo
argentino, (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1967), p. 436.
3
As will be seen, the years after the 1943 coup were critical
in this respect.
^"National Economy of Argentina" in Commercial Pan America,
(Washington, D.C., Pan American Union) (July-August 1946).
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Though manufacturing became the leading sector in the Argentine
economy in terms of growth during the thirties, this growth was largely
confined to the expansion of existing plant.

Nor was this surprising

given the integration of the industrial sector into an alliance of
classes structured around the hegemony of the leading oligarchic faction.
The industrializing project of the period was therefore confined to a
limited framework which Murmis and Portantiero aptly define as "indus
trial growth without an industrial revolution;"^
growth without basic structural changes.

that is, industrial

In summary, industrial growth

under oligarchic auspices was limited to filling the vacuum previously
covered by the importation of consumer goods, principally in the food
stuffs and textile branches.

Its limitation followed from its basic

aim which was the maximum utilization of the existing plant and facilities without major investments in machinery and equipment.

2

Contradictions in the Industrialization of the Thirties
Though limited and subordinated, the resulting industrial
growth was nevertheless of such a magnitude that the process had es
caped the control of its initiators by 1943.

It was in this sense

that the infrastructure for the developmental pattern implemented
through Peronist policies was being vastly expanded in the decade be
fore Peronism came to power.

The Argentine Industrial Census of 1946

shows the accelerated expansion in the total number of industrial
plants established.

It reveals a progression of approximately 1,700

newly established enterprises per year in the decade of the twenties,
1
Murmis and Portantiero, p. 11.

2

Ibid., p. 12.
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2,800 per annum in the thirties, and 5,000 new firms per year in the
Second World War.
In one sense Peronism represented a continuation of trends
gaining ground in the thirties.

Peronist policies basically continued

the import substituting industrialization of its predecessors.

Though

the balance of power in the bargaining area was shifted towards labor,
these policies aimed to keep industrial activity within a capitalist
framework.

However, as we shall see, the very continuation and ac

celeration of the pace of industrial activity required substantial
modifications in the economic and socio-political patterns of the
thirties, and it required fundamental shifts in the connections between
local groups and external interests.

The astronomical rise in manu

facturing activity promoted by Peronist policies from 1943 to 1950
represented a basic departure from the policies of the thirties.
Reversing the traditional subordination of manufacturing activity to
agricultural production was the cornerstone of the Peronist strategy
for industrialization.

In raising the primacy of industrial interests

over those of landowners, Peronism diverged radically from the oli
garchic developmental model.

The reasons for these shifts are to be

found in the contradictions being intensified with the policies of the
thirties.
The contradictions implicit in the nature of industrial devel
opment taking place in the thirties and its relationship to the class
structure provided the conditions which made the rise of Peronism
possible.

As a by-product of the tremendous increase in manufacturing

activity, the working class saw its ranks mushroom.

According to one

source, while industrial production expanded 53.7 percent between
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1937 and 1946, a half a million people entered the labor force,
thereby more than doubling the numbers of workers in industrial
establishments employing ten or more laborers in the 1935-41
decade, from 440,582 to 936,387.1

This

growing

mass

significantly swelled by rural immigration into Buenos Aires, was to
provide the social base for Peron's rise to power.

While industrial

workers were increasingly incorporated into the economy, there was no
commensurate integration of the working class into the political sys
tem.

Quite the opposite characterized the conservative regimes of the

thirties.

Moreover, repressive labor policies curtailed wages and

benefits.

Adding to the workers’ discontent was the fact that along

with the rural to urban migration and low agricultural productivity,
there was also an increased urban demand for foodstuffs which led to a
rise in food prices.

The result was further decrease in the living

standards of the urban proletariat.
Industrial development of the thirties also produced disaffections among sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie.

For one thing,

though their economic importance rose,they too did not see their
political power rise commensurately.

For another, the rise in

agricultural prices for the domestic market meant that low income con
sumers had less to spend on manufactured goods.

This brought the

interests of sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, particularly those
producing wage goods— textiles and other non-durable consumer goods—
into conflict with those of the landowning class.

Additionally, the

^Victor,Testa, "Crecimiento (1935-46) y estancamiento (1947-63)
de la produccion industrial argentina" in Fichas de investigaci<Tn
economica y social 1: 6.
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tremendous expansion of national industry in the thirties created
pressures for protectionism amongst sectors of the industrial bour
geoisie that went beyond those envisaged by offical measures already
instituted, and conflicted openly with the dominant "free trade" econ
omics and the favoritism shown toward British imports.

Thus the indus

trialization of this pre-Peronist period created a dynamic of its own
toward a nationalistic, self-sustained economic growth.

Such orienta

tions toward economic independence and autonomy conflicted with the
oligarchy's trade alliance with foreign, particularly British, capital.
Peronism, on the other hand, found fertile ground in these orienta
tions.

Indeed, the industrialists' acquiescence to Peronism's initial

pro-Axis stance may be largely attributed to their fear of the more
immediate Anglo-American competitive threat in the area of providing
consumer goods.
Peronism resolved the contradictions arising from the economic
formulas of the thirties and replaced them with new contradictions
that ultimately led to its disintegration.

The central contradiction

in the oligarchic model of economic development was that it promoted a
certain degree of internal industrial development in order to maintain
the basic structures of externally oriented growth based on agricultural
production.

The needed modifications in the traditional arrangements

generated tensions and produced a host of postponed demands and aspira
tions.

The limited import substituting industrialization promoted in

the thirties began to conflict with the interests on which the alliance
between the ruling faction of the oligarchy and British capital was
based.
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The pressures in the direction of a nationalistic conception
of a fully developed national industry providing for the nation's
needs formed the basis for Peronism's economic program.

And labor's

accumulated demands provided the mortar with which Peron built the
mass movement forming the regime's foundation.

In order to push

import substituting economic development to its full potential, a
broad social base was essential to offset the political power of the
oligarchy.

This is precisely what Peronism accomplished with its

populist base and its nationalist inspired First Five Year Plan.

It

resolved the tensions in the limited import substituting industrial
development of the thirties in favor of the full scale import substi
tuting model of internally oriented growth of the forties.
Two aspects of the economic and socio-political developments
of the 1930-43 period should be stressed here because of their vital
bearing on the emergence and content of the Peronist formulas of
1943-55.

First are the ramifications which follow from the fact that

industrialization took place under the auspices of the pro-British
faction of the rural oligarchy.

The beneficiaries of import substitut

ing manufacture did not represent an independent, progressive bourgeoi
sie attempting to impose its socio-political formulas on a backward and
recalcitrant feudal class.

As we have seen, industrialization did not,

as in the classical model, develop as a dynamic consequence of a rising
industrial bourgeoisie.

Indeed, what emerged in the thirties was not

a homogeneous national entrepreneurial class, but rather an industrial
sector with deep divisions among industrialists.
This heterogeneity and division within classes and sectors was
the other important aspect of the economic and socio-political develop
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ments of the thirties.

It applied not only to the industrial bour

geoisie, but to all classes as well.

Both, the set of groups support

ing the regime's economic policies and that of those opposing them, were
comprised of fractions of classes and social sectors.

One cannot

speak of clear-cut homogeneous class interests; the social picture
was characterized by tensions and conflicting interests cutting across
all major socio-economic sectors.

As we have seen, not even the

ruling group enjoyed the solid support of its economic and social base,
but sought rather to construct an alliance of diverse interests cen
tered on its hegemony.

This rather fluid social situation, characteris

tic of a transitional period, also had an important bearing on the
development of Peronism.

The Populist-Nationalist Critique
This discussion of the developments in the thirties which made
Peronism a viable alternative, would be incomplete if it omitted the
intense critical ferment that took the form of a progressive nationalism
challenging the oligarchy's leadership.

Peronism as a doctrine anchored

itself on the populist-nationalist critique that developed in response
to the contradictions of the "infamous decade."

The collapse of Argen

tina's position in world trade and the adjustments in the traditional
arrangements to meet the new situation, produced a sense of disequili
brium and a climate of uncertainty and tensions.

Not surprisingly

therefore, the 1930-43 period was filled with critical ferment repudiat
ing the society's dominant values of economic and political liberalism,
values which after all were being negated with the policies of the
elite that came to power through the military coup of 1930.

Moreover,
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though these policies aimed to preserve the functional primacy of the
agricultural sector, they depended, as we have seen, on a certain type
and degree of industrialization.

Though intended to have a limited

scope, the industrializing process developed a dynamic impetus which
pushed it beyond the envisioned confines.

This too found its expression

in the populist-nationalist critique of the thirties.
Essentially the populist-nationalist polemics of the period did
not trace the causes of Argentina's problems of the bottom of the socie
ty, as elite historians had done by pointing to the uncivilized masses
of the interior or the ignorant proletarian immigrants from Europe.
Instead they traced these problems to. the top . of the society.

The

national dilemma was framed in terms of the unholy alliance between
the vendepatria (selling out the country) oligarchy and foreign imperi
alists.*

This type of nationalism was therefore more inclusive than

exclusive; it struck a responsive chord with the urban masses and the
intelligentsia.

Programatically, it "offered the Argentine middle

class the gratifying possibility of pursuing its own corporate
interests— social mobility, economic opportunity, political influence—
within the framework of a crusade for national sovereignty."

*Books like Benjamin Villafena's La tragedia argentina
(1943), Julio and Rodolfo Irazusta's La argentina y el imperialismo
britanico (1934), Jose Luis Torres' Algunas maneras de vender la patria
(1940), and Raul Scalabrini Ortiz's Pol£tica britahica en el Rio de la
Plata and his Historia de los ferrocarriles argentinos (both 1940) "de
picted Argentina as a sort of gigantic estancia whose agricultural and
stock-raising capacities were being mercilessly exploited by Great
Britain through a pliant Argentine elite." From Falcoff, pp. 77-8.
This section relies on the analysis developed in his article.
2Ibid., p. 78.
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As enunciated by Peron in lusticialismo's famous trinity—
economic independence,

political

sovereignty

and social justice— the movement's reason for being as well as
its fundamental aims, expressed the essence of the populist-nationalist
polemics.

Each side of this trinity was conceived as firmly bound to

the other; one could not exist without the other and the pursuit of
one would naturally lead to the others.

Thus the Peronist goal, to

free Argentina from the domination and exploitation of British and
North American imperialists, and from the rule of the vendepatria
oligarchy in alliance with them, could only be achieved by exercising
the nation's political sovereignty. At the same time, removing the
primary barrier to the attainment of popular aspirations— the domina
tion of the imperialists and vendepatrias— would also lead to social
j us.tice.
Populist-nationalism provided Peronism with the content of
its program and its class orientation.

Peron himself acknowledged his

indebtedness to its major exponent, Raul Scalabrini Ortiz.

According

s
to Peron, Scalabrini Ortiz
shaped the entire nature of the resistance to the usurpers
(during the 1930s), elucidating what everyone else sought
to discover--the "causes of the Argentine defeat." He was
a born fighter, and I am especially indebted to him for the
original ideas set forth in my La fuerza es el derecho de las
bestias and Los vendepatrias.
He exercised, in a certain way,
the first moral magistracy of
the republic, and when hedeparted^
this world, he made me the recipient of his political testament.

1

*

*

Enrique Pavon Pereyra. Coloquios con Peron (Buenos
1965), p. 59 as quoted in Falcoff; p. 79.

Aires: n.p.,
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It was from the propagandists efforts of Scalabrini Ortiz and others
that Peronism derived its view of Argentina tied to Great Britain
though economic structures that made a colonial type of relationship
inevitable.^

The program for "economic independence" was designed

to remedy this national disgrace.
Three interrelated aspects of the populist-nationalist per
spective both gave Peronism its resiliance and strength and also made
for its limitations and weakness.
above.

The first of these is alluded to

Its populist and nationalist thrust linked the activities of

foreign imperialists to their connections with the local ruling class.
In this respect the populist-nationalists were definite precursors of
the dependency theory analysis.

In his definitive study, Juan Jose

Hernandez Arregui says of Raul Scalabrini Ortiz:
This Argentine writer, who does not cite Marx, proved to be
more of a revolutionary than the impostors of the left. These
men (populist-nationalists), who were not Marxists, were the
first to analyze our national history and its relationship to
Latin America with methodological and historical criteria
very close to Marxism. In one of his first works with a his
torical orientation, he said: "Europe never looked to America
as a source for establishing offshoots. It was hostile and
almost cruel, first with the indigenous and then with the as
similated. Europe only wanted to extract from America, gold

For example, in Pol£tica britanica en el Rio de la Plata,
Scalabrini Ortiz convincingly showed the process whereby British
interests achieved their economic domination of Argentine life by
extending strategic loans. In Historia de los ferrocarriles argentinos he showed how the British took control of the railroad network
by acquiring already functioning Argentine lines with generous condi
tions facilitated by the Argentine government or gaining from it con
struction subsidies and later acquiring its shares. In both instances
he demonstrated that the process was not so much one of foreign
capital investing in a virgin area because of the lack of national
capital, as much as one of foreign capital gaining access to the
apex of a base of indigenous capital through the all-too eager
intermediary of the national government.
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in the beginning, minerals later, and raw materials and
foodstuffs today. Formerly it used force and compulsion, now
it makes use of financial ability and astuteness. In any
case, gain was always the motive. That is why the study of
the economic factor^is fundamental in the relations between
Europe and America.
"If British capital and investment had been unnecessary— indeed,
dysfunctional— to Argentine development,' of what value had Argentina's
commercial relationship with the U.K. been?"

Scalabrini argued that a

key lesson derived from the crisis of the thirties was that whatever
•h

purposes the exchange of Argentine raw materials for English manufac
tures might once have served, since 1930 the terms of trade had turned
increasingly disadvantageous for Argentines.

2

Another lesson for Argen

tine patriots to be learned from the crisis of the thirties according
to Scalabrini Ortiz— and here we come to the second of populistnationalism's aspects providing both for Peronism's strength and weak
ness, the class analysis implicit in the populist-nationalist perspec
tive— was that the thirties revealed the true divisions within Argen
tine society.
On one hand stands the whole nation, the whole people, without
distinction as to rank and class. On the other stand the
English and North American capitalists and their (Argentine)
representatives, who are . . . hoping to direct the outburst
of national passion either into internecine (class) conflict
or into xenophobic outbursts against the innocent, defenseless^
new immigrants, who work side by side" with native Argentines.

Juan Jose Hernandez Arregui, La formacion de la conciencia
nacional (Buenos Aires: Editorial Plus Ultra, 1973), pp. 334-5. My
translation.

2
Mark Falcoff, p. 94. He mentions Scalabrini Ortiz's Polixica
britanica en el Rio de la Plata (p. 224) as the source for his argument.
3
Ibid., p. 86.

Falcoff quotes from "Who Owns Argentina," p. 28.
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"Argentina was an agricultural and pastoral nation, Scalabrini
asserted, not because it was ’particularly suited' to be so, but
because its primitive state suited the interests of Great Britain
and the Argentine oligarchy."*
Internally, this analysis drew the conclusion that the pri
mary contradiction was that between "the people" as a whole (without
distinctions as to rank and class) and the oligarchy, for it was the
latter through whom the foreign imperialists implement,
ploitative design.

their ex

Populist-nationalism lent itself admirably well

for the purpose of mobilizing a broad, socially inclusive base,
strong enough to offset the political power of the oligarchy.
potential

Its

for uniting diverse sectors on a crusade for national

salvation served a useful ideological function for Peronism.

It

was populist-nationalism that inspired Peronism’s programmatic
orientation that sought, simultaneously, to satisfy the interests of
the working masses and the national bourgeosie.

In a conjunctural

circumstance where the local entrepreneurial class is very weak and
industrial capitalism is a largely foreign phenomenon, it does not
appear contradictory to maintain that the evils of capitalism will
disappear through economic development guided by the state and managed
by the national bourgeoisie.

By utilizing populist-nationalism's

class formula, Peronism was able to mobilize a very powerful social
base behind the regime, enabling it to keep its enemies in check for
a decade.

As we shall see, populist-nationalism's weakness was its

failure to recognize that the viability of its class formula was limited
to a specific conjunctural situation.

*Falcoff, p. 87.
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The populist-nationalism that emerged from "the infamous
decade" represented the response of an incipient national bourgeoisie
at a moment of crisis when its class position should have been, and
to a certain extent was, in ascent, but when it was also being con
tained by the representatives of the traditional order.
for Peronism to push its interests to the forefront.

It remained

The limitations

in this nationalist perspective did not therefore become fully appar
ent until they found their full expression in governmental policy a
decade later.

They were however, already implicit in this nationalism’s

petit bourgeois class base.

Thus although populist-nationalism's

lack of class distinctions in its analysis enabled it to have such
wide appeal that it became the popular political conscience of its
time, its lack of class analysis also became its principal weakness.
Beyond vague generalities, it had no penetrating social analysis.

This

was not accidental; it resulted from its being the product of a petit
bourgeois intelligentsia.

Speaking of populist-nationalism's

chief organizational expression in the thirties, the Fuerza de
Orientacion Radical de la Joven Argentina (FORJA), Juan Jose^ Hernandez
Arregui notes that the proletariat was non-existent in their analysis
of the historical development of nationalism.
In its extensive pamphletary and political literature of ten
years, the word proletariat was mentioned only once, and then
in a purely incidental manner. The term working class, never.
FORJA preferred to speak of the people as an idealizing gen
eralization which is, precisely because of the petit bourgeosie's
fear of class, an ideological technique to avoid recognizing
the existence of classes and real social antagonisms.

^"Hernandez Arregui, pp. 389-90.
original.

My translation, emphasis in
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On the other hand, as Hernandez Arregui also points out, without this
type of nationalist agitation, the entrance of the Argentine masses
onto the political stage and the emergence of a mass anti-imperialist
struggle would never have taken place.
The third interrelated aspect in the populist-nationalist
perspective that provided Peronism its strength and made for its
limitations was populist-nationalism's emphasis on, and attitude
towards, industrialization.

The populist-nationalist critique helped

undermine the deep-seated belief in the inevitability of Argentina’s
agro-pastoral role in the world economy.

By attacking the oligarchy,

its agro-pastoral base and its free trade orientation, Scalabrini Ortiz
and others contributed to the goal of industrialization through govern
ment policies.

But while the diagnosis of Argentina's economic ills

was accurate, the type of industrialization prescribed was an insuffi
cient remedy.

Scalabrini Ortiz saw industry as

the results of economic independence rather than its cause.
Scalabrini saw industry as something toward which the Argen
tine economy automatically tended . . . The conservative oli
garchy had deliberately placed obstacles in the way of indus
trialization— low tariffs on imports, high duties on raw
materials, high railroad rates, manipulation of credit and
currency— so that the problem was not so much to plan and
promote industry as to dislodge the oligarchy and the British
from power and allow events to take their 'natural' course.
The economic policies of the Peronist government based themselves on
this analysis and assumed that self-sustaining industrialization was
the automatic result of economic independence rather than its necessary
foundation.

This was one reason why so many key problems were ignored

and vigorous action postponed, until it was too late for the Peronist

falcoff, pp. 99-100.
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regime.

Consequently, while industrialization was certainly very

high on the agenda, the regime's policies did not go far enough beyond
those that had already been instituted by its oligarchic predecessor.
As will be shown further on, an important reason for Peronism's
failure to deal decisively with the roots of foreign dependency within
Argentina's class structure, was due to the fact that Peronist anti
imperialism did not go beyond that of the populist-nationalist critique.
Though it effectively attacked the oligarchy's political control with
popular mobilizations, Peronism did not substantially challenge the
oligarchy's material base in landownership.

Even the oligarchy's

institutional expressions like the Sociedad Rural Argentina and the
Catholic Church were not confronted by Peronism.

The hypothesis ex

plored in this study maintains that the Peronist government followed
economic policies, such as protective barriers, that sought to strengthen
national industry.

It did not however, seek to alter the class rela

tions involved in this process.

In this way, the regime neglected the

internal foundations that later reversed the trend towards economic
independence and autonomous growth.

Conclusions
This chapter addressed two of the conditions for the emergence
of a transitional period: 1) an international crisis with internal
repercussions severe enough to disrupt the ongoing pattern, and 2) the
development of the infrastructure for the new pattern.

The chapter

showed how the industrial plant and equipment, on which the new
pattern would base itself, were being rapidly expanded as manufacturing
became the leading sector in growth rate.
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The analysis focused primarily on the domestic repercussions
of the international crisis set off by the 1929 crash.

It discussed

the growth of the state apparatus and the tendency toward greater
autonomy for the state, which resulted from the increasing complexity
of the class forces structured around the ruling alliance and those
opposed to it.

Factors instrumental in the emergence of Peronism

were examined in the context of analyzing the modifications of the
externally oriented growth pattern introduced during this period.

In

providing an increased role for the manufacturing sector and the
groups tied to it, these modifications succeeded in intensifying the
contradictions that brought Peronism to power. By sponsoring a certain
degree of internally oriented growth as a prop to maintaining an externally
oriented economy, the oligarchic regime provided an increased role for
industrialists and labor, but it also constrained them and postponed and
suppressed their demands.

These were contradictions utilized by

Peronism in pushing the import substituting developmental model
initiated in the thirties to its full potential in the forties.

In

the above pages we also noted that the populist-nationalist critique
of the thirties provided Peronism its class orientation and programmatic
direction.

These will be looked at further as we analyze the Peronist

regime's strengths and weaknesses.

CHAPTER IV

PERONISM1S ACHIEVEMENTS, 1943-50

Introduction
In Chapter 3 I covered the first two conditions for the
existence of a transitional period.

This chapter analyzes the factors

involved in the remaining two conditions: the mobilization of a
social base into a political force strong enough to counter that of
the

traditional

ruling strata and determine the use of available

resources; and the presence of the material conditions needed for the
emerging developmental patterns to succeed.*

As will be seen, though

theoretically distinct, these two conditions were in reality closely
interconnected.
Peronism achieved its greatest successes in the areas of
industrialization and social welfare.

These achievements were closely

related in that they depended on a very favorable confluence of external
and internal factors.

This chapter argues that in the first place, the

increased demand for traditional exportables and the lessening of for
eign competition in the industrial area due to the war, provided the
material foundation to cover the costs for both industrialization and
social benefits.

In the second place, the policies enacted to achieve

these ends depended on the mobilization of social forces strong enough
to offset the power of the previously dominant groups.

*See pp. 23-4, above.

The diverse

146
✓
social sectors mobilized into Peron's power base, in turn, were held
together by the benefits derived from the regime’s policies.
Following the theoretical framework adopted in this study,
the analysis focuses on the continuities and differences with shifts
already present in the prior period.

Understanding the basic con

tinuities of Peronism and the ways in which it departed from its
oligarchic predecessors reveals the contradictions within Peronist
development.

The theme of the analysis is that Peronist policies

intensified the contradictions emerging from the shifts of the
thirties to the point that their impact went beyond quantitative to
qualitative change.
The analysis will show that the type of manufacturing
activity initially benefiting from Peronist policies was essentially
the same as that which had experienced rapid expansion in the
thirties.

In promoting a basically import substituting industrializa

tion within a capitalist framework, Peronism did not depart from the
policies of its predecessors.

This was true not only in the type of

enterprise which proliferated— small scale, producing non-durable
goods for domestic consumption— but also in the fundamental social
relations governing industrial activity, which remained the same in
spite of shifting the balance of power in the bargaining arena towards
labor.
Though the nature of manufacturing activity promoted did not
differ from that of the thirties, the amount of industrialization en
couraged did represent a departure and did lead to fundamental shifts
in the developmental pattern.

The years between 1945 and 1949 marked

the most intense industrialization Argentina had ever experienced.
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Indeed, 1944-45 represents the turning point at which the proportion
of the Gross Domestic Product contributed by manufacturing became
consistently larger than that contributed by the rural sector.
The Peronist years were the critical juncture in Argentine
history when the relationship between agriculture and industry was
reversed.

In other words, the 1943-45 period represents the decisive

stage in the transitional process toward dependent industrialization
because the nature of productive activity underlying Argentine economic
life was fundamentally altered during those years.

Industrial produc

tion oriented to the internal market became the predominant form of
economic activity.*
This chapter looks at the external and internal conditions so
favorable to the rapid and consistent expansion of manufacturing
activity, and to the development of the national market for consumer
goods between 1943 and 1950.

In relating the external factors, follow

ing pages explore the beneficial effects of World War II and of the
immediate post-war period on Argentina's international position.
Europe's increased demand for Argentina's traditional exports produced
the foreign exchange reserves
equipment.

needed

for purchasing machinery and

Moreover, Britain's weakened position as an exporter of

manufactured goods and North America's preoccupations in the war
effort, enabled Argentine industry to fill the vacuum.

As far as the

*The fact that Argentina's proportion of the population em
ployed in industry was the highest in all of Latin America in 1950,
indicates how important the manufacturing sector had become. See
John P. Cole, Latin America; An Economic and Social Geography, (London:
Butterworth and Co., 1965), p. 169.
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internal factors are concerned, industrialists benefited both directly
and indirectly from the sectoral and social redistributive policies
of the regime.

They were aided directly through availability of

state financing on easy terms, and indirectly via expansion of the
domestic market and minimized industrial strife, resulting from higher
wages and increased purchasing power of workers.
To achieve the astronomical rise in manufacturing activity
that took place from 1943 to 1950, Peronism incorporated aspects into
its policies that diverged radically from the oligarchic developmental
model.

Whereas industrial activity in 1930-43 was subordinated to

preserving rural production as the foundation of the economy, in the
1943-50 period agricultural production was clearly subordinated to the
requirements of the manufacturing sector.^

Indeed, reversing the

traditional subordination of manufacturing to agricultural production
was the cornerstone of Peronism's strategy for industrialization.

With

the creation of I.A.P.I. (Instituto Argentino de Promocion del Intercambio), Peron channeled the surplus generated by the rural sector into
industrial production.

Besides the monopolization of agricultural

exports by the state, other policies designed to achieve industrial
growth and economic liberation included: nationalization of Britishowned railroads and foreign-owned utility companies, development of a
state-owned merchant marine with considerable tonnage under Argentine
flags, creation of the Banco Central de la Republics Argentina, and
Five Year Plans with a priority on industrialization using such means

^Next chapter's analysis deals with the retrogression in
this relationship during the 1950-55 period.

149
as state investments and subsidies and the liberalization of credits.
Essentially, these policies.resolved the contradiction between
production for external markets and economic activity catering to
domestic needs, in the direction of the internally oriented growth
pole.

Obviously these policies undermined the interests of the foreign

and national groups that had determined the developmental process prior
to Peronism.

For this reason, in order to assert the new developmental

pattern, a mass mobilization under nationalist banners, Peronism1s
political tool, became an essential component in overcoming the resis
tance to the traditionally dominant groups.

Populist-Nationalism
This section appraises the doctrine that served Peronism in its
mass mobilizing efforts. An outgrowth of the nationalist polemics of
the crisis of the thirties, populist-nationalism called on "the people,"
including all popular sectors— workers, peons, small farmers, middle
classes, national entrepreneurs— to band together in a crusade to
rescue the nation from the domination of foreign interests and their
local allies, the vendepatria (sellout) rural oligarchy.

Populist-

nationalism provided Peronism with its class orientation and its pro
grammatic direction.

In tracing these, the survey that follows concen

trates on those aspects of Peronist doctrine which cast light on the
regime's strengths and weaknesses-.

I begin with the consumerist

orientation in Peronist economic policy.
With more than a little exaggeration, Peron remarked that
"We have overthrown an entire [economic]

theory and system that has

been applied for a century and a half throughout the world and on which
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thousands of volumes have been written."*

He was referring to the

primacy of the sphere of consumption in the orientation of the regime's
economic policies during its first

period in power.

When we improve the standard of living and increase consumption,
we subordinate capital to the economy and production to consump
tion. We do not ask the industrialists if they will produce
more when we raise salaries five-fold and increase consumption.
. . . They are producing more. . . . Everybody eats more, dresses
better, and lives more happi£y> and the capitalists make more
profit than they did before.
This orientation accorded with the propitious economic conditions for
Argentina at the time which allowed

the regime the possibility of

instituting reforms with a minimum of social turmoil.

However, be

cause it confined itself to the sphere of consumption, this orientation
also proved a liability in that it diverted attention from consideration
of the sphere of production.

Hence, when the situation favoring a

consumption orientation approach shifted, Vexon and his policy-makers
failed to move aggressively in changing the social relations of pro
duction.

In this way, they diminished their chances of successfully

confronting the burgeoning crisis.
Though the emphasis on consumerism ultimately created more
problems than the regime could cope with; while the advantageous
conditions prevailed this policy orientation obviously brought the
Peron government enormous popularity thereby solidifying its bonds
with the popular sectors.

Those aspects of Peronist economic doctrine

1
*
'
/
Juan Peron, Conduccion polftica (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Freeland, 1971), p. 74. My translation.
2Ibid., p. 75.
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which confined the regime's attention to the sphere of circulation
were thus both a source of strength as well as being responsible for
serious limitations.
There were also strengths and weaknesses implicit in how
Peronist doctrine treated the international dimension.

The connection

between economic dependence and foreign domination was one of the
maxims frequently repeated in Peron1s statements.

"Without economic

independence," he said in a speech at the Military School on August
7, 1945, "we shall always remain a semicolonial country."*

On another

occasion Peron observed, "I have said many times that in our internal
as well as international actions, we face but one problem and that
problem is the international problem."
of the international

2

*
Peron compared the functioning

system to a central tank,representing the ad

vanced industrial nations, and a
senting the peripheral economies.

series of tanks connected to it

repre

Labor and wealth Are the liquid

travelling through the system and the volume contained in the central
tank depends on how much is siphoned off from the periphery.

"There

is then only one remedy: put a shut-off valve on the pipe connection
to the central tank. . . . Our economy was only able to achieve this

3
with the first phase of its economic independence.

It was not easy."

^Quoted by Alejandro Peyrou and Ernesto Villanueva, "Documentos
para la historia del peronismo" in El peronismo (Buenos Aires: Carlos
Perez Editor, 1969,
p. 204. My translation.
2

*

/

y

Peron, Conduccion politica, p. 244.

3
In a statement made bn July 23, 1947.
Villanueva, pp. 239-40.

Cited by Peyrou and
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Despite his simplistic analogies, Peron disseminated a fairly
sophisticated understanding of the international system.

It encom

passed a clear awareness of the consequences of challenging dependence
on external interests.
(Though threatened with economic pressure and the sabotage of
foreign tradgj . . . we have decided to remain in the category
of those who choose not to submit . . .
That is why foreign interests will never forgive us and
will try for many years to recover what they have lost. That
is why they aim to boycott us by again invoking economic blockades
and international controls. But here too we know how to overcome
them.
On this latter point Peron proved to be wrong.

Though Peron's govern

ment struggled to resist direct foreign pressures, it was less able
to overcome the more subtle forms of economic penetration by foreign
interests.

The analysis in these two chapters shows that in spite

of drawing the connection between the international and the national,
Peronist doctrine did not lead to directly challenging these internal
manifestations.

This was a key factor in the ousting of Peronism from

state power.
No discussion of the international dimension in Peronist doc
trine would be complete without mention of the "third position."

Peron

used "the third position" to distinguish justicialism,/from capitalism—
the first position— to which his movement was a response, and communism
— the second position— which had failed as a solution.

2

The term was

defined in a variety of ways including, in the economic realm, as "the

*From statement dated July 6, 1951 in Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 244.

2

For example in a lecture given at the Escuela Superior
Peronista on July 2, 1953. In Juan Peron, Filosof{.& peronista
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Freeland, 1974), p. 265.
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abandonment of free enterprise and a planned economy, and their
substitution by a system of a social economy to which one arrives by
placing capital at the service of the economy."^

But its most enduring

meaning was in the area of international relations where Peron right
fully claimed to be a founding father of the movement of Third World,
non-aligned nations.

In a later, definitive statement on the subject,

Peron asserted:
Recovery of national dignity requires taking a position,
defining this position vis-a-vis the conflict between the
two camps, such as Argentina has done. But she has defined
herself, not within one ofjthe two camps; instead she has
opted for an independent third position.
Nevertheless, Argentina does not pretend to create a
third force to intervene between the conflicting imperialist
camps; she wishes only to act in her sovereign capacity to
decide her own destiny and to integrate this destiny fraternally
with her sister nations of Latin America.^
In one of his many earlier anti-imperialist statements,
Peron

pointed out that the struggle for economic independence, to

put into effect the principles of sovereignty and nationhood and the
conception of the juridical equality of states, meant "preventing the
interference of capitalist imperialism which, in its hunger for profits
and in accordance with its own interests, withholds from the natives
the benefits of their labor and of the exploitation of their wealth,
taking fabulous earnings out of the country and having a negative
impact in the economic and social realms, and often condemning the
country's children to live a life of misery."

Message to Congress on May Day 1950. In Filosophia peronista, p. 271.
All citations from this source are my translation.
2Ibid., p. 269.
3
Made on the 24th of May of 1948. Cited by Peyrou and Villa
nueva, pp. 295-6/
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It is important to stress the anti-imperialism in Peronist
doctrine because it provided.a key basis for the movement's mass
appeal.

It is also important to note that contrary to the allegations

which view Argentine expressions of anti-imperialist solidarity with
Latin American nations as a cover for continental hegemonic aims,
such expressions reflected a sympathetic understanding for parallel
struggles against a common enemy.
Getulio Vargas, authentic representative of the Brazilian people,
triumphs against the pressure of the North and the dollars of
Standard Oil. Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia overcomes the same
foreign opposition. Ibanez in Chile wages a similar struggle
against the imperialist interests. Venezuela squashes a coup
attempt of the foreign type, so common on this continent of
"the Good Neighbor." Near her, other countries suffer the same
threats. Guatemala has been the victim of almost twenty coup
attempts in four years, all discharged from the same direction.
Puerto Rico fights for her independence against the common
danger of all our people. In Central America Guatemala, Hon
duras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, etc., get together, all of them
being on "the list" and jointly exploited and threatened. *
It must be noted however, that despite his vigorous statements,
✓
Peron was essentially a pragmatist.

Thus in the same year that he

made the above statement, in observing that there would be a war be
tween the two imperialisms in which "one would triumph and the other
be defeated but
the

in which neither of the two, neither the victor nor

vanquished, would win the war," Peron justified

cipation in the U .S .-sponsored anti-Soviet bloc.

Argentina'sparti

"For political, ideo

logical, geographic, and strategic reasons, we cannot come out in favor
of Communism. . . .

We know where the center of gravity for our actions

must lie: within the Western bloc."

2

^Dated October 25, 1951 in Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 317.
2

/

Conduccion politics. p. 251.
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Nevertheless, Peron responded to and, in turn, deepened the
anti-imperialist consciousness of the Argentine masses.

Following in

the footsteps of populist-nationalist polemicists of the thirties,
Peron found a responsive echo when he taught Argentines to respect
their own and despise the elitists who downgraded the indigenous and
identified with the "superior" culture emanating from abroad.

He

characterized the renowned Argentine intelligentsia as "constantly
looking to Europe with envious eyes, ashamed of being Argentine and
American, underestimating their own people, who could be the only
source of something substantial and authentic."

"The ruling classes,"

he said, "had a predilection for the French, the British or the Yankee,
and absolute contempt for the Argentine."*

The consequences of cul

tural imperialism, Peron taught, were "to create deceptive ideas about
superiority and foment petty conflicts among people of a common des
tiny, such as those of South America."

Such conflicts undermined the

basis for an international solidarity against imperialism..

"Just as

freedom is vital for a person's full development, so a people need
2
freedom if they are to achieve their cultural destiny."
I must emphasize a point that is essential to this analysis of
Peronism.

Though Peron often tended to identify his anti-imperialism

with anti-capitalism, he was not an enemy of capitalism per se and was
in fact, in his own words, its best friend.

He was a firm supporter

of national capitalism and a foe of international capitalism.

*Filosoffa peronista, p. 253.
2Ibid., pp. 254-5.

In
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one of his clearest expressions on the subject, Peron underlined this
point:
We are not in any way enemies of capital and the future will
show that we have been its true defenders. It is necessary
to clearly discriminate between the international capitalism
of the great consortiums of foreign exploitation and the patri
monial capital of industry and commerce. We have defended the
latter and mercilessly attacked the former. International
capitalism is cold and inhuman; patrimonial capital of indus
try and commerce represents, in our view, a working tool for
businessmen. International capitalism is an instrument for
exploitation while patrimonial capital {[i.e., national capital]
is one for well-being. We are not enemies of capital, even
foreign, that dedicates itself to its business; we are however
enemies of capitalism, even Argentine, that erects itself into
an oligarchy in order to challenge the nation's right to govern
itself and the state's privilege to defend the state against
ignominy and against treason.!
Peron proved to be a good friend to national capitalism.

His

policies promoting industrialization were motivated by a desire to
aid indigenous entrepreneurs.

In enacting policies proceeding from

the view which considered the growth of national industry and economic
independence to be fundamentally interrelated, Peron was implementing
a program agitated for by Argentine industrialists in the thirties.
Consider the following written by Benjamin Villafane in the December
1930 issue of the Anales de la Union Industrial, the major organ of
the industrial bourgeoisie:

October 21, 1946, as cited by Peyrou and Villanueva, pp.
237-8. This contradictory assessment of capitalism as both progressive
(when national) and reactionary (when imperialist) is consistent with
those interpretations such as Jorge Abelardo Ramos' in Revolucion y
contrarevoluci^n en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1965), 2:
619, which see the Peronist period as one of bourgeois "democraticnational" development towards socialism. Though it also recognizes
the progressive strains inherent in Peronist populism and nationalism,
this study
differs in that it does not conceive of the outcome of
Peronism's contradictions to be inevitably in one direction.
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What were the prospects for national industry the day the
European war (World War l| finished? The most indispensable plants
for our national life had been born. They were strong and
potent, and a moderate protective barrier would have been suffi
cient to achieve the industrial emancipation of the nation.
That would have been tantamount to gaining our true freedom.
Because a people are not free if to dress themselves their
wool must be knit for them and they depend on others to provide
them with machinery they need to till the soil and harvest their
crops. The steel industry, mother of all industry, backbone
of the nation's wealth and indispensable to the army and the
navy for national defense, was flowering. . . . It was well on
the road to providing the nation’s needs. . . .
Factories producing peanut oil were in bloom. . . . We were
manufacturing a good part of the clothes to dress our people.
What happened then? Instead of protecting these industries they
were deliberately decimated. . . .
Customs doors were thrown open to oils from Italy and
Spain, at precisely the time when these countries were rejecting
our meat. And our peanut oil factories, producing a product
superior to the imported ones, had to close their doors and our
farmers abandon their fields.
The same thing happened to the wool-processing industries,
textiles, and many others. . . .
Without a doubt, if we had not insensitively killed off our
national industries born out of the European war, we would have
been in a better position and could have told Europe and the
United States when they closed their doors to our grains and
cattle, "You don't buy our products, well we won't buy anything
from you even though it will cost us more to produce what we
need locally." And we would have come out ahead because the
money that stays at home enriches everybody. Today we have no
choice but to complain uselessly about our foolishness and to
deliver the fruits of our labor at the prices they are willing
to pay us and pay dearly for what they are willing to sell us. A people without economic independence is not a free nation.
Thus, far from threatening the interests of national capitalists,
the Peronist push for economic independence in fact incorporated the
programmatic orientation of important sectors of national capital.

But

what about that other basic foundation of Peronist economic policies:

Cited by Antonio Cafiero in Cinco anos despues (Buenos Aires:
Impresores El Grafico, 1961), pp. 206-7. My translation; emphasis in
original.
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to put capital at the service of the economy?*

Here it must be

stressed that, in spite of occasional rhetorical lapses— especially
when Peron was under attack and needed counterpressure from the
masses— Peron had no intention of reversing the role of capital in
defining the relations of production.

Quite the contrary.

His

reformist intentions were motivated by the desire to undercut the
/

potential for revolutionary transformations.

Peron repeatedly justi

fied his policies redistributing wealth on these grounds.

For example,

in a speech to the Chamber of Commerce on the 25th of August of 1944:
Capitalist gentlemen,: do not fear my pro-labor orientation.
Now more than ever, capitalism is secure because I too am a
capitalist. I have a ranch and workers on it. What I wish
to do is to have the state organize the workers so that it
can direct them and orient them in the right direction. This
way we can neutralize the ideological and revolutionary currents
within the working class that threaten our capitalist society
in the post-war years. One must give the workers something
and they will be a controllable force. 2

Defining the basic foundations for his policies at the height
of his achievements in opening the legislative session on May Day of
1948, Peron stated:
We found the economy at the service of capital. The reform
consisted in placing capital at the service of the economy.
We found a colonial economy. The reform consisted in achieving
economic independence.
And he added:
These two achievements of the new Argentine economy are the
basic foundations for any economic and social evolution to
be carried out in the future.
Cited in Eldon G. Kenworthy, "The Formation of the Peronist Coalition,"
Ph.D. Dissertation (Yale University, 1970), pp. 274-5.
^As cited in Pardo.Cuneo, Comportamiento y crisis de la clase
empresaria (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleainar, 1967), pp. 171-2. My
translation. Note the similarity of these views to those expressed one
hundred years earlier by that great populist of his day, Juan Manuel
Rosas. See footnote 1 on p. 68 above.
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Though clearly aimed at eliciting his audience’s sympathy, the sentiments expressed here are a consistent theme in Peron's pronouncements.
There is no doubt that one of Peron's almost obsessive pre
occupations was to win the workers away from communism which he per
ceived to be his major adversary for the workers' loyalty.

In the

same speech cited above, given in the initial period when Peron was
still Secretary of the Department of Labor and Social Welfare, he
characterized the problem presented by the unions in terms of their
leadership being forty percent Communists or Communist-sympathizers.*
That is why, he argued, it was so important to use his Department to
win the workers' trust so that they could be organized into a force at
the state's disposal.

On another occasion Peron described his initial

preoccupations as Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare more graphically:
Some, when they heard me give my first speeches at the
Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, said, "This guy is a
Communist."
And indeed I did speak a little like a Communist. Why?
Because if I had spoken in any other language for my first
speech I would have received the first orange thrown at me.
Because these were men that came with forty years of Marxism
and with Communist leaders.
I wanted to please the latter a little bit but it was really
the others who interested me because it was these that I wanted
to take away from them.
The Communist leaders brought me these people because they
wanted me to see that they were backed by the masses.
I received them and made them believe that I believed that.
But what I really had in mind was to take the masses away
from them and leave them without any backing. 2
"Putting capital at the service of the economy," "humanizing
capital," and "the social economy;" indeed the Peronist; focus on "social

■^Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 215-6.
2
^
Conduccion politica, pp. 290-1.
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justice" emphasized redistributing income towards the workers.

On

/
the 25th of April of 1945, Peron said:
A national duty of first rank importance which nowadays is
an already universally accepted postulate, demands that economic
organization be transformed to serve the people. This is democ
racy's true objective in the social realm. If industry resists
being put in the position of paying remuneration to the workers
that allows them to buy and utilize the products produced by
their labor, then it will experience a considerable regression
and we return to the ancient crises of underconsumption.1
Peron readily admitted that his initial efforts at redistributing
wealth did not flow from a concern about the production of wealth.
It would have been logical to see how much we produced, how
much we could afford to pay, and then pay in relationship
to this calculus. We did the exact opposite without thinking
whether we could or whether we had it, we said: "Pay, later
we will figure out how." That is to say, "we burned our
bridges behind us" because there was no turning back.2
Though Peron clearly envisioned his reforms in the redistribu
tion of wealth as salvaging capitalism, he encountered stiff resistance
from the industrial bourgeoisie.

His social policies provided the

impetus for their opposition and the chief rationale for their enthu
siastic participation in the "Democratic Front" opposing Peron in the
1946 elections.

The going over of the industrial capitalists into the

camp of his enemies caused Peron some bitter disappointment.

On May

Day of 1947 he said:
if something hurts me deeply, it is that some capitalists have
not given my social policies the collaboration they deserve and
that, united with the oligarchic opposition, they have fought
us. They are blind and they cannot even appreciate what is
going on in the world. I have warned them repeatedly: by wanting
to defend it all, they will wind up losing it all if they don't
change their behavior.3
1

Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 255.

3

Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 249.

2

/

Conduccion polrftica, p. 79.
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The theme that emerges from Peron1s pronouncements on capitalism
is that he viewed it as a necessary force in the organization of the
economy which, however, left entirely unchecked would be driven to selfdestruction by the capitalists' greed for profits.

Consequently, it

was the state's role to confine the capitalists' striving for gain
within just limits and ensure that benefits were spread to the people.
The state should not, however, overstep its proper bounds.

Beyond en

suring equitable distribution of income, its legitimate function lay
in stimulating economic forces in the production of wealth by preventing
them from working at cross-purposes.

In other words, the state should

assist indirectly and not take a direct part in the organization of the
forces of production.
Early on, on the 6th of September of 1944, in a speech inaugura
ting

the National Post-War Council, the organization formulating the

regime's economic policy, Peron set the tone for the role the state was
I
to play in economic matters.

He stressed the part played by private

capital in achieving economic growth and emphasized that the state's
role must not interfere with private capital's initiative.

The state

must confine itself to setting ground rules promoting the most effi
cient utilization and expansion of economic resources, including labor,
and ensure a just equilibrium so that the workers would also benefit.
This was one of those occasions where he drew the analogy of the state's
directing role as not interfering with economic freedom any more than
the setting of traffic regulations interfered with a driver's freedom
to go anywhere.

^Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 231-33.
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Peron viewed the state as an instrument whose "natural
function" was that of "coordinating the general interests of society."1
The state should coordinate the; general interests because this was
necessary in order to prevent conflict and struggle between classes
as well as to achieve the happiness and well-being of the whole people,
without distinction of class or social status.

Since they were both to

be used for the same end— the happiness and well-being of the people—
Peron saw no contradiction between freedom and authority.

Thus he

rejected the notion of liberty propounded by liberalism as an end, and
saw it rather as a means.

According to Peron, "Once the Justicialist

Revolution abolished the privileges of oligarchy, the Argentine State
would be transformed into a social democracy thus overcoming the
antagonism between the common citizen and the state because the people
would be sovereign."

2

/
One of the motivations which played a key part in Peron1s
actions from the beginning to the end of his political career was the
desire to avoid discord and social turmoil.

It is one reason why he

placed so much emphasis on achieving national unity.

With the recent

experience of the Spanish Civil War in mind, he said in a speech on
August 25, 1944:
We seek this unity (of all Argentines} because we understand
how any departure from the national consensus, no matter how
insignificant at the time, will end up as a negative factor
for future solutions. And if this departure is of major pro
portions and the people do not unite, they will be the authors
of their own undoing because it is beyond doubt, gentlemen, that
if we continue playing at partisanship, we'll end up fighting;
and in this struggle ho one will win and everyone will lose. . . .

1Filosofdfa peronista, p. 170.
3
Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 227.

^Ibid., p. 150.
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Peron seemed to have been sincere in this desire to.avoid civil
strife.

The fear of precipitating a civil war was the reason cited

by Peron why he chose not to put up a fight at a time when he
probably could have overcome the forces which overthrew him.

Instead

he peaceably chose to go into exile in 1955.*
The fear of social discord spilling over into insurrectionary
violence forms a persistent theme in Peron1s thinking.

Repeatedly he

justified the state's role in integrating the masses by giving them
a material stake in the system on those grounds.

He used the same

reasoning in stressing the state's instrumentality in organizing the
masses structurally because, as he put it, the greater danger comes
from a fluid, unorganized mass.

From this one could conclude that

Peron was nothing but a demagogue bent on manipulating the masses for
his egotistical ends.

The manipulative element undoubtedly played a

part in Peron's actions but, at the same time, it would be a serious
error not to see his faith in the masses and his sincere desire to

According to Arthur Whitaker, the forces directly involved in
Peron's overthrow were confined to "a part of the armed forces, with
little active civilian^participation, except in Cordoba. . ." Up
"to the moment of Peron's resignation the forces loyal to him still
controlled the country's second largest city, Rosario, and most of the
provinces, in addition to metropolitan Buenos Aires, which contains one
quarter of Argentina's 19 million inhabitants." Arthur P. Whitaker,
Argentine Upheaval: Peron's Fall and the New Regime (New York: Praeger,
1956), pp. 29-30.
Though at a high cost, a movement of loyal troops against Cor
doba, would probably have crushed the revolt. Peron refused to order
such a mobilization.
In his open letter of resignation to the Army and
the people, he said he wished to spare the nation a civil war and the
city of Buenos Aires a bombardment.
2
For example, in the speech referred to above.
Villanueva, pp. 214 and 217.

Peyfou and

164
defend their interests as a motivating factor.

To see only the

demagogic in Peron is to completely miss the dynamic aspect that made
Peronism such a living force for over a quarter century of Argentine
politics.

The following is, I believe, a relatively honest assessment

/

.by Peron of the role of the masses

in his movement:

Peronism ha£ an essential task to accomplish among the
Argentine people: to raise their political and civic conscious
ness.
Without it we will always be vulnerable to having the masses
taken away from us; but if we teach the masses to distinguish
for themselves, to appreciate for themselves, to understand for
themselves, then we can rest assured that they will never be
fooled again.
And, if they cannot be fooled, the masses will not go with
those who have bad intentions, but will instead go with those
who have good intentions.
And this will be a safeguard for Peronism, so that we may
never have any bad intentions, and that we be the instruments
of the people, and never make the people our instruments.
The massive popular support enjoyed by the Peronist regime has
often been misinterpreted as evidence for, either Peron's demagogic
skills, or the charismatic nature of the ties between Peron and the
masses.

Though there is an element of truth to both views, the impor

tant point is the rational and instrumental connection between the
regime and its popular base.

Eldon Kenworthy develops this argument

in his careful and detailed critique of Seymour Martin Lipset's inter
pretation of Peronism as an instance of "working class authoritarianism."
Lipset assumes that "a desire for immediate action," a rejection
of "a gradualist image of political change," and a tendency to
place more faith in strong leaders than in liberal democratic
institutions constitute prima facie evidence of projection, subrational political behavior. But is this not merely a projection
of U p s e t ’s own values? There are situations in which "extremist"

Conduccion pol^tica. p. 141.
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politics are instrumental politics and in which adherence to
liberal democracy represents an evasion of reality.1
Analyzing the best empirical data available in studies of election
results of the forties and fifties, Kenworthy shows that Peron's
labor voters were clearly rational from the point of view of selfinterest.

As will be shown shortly, the regime's redistributive and

pro-labor measures benefited workers and lower income groups in a dra
matic and unprecedented way.

The Peronist slogan "Peron cumple"— Peron

delivers— was no empty rhetoric.
sectors' material interests

Though the promotion of the popular

was clearly self-serving for the regime

in the sense of building and solidifying a base, I believe it is mis
leading to see Pero*n's views of his relationship to the masses and his
characterization of their role in purely manipulative and demagogic
terms.

Certainly Peron's exhortations of popular sovereignty served

his purposes and were cast in supremely egotistical terms, yet they
were also sincerely felt.

The intense loyalty of Peron's followers is

best understood in both an objective and subjective sense: gratitude for
the real improvements Peron's rule had brought and a recognition of the
/
2
sincerity of Peron's belief in the masses as the real Argentina.
This genuine commitment to popular sovereignty in Peronist doc
trine runs counter to the interpretation of Peronism as an example of

Eldon Kenworthy, "The Function of the Little-Known Case in
Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn't," Comparative Politics 6 (1973):
30. Emphasis in the original.
2

For a different view on Peronist conceptions relating to
organizing the masses and a different portrayal of the regime's rela
tions to its mass base, see Walter Little, "Party and State in Peronist
Argentina, 1945-55," Hispanic American Historical Review 53 (1973): 644-62.
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corporatism.

Though the regime's practice often deviated, the fact

that there was an official commitment in Peronist doctrine to an
autonomous role for the inasses served to spur on initiative from
below.

Thus, for example, on October 6, 1952, Peron said:

We must then listen to the genuine voice of the people as
expressed by their own organizations and for that we need
the people to be organized. That is why our system needs real
representation, that is to say the organization of the popular
forces so that they ensure that their representatives execute
from within the government what the people want. That is to
say, that the government be controlled. It is necessary to
avoid placing numbers of people in jeopardy through discretion
ary acts or the personal excesses of a leader,
In other words
that the people act as weight and counterweight in the organiza
tion; so that if the government wants to adopt a measure that
might be contrary to the interests of the community, they can
make themselves felt to prevent its implementation. This is not
limiting government but rather collaborating with it in order
to avoid all possible inconveniences that can result from a
strike or any other reaction of the people to something that
does not accord with the interests of their representatives. . . .
The only guarantee against bad government is popular or
ganization. That is why I fight for it. I fight for it so that
there will be no bad government, and if some day we become a bad
government we will perish from our own creation, because it will
be the popular organizations that will eliminate us.1
Peron's conception of how to structure and organize his move
ment allowed for relative autonomy for lower level cadres so that they
would exercise ingenuity and initiative. He demanded allegiance
to general directives but also encouraged independence and initiative
from below in carrying them out. Peron's distinction between military
and political leadership is instructive in this regard.

The former

commands and orders, the latter relies on persuasion and winning people
over. A political leader mobilizes people's convictions and can
^Cited in Peyrou and Villanueva, 288-9.

This orientation con

trasts with the clearly corporatist and elitist notions espoused by
Francisco Jose^de Oliveira Vianna, Getulio Vargas' advisor on labor
matters. See Kenneth Paul Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State
and Working Class Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1977), p. 16.

/

therefore count on their fervent support.

After Peron1s overthrow

in 1955, independent initiative from below expressed through militant
actions by workers apart from, and quite often against,the express
orders of the trade union bureaucracy, allowed Peronism to survive as
a dynamic force within Argentina’s working class in spite of over
fifteen years of severe repression.

Indeed, it was the resilience of

its working class backbone, that enabled Justicialism to emerge as
the majoritarian expression of the Argentine people in 1973.
Peron1s insistence on the organization of all interests and
on the state setting the guidelines for their legitimate activities,
so that the general, and not some particularistic interest emerges,
exemplifies the regime's corporatist tendencies.

The corporatist

aspects in Peronist doctrine can be traced to a combination of
nationalist and military influences.

We have already seen how

Peronist doctrine came out of the populist-nationalist critique of
"the infamous decade."

Peronist emphasis on industrialization and

even its commitment to progressive reforms can also be explained as
arising from military influences.
In the famous conference on the "Significance of National Defense
From the Military Point of View" given in La Plata on the10th of
June of 1944, the then Colonel Peron— deliberately citing von der
Goltz— applies the idea of "the Nation in Arms" to Argentine reality:
The two words "National Defense" may lead some to think that
we are dealing with a problem of interest only to the Armed Forces.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality its solution
involves all of the nation's inhabitants, all of its energy resources,
all its wealth, all its industry, its means of transportation and
communication, etc., the armed forces being but . . . a fighting in
strument in this great complex which makes up "the Nation in Arms."
Peron criticized the shortsightedness behind opposition to
production of war material, for it had to be bought
abroad athigh
prices and by not "establishing the factories that could
produce these within the country, which would now be operational,
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we also failed to gain considerable Industrial experience."
And he adds: "What I say about war materials can be extended
to farm machinery, means of transportation, land, river, and
sea, and any other order of activity.111
Peron's rhetoric betrays his military background.

He re

peatedly used terms like strategy, tactics, campaign, retreat, enemy,
traitors, victory, and so on.

However, though he certainly stressed

leadership and authority, one should not take the military element too
far in accounting for his perspective on the organization of the movement and government.

2

Nevertheless, in the economic realm, not only

did the military extend its influence by backing industrialization in
general, but it also played a direct and significant role in heavy
industry through its participation in steel production with the Direc/•
/
*
cion General de Fabricas Militares in 1947.

Because it favored reliable

knowledge on what material and human resources were available for
mobilization, the military was also a large factor in Peronism1s
remarkable statistical and census data gathering.

Even the Peronist

emphasis on women's rights was acceptable to the military in view of
the potential need for female labor on the home front in the event of
war.

3
This survey of Peronist doctrine highlighted several areas of

significance to the analysis of Peronism as a transitional period.

We

^"Alberto Ciria, Peron y el justicialismo (Buenos Aires: Siglo
Veintiuno Editores, 1971), pp. 33-4. My translation.

2

Peter Waldmann in Per Peronismus, 1943-55 (Hamburg: Hoffmann
and Campe, 1974) tends to do this. See p. 171, for example.
^Ibid., pp. 170-1.
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saw that Peronist doctrine called attention to and stressed the
economic link between international circumstances and national
realities.

The wide appeal of Peronism*s anti-imperialism aided

Peron in his ability to mobilize the masses.

Moreover, the expression

of faith in the masses and the non-elitist character of Peronist doc
trine encouraged the movement's broad-based rank and file to exercise
initiative and ingenuity in supporting the regime.
Another theme in the survey needs to be stressed.

Though

strongly anti-imperialist, Peronist doctrine was not anti-capitalist.
The regime had no intention of changing the social relations of pro
duction.

It confined its preoccupations to the sphere of circulation,

instituting substantive distributive reforms.

These reforms, which

were indeed impressive achievements and constituted a source of strength
for Peronism, were facilitated by Peronism*s inclusive class orienta
tion.

In the favorable economic climate for Argentina in the World War

II and immediate post-war period, the regime could use its populistnationalist doctrine to mobilize political pressure behind its redis
tributive policies and, the results yielded by these policies in turn,
reinforced the regime's broad social base.
On the other hand however, Peronism's class orientation was
also responsible for its major limitation: the failure to attack the
internal base for dependency.

The hypothesis explored in this study

maintains that Peronism's populist-nationalist doctrine prevented the
regime from making changes in the social relations of production.
These changes would have given the regime a better chance to survive
once the favorable context of the earlier period was gone.

In the

remainder of the chapter I elaborate on these points by showing how
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the strengths and weaknesses in Peronism1s populist-nationalism were
reflected in the regime’s class orientation and its programmatic
direction.

Corporatism
In considering Peronism's class orientation, as distinct
from its actual class base, it should be noted that the regime's
populist-nationalist doctrine was heavily influenced by and contained
a significant

dosage of corporatism.

Peronist doctrine is most use

fully conceived as populist because it proclaimed its legitimacy as
resting on the popular sectors while it also legitimized the state's
role in terms of promoting their interests.

At the same time Peronist

doctrine can best be described as nationalist because it justified pro
moting the interests of the working class and the poor in nationalist
terms.

It

also stressed "the people" as the embodiment of the

nation as the ideological reason for their being the source of legiti
macy.

It is in drawing such a close correspondence between "the people"

as a whole and "the nation," rather than connecting the popular sec
tors principally to class criteria, that Peronist populist-nationalism
can be seen within a corporatist framework.
Certainly Peron articulated the classic corporatist position
in his views on the proper function of the state as being above particu
lar interests and acting as a neutral arbiter between them in enacting
policies expressing the general interests of society over those of its
narrow constituent segments.

In particular Peron's views to the

effect

that the interests of capital and labor are not necessarily contradictory
and that the state can and should mediate between them in formulating
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a balanced economic program, conform to the corporatist paradigm.
/

In

/

this Peron was influenced by the ideas of Jose Figuerola who had come
to Argentina from his native Spain in 1930 after having served in the
Ministry of Labor under the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera.
Figuerola published a book outlining concepts of state-labor
relations which served ap a model for Peron*s ^labor ideology.
The work, La colaboraclon social en Hispanoamerica, stressed
the role of the state as mediator between capital and labor, the
necessity of transcending "class conflict" and replacing it with
social collaboration, and finally, of integrating non-political
union organizations into the state structure.1
Significantly, it was Jose^Figuerola who was largely responsi
ble for reorganizing the Labor Department into the Secretariat of
Labor and Welfare when Peron took it over.
However, if he had corporatist aspirations for his regime,
/

Peron was unable to translate them into reality.

From a corporatist

point of view, the political practice of the Peronist government was,
at best, ineffectual.

Though he may well have been guided by a cor

poratist ideal in his outlook on class relations, the fact that his
regime was firmly based on the popular sectors and on the working class
in particular, made it politically impossible to achieve a corporatist
model.

Indeed, in the sense of succeeding at "balancing" the interests

of capital and labor, contemporary Northern European social democracies
can be considered to have come closer to the corporatist model.

2

David Tamarin, "The Argentine Labor Movement in an Age of
Transition, 1930-45," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Washington, 1977),
pp. 294-5. See K. H. Silvert, ''The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina,"
in his Expectant Peoples; Nationalism and Development (N.Y .: Random
House, 1963), for a general discussion of Peron's corporatist tendencies.
2

...

See Lee Panitch, The Development of Corporatism in Liberal
Democracies" in Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbriich, eds.,
Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publica
tions, 1979).
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It is the actual role of the working class that differentiates
Peronism from Getulio Vargas' Estado Novo, which can more properly be
seen as an instance of corporatism.
on the Brazilian working class.

The Estado Novo kept a tight rein

Though not in fact organs of the state,

the syndicates enjoyed little actual autonomy.

By contrast, though

the Peronist regime sought to control the unions, especially through
the appointment of the top officials, Argentine unions had enjoyed a
strong institutional life prior to Peronism.

Indeed, the Peronist gov

ernment openly recognized the CGT's role as the mediator between the
workers and the political authorities.

Because Peronism was never able

to come close to corporatism in its actual political practice, it is
more useful to conceptualize it as an example of populist-nationalism.

Peronism1s Class Perspective
Justicialism came close to corporatism because Peron's deepseated aversion to the divisiveness of social turmoil led him to make
the pursuit of social harmony over class struggle an all-encompassing
aim of the regime.

The importance Peron attached to defusing the

impetus toward revolution is evident in the speech he gave at the
Military College on August 7, 1945.

There he stated that just as the

French Revolution had ended aristocratic government, the Russian Revolu
tion had put an end to government by the bourgeoisie and ushered in the
era of the popular masses in government.

"This is a fact the Army must

accept and place itself within this evolution.

This is fatal.

If we

do not make a peaceful revolution, the people will make a violent one."
This does not imply becoming a Communist, he continues, but it does mean
placing oneself within the stream of world evolution
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for to resist it is like swimming against the current; it
won't take long to drown. And the solution to this problem
is to be found in bringing social justice to the masses. This
is the remedy which in suppressing the cause also suppresses
the effects. One must organize the popular formations and
have sufficient force to maintain the equilibrium of the state.
Thus, to prevent a violent revolution, the redistribution of
wealth was necessary and it could be accomplished in only one way:
taking from those who have much in order to give to those
who have too little. Undoubtedly this will arouse the reaction
and resistance of those gentlemen who are their own worst enemies
because for not wanting to give up 30 percent, they will lose it
all in a few years or a few months, and on top of that, their
necks as well.*
Peronist doctrine viewed the state as the chief instrument in
promoting class harmony over class struggle.

In one of his more famous

✓
statements on the subject, given in his May Day speech of 1944, Peron
approvingly quoted this maxim as providing the guiding beacon to his
efforts: "We seek to suppress class struggle,replacing it with just
agreement between workers and employers, under the sheltering justice
that emanates from the state."

The state was to act as equilibrator

. and arbiter in reconciling the interests of capital and labor which,
without its intervention, would lead to conflict.

Instead of basing

itself on the conflicting interests of capital and labor like those pro
moting class struggle, the Peronist state sought to undercut these
efforts by the purveyors of "foreign ideologies" by building on the
common ground shared by workers, employers, and the state, including
3
their nationalism.

1

Thus their harmonious interaction would be

Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 206-8.

3

2

Ibid., p. 252.

s
These themes appear repeatedly throughout Peron's statements.
For example, those of May 1 and August 12, 1944 and March 23, 1949
cited in Ibid., pp. 252-3, 254-5, and 258 respectively.
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heightened through the campaign to free Argentina from the domination
of foreign interests and their allies.
As the last chapter noted, in a conjunctural situation where the
local entrepreneurial class is very weak and industrial capitalism
a largely foreign phenomenon, it does not appear contradictory to main
tain that the evils of capitalism will disappear through economic devel
opment guided by the state and managed by the national bourgeoisie.
Being a continuation of the populist-nationalist critique that gained
momentum in the "infamous decade," Peronism traced the primary cause
of Argentina's problem to the Anglo-oligarchic connection.

This struck

a responsive chord among groups whose interests had been held in check
by the oligarchic policies of the prior decade, including the workers
as well as significant sectors of the national bourgeoisie.

The

resentment against restrictions growing out of the pro-British economic
policies of the 1930's oligarchic regime and the fear of potentially
disastrous consequences from competing with the major foreign suppliers
of manufactured goods (the U.K. and the U.S.), also account

for the

tolerance of Peronism's pro-Axis sympathies on the part of a large
number of industrialists.
Because the Socialist and Communist parties levelled most of
their criticism against the regime's foreign policy, Peron's pro-Axis
sympathies also helped him to win workers away from them.
activists had a definite upper class coloration
✓
groups in power before Peron.

Pro-Allied

reminiscent of the

Take for example an account quoted by

Eldon Kenworthy of the March of the Constitution and Liberty held in
Buenos Aires on September 19, 1945.

The account is by Juan Jose^ Real

who represented the Argentine Communist Party on the Junta de Coordina-
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cion Democratica, the coalition of forces opposing Peron.
In the "March," I soon saw myself surrounded by figures that
brought back memories of September 6, 1930, of the infamous
decade, of the frauds Present were the most extreme repre
sentatives of conservatism, of the foreign banks, of the
Sociedad Rural. I didn’t see my class, the workers, except
for a scant number of communist militants. Barrio Norte
(the upper class section of Buenos Aires) applauded us from
the balconies, while in the service entrances maids stared
at us with rancor, with hate. Put off by the sight, I said^
to a comrade, "Those applaud us because they are afraid Peron
will take their lands." I said it spontaneously without
realizing the full thrust of my words.1
In using the state as an instrument to combat divisiveness and
social turmoil and promote class harmony, Peron1s aim was to achieve
profound social change without class struggle.

He sought to improve

conditions for workers while also providing profits for capitalists—
a program which, if realizable, was naturally congenial to all concerned.
Indeed, in the conjuncture of 1) an internationally favorable situation
for the Argentine economy during World War II and the immediate post
war years and 2) a situation internally in which the traditionally
dominant groups were in disarray because of intensified contradictions
resulting from their readjustments to the world crisis, the Peronist
program was realizable.

But this program was opposed by the oligarchy

and even by the organized expressions of the industrial bourgeoisie
who were in a sense, as Peron noted, acting against their own selfinterest.

Hence, the basic thesis that emerges from this analysis is

that the Peronist state acted as a substitute for a weak and non-selfconscious national bourgeoisie implementing a program serving their
interests on their behalf.

^Eldon G. Kenworthy, "The Formation of the Peronist Coalition,"
Ph.D. dissertation, (Yale University, 1970), p. 210.
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If Peronist policies basically amounted to implementing the
interests of the national bourgeoisie on their behalf, what then about
Peronism*s claim to be fundamentally centered on the interests of
the working class?

As Peron put it, nothing is more important than

that "work and the worker constitutes the means and the end for
Justicialist humanism."^

Not only did the regime dramatically improve

the living conditions for workers, but labor was invested with a sense
of dignity and pride that it had never enjoyed before or since.

Not

only did workers experience an uplifting of their material circumstances
but they could also honestly feel that they were the cornerstone of
"the new Argentina."

Thus they could look around and see the creation

of a whole new educational system catering to their needs and culminat
ing in the opening up to their children of the previously inaccessible
and hallowed preserve of the middle class, the National University.
And the new system would turn out, in Peron's words, "engineers and
technicians who would not, as before, speak a strange language, but
would be the sons of our own people."

2

Perhaps the most dramatic

illustration of Peron's intention to elevate the prestige of workers
was, as he put it, the fact that "the President of the Nation himself
has accepted with honor the title of 'First Worker.'"

And if he chose

to call himself a worker, others would feel themselves privileged to
do likewise.
A doctor would consider it an honor to call himself a
scientific worker, as would schoolteachers or writers to call
themselves cultural workers, and there are thousands of
children throughout the country today who dream of becoming
qualified workers, technicians, teachers, tractor drivers, etc.

'*'Peron, FilosofiTa peronista, p. 236.

^Ibid.
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And it will no longer be true, as it was in the oligarchic
epoch, that everyone from the President of the Republic on down,
would try to become anything but a worker.^
Instead of being an insult, the status of being a worker would become
a mark of distinction.

Additionally, the Argentine proletariat had

its champion in Peron's wife,Evita,whose inilitantly pro-working class
orientation was much more extreme and clear-cut.

While Peron attempted

to forge a multi-class alliance behind his regime, Evita's sole concern
was to solidify the regime's base among the popular masses and the
organized working class.
Doesn't all this contradict the thesis of the Peronist state
as a functional instrumentality of the national bourgeoisie?

In a

fundamental sense, yes, but not in the immediate conjuncture within
which the Peronist state came to power.

In the first place,it must

be remembered that the purpose for which Peronism undertook class
mobilization was not to promote, but rather to undermine class struggle.
Paradoxically, in order to initiate a program beneficial to the
interests of the national bourgeoisie against the opposition of the
traditionally dominant groups, Peron needed to mobilize the urban
proletariat.

As Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare, Peron promulgated

his pro-working class reforms because he needed the workers as a base
of support.

On June 17, 1944 he made the following appeal:

The Secretariat of Labor cannot function without your being
well organized. What is more: the Secretariat of Labor will
some day in the future need you to defend it since it will
be you who will be left to your own resources and the injustices
that have always prevailed, if you cannot preserve the existence
of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare with your own
efforts.^

1

Filosoffa peronista.

2

Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 262.
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Peron was therefore caught in a contradiction which did not
become immediately apparent because it was obscured by the conjuncture
of favorable external and internal factors.

✓
Peron promoted the workers'

interests because he needed their force to offset that of his enemies.
Though his aim was a social balance which would enable the state to
mediate between social forces in bringing about a just equilibrium, to
achieve this he had to encourage the workers to organize, to be mili
tant up to a certain extent, and to express their class unity.

In

other words, he needed a controlled degree of class struggle as politi
cal pressure behind policies that would give workers a material stake
in the system in order to undermine the causes for class struggle.
✓
It will be recalled that Peron encouraged workers to organize
in order to erode the influence of the Left within the working class.
Though the state obviously played the key part in organizing workers,
Peron was not prompted by corporatism as much as by the fear of the
Left and the susceptibility of unorganized workers to spontaneous
violence.

As Peron saw it:

We are not state syndicalists, or corporatists, or any of these
strange things: we are only men who want united and well-led
unions, because unorganized masses are always the most dangerous
for the state as well as for themselves. An unorganized working
class mass, such as some people want, is an easy prey for exotic
political and ideological conceptions. Those who unite for
bread and butter issues must be supported and defended by the
state, but those unions that pursue political or ideological
ends must be pushed outside of the law.
To win the workers' trust and cement this newly found loyalty to the
regime, Peron had to provide tangible material benefits for the members
of unions that supported him, as well as improving conditions for the

Statement of November 17, 1944 in Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 26970.
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working class in general.

However, because of the bitter opposition

from his adversaries, in order to provide these benefits, Peron had to
promote a certain degree of class struggle.

The equation of "class

unity and militancy equals improved material conditions for workers"
posed a contradiction to Peron*s aim of class conciliation and harmony
which could be and was obscured in the favorable conjuncture.

But,

as we shall see, it surfaced when circumstances arose that adversely
affected the working class' standard of living.

It was this contra

diction, and Peron* s hesitancy in confronting it, stemming from his
populist-nationalist orientation, that was involved in. the chain of
events that ultimately resulted in his overthrow in 1955.

On August 10

of 1944 he had said: "the decrees we have dictated from the Secretariat
of Labor make every backward step impossible.

You can be completely

assured that in order to suppress what we have achieved for the working
class, it will be necessary to fundamentally alter the institutional
organization of the s t a t e . H o w prophetic these words proved to be!
Though the working class constituted Peronism*s most solid
foundation and though Peron delivered unprecedented gains for the
urban proletariat, it is nevertheless important to keep in mind that
*
Peron viewed the working class from a populist-nationalist, and not
a Marxist, perspective.

Thus he did not view workers as the harbingers

of the new society and the troops that would bring it about.

Of

course Peron did not shrink from using the working class as a political
force, but only as a countervailing power and not as the social force
that would sweep away all others.

Moreover, whereas Marxists draw

Peyrou and Vi-llanueva, p. 269.
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sharp distinctions between working class and bourgeoisie in terms of
their relationship to the means of production, Justicialism also pro
claimed itself to be based on the workers but defined them in a way
that obscured distinctions, particularly between industrial workers
and smaller scale entrepreneurs.

In the Justicialist lexicon a

worker was anyone who performed "a useful social function."

Useful

social function was itself broadly defined to include just about any
work, including that which Marxists would consider unproductive labor.
For example, though they create no surplus value through their labor,
merchants would be considered "workers" in the Peronist view.
/

Peron1S conception of the working class and his relationship
to it in practice reflect his own class position,

indeed, in that it

was based on the proletarianized masses with its leadership being pro
vided by upper and middle class sectors excluded from the former
ruling coalition, Peronism illustrates the strengths and weaknesses
in populist-nationalism.

Its strengths came from the fact that it

corresponded to the conjuncture of internal and external factors and
thus provided a realistic and viable approach in that context.

In

addition, while it was based on the proletariat, it was also a multi
class phenomenon and therefore possessed the potential for a broadly
based mobilization.

Peron and Evita— the marriage between the middle

and proletarian sectors— symbolized this aspect of populist-nationalism1s
strength.
Important consequences.followed from this populist-nationalist
orientation toward the workers.
of the points raised above:

Walter Little provides a good summation
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Although the popular support which the Peronist regime enjoyed
was largely working class in character, its leaders showed
little more than rhetorical enthusiasm for the pursuit of strictly
working class interests. On the contrary, they repeatedly subor
dinated them to what they believed to be the interests of the
nation as a whole. There is nothing very surprising about this.
It is a reflection of the fact that they were drawn for the
/
most part from among middle-class stratae, never became declasse,
and remained dependent throughout their exercise of power upon
^
the tacit acquiescence of important business and military interests.
This rejection of class struggle in Peronist doctrine and its
corresponding emphasis on class cooperation was reflected in the regime's
policies.

The basic lack of a class analysis prevented Peronism from

developing a revolutionary approach to the problems it confronted.
Herein lay its major weakness.

The populist-nationalist rejection of

class struggle and the promotion of manufacture without altering
relations of production, made Peronism an essentially bourgeois doc
trine.

Moreover, despite its strong nationalism and anti-imperialism,

Peronism in power remained a reformist regime, an outgrowth of socio
economic currents and accumulated grievances that found fertile ground
in the favorable circumstances prevailing during the forties.

2

Summing up, Peronism's populist-nationalist doctrine sheds
light on its impressive successes during the first half of its rule,
and also on the post-1950 weaknesses leading to its overthrow.

Peronism

achieved an unprecedented mass mobilization based on the alliance of

Walter Little, "The Popular Origins of Peronism" in Argentina
in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1975) edited by David Rocl^ p. 162.

2

✓

David Tamarin points out that even "Peron's labor programs of
1943-5 accomplished the reformist platform that labor had drafted during
the thirties." "The Argentine Labor Movement in an Age of Transition,
1930-45," Ph.D. dissertation :(University of Washington, 1977), p. 316.
My emphasis.
In general, Tamarin's thesis about basic continuity con
curs with that developed here.
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classes and social groups in a crusade against the

oligarchic

minority and its British and other foreign partners

In contra

distinction to Marxism, Peronism rejected class struggle and preached
class conciliation and cooperation under.a common national interest.
Even the oligarchy was not principally attacked by Peron for its class
position and privilege, as much as for its dishonorable subservience
to foreign interests.

In its use of a doctrine which openly called

for the alliance of the working class and the industrial bourgeoisie
in the joint venture of national development under the guidance of the
patriotic armed forces, Peronism1s efforts were aided by the inter
national economic trends prevalent at the time, which provided the
material conditions that made this alliance feasible.

However, this

class alliance aspect also accounted in great part for the demise of
Peronism as a viable socio-economic alternative for Argentina,once the
external conditions were no longer so favorable.
In retrospect it is easy to see the validity of the Marxist
position that a movement for national liberation devoid of class
struggle loses its revolutionary potential.

For the Marxist, economic

independence is the first step toward a socialist economy, while for
Peron it was the final step necessary to the achievement of national
prestige and power, a necessary antidote to the humiliation of foreign
exploitation.

In his study Julio Mafud concludes that Peronism con

tributed mightily to the Argentine tragedy by providing the masses with
a social consciousness without giving them a doctrine for social change.

*This point is made by Bertram Silverman in his "Labor and
Left Fascism: A Case Study of Peronist Labor Policy," Ph.D. disserta
tion (Columbia University, 1967), p. 107.
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Its great achievement was to integrate the masses into political life.
Its great shortcoming was its failure to overhaul Argentina's social
and economic structures when it seemed to possess the power to do so.
"If Peronism comes back into power it must initiate structural
changes."

And he added prophetically, "if it does not, it will

remain trapped in the bourgeois-capitalist framework"^ and hence be
rendered impotent to deal with the problems arising within capitalist
structures.
To this point I have focused my concerns on the context that
made Peronism a viable response and on its doctrine and orientation.
In the process I raised the major themes of the analysis in a prelim
inary way.

I now propose to trace these in more detail by examining

the relationships with the groups the regime sought to benefit, the
actual impact of its policies, and the attitudes of the major actors
towards the regime.

Peronism and the Class Context: The Regime's
Programmatic Intent and Its Impact
Distribution of Income
The coup mounted by the G.O.U.^ in 1943 took place amidst a
mounting crisis resulting from the conservative regime's inability to
contain processes it had set in motion during "the infamous decade."

^Julio Mafud, Sociologia del peronismo (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Americalee, 1972),,p. 171.

2

Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, a lodge of nationalistic Army
officers with pro-Axis sympathies, of which Peron formed a part. The
Axis sympathies resulted in part from the influence of German military
thought and training within the Argentine Army. More important, in
my view, was the anti-British component of Argentine nationalism which
featured so prominently in the populist-nationalist polemics of the
period.
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On the one hand, conservative policies had promoted a certain degree
of industrialization in an attempt to salvage externally oriented
growth on a modified basis, but had also contained and subordinated
this industrialization by allowing British imports to compete with
Argentine goods as called for in the Roca-Runciman Pact.

Peronist

policies responded to the increased clamor for more national industry
which resulted from this contradiction.

On the other hand, more manu

facturing in the thirties brought about an expanding labor force along
with the regime’s suppression and postponement of workers' demands.

As

the decade progressed, the number of strikes and strikers grew, with the
year before the G.O. U. coup marking the high point of workers' combativity measured in number of strikes.
of these strikes in 1942 were won.^

Significantly, only ten percent

It was here that Peron found the

reservoir of disaffection that he molded into his power base.
The Peronist program did not however, emerge full blown in
June of 1943; nor did the military team which seized power possess any
thing resembling a worked out and detailed platform.

The immediate moti

vation for the officers involved was to prevent the succession of a proBritish Conservative candidate to the presidency.

The G.O.U. voiced

strong nationalist sentiments, were sympathetic to national industrialists
and disliked the Anglo-oriented rural based ruling class.

In an atmos

phere of distrust and contempt of the Argentine masses toward the gov
ernment, their first priority was to win a measure of trust for the new
regime.

Thus, among its first measures, the regime decreed a prohibition

of rent increases until further.notice and the prices for articles essen-

"*■866 Murmis and Portantiero, pp. 87-91.
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tial to daily survival, including food, were fixed.

Indeed, Peron's

activities when he took over the Departamento Nacional de Trabajo in
keeping the cost of living frozen and, when possible, even lowering it,
were not only tolerated but, at first, were carried out with the full
knowledge and approval of the other senior members of the junta.

s
Peron was able to expand his working class base of support so
rapidly because his efforts went beyond rhetoric and, as Table 9 shows,
achieved an almost immediate impact in improving material conditions
for workers.

TABLE 9,— Employment and real wage rates for Buenos Aires (1929=100)
Year

Real Wages

1940

98

129.18

1941

98

135.01

1942

101

140.63

1943

107

147.02

1944

118

155.24

1945

118

155.08

Employment

~SOURCEdnvestigaciones sociales, 1943/54, pp. 61 and 258.
Murmis and Portantiero, p. 105.

From

When the Peronist propaganda machine said "Peron cumple!" (Peron
delivers!), for the workers this was not an empty slogan.

Their

improved conditions were all the more dramatic contrasted to the
thirties when the urban proletariat had been the sector bearing the
heaviest burden in the accumulation of capital.

During the 1943-55

years, on the other hand, wages and salaries’ share in the distribution
of the national income rose, as Table 10 clearly indicates.
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TABLE 10.--Wages and salaries as a percent Qf national income

Year

Wages and Salaries

Other

Year

Wages and Salaries

Other

1943

44.1

55.9

1949

56.1

43.9

1944

44.8

55.2

1950

56.7

43.3

1945

45.9

54.1

1951

52.8

47.2

1946

45.2

54.8

1952

56.9

43.1

1947

46.6

53.4

1953

54.6

45.4

1948

50.2

49.8

1954

56.4 ,

43.6

SOURCE:
Presidencia de la Nacion, Producto e ingreso de la
Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1955). Cited by Bertram Silverman,
"Labor Ideology and Economic Development in the Peronist Epoch" in
Studies in Comparative International Development 4. 11 (1968-9); p. 243.
From Cafiero,
Table 11 shows that in considering the longer frame of 1935 to 1960,
the distribution of income towards the workers reached a high point
around the midway mark of the Peronist period.

TABLE 11.— Distribution of

net internal income

Year

Wages*

Net Income of Employers,
Owners, Professionals,
Rentiers, etc.**

1935

46.1

53.9

1940

46.4

53.6

1945

46.7

52.2

1950

60.9

39.1

1955

57.9

42.1

1959

50.6

49.4

SOURCES: "Producto e ingreso de la Republica Argentine en el
periodo
1935/54" and Boletiui Estadistico del Banco Central. Cafiero, p. 128.
*Includes personal and managerial contributions to retirement funds.
**Includes estimated replacement costs for consumption of capital.
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Clearly the Peronist period represents a departure in that labor's
share in the distribution of income was significantly higher than
that it commanded before 1943 and after 1955.

The figures also show

the highest increase in wage income occurring in the 1945^-50 stretch,
with the high point being reached in 1949-50.
The Capitalists
It is important to note that while industrial capitalists'
share of income distribution decreased relative to that of workers,
their absolute earnings did not fall.

On the contrary, like wage

earners, managerial personnel (assuming this category to be generally
reflective of industrial capitalists) also experienced a rise in their
incomes during the Peronist years, as can be seen in Table 12.

TABLE 12.— Index of managerial and rentier income during Peronist
years (1943=100)
Year

Managerial

Rentier

Year

Managerial

1944

118.9

107.8

1950

170.3

53.1

1946

126.5

100.6

1952

113.2

34.7

1948

170.2

64.6

1954

115.2

34.9

Rentier

SOURCE: Panorama de la economia argentina (November 1957), p. 119
Adapted from Silverman, p. 244.
As far as workers and capitalists were concerned, the Peronist period
represents a situation in which both sectors' slice of the pie in
creased because the pie as a whole got bigger, the pie being the
expanding output of the industry.

However, the slice of the pie

going to the financial interests seems to have decreased, if the
declining income for rentiers shown in Table 12 can be considered
representative of this sector.
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Responding to the new government's positive orientation to
industry and, indeed, to the obviously improved business climate, the
Union Industrial Argentina's (UIA-r-the organization representing manu
facturing interests) initial relationship with Peron was quite cordial
and favorable.

Not only did the UIA appreciate policies which

increased industrial activity, its members specifically approved of
the Colonel's anti-communism and his emphasis on solidifying harmonious
relationships between capital and labor.

On "Industry Day" of 1944

the UIA's president, Luis Colombo, proclaimed:
We therefore understand the concerns of the Vice President of
the Nation, Colonel Juan D. Peron, who as Secretary of Labor and
Social Welfare attempts to resolve the problems of Argentine
industry, just as he collaborated in the solution of the problem
of apprenticeship of minors and is now doing with that of pensions
and retirement funds, with the aim of ironing out difficulties
without upsetting the public order and within the realm of the
economically feasible; because it would be of little comfort to
those who would benefit, if.these benefits were built on a
foundation of sand.*
It was on these two grounds— the concern for order in the labor
process and redistributive measures confined within what is thought to
be economically reasonable— that the relations between Peron and the
UIA deteriorated.

The fallout between the UIA and Peron dates to the

end of 1944/beginning of 1945 and arose basically over the UIA's unhap
piness with the regime which it perceived to be fomenting labor unrest
and the breakdown of industrial discipline.
Revista de la UIA

The UIA's publication,

of January 1945 (dated December 21) bemoaned "the

breakdown of discipline that necessarily accompanies the ever more
prevalent use of certain terminology that portrays the bosses in a

^Cited by Dardo Cuneo, Compbrtamiento y crisis de la clase
empresaria (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1967), p. 170. My
translation.
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position of power and every agreement, not a just accord, but a
'conquest,* which if necessary, the workers would defend by force.
What is involved is the use of words and concepts poorly assimilated,
similar to those used by the old socialist organizers during the first
phase of trade unionism."*
As 1945 progressed, increasing uneasiness and opposition was
manifested by the industrial bourgeoisie over the redistributive
measures coming out of the Labor Secretariat, The April 1945 issue of
the Revista de la UIA, referring to paid holidays, contributions to
pension funds and more vacation time, found that these "indirect redis
tributive measures are the most troublesome because they cannot be
modified as easily as wages, even though circumstances may make it
imperative to do so."

2

There was also opposition to minimum wages and

equal pay for men and women.

On the latter issue, the March 1945 issue

of the Revista de la UIA saw "a theoretical principle involved which,
under the guise of improving women’s economic conditions, actually
achieves the opposite by making the employment of women more difficult

3
compared to that of men."
1 /•
'
Cuneo, p. 175. As reflected in this section, Cuneo provides a
very useful compendium of citations from the organs of the major inter
est groups, as well as organizing these into a cohesive and comprehensive
analytical framework.
For another good source covering the conflict between Peron and
the employers over his redistributive measures, particularly on the em
ployers' fear of the danger of labor insubordination and lack of disci
pline as well as their opposition to workers' participation in the
profits of firms, see Argentine Republic, Cronica mensual de la Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision; ano 2, no. 15-6 (July-August 1945),
especially pp. 47-50. In general, the Cronica is a useful source for
tracing how Peron wooed the workers and how the Peron-employer relation
ship developed over time.
^Cuneo, p. 176.

^Ibid., p. 177.
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In spite of the fact that they too benefited, bourgeois
sectors resented Peron1s redistributive policies because, regardless
of the actual magnitude, they felt threatened by the comparative
ascent of proletarian sectors.

Traditional distinctions in standards

of living were being eroded and the regime seemed to encourage "the
working classes1' to have pride; the latter, for their part, were
getting "uppity" and haughty, actually demanding to be treated with
dignity and respect.

For these reasons, although it. had initially

declined to do so, the UIA joined the opposition to Peron spearheaded
by the financial interests represented by the Bolsa de Comercio de
Buenos Aires (Chamber of Commerce)— a group even more pro-British than
the UIA, and much more oriented to the interests that had thrived under
the externally oriented growth pattern.^- The coalition centered around
the Bolsa first came together to resist Peron1s compulsory holiday bonus
decreed in December of 1945.

Later it became an important component in

the block of forces behind the Union Democratica— the coalition of all
parties, including the Conservatives, Radicales, Socialists and Commu
nists, facing Peron in the 1946 elections.

October 17 and the February Elections:
Clash between the Classes
/

Peron’s redistributive measures during 1944 and going into 1945
thus aroused resentments among bourgeois sectors.

Indeed, he was per

*Commenting favorably on the proceedings leading to the RocaRunciman Pact, the Memoria de la Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires of
1933 assigned to British capital the role of being "the greatest accel
erator of our progress, and hence arriving at an agreement reaffirming
the mutual interests of both -countries is considered imperative to safe
guard the bases of Anglo-Argentine trade." Found in Cuneo, p. 233.
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ceived as having gone too far even by his junta colleagues.

Of

particular concern to them was Peron's effectiveness in building a
working class base which could potentially enable him to exercise
power independently of the force of arms and thus free him of having
to rely on the army's consent.

For these reasons he was forced to

resign his various positions and placed under arrest in 1945.

But

not for long.
/

News of Peron1s arrest naturally caused apprehension among
union members that the unprecedented gains and recognition they had re
ceived from Peron would now be reversed.

Their national organization,

the Confederation General del Trabaj o (CGT), decided to call for a
general strike on October 18 to drive home their demand for a govern
ment sympathetic and responsive to labor.

However, some union leaders

like Cipriano Reyes, who had been direct beneficiaries of Peron's
interventions as Secretary of Labor and who were closer to the rank
and file, were instrumental in mobilizing them.

By noon on the 17th

of October, thousands upon thousands of them had taken to the streets
*

converging on the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Presidential Palace,
demanding Peron's release in the largest mass demonstration Argentina
had ever seen.*

The spontaneity and magnitude of the demonstration

caught the army off guard.

The sea of humanity concentrated before

the Casa Rosada kept growing ever larger and more ominous.

They had

been chanting incessantly for Peron for more than half a day and they

^One of the best accounts, conveying the electricity of the
events, is that of Felix L u h a i h El 45 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1973), pp. 272-99. See also Hugo Gambini, El 17 de octubre
(Buenos Aires: Centro Editor, 1971).
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showed no signs of leaving before being reassured by Peron's physical
presence and words that their beloved leader was safe and sound, and
back in power.

The junta gave in.

They really had very little choice:

the alternative was a bloodbath, of vast proportions.
worth that.

Peron was not

He might be dangerous and he might be flirting with forces

that could get out of control, but he was still one of theirs.
October 17 proved to be the turning point for Peron's fottunes.
A hastily thrown together Partido Laborista (Labor Party), organized
by some of the same trade unionists active in the mobilization of the
17th of October, was able to parlay the massive support shown for
Peron into a decisive electoral victory in February of 1946.

What

made this triumph all the more remarkable was that contrary to the
image of Peron the totalitarian, controlling all the media and bludgeon
ing his opposition with a massive propaganda campaign, in fact he had
to face a well organized and powerfully financed array of forces.

Felix

Luna for example, points out that the space dedicated by the two major
so called independent dailies, La Nacion and La Prensa, to coverage of
the activities of the Union Democratica contrasted with those of the
Peronist front, was in the order of 90 percent to 10 percent.

The

latter tended to concentrate on scandals within Peronist ranks and on
desertions.

Peron1s name seemed to be scrupulously avoided and he was

referred to as "the retired military personage active in politics" or
"the candidate of forces recently created."1
An interesting aspect of the electoral campaign was Peron's
skill in turning to his advantage the clumsy efforts orchestrated by
Spruille Braden-— the ex-U.S. Ambassador very active and closely identi-

^ e l i x Luna, p. 439.
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fiedwith the coalition opposing Peron— to smear Peron as a Nazi.
Peron relied on the nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments of the
Argentine masses.

In his last speeches he no longer bothered to refer

to Tamborini and the Union Democratica.

Instead he hinted that sinis

ter plans were afoot between Braden and the oligarchy which would turn
back the clock to undo Argentina's independence from foreign influences
and roll back gains for the workers.

He ended with the slogan that

spread like wildfire: "It’s Braden or Peron."
The results of the 1946 elections, one of the most free and
open in the country's history, gave Peron a solid 54 percent majority
thereby decisively establishing both the strength and depth of the
regime's social support, and the legitimacy for its rule.

In the

smaller towns a coalition of small property owners and lower income
groups rallied to Peron and in the big cities the solidity of the
industrial working class' support gave him the votes needed to carry
the large urban concentrations.'*'

The bourgeois sectors which had been

See Peter Smith, "The Social Base of Peronism," in the Hispanic
American Historical Review 52 (feb. 1972): 56-68. This article also pro
vides a strong empirical case for rejecting the notion held for so many
years that Peron derived his major support from a "new working class"
of recent immigrants from the countryside not integrated into the tradi
tional left groupings of the "old working class." Smith shows that
Peron's most solid and loyal support came from industrial workers con
centrated in large unionized factories. E. Spencer Wellhofer, "Peronism
in Argentina: the Social Base of the First Regime, 1946-55," Journal of
Developing Areas 11 (1977): 335-56, generally confirms Peter Smith's
findings. See also Walter Little, "Electoral Aspects of Peronism, 194654," Journal of International Studies and World Affairs 15 (1973): 267-84.
Apparently Peronism retained its ability, unique among popular
political movements, of obtaining massive electoral support from both
industrial working class areas as well as the poorest rural regions.
See Manuel Mora y Araujo and Peter H. Smith, "Peronism and Economic Dev
elopment: the 1973 Election" in Frederick G. Turner and J o s ^ Enrique
Miguens (eds.), Juan Perdii and the Reshaping of Argentina (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh, 1983), p. 174. -In analyzing electoral results
by departamentos (the equivalent of counties), Mora y Araujo and Smith
found a strong relationship between higher Peronist vote and less devel
oped, economically and socially backward, poor, and less urban areas.
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at the heart of the coalition opposing Peron in the elections, accepted
the decisiveness of the election results and did not overtly attack
the regime until the fifties.

The Bolsa de Comercio for example, whose

✓
President not many months before had characterized Peron s regime as
totalitarian and issued a call to join in the battle of "democracy
against totalitarianism, of the respect for the dignity and rights of
human beings and against the absorption of the individual and his goods
by the state,"1 now endorsed and urged support for the government's First
Five Year Plan (FFYP).

The Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires' Memoria

for 1946, in defining the FFYP as a series of measures aimed at
"bettering the worker's standard of living and at the same time d i g n i 
fying him with the undeniably worthy pursuit of his social welfare,"
went so far as to call on the ruling classes

,2

patriotic duty to facili

tate the execution of the plan in every way compatible with the respect
and defense of their legitimate interests, since great benefits are to
3
be hoped for from this coordinating and harmonizing action."
The Workers
A somewhat complex picture emerges of Peron's views on the
proper role to be played by the major actors in Argentina's class
structure and of his actual relationships to them.

At first his con

cern was probably the pragmatic one of achieving some stability for the

,
1Quoted in the Revista de la UIA of January 1946, cited by
Cuneo, p. 225.

2
The text speaks of "clases dirigentes" and "fuerzas vivas."
The former has no direct English equivalent and the latter can be
translated as "dynamic" or "vital forces." Both connote the groups in
control.
3Ibid.
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new regime by providing it with civilian support.

His position as

Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare gave him the opportunity of
gaining some working class friends.

Very early this must have inter

twined with his personal ambitions,and he used his advantageous posi
tion to build his own constituency.

In terms of Peron’s views on the

proper nature of class relations, he probably believed what he espoused
officially.

He probably saw himself as implementing what Justicialist

doctrine called for, deviating only to the extent that political exigencies required.

✓
Peron described his initial pro-labor measures as

necessary to balance out past inequities.

Social justice was need as

an antidote to prior policies which always sided with business and
deprived workers of the just rewards for their labor.

These rectify

ing measures were not conceived as contradicting the Justicialist aim
of forging a multi-class alliance around the common project of building
up national industry for national needs. ' Each sector was to contribute
that share for which it was best suited, and receive, in turn, the fruits
to which it was justly entitled.

Therefore, bourgeois opposition to

✓ ,
Peron's redistributive measures before 1946, probably drove him to establishmuch closer links to the workers than he would have preferred
under calmer circumstances.
Peron had effectively countered the opposition to his rule
with the massive backing he obtained from the urban proletariat and
he had, in fact, relied upon his working class base for his political
survival.

His remarkable success rested on his ability to deliver

tangible material benefits from his post as the Secretary of Labor and
Social Welfare.

Now that he had neutralized his bourgeois opposition

and was therefore in a better position to do so, it was time to consoli
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date his political ascent by improving the material conditions for
workers even more.

In this way he forged the link between his politi

cal future and the fortunes of the working class.

Indeed, not only

did the working class provide Peron’§ most solid bulwark and reliable
ally, it was also the only sector that remained loyal to him throughout
his long career.

The workers never wavered in their personal allegiance

to Peron— though there were times when their enthusiasm was not so
intense— because they saw him as a friend who had concretely demonstrated
his willingness to pursue their interests, and because they understood
that whatever rhetoric might be employed— whether democracy versus dic
tatorship or freedom versus fascism— a basic motivation underlying the
opposition was to reverse the working class’ material gains achieved
under Peronism.

Reduced real wages and declining living standards after

Peron's overthrow confirmed what Argentine workers had feared all along
and reaffirmed their loyalty to the man who had stood by them when he
was in power.

Realistically, there was no political alternative to

Peronism for the workers.
The persistence of Peronism within the Argentine working class
must be traced to the 1945-50 period.

It is important to keep in mind

that the relationship between Peron and the workers was not merely one
between charismatic leader and masses; the persistence of Peronism had
a material foundation.

Even the Wall Street Journal of February 23, 1945

("Argentine Appraisal") characterized Argentine in glowing terms as the
best fed country in the world.

Clothing was abundant, housing adequate,

transportation good, and prices low.
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Looking at the trend in the distribution of income displayed
on Table 11*

it will be recalled'that the working class' proportional

share peaked in the 1945-50 period,

2

the percentage of wages in the

distribution of net internal income being more or less constant from
1935 to 1945 (around 46 percent), then rising to 60.9 percent by 1950,
and declining to 50 percent by 1959.

Table 13 confirms this trend.

TABLE 13.— Real wage index (1943=100)
1939

100

1946

112

1953

135

1960

120

1940

97

1947

140

1954

153

1961

130

1941

97

1948

173

.1955

140

1962

127

1942

97

1949

181

1956

164

1963

126

1943

100

1950

173

1957

134

1964

131

1944

111

1951

145

1958

148

1945

106

1952

135

1959
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SOURCES: Gilbert W. Merckx, "Sectoral Clashes and Political Change:
The Argentine Experience." Latin American Research Review 4 (Pall 1969):
97. He uses tables which subsequently appeared in Carlos Diaz Alejandro
Essays on the Argentine Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979),
p. 538, for 1939-50 and Clarence Zuvekas, Jr., "Economic Growth and In
come Distribution in Post-war Argentina," Inter-American Economic Affairs
20. (Winter 1966), p. 28 for 1950-64. Taken from Kenneth P. Erickson,
"Populism and Political Control of the Working Class in Brazil," Pro
ceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies 4 (1975):

122.

On page 186above. Since the source's concern is to justify
Peronist policies, these figures are undoubtedly on the high side. How
ever, though the magnitudes involved can be disputed, most authorities
agree that the trend these figures show is accurate.

2

Table 10 on page 186 had shown that the highest single jump of
wages and salaries as a percentage of national income occurred from
1948 to 1949, from 50.2 percent to 56.1 percent.
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The trend that emerges so sharply from the figures in Table 13
verifies an important aspect of this analysis of Peronism.
wage index in Table 13

The real

represents the most accurate indicator available

of working class living standards.

We can thus be relatively certain

that the working class saw its material conditions rise steeply from
1945 to 1950.

After 1950, these conditions levelled off somewhat but

were still considerably higher than before Peron came

to power.

Table 13 establishes another key hypothesis in this interpreta
tion of Peronism.

The data shows that after 1955, with the exception

of 1956 and 1958, the working class suffered a severe setback in its
living standards.

This confirms the point to be made in Chapter 6

covering the stage of dependent capitalist industrialization that took
place in the decade after Peron's ouster: that the workers as a class
paid a heavy price in the consolidation of the new pattern. ^
Indeed, the regimes of the sixties, and especially that of
General Ongania as will be seen in Chapter 6, enacted an exact reversal
of Peronist incomes policy.

Whereas Peron used governmental policy to

raise the working class' living standards, in the sixties the effort
was to combat inflation by containing wages.

Whether intentionally or

/

not, Peron's lasting contribution was the elevation of the labor move
ment to the center stage of national politics.

As we saw, Peron en

couraged workers to politicize income distribution, to refuse to abide

Erickson, the source for Table 13, also provides real wage indexes
for Brazil and Mexico. These show'substantially the same relationship
to workers' living standards during the populist periods in those
countries-— Vargas and Goulartregimes in Brazil and Cardenas' in Mexico—
and the reversal of this relationship for the period of capitalist con
solidation which followed. The same trend as in the Argentina case
holds: improved conditions during the populist period and a severe deter
ioration thereafter.
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by market forces.

/
Few items on the political agenda plagued Peron1s

successors after 1955— or indeed Peron himself in 1973— 74, as we
shall see ~ a s much as the question of equitable wages and salaries.*
Another reason for the persistence of Peronism within the
working class which also goes back to the 1945-50 period, lies in the
history of the relationships between the national federation of labor—
/
/
the Confederacion General del Trabajo (CGT)— and Peron: the tremendous
impact he had on its growth and its elevation into a major factor in
national politics.

It will be recalled that labor had been severely

burdened by the process of capital accumulation of the thirties.

Miguel

Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero in their study on the role of the
workers' movement in the origins of Peronism, while not denying the
existence of diverse sectors within the working class, note that the
very severity of the impact of capital accumulation in the thirties
on industrial workers was a factor leading to homogeneity, unifying
rather than exacerbating such differences as those between the more re
cent internal immigrants and the older proletariat of European origins.

2

Murmis and Portantiero's chief point is that the containment

and postponement of labor's demands in the thirties— a period when
industrial output and employment were on the rise while labor's share
of the national income declined— provided Peron with ready-made material
that he could parlay into winning support for the fledgling regime by
addressing some of the backlog of grievances.

Labor leaders for their

part, were more than eager to make up for lost time.

*Gary W. Wynia makes'this point. See his "Workers and Wages:
Argentine Labor and the Incomes Policy Problem" in Turner and Miguens,
p. 33.
^Murmis and Portantiero, p. 76.
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Declining strike activity in relation to lowering number of
strikes won provides a good indication of the unfavorable climate the
unions were forced to operate in as the thirties progressed to the
coup of 1943.

According to official tabulations 34 percent of those

out on strike in 1935 won a victory, while this was true for 27 percent
in 1940, and for only 10 percent two years later.

Not surprisingly,

attendance at union meetings fell by some 27 percent between 1939 and
1942.^

These conditions had a negative impact on unionization itself.

According to Eldon Kenworthy,
Between 1936 and 1941, the industrial work force grew at an
average annual rate of 6 percent, while union membership
climbed at a rate of 4 percent. Between 1941 and 1945, a lag
is still apparent. Industrial workers increase some 8 percent
per year, while the figure for unionization is 5 percent. In
fact, knowledge of what transpired in these years makes it al
most certain that the increase in union membership registered
for 1941-45 was confined to the years 1944-45, when Peron actively
encouraged the process. Attendance at union meetings, for in
stance, which declines steadily throughout the late thirties,
reaches its nadir in 1943, from which it suddenly jumps.
Kenworth concludes that "in relative— perhaps even in absolute— terms,
unionization lost ground until Peron captured the process in late 1943
and this in a period of full employment and stagnant wages!"

2

Using official sources, Kenworthy presents figures that show
the dramatic reversal effected by Peron in the short span from 1943 to
1945

when he was most

directly concerned with labor policies,

as shown in Tables 14 and 15 on the next page.

With Peron's personal

blessings and support, the CGT experienced an astronomical growth
rate during

the first half

of the Peronist decade.

Its

^Cited by Eldon G. Kenworthy in his "The Formation of the
Peronist Coalition," Ph.D. dissertation (Yale University, 1970), 150.
2Ibid., pp. 149-50.
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numbers jumped from 528,523 unionized workers in 1945, to a million
and a half by 1947, thereby almost tripling its membership; and then
again doubling it to some three million unionized workers by 1951.*

TABLE 14.—

Yearly indicators of union activity, 1942-45

Change in

Number of Workers Striking

Attendance at
Union Meetings

1943 over 1942

down 83%

down 58%

1944 over 1943

up 35%

up 85%

1945 over 1944

up 384%

up 87%

SOURCES: Argentine Government, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad
Social, Direccion General de Estudios e Investigaciones, Conflictos del
trabajo. Buenos Aires: 1961 and 1965; Argentine Government, Direccidn
de Estadxsticas Sociales. Investigaciones sociales 1943-45. Buenos
Aires, 1946. From Kenworthy, p. 162.

Table 15 displays the impact on labor struggles of Peronist intervention.

TABLE 15.— Official tabulations of who wins strikes
Percentage of strikers involved in outcome classified as:
Victory
for Strikers
1942

10.3

1945

95

Compromise

Victory
for Management

82.8

6.1

.2

4.8

Pending

.9
0

SOURCES: Argentine Government, Ministerio del Interior, Departamento
Nacional del Trabajo, Division de Estadxstica.
Estadxstica de las
huelgas. Buenos Aires, 1940, 1947; Argentine Government, Ministerio del
Interior, Departamento Nacional del Trabajo, Division de Estadxstica.
Investigaciones sociales, 1940, and 1943-45. Buenos Aires, 1941, 1946.
From Kenworthy, p. 162.
/
The CGT became Peron*s most solid and reliable institutional
base of support and the only one that remained loyal to him throughout.
However, though at times it'came close, the CGT never became a mere

Figures cited by Murmis and Portantiero, p. 79, from official
sources.
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appendage to Peron.

In a' detailed study of strikes during the first

Peronist period, Louise Doyon demonstrates that the greatest incidence
occured during the 1946-49 years which suggests that the workers sought
to extend their victory at the polls to the workplace.1

Moreover,

the most strike prone were those workers who had benefited the most
from Secretariat of Labor interventions in earlier years, thus dis
pelling the notion of their being mere rubber stamps of the state
apparatus.

Hence the Doyon data suggest that even those parallel

unions Peron succeed creating in 1943 and 1944 to counter those led by
Communists and Socialists who refused to cooperate with him, were not
docile extensions of his regime.

It is well known that Peron had

been most adept at interceding on key issues and providing the bene
fits that enabled the new leadership to successfully compete for the
right to represent workers in the given branch.

Such leaders as

Cipriano Reyes of the packinghouse workers, Angel Perelman of the
metal workers, and Mariano Tedesco of the textile workers played a
/

crucial part in the mobilizations of 1945 and 1946 that brought Peron
firmly into power.
their actions.

Yet it is also clear that Peron did not control

All available evidence indicates that the initiative

for the mass mobilization of October 17 came from below and was not
/

orchestrated by Peron s immediate coterie.

2

The workers gravitated to Peron not because they were easily
manipulable or particularly susceptible to demagogic appeals, but

1Doyon argues that the relative decline of strikes after 1948
was due to the greater capacity of the Labor Secretariat to mediate
effectively. It was not as equipped to do so in the earlier period.
Louise M. Doyon, "Conflictos obreros durante el regimen peronista
(1946-55)," Desarrollo ecohomico 17 (1977): 460-1.

2

See pp. 48-9

above.
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/

because they saw that Peron best represented their interests.

Ken

worthy quotes Tedesco as representative of the motivations of this
group of "young people not fighting for any ideology."
In 1945 people were tired. For years and years in their
hunger they had been deceived by songs of liberty, but
liberty begins with economic liberation. I never wasted
time with (Marx's theory of) surplus value with which the
Socialists and Communists entertained themselves so much.
I clearly saw that Peron was fixing things and that everybody j
had more liberty because there was more money in their pockets.
Not only were they attracted by Peron's willingness and ability
to provide material benefits, they were also reacting to opportunism
on the left: particularly of the Communists who seemed less concerned
with defending their interests than in gaining the workers' compliance
with the Party's international line.

A. Lawrence Stickwell illustrates

this point with a discussion of the history of the Communist-led
Federacion de Obreros de Industria de Construccion (FVO.I.C.) from
1943 to 1946.

Led by the immensely popular Jose^Peter, the F.O.I.C.

represented the pivotal working class sector comprised of packinghouse
workers.

This was the sector that with Peron's help was successfully

wooed by Cipriano Reyes' rival union.

In accounting for this case

where the workers had been so strongly devoted to their leadership but
nevertheless tolerated the emergence of a rival leadership, Stickwell
stresses the erosion of the Party's reserves of influence resulting
from its international line.
their job action— he

had

Peter had asked the workers to suspend

been rearrested and the workers were striking

to attempt to secure his release— in the interests of supporting the
allied war effort.

Moreover, he was asking them to subordinate

^From an interview in Primera Plana. Aug. 31, 1965, p. 44.
Cited by Kenworthy, p. 160.
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grievances against their bosses who happened to be Allied owners of
the packinghouses.
The Communist Party from 1943 .to 1946 thus found itself in the
contradictory position of defending foreign industrial inter
ests while claiming to be the'true representatives of the Argen
tine workers. In early 1943 Peter had called for better rela
tions between packinghouse workers and management. As reported
in La Hora, Peter pointed out "the necessity to better relations
between the workers and management of the frigorificos in order
to avoid the handiwork of Nazis and saboteurs." To solve the
problems of Argentina, Peter asserted the need to create the
"broadest national unity of all political and social sectors."
. . . While Peron actively sought tomeet, at least symbolically,
the demands of Argentine workers, the Argentine Communists be
came linked with a broad spectrum of political parties which
wished to reestablish electoral democracy and put Argentina in
the Allied camp. Included in these parties were representatives
of the oligarchy and foreign interests.
The history of the packinghouse workers during this period
illustrates how aptly Peron used state power, on top of the Communist
Party’s self-imposed limitations and equivocations, to undermine the
party’s base among the working class.

In April of 1945, just six

months before the massive spontaneous demonstration that brought
Peron firmly back into power, the Cipriano Reyes group called a general
strike over some dismissals.

The government intervened and ordered the

plants to take back all workers with the promise that it would pay the
salaries of up to 12,6000 workers for three months if it proved econ
omically unfeasible for the companies to do so.

Pay the government

did, to the tune of 10 million pesos, probably using foreign exchange
reserves the Argentine state had accumulated during World War II.

2

^A. Lawrence Stickwell, "Peronist Politics in Labor, 1943" in
New Perspectives on Modern Argentina edited by Alberto Ciria (Blooming
ton: Indiana University, Latin American Studies Program, 1972), p. 42.

2
See the account in.Peter H. Smith’s Politics and Beef in
Argentina: Patterns of Conflict'and Change (N.Y.: Columbia University
Press, 1969), p. 238.
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Peron. succeeded not only in undermining the influence of
Communist and Socialist leaders in specific unions, he was also able
to capture or replace the top leadership of the CGT.

In early 1947 Pe

ron appointed Aurelio Hernandez, a man with no strong opinions or inde
pendent base, to replace Luis F. Gay who had been elected Secretary
General of the CGT in November of 1946.

Not long after he too was

replaced by the even more docile Jose Espejo>who had been the janitor
in the building in which Eva Duarte and Juan Peron had resided in 194445.

This process culminated in 1950 when an extraordinary Congress of

the CGT was convened and the organization's statutes were modified to
/

adhere officially to Justicialism as its doctrine and to Peron as Chief
of the Movement.
Though there is no question that Peron controlled the top levels
of the CGT's hierarchy, it would be a mistake to conclude that the
CGT was thereby transformed into a mere extension of Peron, an appendage
of the Peronist state, or as Alberto Ciria puts it, into an agency for
"state trade-unionism" ("sindicalismo de Estado").'*'

Peron controlled

the top but he did not thereby destroy the autonomy and independent
initiative exercised by the CGT's rank and file.
pointed out,
below.

2

Indeed, as was

Peronist doctrine approved of independent initiative from

The independence of the working class and the fact that Peronism

never extinguished initiative from the CGT's broad base, distinguishes
the Argentine from the Brazilian case of populism.

^Alberto Ciria, "Peronism and Political Structures, 1945-55"
in Ciria, p. 11.
2

See pp.

162-6 above.
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Certainly to fail to recognize the long history of autonomy and
independent

initiative on the part of Argentine workers would lead to

an inability to understand and place in their proper context many of
the most crucial events in the last thirty-five years of Argentine his
tory.

Juan Carlos Torre for example, notes a strong parallel between

the Peronist period of the forties and that of the seventies in regard
to working class militance.

The highest level of labor conflict— de

fined by the greatest number of strikes and work stoppages— during the
J

populist decade took place between 1946 and 1949, right after Peron was
confirmed and legitimized at the polls.
the seventies after Peron*s election.

The same pattern occurred in
Torre concludes that the workers

sought to duplicate their political victory in the electoral arena
with an economic victory at the workplace.*- One thing is certain: if
/

Peron controlled the unions, that did not mean a docile working class.
Whether on their own initiative or encouraged by the regime, the workers
did not pursue their interests with passivity.
The Partido Peronista provides another example of the Peronist
practice of combining control at the top levels with relative freedom
and democracy at the lower levels.

Its predecessor, the Partido Labor-

ista which had been hastily thrown together just four months before the
February 1946 elections, nevertheless achieved an impressive victory
only to be dissolved and replaced by the Partido Peronista shortly after
the elections.

Peron disbanded the Partido Laborista because inspite

of offering Cipriano Reyes official posts and honors in.exchange for
dissolving the party and urging its union affiliates to give their first

*Juan Carlos Torre,"The Meaning of Current Workers' Struggles,"
Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974), p. 74.
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allegiance to Peron, the top leadership refused and insisted on main
taining the party’s independence as the legitimate arm of the working
class' aspirations.1

Even though the Partido Peronista was set up to

counter this autonomous trend in the.working class' top leadership, it
nevertheless encouraged a good deal of freedom of initiative from its
own base.

Though it was a hierarchical organization with. Peron at its

summit, its two basic units— the unidades basicas gremiales made up of
trade unionists in the same occupational category and the unidades
basicas ordinarias— elected their leaders by direct vote of the member
ship .
Workers, Capitalists, and the State
In his efforts to undercut the influence of the revolutionary
left within the working class, Peron understood quite correctly that he
had to eliminate the potential for revolutionary upheavals by using the
state as an instrument to give excluded sectors a material stake, inte
grate them into the system, and thus achieve a greater social balance.
/

Peron s stiffest opposition came from upper sectors who perceived his
pro-labor policies to be directly opposed to their interests.

As we have

/

seen, Peron countered this opposition by basing his regime on an even
closer identification with the lower sectors.

Hence, even if Peron had

wanted to control the working class by exercising a rigid hold from top
to bottom of the trade union structure, he could not because he depended
on impetus and initiative from below to make himself a credible inter
mediary.

He needed the thrust from below to show the traditionally

leading groups that he could defuse the threat from the masses.
1For an account see Walter Beveraggi Allende (the Partido Laborista's
Vice President), El fracasode Peron-y el problems argehtino (Buenos
Aires: Talleres Gr^ficos'L. J. Rosso, 1956), p. 53.
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In fact, a certain degree of independent initiative from the
rank and file accorded well with Peron*s conception of his role and
that of the state as an arbiter above, and independent of,classes and
social forces, assuring a just and equitable distribution of the
society's wealth, and thus achieving a harmonious balance.

To counter

the opposition from oligarchic and bourgeois groups while not at
the same time becoming the expression of an exclusively proletarian
project, Peron relied on mobilization but only to a point.

He needed

mobilization but he had also to keep it within limits so that it would
not spill over and upset the social relations associated with an econ
omic system based on the private property framework.

To maintain him

self independent of his working class base, Peron had to adopt difficult
and sometime contradictory tactics.

He sought on the one hand to pre

vent open conflict between antagonistic social forces, but on the
other hand he also benefited from promoting tension between them.
Some analysts have seen Peron*s concern for an equitable dis
tribution of wealth as subsidiary to, and motivated by, his desire for
an autonomous state independent of any social attachments.

Waldmann

for example, notes that Peron paid as much attention to the problem of
an equitable distribution of wealth as he did, because this allowed him
to anticipate and sidetrack the demand of the masses for more intensive
participation in the political decision-making process.

He thus sub

stituted their potential pressure for more political power with a greater
share in the distribution of wealth.. ^

There is no doubt that Peron

strongly believed that the.state should not be tied

^Waldmann, p; 118.

to any particular
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class or sector.

In my view Peron,believed that achieving a just

distribution of wealth was a proper goal for the state, not simply
because he was motivated by an opportunistic quest for power, but also
and more importantly, because he felt that the state's all-consuming
mission was to bring about national greatness.

It could do so only by

preventing social discord and by promoting the cooperation of all
legitimate national groups, including capital and labor, in a common
crusade for national reconstruction.

For this reason, because it had

to be able to lead all sectors and not as an end in itself, the state
had to be kept free from being tied to any one particular sector of the
social complex.
The different functions performed by Peron and Evita and their
corresponding leadership styles, conveniently allowed Peron to pursue
his contradictory relationship to the masses.*'

Evita

championed the

cause of the humble and the working class; she was their undisguised
partisan.

2

/

This allowed Peron to be the statesman, the leader of the

Among others, Waldmann makes this point, p- 141.

2

In this regard mention should be made of the enormous efforts
undertaken by the Fundacion de Ayuda Social which bore Evita's personal
stamp. It was responsible for thousands of clinics, old age homes,
orphanages schools, homes, all of the best quality. Evita did not be
lieve in charity, which she felt was a way for the aristocracy to humil
iate the poor. In her view she was providing services which all Argen
tines were rightfully entitled to as full-fledged participants in
their society. She felt that the poor had as much of a right as the
rich to enjoy, for example, the best medical care and facilities that
money could buy. Drab hospital rooms and second-rate equipment were a
way to humiliate the recipients who had no choice but to rely on public
facilities. See Marysa Navarro, Evita (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 1981).
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nation

above narrow group interests, and thus able to arbitrate the con

flicts arising between them.

It was Evita1s passionate partisanship

*
which allowed Peron to perform his role while still maintaining the
loyalty of the descamisados.

Evita*s final speech on May Day of 1951

provides a good example both of her style and the function she per
formed for Peron.
My dear descamisados. . . be on your guard. The enemy are
preparing an ambush for us. Stand by Perdn, who stands by you,
and then we can never be defeated, for we are the real Argentina.
. . . We will never again let ourselves be kicked around by the
traitorous and corrupt oligarchy and their foreign masters.
Woe to them the day they lift a hand against Per^n. For that
day . . . I will go out into the streets with the workingmen,
with the women of the people, with the descamidados, and we will
not leave one stone upon another that is not Peronista.1
Once the policy shifts of the fifties began to dry up the

✓
popular enthusiasm for his regime, Peron tried to shore up the eroding
support of the workers through rhetoric, reverting to Evita*s oratorical
style.

Quoting her directly, he said on May 13, 1953: "The class strug

gle will end only when one class disappears."

The Peronist movement,

he insisted, would "destroy the oligarchy because in Argentina there
could only be the class that worked."

The fact that Peron was forced

to interchange his more characteristic conciliatory role for Evita1s
firebrand militance after her death in 1952, made it even more difficult
for him to confront the growing problems he had to face in the second
half of his populist decade.
An occasional lapse into class struggle rhetoric notwithstanding,
✓
Peron sought very hard to avoid being tied to a specific.class or sec-

As quoted by Samuel L. Baily in Labor, Nationalism and Politics
in Argentina (New Brunswicki New'Jersey: Rutgers University, 1967),
p. 147.
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tors within classes.

This does not however, mean that his regime

lacked a social base or that the state did not in fact implement a
social project benefiting definite interests.

The Peronist state pur

sued a program of internally oriented industrialization that rested on
the interests of the urban proletariat, the medium and small managerial
groups in industry and commerce, and, to a lesser extent, those of the
rural middle class and proletariat.

Thus the common denominator for

all these classes, which underlay the possibility for their political
convergence, was given by the centering of their interests on internal
development.*

In that it attacked the imperialist control and monopoly

of export commerce and finances, and checked foreign interests at the
level of imports as well as direct investments, the Peronist program
met their needs.

Protection from foreign competition was essential to

permit the survival and expansion of new branches of medium and small
industry that had sprung up at an accelerated pace in the prior period.
However, though the Peronist project certainly benefited their
✓
interests and though Peron sought to center the social base for the re
gime on a coalition of labor and national capitalists, industrialists
never played the part in the movement or enjoyed the proximity to the
state apparatus that labor did.

As we saw, this was largely a result

of their opposition to Peron prior to the 1946 election.

This opposi

tion— centered on the Sociedad Rural Argentina, the Bolsa de Comercio,
/

/

.

and the Union Industrial Argentina— led Peron to rely, probably more
heavily than he would have liked on working class mobilization.

This

in turn produced an almost revolutionary transformation,of the Argentine

*These points are extrapolated from Jorge, pp. 11-2.
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political system: 56% of the 1946 congressional seats were held by mem
bers of the working class.*

Nine-tenths of the seats in the lower house

were held by people new to politics^only fourteen had served previously
(12 Radicals and 2 Peronists)— and seventy were held by working class
people, mostly union leaders.

2

When the UIA made its peace after Peron’s overwhelming electoral
victory in 1946, its support for the regime was never as spontaneous and
enthusiastic as that which came from the CGT.

While the UIA accorded

Peron respect, the CGT gave him love.and adoration.

In fact there was

dissension within the UIA in 1946 between those who favored closer rela
tions with the government and those who wanted to continue the organiza
tion’s oppositional stance.

Indeed, it was because the UIA could not

be won over completely that the Consejo
founded in December of 1952.

General Economico (CGE) was

In its formation, dissidents from the UIA

who were closest to the Peronist regime played an important part.

In

contrast to the more traditional and British oriented UIA, the CGE with
/
3
its president Jose Gelbard represented those sectors associated with the
national bourgeoisie.

Less tied to traditional foreign linked entrepre

neurs, it brought together organizations representing small businessmen
from the interior and industrialists oriented to the domestic market.
The CGE was also a more democratically structured organization along

^Gilbert Merkx, "Sectoral Clashes and Political Change: The
Argentine Experience," Latin American Research Review 4 (Fall 1969): p. 92.

2

Luna, p. 505.

3
As we shall see, Gelbard was responsible for the brief attempt
at formulating an economic projects seeking to promote the interests of
the national bourgeoisie when'Peron returned to power in 1973.
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federative lines, with each region and branch of economic activity hav
ing its own chamber.*
Perhaps it was because the bourgeoisie failed to play a dynamic
part in developing the productive forces within the Argentine economy,
that the Peronist government acted'in a surrogate capacity pursuing
policies which therefore led to a marked tendency towards state capital
ism.

By monopolizing export-import structures and utilizing credit and

fiscal devices, Peronism succeeded in reorienting capital flow towards
circuits based on the internal market.

The state speeded the expansion

of the productive forces inherent in pushing internally oriented growth
to its full potential by aiding in the development of the needed infra/

structure.

The proceeds from the Instituto Argentino para la Promocion

del Intercambio’s (I.A.P.I.)— the state's agency monopolizing export
trade— operations for example, were used in nationalizing public utili
ties, expanding the state's merchant marine fleet, purchasing other
means of transportation, and capital equipment for the state's oil
company (Y.P.F.).

The state also played a more direct role in this pro-

cess via state-owned enterprises.

2

It must be emphasized that this con

stituted state capitalism rather than a move towards socialism, because
though the state sector owned significant means of production, there
was no attempt to alter the relations of production from a private prop
erty framework.

Indeed, the state sector acted to enhance the conditions

that would give the private sector a. greater return on its capital.

^Cuneo's work, pp. 186-202, contains a good discussion of the CGE.

2

Though this was primarily in military-related.production, it
was not confined to this area. Thus the nationalization of the railroad
network and of public utilities.
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The thesis that sees the Peronist regime as an incident of
state capitalism^ is correct to the extent of the ownership of means
of production and their use to promote a capitalist relations of pro
duction and distribution.

However,.understood in the sense of the

regime’s class base being restricted to a privileged bureaucratic
caste within the state apparatus,

2

be incorrect for the Peronist case.

the state capitalist thesis would
The analysis developed in this

study maintains that the Peronist state tended to be autonomous, that
it was not specifically tied to, nor was it a mere expression of a par
ticular class.

This view is not, of course, tantamount to asserting

that the regime lacked a social base or that the regime did not in fact
represent interests, both in terms of its personnel and its policies.
In terms of social base, I find Eldon Kenworthy’s view of the
Peron government as having rested, at least initially, on a military/

3
labor coalition to be essentially correct.

In terms of governmental

personnel, these and other interests not usually represented in prior
governments were present throughout the entire structure.

For example,

Kenworthy compares the members of a 1942 pre-Peron cabinet with those
of Peron1s first cabinet and finds among the latter but not the former,
labor leaders and industrialists not engaged in the elaboration of
/

agricultural goods.

In Peron’s cabinet there was also a very signifi-

cant increase in the members who did not possess an elite background.

4

^Juan Carlos Esteban argues this position in h i s .Imperialismo
y desarrollo economico (Buenos Aires; Merayo Editor, 1972).

2

As for example in Leon Trotsky’s analysis of the Soviet instance
in The Revolution Betrayed.
3
See the first part of the section beginning on p. 183 above.

4
Kenworthy's Ph.D. dissertation, p. 248.
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The 1946 group apparently contained no members of the
prestigious Jockey Club or the more exclusive Circulo de
Armas, while half of the 1942 cabinet are known to have been
members of one or both. No less novelthan union leaders is
the presence in the 1946 cabinet of at least one self-made
industrialist. Previous governments contained;— the precise
mixture depending on the party in power-— representatives of
large beef-raisers and wheat growers, and those associated
with the processing and trade of these products. . . .
Totally missing in 1942, and in all previous cabinets
to my knowledge, are men like Rolando Lagomarsino, a medical
school drop-out who built up his own company, manufacturing
hats and other products.
Kenworthy underlines the difference between the two cabinets, noting
that though Peron's Minister of Agriculture was a landowner and
member of the Sociedad Rural like his predecessors, he was also "a
president of a chemical concern and Under-secretary of Industry and
Commerce."1
In discussing whether the interests of industrialists were
represented within Peron1s government, Kenworthy makes a very useful
distinction between "old" and "new" industrialists.

The former refers

to those engaged in activities related to the agro-exporting sector, the
quintessential example being the meatpacking plants.

The latter involves

the import substituting sector oriented to domestic consumption and
often depending on protective barriers and other governmental assistance
against foreign competition.

Within this type one can make a further

distinction between those lighter industries which first came into
existence, more labor intensive and with a lower organic composition
of capital, such as textiles and foodstuffs, and the newer, heavier

Kenworthy, pp. 250-1.

2
Eldon G. Kenworthy, "Did the 'New Industrialists' Play a
Significant Role in the Formation’of the Peronist Coalition, 1943-6?"
in Ciria, p. 27.
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industries with a higher organic composition, such as metallurgy.

This

distinction hecomes very important further on when the analysis turns
to the dual, contradictory nature of the industrial development taking
place during this period.
The "new industrialists" certainly benefited from Peronist
policies and their interests were well represented within the regime.
Their personnel occupied the key economic policy making positions.

For

example, as Kenworthy points out, Miguel Miranda was the "economic czar"
behind the changes in early 1946, among which were the nationalization
of the Central Bank and the creation of I.A.P.I.

He was also the major

influence in the formulation and administration of the First Five Year
Plan (FFYP).

"Once an employee of a typical ’old1 firm, Bunge y Born,

Miranda had struck out on his own in tin- and chrome-plating and in
the related field of canned f o o d s . M i r a n d a personified the "new
industrialist," a self-made captain of industry of manufacturing plants
in the import substituting sector "which had grown under the protective
shadow of the Depression and the Second World War."

2

Though it is tempting to identify the regime's industry pro
moting policies with Miranda and Lagomarsino, Kenworthy correctly notes
that these policies actually predate them.

3

Miranda and Lagomarsino

✓
were not even associated with Peron prior to 1945; in fact, Miranda
was one of the UIA's anti-Peronist leaders before 1945.
1
Kenworthy, p. 17.

4

"The evidence

°
'‘'Ibid., p. 16.

3
He cites the expansion of industrial credits on August 23, 1944,
the integral industrial promotion law of June 1944, the establishment
of the Industrial Credit Bank in April, and in July of 1944, the crea
tion of the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce. Ibid., p. 18.
4Ibid.
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suggests, then, that the adhesion of any significant group of industri
alists, new or old, to Peron's Army-labor coalition came only after the
triumph of the coalition was a fait accompli.

As a group the new

/
industrialists did not play an important role in bringing Peron to
power.By

contrast, as we have seen, labor did play a very important

role, first in saving Peron from his erstwhile military comrades and
then in reinforcing his hold on power.

In ousting Peron from the junta

in 1945, the military was responding to pressures being fomented largely
by landowners and industrialists.
Budgetary allocations are indicative of the changing role of
the military within the Peronist coalition.

As Alberto Ciria points

out,^ the military budget allocation for 1945 was five times as high
as that for 1942.

On the other hand, once his labor base had secured

him more firmly in power and the industrial bourgeoisie began to be
✓
more responsive to his appeals to join in the coalition, Peron preferred to rely less heavily on the military as the base for his regime.

3

The Oligarchy
This survey on the attitudes of classes and sectors within them
towards the regime, and the regime's relationships with them, would be

* Kenworthy, p. 22. Emphasis in original.
^In his previously cited Peron y el justicialismo, p. 42.

3

Waldmann, pp. 162-3, According to Peter Waldmann, the military
received one half of the state's expenditures in 1945, one third on 1946,
and only one fifth of the state's expenditures by 1951. On this subject
Waldmann cites Cafiero, p. 109 and Robert Alexander, The Peron Era (New
York: Russell and Russell, 1965), jd. 119 and Alain Rouquie, "Adhesion
militar y control politico del Ejercito en el regimen peronista (1946-55)"
in Aportes, No. 19 (Jan. 1971), p. 79.

incomplete without a discussion of the landowning oligarchy.

There seems

to be little doubt that during the first half of the Peronist decade,
the rural sector bore the costs of the industrializing drive.

According

to David Rock, "the weight of the evidence suggests that the sector
mainly penalized by this.policy was the agricultural producers.

E.C.L.A.

figures suggest a 27% decline in agricultural incomes between 1946 and
1949."*

Though Peronist industrializing efforts represented a basic con

tinuity with the limited import substituting policies of its predecessors
Peronism also went far beyond the scope of the latter and indeed funda
mentally reversed the relationship between the sectors by subordinating
rural production to the requirements for furthering expanded manufacturing activity.

✓
Thus, even though Peron was in a sense merely carrying

out, albeit in an accentuated manner, policies proposed by members of
their own class, the oligarchy could not help but be hostile once the
impact of the Peronist project began to be felt.
It must however be stressed that, though he instituted such

✓
measures as the Estatuto del Peon which provided for increased wages
and better working conditions for the rural proletariat, Peron did not
directly attack the social relations prevalent in the countryside.

He

did not seek to undo the oligarchy's material base; indeed, as has been
noted by analysts with differing political perspectives on Peronism, the
failure to expropriate large landed property may well have been the
regime's major error.^

^-Rock, "The Survival of Peronism" in the book edited by him, p.
189. He also points out that I,A.P.I., the primary Peronist instrument
for redistributing agriculturally generated surplus, "had been among
the proposals of the conservative Pinedo Plan of 1940."

2

Even Antonio Cafiero,who represents Peronist orthodoxy, seems
to have grudgingly accepted this conclusion ex post facto; see pp. 441-2.
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Nevertheless, though their material base was not being
attacked directly, the oligarchy was right to feel threatened by the
political and social climate introduced by Peronism into the country
side.

The notion gaining currency among peons and rural workers that

the state represented a higher authority than their boss, and that
they could appeal to this authority to protect their interests, was
much more dangerous to the oligarchy's position than the granting of
wage increases.

To the oligarchy, and as we have seen there were

similar sentiments among the industrial bourgeoisie, the Estatuto del
Peon was just one more example of a process being set in motion which
could run out of control.^

For example, the December 1944 issue of the

Anales de la Sociedad Rural insisted that it could no longer remain si
lent in the face of public declarations surrounding the Estatuto del
Peon in which landowners are portrayed as
egotistic and brutal beings who satisfy their inhuman sensual
needs at the expense of the misery and hardships of those who
must work for them. . . . Work in the countryside was and re
mains an extension of the boss' personal intervention. The
latter frequently joins the peasants in common labor, which
may lead some to confuse this relationship as one of the
owner and slave when in reality it comes closer to being that
between father and sons.
In addition to posing an indirect threat with the potential of a
/

breakdown in labor discipline, Peron's active crusade to bring dignity
and pride to working people, and his use of governmental machinery to
back them up, seemed to insolently flaunt the traditional rules of the

1-Luna makes these points, p p . 43-4.
o
/
^Cited by Cuneo, pp. 154-5.

My translation.
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political game.

It is significant that all groups representing agri-

✓
cultural property owners were united in their opposition to Peron.

As

Peter Smith aptly notes, as long as the rural groups controlled the
country, they fought among themselves over the distribution of the
spoils.

When however, the whole arrangement seemed to be challenged

by the urban proletariat, they joined together in a common effort to
salvage their society,*
The opposition of the landowning interests to the Peronist re
gime reached a crescendo and peaked by the 1946 elections.

Thus, in

1945, the socially and politically significant annual exhibition spon
sored by the Sociedad Rural, was used as a political demonstration.
When the Army officers who were to participate in the equestrian events
came on the field, they were greeted by boos and shouts of

Libertad.

By contrast, at the 1946 exhibition, Peron was received as an honored
guest.

Though it did not cease to criticize the regime on interference

with labor relations, just like the UIA, by 1946 the reconciliation with
the regime had been completed and relations remained officially cordial
for the duration of the Peronist period.

2

As we saw, this reversal came about as a result of the vivid
demonstration of the solidity of Peron1s working class base through
street mobilizations and then the resounding victory at the polls.

These

pragmatic reasons were undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that although
s
Peron might represent an indirect threat through his disruptive impact
on labor discipline, he was not a foe of private property, nor, despite

*Smith, p. 258.
2

/

On relations between the SRA and the regime, see Cuneo, espec
ially pp. 159-60, 163-5.
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the militant rhetoric, did he seem intent on expropriating large
landed estates.

Article 38 of the Justicialist Constitution of 1949

had stated:
It is incumbent on the state t o .control the distribution
and utilization of the land and to intervene with the ob
jective of developing and increasing its yield in the interest
of the community, and to secure for each rural worker and for
his family the possibility of becoming the owner of the land
which he tills.
The Second Five Year Plan also contained a series of measures along
these lines, but it was clear that the regime did not consider them
seriously since it never undertook the mobilization of popular forces
which their implementation would have necessitated.

Indeed, after 1949,

the regime's hostile stance towards the oligarchy changed and its
relations with the agro-pastoral exporting interests mellowed consider
ably.

As we shall see, faced with the agricultural crisis of 1951-2,

rather than moving towards expropriation, Peron chose to allay the
large landowners' fears.
Some have argued that Peronism's fatal error was its failure
to expropriate the landowning oligarchy not only because this left its
major opposition's material base intact, but also, because in failing
to grasp the closeness of the connection between the oligarchy and the
industrial bourgeoisie, the regime deprived itself of the only effective
way of undermining opposition from that source as well.

Julio Mafud,

for instance, argues that Peronism's inability to see that the industrial
bourgeoisie was the child of the landowning oligarchy led it to the
futile policy of promoting the growth of industrial capital as a means

^As cited in Silverman's thesis, p. 112.
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of offsetting the oligarchy’s.power.
Peronism did not understand* or understood too late, that there
can be no national liberation or emancipation from imperialism
that does not involve the destruction or elimination of the
landowning oligarchy's socio-economic structure. . . . It did
not comprehend that as it promoted industrialization it in
creased dependency on two sides. On one side, the government
depended on the landowning oligarchy, owner of almost all
industrial capital. On the other side it depended on foreign
imperialist capital if it wanted' to maintain the technical
rhythm of modern industrial production, as it discovered after
1950 when it lacked the technical capacity for further develop
ment.3To the extent that Mafud calls attention to Peronism's failure
to dismantle the social relations that provided the base for Argentina's
dependency, and in that he portrays industrialization within the private
enterprise framework as merely replacing one set of dependent foreignnational relationships with another dependent set, the above statement
paraphrases the major thesis developed in this study.

However, Mafud's

analysis diverges from ours in its implication of an almost total iden
tification of agricultural with industrial capital.

Having said this,

I would also add that the more serious mistake is the opposite one.

It

would be even more misleading to adopt the conventional paradigm that
asserts an inherent conflict between the rural-based landowning elite
and the urban-based bourgeoisie tied to the development of the factory
system, assigning the latter a dynamic and progressive role in undoing
the former's traditional society.
Although the truth lies much closer to Mafud*s interpretation
than to the latter, both err in that they characterize the Argentine
industrial bourgeoisie of the period as a more homogeneous entity than

^Mafud, p. 168.

My'translation.
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it was in reality.

It was composed of diverse sectors with the dom

inant group in fact being closely linked to the oligarchy and materially
tied to agro-exporting activities.*

There was also however, another

sector developing within the industrial bourgeoisie with an interest
in an economy centered on manufacturing activity oriented to the
domestic market.

This is the sector Kenworthy calls the "new industrial

ists" and which this study refers to as the "national bourgeoisie."

It

was the sector which Peronist policies sought to promote and which indeed
benefited from them.
Stressing the proximity of the dominant sector within the indus
trial bourgeoisie with the landowning oligarchy offers an explanation
for the seeming paradox of the hostility of the industrial bourgeoisie
towards the regime in spite of its policies favoring the growth of manu
facturing activity.

This proximity was fostered by the landowning oli

garchy which, as an "open" ruling class not unlike its British counter
part, maintained its control over newly rising elites through selectively
incorporating their most dynamic members.

This not only deprived the

emerging industrial bourgeoisie of its most dynamic elements, it also
led to a lack of an independent orientation since its most successful
members aspired to oligarchic status and identified with the ruling
stratum’s values.

Dardo Cuneo cites a dramatic illustration in the per

*In a 1965-6 survey, Cardoso shows a close linkage between
entrepreneurs and estancierbs, at least as far as attitudes are con
cerned. When entrepreneurs were asked whether important divergences
existed between the interests of rural and industrial sectors, 51
percent of them said "no," with only 21 percent answering affirmatively,
and another 20 percent saying "sometimes." F.H.. Cardoso, Ideologias
de la burgues^a industrial emsociedades dependientes (Argentina y
Brasil) (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veihtiuno Editores, 1972), p. 146.
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son of the founder of the Jockey Club, one of Argentina's most presti
gious social institutions.

Carlos Pellegrini was an industrialist, and

yet when the Jockey Club honors.its founder with an edition of his
speeches, not a single one with a pro-^industrializihg theme is included.*"
Nor was this a one-way street.

"Indeed, the aristocracy can he seen

moving in a symbiotic direction, its members turning their backs on a
declining rural income in order to parlay social influence into new
wealth through lending their names and connections to business, both
foreign and domestic."

2

The close connection between the landowning ruling class and
the industrial bourgeoisie also makes less paradoxical the espousal
of the qualified industrialization program of the thirties on the part
of a regime so closely identified with the oligarchy.

Thus it is not

so contradictory that Luis Duhau who was the Minister of "Agriculture
in the Justo Administration and who was a member of the Sociedad Rural,
should have been one of the proponents of that policy.

In its defense

he made this revealing statement:
The historic stage of our prodigious growth under the direct
stimulus of the European economy has finished. . . . After
writing off the external stimulus, due to the confused and
disturbing state of the world economy and policy, the country
should look to itself, to its own resources, for relief from
its present difficulties.^
Did the oligarchy use its material base to sabotage the Peronist
regime's efforts to build up the national economy by cutting back on

^Cuneo, p. 278.

^Kenworthy, p. 25.

3
Cited by Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History
of the Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970),
pp. 37-8.
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rural production?

There is controversy on this subject and the data do

not clearly support either side of the question.

Robert Alexander is

one of those who have argued that Peronism's attack on
the economic and political power' of the rural landowning class . . .
had a disastrous effect on Argentina's agricultural output.
According to the January, 1956 issue of the Boletin economico
de America Latina, published by the Economic Commission for
Latin America, the total amount of land under cultivation in
Argentina dropped from 21,814,000 hectares in the 1934-38
period to 17,254,000 in 1955. The amount of land under cul
tivation in cereals and vegetable oils dropped by 1955 to only
74.4 percent of what it had been in 1934-38. Some observers
have argued that the fall in the amount of land in use was
even greater than these figures would show. ^
Jorge Fodor, in an excellent analytical article interprets the
same kind of data in the context of how international economic factors
impacted upon Argentina and concludes that, far from being wasteful
and capricious, Peronist policies toward the agricultural sector were
the most appropriate and rational under the circumstances.

He argues

that what "happened was simply that beef production increased."

Citing

E.C.L.A.*s Economic Survey 1949 (p. 133) he maintains that it increased
by 24 percent between 1937 and 1947 and that this was largely in re
sponse to what seemed excellent prospects for beef to gain access to
the U.S. market in 1946 and become

a dollar earner.

On the other

hand, because of the lack of markets, "cereals had to rot or be used
as fuel.

It was estimated that in 1943 alone, 1.7 million tons of

wheat and 1.5 million tons of linseed had been burnt. (United Nations,
E.C.L.A., Economic Survey 1949. p. 132)"
Meat exports had, on the contrary, remained comparatively
stable. These relatively favourable conditions for livestock
explain why cattle increased at the expense of cereals. This

^Robert J. Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution (New York:
MacMillan, 1972), p. 253.
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shift also explains what had happened with the land. The
total decline in cultivated area in Buenos Aires, Cordoba,
Santa Fe, La Pampa, and Entre Rios between 1936-7 and 1946-7
had increased in these same provinces by 7.4 million heads,
an addition in land terms of slightly over 8 million addi
tional hectares. (.United Nations, E.C.L.A., Economic Sur
vey 1949, p. 133)1
Fodor1s basic point is that cultivated land declined and agri
cultural production suffered in those areas producing for overseas
markets and that the government's policies were a rational and appro
priate response to circumstances and factors over which it had very little
control.

On the other hand, he points out, agricultural production

geared to the internal market increased dramatically in the Peronist
years.
With the development of the edible oil industry in Argentina,
sunflower increased from zero in 1933 to 1.5 million hectares
in 1948. The area cultivated with industrial crops (sugar
cane, wine, peanuts, tobacco, yerba mate, and cotton), ex
panded from a yearly average of 439,000 hectares for 1925-9
to 1,061,000 hectares in 1945-8.
Table 16 partially confirms Fodor's analysis, showing that, based on
the government's figures, if one takes the yearly average of cattle
slaughtered in the five year period immediately preceding Peron and
compares this figure with the five year period immediately after the
1943 coup, there was a slight drop in beef exports.

Of course this does

not necessarily invalidate Fodor's argument, since it is relative and
hinges on perceptions of trends.

That is, the foreign demand for wheat

and cereals declined more drastically and the prospects for placing beef
abroad looked relatively good.

What is significant about the figures in

*Jorge Fodor, "Peronist Policies for Agricultural Exports
1946-8; Dogmatism or Commonsense?" in Rock, pp. 154-5.
2Ibid., p. 153.
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Table 16

is that the output of beef did not decrease and that production

for domestic needs seems to have gone up significantly.

TABLE 16.— Average of cattle annually slaughtered in millions of head
Period

Export

Internal Consumption

Total

1938-42

2.45

4.79

7.24

1944-48

1.85

5.48*

7.40

SOURCE: Adapted from figures found in Anuario EstadHstico, Tomo I
(Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nacion, Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos,
1948), p. 408.
*Does not include cattle slaughtered for industrial use.

With a growing proportion of its production destined for domestic
needs, the agricultural sector mirrored the overall impetus of Peronist
policies promoting an internally oriented growth pattern.

Table 17 shows

this trend: the contrast between the 60 percent of agro-pastoral produc
tion for foreign markets in 1927 with the 78 percent for domestic consump
tion in 1955 provides a sharp illustration.

Table 17

also corroborates

my argument that Peronism represents the culmination of a transitional
process whose trends accelerate after 1930.

The figures show that the

inversion of the proportions destined for foreign and domestic markets
took place in the 1930-4 period and that the gap between them increasingly
widened after that.
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TABLE 17.— Proportions of agro-pastoral production destined for external
and internal consumption
Period

Percentage Going to
Foreign Markets

Percentage Destined for
Domestic Markets

1920

52

45

1927

60

40

1930-4

48

52

1935-9

43

57

1945-9

29

70

1950-4

21

79

1955

20

78

✓
SOURCE: E.C.L.A. El desarollo economico argentino. Part II. Los
sectores de produccion agropecuaria y sus posibilidades de crecimiento.
Adapted from Juan Carlos Esteban, p. 130.

Overview
The example of the oligarchy illustrates limitations inherent
in Peronism's class alliance formula.

At this point I want to raise

in a preliminary and theoretical way a key theme that the remainder of
the analysis seeks to demonstrate: by using the state and popular mobili
zation as "pressure," choosing to influence class relations through indi
rect means, rather than restructuring state power on a class basis in
order to use it in altering existing class relations, Peronism determined
the nature of the succeeding developmental model.
In accordance with its populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronism
used the state as an instrument to undercut class struggle, to expand the
common ground shared by all social sectors by involving them in the cru
sade to build the new Argentina free from the domination of foreign im-.

/

perialists and their vendepatria allies.-

As we saw, Peron believed in

an activist state, but not one tied.to any particular social group, be
lieving instead that its proper role lay in the forging of the widest
possible alliance in this common national enterprise.

Being committed

to achieving this objective while preserving the private property frame
work, he had no intention of tampering with the social relations under
lying production and indeed was strongly opposed to any such attempt.
For this reason the Peronist state confined its reforms to the sphere
of circulation, believing a redistribution of wealth to be essential to
prevent class struggle from spilling over into the sphere of production.
As we saw, the bourgeoisie vehemently disagreed with Peron on this score,
its perception being that such reforms tended to undermine labor disci
pline by creating the sense among workers that they could count on the
state as their ally.
It must be stressed that Peronism1s populist-nationalist program
of displacing class struggle onto a common effort in the development of
national capitalism was only possible because of the very favorable con
ditions for the Argentine economy internationally at that time.

Because

the regime's developmental program was congruent with these conditions,
it could provide simultaneous benefits to social sectors with antagonistic
interests in the distribution of surplus value.

In this way the regime

was able to maintain its populist-nationalist base intact and deliver
the material pay-offs essential for social peace.

However, though

obscured for the time being, contradictions between sectors comprising
the Peronist coalition remained and, in the end, proved instrumental
in the 1955 coup.

An important factor in the regime's overthrow was the

fact that it was never able to overcome the distrust felt by the military
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and the bourgeoisie as a result of its identification with the working
class and popular sectors.

Contradictory Industrialization of the Forties
Key to populist-nationalism's class alliance formula was the
provision of higher wages and an improved living standard for the working
population along with increased profits for industrialists.

Peronism's

developmental program sought to do this with a two-pronged approach:
1) it aimed to expand the domestic market by raising the purchasing power
of the broad masses through redistributive measures, and 2) it sought to
encourage local manufacturing through protective tariffs and easy financing^
by shifting agriculturally generated surplus toward industry.

This program

was successful in the forties because of its congruence with exceptionally
favorable circumstances for the Argentine economy.
These external factors were a direct result of wartime conditions.
The most important were: 1) the relative lack of competition from foreign
manufacturers which created a gap in the demand for industrial products
that Argentines could fill, not only in Argentina itself but to an impor-

*0ne of the primary instruments was the Banco de Credito
Industrial founded in 1944 with the aim of "fomenting national industry."
According to Cafiero it financed the installation and expansion of more
than twenty thousand establishments between 1946 and 1951. Its wideranging activities included supporting many projects and developments
requiring large scale capital investments with little immediate return
such as manufacturing railroad cars, rebuilding locomotives, fabrication
of diesel engines and farm machinery, and so on. Significant to the
thesis about Peronist industrialization in this section, the Banco de
Credito Industrial also aided small scale, artisan type enterprises.
As a matter of policy, it benefited proprietors relying on manual tools
and in many cases financed the.installation of simple auxiliary machines.
According to Cafiero, the bank approved more than two thousand requests
for credits of this type during the first months of the program's existence.
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tant degree in other Latin American.countries, and even to some extent
in the more advanced industrial nations^ and 2) the requisites of war
time production and the disruption of international trade which affected
Argentina less in her status as a neutral nation, produced a boom in
the demand for Argentine agro-pastoral goods.
In contrast to the past, where the oligarchy would have further
enhanced its position, the Peronist state reaped the benefits of this
favorable situation because it had moved to monopolize the export
structures for agricultural commodities.

I.A.P.I., which in its initial

years forced landowners to sell their products at prices below those
that prevailed on the world market, to be resold by I.A.P.I. under the
best terms it could secure, reflected both the regime's strength and
the disdain it felt for the oligarchy during this phase.

As a result of

all these trends, manifested in a record of favorable balance of payments,
Argentina possessed in 1945 the highest amount of gold, dollars, and
European currencies in her history.

These were used to pay off all past

debts the Argentine government had contracted and to provide handsome
compensation for the British railroad system and the North American and

Iperon was able to claim in a speech he gave on December 2, 1944,
that Argentina's exports of industrial goods for 1943 equalled the value
of her agricultural exports for that year. Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 285.
Murmis and Portantiero cite figures from the UIA's Memoria for 1943
comparing exports in 1939 and 1943. These show that the export of fin
ished manufactured goods for 1939 amounted to one percent of that year's
total exports. The corresponding figure for 1943 had risen to 11 percent.
Semi-elaborated Industrial goods rose from 3 percent of the total in
1939 to 14 percent by 1943. Similarly, processed primary goods exported
increased from 32 percent in 1939 to 44 percent of total exports in 1943.
On the other hand, according to the same source, for the same years, the
export of primary goods decreased from 64 percent in 1939, to 31 percent
of the.total for 1943, Another interesting effect of the wartime condi
tions is revealed by the fact that Latin America absorbed 47 percent of
these exports in 1943. Murmis and Portantiero, p. 129.
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English owned utilities that were nationalized.

Even though these

measures practically wiped out all the.foreign exchange reserves Argen
tina accumulated during the wartime boom, these were monumental achieve
ments which a weaker government would not have dared to undertake.

This

was the context that enabled Peronism to expand manufacturing to the
point that it replaced agricultural production-as the nation's predomi
nant form of economic activity.

Table 18 shows this expansion of manu

facturing activity and how its output began to surpass that of the rural
sector.

TABLE 18.— Contribution to the GDP of the rural and manufacturing sectors
(at factor cost, current prices in billions of pesos) between 1935 and 1950.

Rural
Manuf ac turing

1935

1940

1943

1944

1945

1957

1949

1950

2.1

2.46

3.04

3.58

3.58

6.27

7.8

9.06

1.21

1.77

3.01

3.71

4.0

7.73

11.84

13.7

SOURCE: Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Secretar/a de Asuntos Economicos,
Producto e ingreso de la Rep&blica Argentina en el periodo 1935-54
(Buenos Aires, 1955). Extrapolated from tables contained in the Statis
tical Appendix found in Diaz Alejandro.

Though not strictly comparable, the figures in Table 19 nevertheless
show the continuation and intensification of the trend established in
Table 18.

TABLE 19.— Contribution to the GDP of the rural and manufacturing sectors
Cat market prices, current prices in billions of pesos) between 1950 and
1960
1950
1953
1957
1955
1960
Rural
Manufacturing

9.0

23.1

26.1

41,8

152.3

22,0

39,1

59.5

92,2

336.9

SOURCE: Presidencia de la Nacion, Consejo Nacional de Desarollo,
Cuentas nacionales de la Republics Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1964),
pp. 66-7. Extrapolated from tables contained in the Statistical Appen
dix found in Diaz Alejandro.
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It is noteworthy that the amount of the GDP contributed by the manufac
turing sector does not surpass that originating in the rural sector un
til 1944, although the gap between them steadily decreases until that
point.

During the Peronist period, compared to the manufacturing sec

tor, the rural sector's contribution.remains relatively stagnant.

The

data also suggest that the process set in motion during this period con
tinued unabated past 1955.

Additional data further on shows this to have

been the case.
This tendency towards the predominance of the industrial sector
and production for national needs was affecting the countryside itself.
According to Luis V. Sommi in El plan Prebisch y el destino argentino
(p. 23) production of cereals and flax dropped 26.1 percent from 1939 to
1954.

However, according to him, this drop was more than offset by the

increase registered in the cultivation of industrial crops, 72 percent,
and the harvesting of fruits and vegetables for domestic consumption which
increased by 82.8 percent.^"
Peronist policies promoting industrial activity clearly achieved
their intended results.

The years between 1945 and 1949 mark the period

of the most intense industrialization in Argentine history.

The Indus

trial Census of 1946, shows the accelerated expansion in the total num
ber of industrial plants established.

It reveals a progression of approxi

mately 1,700 new industries per year in the decade of the twenties, 2,800
per annum in the thirties, and 5,000 new firms per year in the Second World
War.

Another indicator of this accelerated pace of industrialization was

the expanded output of the manufacturing sector.

According to Cafiero

the volume of physical output from industrial production increased by

^■Cited by Esteban, p. 51.
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almost one third (31%) from 1945 to 1949, while that of agriculture rose
some 30 percent, construction 17 percent, and that of the service sector,
which Peronism is often accused of having artificially expanded at the
cost of productive activities, by only 17 percent.*

As a corollary to

this rapid increase in manufacturing activity, Peronism's social base,
the industrial working class, continued to expand.

According to George

Blanksten, the industrial labor force rose by almost one third, from
732,799 workers employed in non-agricultural industries in 1943 to
955,890 workers in 1949.^
To understand the contradictions within Peronist development one
must first understand the basic continuity of the Peronist developmental
model and the ways in which it diverged from the experience of the
thirties.

The type of industrialization that initially took place did

not basically differ from that of the prior period.

In essence, Peronist

policies promoted an import substituting manufacturing sector.

Even

though the balance of power in the bargaining arena was shifted towards
labor, pro-labor policies were conceived within a capitalist framework.
Even the trend of continued expansion of industrial activity represented,
as we have seen, an element of continuity with the immediate past.
However, this increased scope and intensity of the industrializa
tion of the Peronist years also produced divergencies from the patterns
of the past.

In one estimate based on data available from Argentine

government sources, Eprime Eshag and Rosemary Thorp calculate that where
as the gross national product rose at a rate of three percent during the

*Cafiero, p. 294.
2

'

George Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 255.
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war years, it rose at least ten percent per annum from 1945 to 1948.*
The even greater magnitude of industrialization of the Peronist years,
added to the already considerable expansion of the thirties, produced a
situation where quantitative changes led to qualitative changes.

In

other words, contradictions which had already intensified, intensified
further to the point that they resulted in qualitatively different ones.
To achieve the tremendous rise in manufacturing activity that
took place, Peronism incorporated an aspect into its policies that diverged
radically from the oligarchic developmental model.

A qualitatively new

set of relationships emerged from the fact that Peronist strategy for
industrialization rested on reversing the traditional subordination of
manufacturing activity to agricultural production.

We saw how I.A.P.I.

represented the institutional embodiment of this reversal.
Peronist policies which undermined the British presence in the
Argentine economy represent another example of the industrializing drive
of the forties leading to a qualitatively new set of relationships.

In

Chapter 3 we saw that the policies of the thirties deliberately sought to
confine industrialization so as not to compete with British interests, as
exemplified by the Roca-Runciman Pact.

Peronism on the other hand, pur

sued policies designed to dismantle the infrastructure for the British
presence.

Besides the state monopolization of the export of grains and

cereals (undercutting commercial interests), other such policies included:
nationalization of British-owned railroads and foreign-owned utility
companies, development of a state-owned merchant marine with considerable
tonnage under Argentine flags (previously most trade had been under

*Eprime Eshag and Rosemary Thorp, "Economic and Social Conse
quences of Orthodox Economic Policies in Argentina in the Post-War Years,"
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 27, No, 1 (Feb. 1965), p. 9.
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British flags), creation of the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina
(there had been a strong foreign influence in the financial sector), and
Five Year Plans with a priority on industrialization.
Indeed, there was a very close association between breaking out
of a semi-colonial relationship with the United Kingdom and the promotion
of industry.

As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, free trade and the exchange

of agro-pastoral primary goods for British manufactures had provided the
underpinning for the Anglo-oligarchic connection.*

Now, as England's

influence weakened further as a result of the Second World War, the
Peronist state moved systematically to dismantle the apparatus of the
United Kingdom's hegemony.

The regime's successful promotion of industry

was therefore, both cause and effect of Great Britain's deteriorating
position within the Argentine economy.
Also interwoven with this qualitative shift away from policies
favoring the British presence, was a third critical qualitative shift
accentuated by Peronism's quest for economic independence.

This was the

shift away from externally oriented growth towards an internally oriented
growth model.

As national industry expanded benefiting from the regime's

policies, economic activity came to be increasingly bound up with pro
viding for an enlarging domestic market.

It is interesting to note here that the debate around the need to
erect protective tariffs for an infant national industry went back almost
a hundred years. Cuneo, pp. 44-6, provides fascinating excerpts from a
congressional debate that took place in 1876 and involved some of Argen
tina's legendary figures including Vincente Lopez and Carlos Pellegrini.
For example, he quotes Congressman Miguel Cane: "Today America is no
more than England's farm; England is the world's workshop." And he adds,
"I understand that one must begin with protectionism in order to thereby
arrive at free trade. Bright will be the day when our country can say,
like Sweden, like Australia: Throw open customs, because it will be as a
result of protectionism having borne fruit, because industry will have
developed." (p. 46)
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The considerable expansion of industry therefore involved a
case of quantitative change resulting in qualitative shifts 1) reversing
the traditional subordination of industry to agriculture, 2) imposing
policies diametrically opposed to those which had prevailed favoring
British interests, and 3) promoting an internally rather than externally
oriented growth model.

However, useful as their distinct conceptualiza

tion is to analyzing and understanding the process under consideration,
it is important to keep in mind that these shifts were closely inter
related: in fact what is involved are three facets of one single process.
To see the shifts towards qualitative impact of contradictions
inherited from the prior period, it is necessary to look a little more
closely into the nature of the industrializing process itself.

It can

be characterized as a process of dual, potentially contradictory devel
opment.

Economic planning began in September of 1944 with the creation

/
of the Consejo Nacional de Postguerra over which Peron presided.

It was

responsible for formulating the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) which Peron
presented to Congress on October 21, 1946 and which covered the years
from 1947 to 1951.

The FFYP sought to protect those industries that had

developed just prior to, and during the World War II years.

It was in

this sector, producing non-durable consumer goods, that a growing national
bourgeoisie was grounded. With

its emphasis on economic independence and

protective barriers, Peronism promoted the interests of these national
entrepreneurs.

With their relatively less efficient and more labor in

tensive productive techniques, the regime shielded them from the poten
tially disastrous competition of foreign suppliers.

Clearly the owners

of businesses in this sector did quite well as indicated by both its
growing size and increased output.

As a result of the FFYP they enjoyed
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very respectable profit margins.

According to a 1949 study cited by

George Blanksten, of 1000 firms participating in the FFYP, 87 of them
realized profits of over 50 percent, "213 of them reported profits be
tween 20 and 50 percent, 528 of them relized profits up to 20 percent,
28 broke even, and the remaining 144 suffered losses."*'

In this sense

the FFYP was an effective instrument for providing the material basis
with which the regime sought to cement an alliance between the working,
class and national capitalists.
Industrial growth in the thirties had been largely confined to
the light, non-durable consumer goods sector, principally in the area
of textiles and foodstuffs.

By widening the domestic market through

its redistributive measures and by consolidating this market for national
producers through its protective measures, especially after the wartime
conditions which had hindered foreign competition began to dissipate,
Peronism further accelerated the expansion of this light consumer goods
producing sector.
trialization.

2

This was the element of continuity in Peronist indus-

On the other hand, the very expansiveness of this

*Blanksten, pp. 255-6.

2

The following sources can be consulted on economic development
during the Peron period:
Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argen
tine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Memoria Anual (1945-1956).
E.C.L.A. (U.N.), Analisis y proyecciones del desarrollo economico.
Vol. V: El desarrollo de la Argentina (Mexico, 1959). This was Prebisch's
report.
Aldo Ferrer, La econom^a argentina: Las etapas de su desarrollo y
problemas actuales (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1963).
/
Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo
economico argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidds, 1973).
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industrialization also led to the growth of other branches of production
that had not been so active in the increase of manufacturing activity
during the prior period.

The development of a heavy durable and capital

goods sector along with the wage goods sector is what this study refers
to as the dual development of the industrial sector during the Peronist
period.
Table 20 shows the dual nature of Peronist industrial development
at the height of the FFYP's achievements.
TABLE 20.— The manufacturing sector in 1948
Branch

Percentage of Total Number of Plants

Food Processing

20

Vehicles and Machinery(excluding electrical)

15

Garment

12

Metals (excluding machinery)

12

Subtotal

59

All other branches had less than 10 percent of the total except for
lumber (12 percent).
SOURCE: The 1948 Industrial Census in Ministerio de Asuntos
Tecnicos, Anuario estadxstico, tomo III (Buenos Aires, 1949-50), p. 9.

The.picture presented by Table 20 is one of a manufacturing sector cen
tered on providing non-durable consumer goods for the domestic market with
important branches producing metals and vehicles and machinery; in other
words, a light industrial economy with an emerging durable and capital
goods sector.
The preponderance of the food processing branch within manufactur
ing emerges from the fact that the same Industrial Census shows it to
represent almost one quarter (24.3%) of the total value of all products,
whereas vehicles and machinery represents only 6.2 percent of this
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total, garment 7.6 percent, and metals 8.1 percent, with all four
branches together accounting for almost half (46.2%) of the total value
of industrial production.

These figures reflect a static view of the

manufacturing sector in 1948.
taking place within it?

What about the directions of movement

What changes in the composition of the industrial

sector were taking place?

What branches were experiencing relatively

higher growth rates?
It appears that up until 1949 all branches were experiencing
rapid growth rates.

No branch or group of branches was outstripping the

others to such an extent as to change the nature of the industrial
sector in any dramatic way.

Nevertheless, as might be expected, there

are indications that the more dynamic, durable and capital goods producing
branches of industrial activity expanded at a relatively faster pace
during this period.

Consider Tables 21 and 22 which continue to use

"vehicles and machinery" and "metals" as representative of the durable
and capital goods sector, while "garment" and "food processing" are
taken as branches representing the light, non-durable consumer goods
producing industries.

TABLE 21.— Relative dynamism of selected industrial branches between
1937-9 and 1946-7
Branch

Vehicles and Machinery

Percent of Increase in Value of
Products and Subproducts
Produced
109

Average of all Branches in Source

60

Metals

37

Garment

33

Food Processing

32

SOURCE: Based on series prepared by Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro,
"Stages in the Industrialization of Argentina" (Buenos Aires: Instituto
Torcuato Di Telia, 1966), using data from E.C.L.A., "El desarrollo
economico de la Argentina," mimeographed version, (Santiago de Chile,
1958) from Jorge, p. 161.
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The data in Table 22 focus on the most intense period of indus
trialization.
years.

They show the relatively faster growth rate of the Peronist

Juan Carlos Esteban presents figures comparing growth rates for

the period immediately prior to Peronism with those covering the Peronist
years, which strikingly illustrate the trend under discussion.

According

to him "textiles" registered an annual growth rate of 11.8 percent for
the 1937-45 period and their comparable figure for the 1945-55 period
declined to 1.4 percent.

Meanwhile, "metals" which had a negative

annual growth rate of 0.1 percent for 1937-45, showed a positive one of
9.1 percent for 1945-55.*

Thus in its commitment to lift all existing

TABLE 22.— Relative dynamism of industrial branches between 1946 and 1948
Branch

Vehicles and Machinery

Percent of Increase in Value of
Products and Subproducts
Produced
109

Metals

96

Garment

92

Average of all Branches in Source

60

Food Processing

28

SOURCE: Based on Ministerio de Asuntos Te'cnicos, Anuario
estadistico, tomo III (Buenos Aires, 1949-50), p. 20.

, P. 19.
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restraints on industrialization, Peronism also further developed basic
industries.

To the extent that it did so, and especially with some of

the plants run directly by the state, Peronism began to alter the nature
of the manufacturing sector.

Not however, fast enough to prevent this

dual development from becoming a contradictory one.
The dual development of the industrial sector promoted by the
FFYP can be characterized as follows: On the one hand, a sector comprised
of relatively less efficient national industries nurtured behind protec
tive barriers producing non-durable wage goods and owned and operated by
a captain of industry type of national entrepreneur and, on the other
hand, another sector consisting of relatively more modern plants producing
durable consumer and capital goods using a more advanced technology.

The

latter branches operated under the direction of a managerial staff, many
of whom already owed their positions to external economic groups and many
more were later recruited into the orbit of industrial activity -dependent
on foreign interests.

This groups of industrialists represented the core

of what was to become the "'internationalized’ national bourgeoisie.1,1
The distinction between these industrialists and the captain of
industry type is important because of their potentially conflicting
interests.

During the period of the FFYP they both provided the bour

geois base for a nationalist ideology because, though resting on differing
material foundations, their interests temporarily coincided.

However,

their divergent economic base propelled them to advocate differing and
conflicting "nationalistic" policies when the conjunction of economic
forces that could satisfy both sets of interests shifted.

^"Cardoso and Faletto develop this term, pp. 149-50.
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The interests of both of these sectors within the national
bourgeoisie, and those of North American and continental European capital,
coincided in that they required the consolidation of the industrial sec
tor and the expansion of the domestic market.

Their interests did not

conflict initially with the emphasis in Peronist doctrine and policy on
expanding the national market by raising the acquisitive power of the
producers, nor even did they disagree with the state's efforts to secure
the market for domestic manufacturers by dismantling the control of
foreign groups over the export-import trade.

This coincidence was, how

ever, transitory and limited to the conjunction of circumstances wherein
the state succeeded in undermining the competing set of foreign and
domestic interests and in expanding the economic pie.

So long as the

manufacturing sector and the domestic market were weak, the interests
of the two sectors within the industrial bourgeoisie coincided and an
alliance with the working class was possible; but as the economic forces
in the industrial area began to grow within the framework of capitalist
ownership, the contradiction in their divergent economic foundation be
came explicit.
Understanding the dual nature of the industrial development that
took place in the thirties reveals the origins of the contradictions that
arise from the class structures characterizing the more industrially
developed Latin American nations today.*

The sector which, in Marx's

terms, operates with a higher organic composition of capital (more
machinery per unit of labor) is by now almost exclusively owned by

*This section paraphrases arguments developed by Frederick
Stirton Weaver, "American Underdevelopment: An Interpretive Essay on
Historical Change," in Latin American Perspectives 3 (Fall 1976), pp.
45-7.
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foreign interests or the state, and produces mostly (durable and capital)
goods for the upper income consumer market or inputs for making these
goods.

Private domestic capital is confined largely to smaller units,

operating with a lower organic composition, which produce wage goods.
The competitive market as an allocative and governing mechanism is impor
tant only for this latter sector, whereas the former thrives on monopoly
conditions and depends heavily on centralized planning in which the
state’s policies play a crucial role.

"The need for centralized direc

tion is so strong .that, as already in the case of late nineteenth century
England, a liberal heritage is a marked drawback; the social and political
decentralization crucial for economic growth in competitive capitalism is
inappropriate for material advance when the organization of economic life
changed."

2

The fact that the dynamic industries are within the monopolistic
sector explains to a large extent the unevenness of industrial development
in Latin America, being characterized by stagnation of relatively low
overall growth rates.

Monopoly capitalism requires strong stimuli from

extra-market sources and conscious coordination to avoid stagnation and,
in contrast to competitive capitalism, does not contain the internal dy
namics that lead to the compulsive drive to expand productive capacity
and supplant the remnants of previous modes of production.
The duality of the industrial sector goes a long way in accounting
for the failure of reformism in Latin America and of Peronism in Argentina.
Given the fact that the modern, technologically sophisticated sector caters
to the high income market and that there is a tremendous gap in the distri

^Weaver, pp. 46-7.
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bution of income between the upper and lower strata, it becomes evident
that Keynesian generalizations about marginal propensities to consume do
not apply.
Even slight changes in income distribution towards the poorest
strata alters the composition of demand such that output from
wage goods firms expand at the expense of profit and employment
levels in large, m o d e m firms. This shift of demand away from
the more efficient to the less efficient firms disrupts estab
lished patterns, reduces average labor productivity and probably
overall growth, and diminishes the incomes of the most powerful
portions of the national and foreign industrial bourgeoisie and
of the best organized segments of the working class . . . With
the structure of the Latin American industrial sectors— particu
larly the need for high income markets in poor countries— reform
politics breaks down under the tremendous weight of its own
contradictions.^
These contradictions were contained in the forties, but in the fifties
they underlay the gradual disintegration of the Peronist attempt to pro
vide for economic liberation and social justice within the framework of
national-capitalist development.
Given their larger scale of operation, it seems reasonable to
assume that those branches of industry involved in producing durable con
sumer and capital goods employ a greater number of workers per plant.
Given this correlation, the Industrial Census of 1948 provides additional
confirmation of the dual character of the manufacturing sector of the
period.

It finds that firms with more than 500 employees occupied about

one quarter of the labor force while the companies which had from 100 to
500 workers employed another 25 percent of the labor force.

Hence, if

we take the former category to correspond with the heavier, more modem,
corporate-managerial type, and the latter with small to medium size, cap
tain of industry type of enterpriese, we again obtain a more or less even
distribution between the two.

^Weaver, p. 47.
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The juridical status of firms provides another way of concept
ualizing dual development of manufacturing in the mid to lata forties.
Generally speaking, the Sociedad Anonima (S.A. or company whose stocks
are traded on the Stock Exchange) tends to be a large corporation relying
upon technologically sophisticated— i.e., high organic composition of
capital— production and or distribution techniques.

The other juridical

forms are more likely to correspond with small to medium size, more
labor intensive firms, often owner-managed.

According to Juan Carlos

Esteban, citing the Industrial Census for 1948, there was a fairly even
split between the sector encompassed by the Sociedades Anonimas and all
other juridical forms.

The S.A.s employed approximately 36 percent of

the labor force and produced about 46 percent of the total value of pro
duction for 1948.

For the same time period, state enterprises employed

about 8 percent of the workers and absorbed around 7 percent of produc
tion.

Meanwhile, all other juridical forms took in about 56 percent of

all workers employed but produced only 46 percent of the total value
of industrial output,^ reflecting their lower levels of labor productivity.
According to Esteban the stocks of 222 S.A.s were traded on the
Exchange in 1947, seven years later, by 1954, their number had only
risen to 275.

In the following four years however, by 1959, their number

had increased to 472.

2

Esteban identifies the activities of the S.A.s

with the social sector Cardoso and Faletto term the "'internationalizedf
national bourgeoisie."

Esteban uses the term "conciliatory bourgeoisie"

^Esteban, p. 108.
2Ibid.
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to indicate that their interests did not conflict with, arid in fact
were largely incorporated into the industrial complex dominated by for
eign capital.

The trend in the above figures shows that, though the

process had clearly begun in the Peronist years, the accumulation and
concentration of capital that gave the sector with a high organic com
position of capital its preponderant weight within manufacturing, really
did not gather steam until the late fifties.
Actually, the degree to which capital was concentrated during
the Peronist period is a controversial question.

There are those who,

like Eduardo Jorge,* maintain that a low concentration of capital characterized the Peronist years.

Others, like Juan Carlos Esteban

2

argue

just as strongly that the opposite trend was prevalent: that there was a
high degree of concentration of capital, and that the process of accumu
lation was increasing rapidly.

It may be that this controversy in itself

mirrors the dual nature of Peronist development.
should be construed to exclude the other.

Neither position

Thus, while the manufacturing

sector was characterized by a relatively low concentration of capital and
there were Peronist policies that encouraged this tendency; it is also
true that the process of concentration was taking place, particularly in
the more dynamic branches, like the electrical and chemical industries,
and that other Peronist policies reinforced this trend.

To a large

extent the argument can be resolved as a question of timing and relative
emphasis.

Thus while Peronist policies benefited both industrialists

based on small, light industry and those connected to larger, more
efficient facilities producing capital or durable goods, the former group
was favored more up until 1950 and the latter*s position enjoyed more
1
Jorge, pp. 169-89.

2
Esteban, for example on p. 107.
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support after 1950.

This shift is consistent with the priorities

spelled out by the two Five Year Plans: the first emphasized protection
of industries that had developed and expanded as a result of the favorable
conditions arising from the World War, while the Second Five Year Plan
emphasized the promotion of the capital goods sector.

Impact of the International Dimension
The policies contained in the FFYP of 1946-51 were officially
designed to achieve independence from the domination of foreign imperial
ists over the economy.

'The FFYP’s major concern was to protect industries

that had sprung up just prior to, and during World War II.

Not intending

to alter the private ownership of capital and land, the FFYP nevertheless
sought to increase consumer demand by using the state to pressure for
higher wages.

This expanded domestic market was to be satisfied by

national industry thereby releasing foreign exchange for the purchase of
commodities essential for economic development.
✓
Peron once said:
Give me the financial system— banking— , imports, exports,
the overland and maritime transportation of my country; I'll give
you the rest and still control the country. . . .
Before we had to pay two and a half million a day in services
on our foreign debt. Today. . . it no longer exists. The rail
roads represented two hundred million in services and dividends.
Now they are ours. Today the telephones, gas, port facilities,
grain elevators, hydroelectric services are in our possession.
All this . . . in our hands permits us to follow our own economic
policies to benefit our producers and consumers.*■
The FFYP achieved its aims of increasing the productive output of national
groups and of wresting control of decisive economic levers from foreigners
because these goals accorded with the propitious conditions of the wartime

*Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 245. Statement dated July 13, 1951.
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period.

The favorable export market for agro-pastoral goods resulting

from the wartime conditions, the accompanying forced reduction of imports
relative to exports which gave Argentina large trade surpluses and finan
cial reserves, and the lack of competition from foreign producers, enabled
the Peronist regime to temporarily liquidate Argentina's foreign debt as
well as to substantially reduce the presence of foreign capital within
the Argentine economy.

As a result, Argentina was among the five nations

in the world with the least per capita transfer of capital abroad in the
1947-53 period: $1.16 dollars per inhabitant in contrast to Venezuela's
$74.85 dollars per capita, Canada’s $20.80, Australia's $18.20 and Japan's
$0.07 dollars per inhabitant.*
Those successes in the direction of economic independence were
all the more remarkable in the context of pre-Peron Argentina whose
economy Peron justifiably characterized as colonial.

In 1940, according

to George Blanksten,
Fifty-five percent of the individual owners of industrial estab
lishments in Argentina were foreigners, and at least twenty-eight
percent of the corporate profits made in the country belonged to
foreign holders. The principal activities in Argentina controlled
from abroad included railroad transportation, meat packing, the
production of tires, the development of electric power, assembling
automobiles, the operation of subways and streetcars, the main
tenance of telephone systems, and the production of quebracho
extract, used in tanning leather.^
By contrast, according to Cafiero, during the 1946-55 period the presence
of foreign capital was reduced to the point that it amounted to 5.1 percent
of the nation's capital, foreign investments constituted only 3.1 percent
of all investments made annually, and the service on these capitals and

*From E.C.L.A.'s El desarrollo economico de la Argentina (Appendix
VII, p. 294) as cited by Esteban, p. 86.

2

Blanksten, p. 239.
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investments absorbed a mere 1.5 percent of export earnings (which
Cafiero says wenat as high as 66.2 percent of export earnings in prior
years).^
The wartime years also saw the nationalization of foreign-owned
utility companies: the British-owned Primitiva Gas Company which supplied
the federal capital, U.S.-owned electric companies supplying power to
Tucuman, Entre Rios, and Corrientes, the Buenos Aires telephone company,
a subsidiary of I.T.&T., culminating in the acquisition of the Englishowned railroad network in February of 1947.

Considering the central

role of the railroads in the United Kingdom’s predominance within the
Argentine economy, their nationalization represented the high point in
the Peronist campaign for economic independence.

Nevertheless it is im

portant to note that the Peronist nationalizations were accomplished
through more than adequate compensation.

Most sources agree, for example,

that the railroads were purchased at a price well above their value.

2

The regime could afford such generous terms because of the reserves that
had piled up from the favorable wartime trade.

"Argentina was . . .

a

leader in the wartime accumulation of gold and foreign exchange, adding
$200 million to her reserves in 1944 alone and amassing a total reserve
by March 1945 of $1.25 billion, or almost one-third of the entire foreign
exchange holdings of Latin America."

^Cafiero, p. 338.

2

According to Ed Daniels, "the British received $300 million above
the real value." "From Mercantilism to Imperialism: The Argentine case
(Part 2)," NACLA Newsletter 4 (Oct. 1970), p. 12.
3
David Green, The Containment of Latin America: The History of the
Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1971), p. 239.
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According to Blanksten the railroad deal cost Argentine most of
the assets she had accumulated in Great Britain.

The United Kingdom was

unable to liquidate the approximately $750 million worth of Argentine
credits frozen during World War II.

After lengthy negotiations the

Anglo-Argentine agreement signed on February 13, 1947 "provided for the
expropriation of the railroads in exchange for $600 million of Argentine
credits already frozen in London."*

Not only did the English owners re

ceive very generous compensation, they also unloaded a progressively less
profitable venture.
tently declining.

The profitability of the railroads had been consis
Before the world economic crisis they paid out 13.3

million pounds annually in profits between 1925 and 1929, by 1940-4 that
sum had declined to 4 million pounds per annum.

The interest on capital

invested in the railroads went down from 5.3 percent in 1925-9 to 1.5 per
cent in 1940-4, while the corresponding percentages on other investments
were 5.9 and 3.8 respectively.

2

Thus, Britain pulled something of a coup

in unloading the railroads in 1947 in exchange for the mounting British
debt.

By then the railroads represented unprofitable and rapidly depre3

d a t i n g capital stock that had assumed burdensome proportions.

1

Blanksten, p. 241.

2

Moreover,

Skupch, pp. 35-6.

3
It is interesting to note that in a meeting on June 14, 1945
between Sir Wilfred Eddy, a railroad director, and the then vice presi
dent Percfn, the latter categorically rejected any interest on the part
of the Argentine government in the purchase of the railroads since great
amounts of the capital were needed for industrial development and "it
would be folly to spend a large sum in the nationalization of something
that was already in the country, that was rendering a service, and that
was proving to be unprofitable." Carlos Andres Escude, "The Argentine
Eclipse: The International Factor in Argentina's Post World War II
Decline," Ph.D. dissertation (Yale University, 1981), pp. 387-8.
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the Mitre Law which exempted the companies from provincial taxation and
restricted the national government to a three percent income tax, expired
at the beginning of 1947.

Even the English government considered the

prospects for a deal involving the railroads to be almost utopian.'*'

Yet,

Argentina’s bargaining position appeared more favorable than it was in
fact.

Considering that its sterling accounts were blocked and that the United

Kingdom was unable and unwilling to provide the capital goods Argentina
needed, the use of Argentina's credits to gain uncontested control over
the internal transportation network was not as foolish as it might seem
with the benefit of hindsight.
Given the railroads' role as a factor of economic domination, as
an instrument that assured the hegemony of British interests within the
Argentine economy, their nationalization had an importance that went
beyond strictly business considerations.

In one sense, British investors

made a good business deal in disposing of the railroads, but in another
sense it was bad business for the British presence in Argentina as a
whole.2

No government would have attacked such a key control lever as the

railroads unless it also meant to decisively confront the Anglo-oligarchic
connection as the basis for economic policy. ^

in fact, the volume taken

up by the physical plant and facilities comprising the railroad network

*"Escude, p. 386.

2

Recall that the British Ambassador in 1929 had stressed the impor
tance of the railroads when he said:
I look upon them as the mainstay, the backbone of our whole
position out here. If they go, we all go. Their loss would be a
death blow to us out here . . . .
Cited by Ford in Rock, p. 51.
3
These observations are paraphrased from Esteban, pp. 98-9.
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was considerable.

According to Esteban it represented 38 percent of the

foreign capital invested in Argentina in 1945* and, without a doubt, the
major portion of the United Kingdom’s capital in the Argentine republic.

2

But, of course, the Peronist regime paid dearly for the measure of economic
independence it was able to achieve.

Scobie estimates that the generous

payments for Argentina's nationalizations absorbed 45 percent of the
3
country’s postwar foreign exchange.

The point to stress here is that

Peronism could pursue such a cavalier approach in its campaign for economic
independence, and yet succeed, because of the temporary weakening of the
dependent relationships tying Argentina to the international economy.
The Peronist government has often been criticized for not care
fully husbanding the country's hard-won reserves and using them only in
areas needed to sustain industrial development after the advantageous
conditions had evaporated.

Instead, it is maintained, the regime squan

dered them much too quickly and too easily on show-case nationalizations
and the purchase of capital stock at inflated prices.

The nationalizations

and liquidation of the foreign public debt "had the beneficial effect of
reducing the servicing charges of foreign capital from about $170 million
to $10 million a year."

However, echoing one of Raul Prebisch's critiques,

Eshag and Thorp continue: "It is not clear that an even greater saving of
foreign exchange could not have been effected by using the equivalent

*Esteban, p. 78.

2

According to George Blanksten, British investments in Argentina
were valued at $1,287,005,000 in 1940, and these "had fallen to approxi
mately $17,300,000 by 1952." (p. 241.)
3
Scobie, pp. 224-5.
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amount of foreign exchange for investment in such import-replacing in
dustries as petroleum and steel; in the years 1946 to 1948 annual fuel
imports alone averaged about $100 million."*'

Though essentially correct,

this is one of those criticisms that is conveniently made ex post facto.
Indeed, as we will see, the regime tried precisely the course suggested
above with its Second Five Year Plan (SFYP), but by then the dual devel
opment promoted by the FFYP made this an even more difficult goal to
achieve.
Referring to the practice of using up Argentina's reserves to pur
chase equipment, even at inflated prices, Peron justified his government
in an article authored by him under the pseudonym of "Descartes."

He noted

that at the end of the war the United States owed Argentina a considerable
sum, which it blocked.

According to "Descartes," since no interest was

payed on this sum and prices were manipulated, Argentina's credit evapor
ated in half.

Nothing could be done about that then and, moreover, "if

we complained, they told us we were Nazis."

Then, threatened by continuing

evaporation of its earnings, the government hastened to spend them in
dollars.

2

✓

Peron argued that this was a wise policy in view of the infla

tionary spiral which increased the prices of goods and the difficulty of

3
obtaining these goods at all because of the United States' blockade.

*Eshag and Thorp, p. 8.

2

The article entitled "This is the Way the Devil Pays" was pub
lished on October 11, 1951. It was one of a series which appeared in the
Buenos Aires newspaper Democracia between Jan. 1951 and Sept. 1952 signed
by Descartes. It was known that Peron was their author. These arguments
appear in Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 308.
"Ibid., p. 314 from the article titled "The Other Side of the
Coin II."
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The United States' boycott of the Argentine economy began in
February of 1942 and ran with varying characteristics and intensity
until 1949.

In March of 1942 the Board of Economic Warfare began refusing

licenses to U.S. exporters wishing to sell electrical equipment and chemi
cals to Argentina.

The blockade was tightened during 1944.

On September

4,Secretary of State Cordell Hull telegraphed his revised export program
for Argentina:
a) With the exception of projects directly contributing to
the war effort no Argentine development project will be approved.
b) Operational equipment used in connection with the production
of petroleum products and boring and oil field equipment, as well
as all other types of petroleum equipment, shall not be exported.
The exports of fuel oil shall be limited to the minimum amounts
necessary to assure the continued services of Argentine tankers in
transporting vegetable oils to the United States.
c) The exoort of automobile vehicles, railway locomotives or
rolling stock is forbidden.
d) No further increase in the number or value limits of products
exportable to Argentina under general license shall be permitted.
e) Exports to the Argentine Armed Forces and supplies and mater
ials for the Argentine armaments industry are forbidden.
f) The export of Fourdrinier phosphorous bronze screens suitable
for the production of newsprint is forbidden.
g) Through navicert control or other appropriate devices an en
deavor shall be made to obtain similar reductions in exports to Ar
gentina by other countries.
h) The quarterly issuance of licenses for the export of all
products not otherwise limited herein shall be restricted to the
requirements of those industries in Argentina whose products are
essential to the Allied war effort. . . . It is desired that the
foregoing changes be accomplished with a minimum of publicity. No
announcement will be made here, and it is expected that Central
Bank certificates of necessity issued in accordance with existing
procedure will continue to be accepted, and then screened closely
against the above stipulations. No intimation of the change should
be given the Central Bank. The foregoing program will be presented
by the Department to the British with a request that they adopt
similar restrictions.
At the same time efforts were made to deprive Argentina of strate
gic materials not supplied by the United States.
1

Escude, pp. 332-3.

The State Department suc
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ceeded in preventing the export of Bolivian tin and Brazilian rubber,
as well as substantially reducing Chilean copper exports to Argentina.^In this way the United States blocked vital supplies, such as tires and
fuel, from reaching Argentina thereby disrupting industry and transporta
tion even to the detriment of Argentina's being able to meet commitments
to provide critically needed food shipments to Europe.
In the postwar years the United States used its foreign policy
and its dominant international position to further harm the Argentine
economy.

In 1947 the United States adopted a policy of preventing Euro

pean food procurements in Argentina with Marshall Plan dollars.

The

Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) which administered the Marshall
Plan, used its power to systematically undermine Argentine interests.

A

secret and extremely revealing State Department document of January 25,
1949, described thirty-three instances of ECA discrimination against
Argentina.

2

For example:

*Advising the Army that because it had been decided not to make any pur
chases from Argentina, it was immaterial that Mexican meat was more
expensive.
*Recommending to the Swedish Foreign Office, contrary to an agreement
between Sweden and Argentina, that trade between them not be balanced and
that Argentina be forced to pay in dollars.
*Advising Paris to insist on US prices for Argentine exports sold for soft
currencies without offering any assurance that European exports, selling
far above US prices, would be offered to Argentina at US prices.
Such discriminatory measures in addition to the British declaration of
sterling inconvertability in August of 1947 (at the urging of the U.S.
State Department) deprived Argentina of desperately needed dollars.

These

were the external factors that were primarily responsible for the failure
of Peron1s FFYP.

1

Escude, pp. 336-7.

2

Ibid., pp. 406-12.
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While the United States had made European recovery possible
with the Marshall Plan, Argentina was subjected to the exact opposite.
During the war years and into the mid forties, materials and inputs
needed for development were withheld and then, in the late forties,
Argentina was cheated out of the foreign exchange reserves it had accu
mulated.

The U.S. saw to it that Argentina was deprived of the dollars

that would have alleviated the financial plight imposed on Argentina.

By

1950 the financial prosperity Argentina had managed to salvage,despite
the boycott, was wrecked and Argentina symbolically capitulated when it
was forced to apply and accept a 125 million dollar loan.

To make things

worse, the Anglo-Argentine connection had been irrevocably severed.*
In 1947, only one country— the US excluded but the Empire included—
exported more to the UK than Argentina, this number rising to two
in 1948 and three in 1949— still normal rank orders.
But in 1950
Argentina was. already down to number 6 in British imports, in 1951
down to number 12, and in 1952 further down to number 18. From
1912 until 1950, Argentina had never been below fourth place, and
very seldom that low, in British imports. Similarly, in British
exports, Argentina fell from number two non-Empire importer in
1947 and number three in 1948 and 1949, to number 11 in 1950, number
13 in 1951, and number 16 in 1952, a position never before heard of
in modern Argentina and that would be all too common in the years
to come.^
A new era had commenced.
Given the United States* power in the immediate post World War II
years and its tenacious determination to subordinate Argentina, Peron*s
shortcomings did not lie in the manner he confronted the external pole in
the relationships of Argentine dependency.

The steps his regime took in

its quest for economic independence represented about all that could have
been accomplished.

The Peronist government manipulated to its greatest

Extrapolated from conclusions drawn by Escude from his analysis.,
pp . 413-4.
2Ibid.

258
advantage

those structures of Argentina's foreign trade over which it

had some measure of control.

Take, for example, I.A.P.I. which was set

up as a state agency to negotiate the best terms possible in the sale of
rural produce overseas.

Its monopoly was meant to counter that of the

successor to the Combined Food Board set up by the Allies during the
war to avoid competition and thus obtain the lowest prices for agricul
tural products.*

I.A.P.I. was able to obtain price increases on the

international market outstripping production costs in Argentina, the sur
plus being primarily shifted to industrial producers.

The United Kingdom,

which continued to be Argentina's major market, consistently paid the
United States more for frozen beef, mutton, and wheat than Argentina
received in 1946 and 1947.

However, Argentina was able to obtain better

prices for these goods than either Australia or Canada.

From this

Fodor concludes "that the price obtained by each country depended mainly
on its bargaining strength" and that "Argentina had used all its bargaining
power, but not having the position of strength of the U.S., it could not
obtain similar prices.

It is highly unlikely that any

government would have obtained similar prices."

other Argentine

2

Minimizing Argentina's financial dependency was another successful
aspect of the Peronist program for economic independence.

Even though the

regime's inability to set in motion an autonomous process of industriali
zation soon undid this success, it was nevertheless a remarkable achieve
ment— not duplicated since then— to have slowed the public and private
outflow of capital to a trickle.

Moreover, in nationalizing the railroads

*This analysis follows Fodor's in Rock, beginning on p. 155.
2Ibid., pp. 156-7.
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which were such a key part of the nation's transportation network,
Peronism undid one of the principal means promoting Argentina's dependency
on foreign purchasers and suppliers.

In addition, to undercut Argentine

dependence on foreign shipping— particularly the English who used their
"rule of the seas" as yet another way of cutting into Argentina's pro
fitable trade with the U.S.— Peron succeeded in building the Argentine
State's Merchant Fleet into one of the fastest growing merchant marines
in the world.

"It carried 27.8 percent of the nation's entire foreign

trade in 1950, and the U.S. Maritime Commission reported the following
year that the Argentine merchant marine was then ten times larger than
it had been in 1936."'*'

Finally, the Peronist emphasis on industrializa

tion, meant to break Argentina's dependence on imported manufactured goods,
proved at least partially successful.

Conclusions
In covering the rapid industrialization and the more equitable
distribution of income that took place in the forties, this chapter
examined the two areas wherein Peronism realized its greatest achievements.
The analysis dealt with factors that made these achievements possible and
with their interrelationship.
The rapid industrialization of these years was possible because
of the conjuncture of favorable internal and external conditions.

Exter

nally, wartime conditions proved favorable for the Argentine economy.
There was an increased demand for traditional exportables and very little
that could be imported which resulted in the accumulation of foreign ex

^George Blanksten, p. 243. Blanksten notes that in his May Day
message to Congress in 1950, Peron reported that only about seven per
cent of the nation's seaborn foreign trade had been carried in Argentine
bottoms as late as 1946.
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change and reserves; and there was the lack of competition from foreign
manufactured goods which enabled Argentine manufacturers to expand
their market.

Internally, the aftereffects of the world-wide depression

had left the traditionally dominant groups in disarray and thus facilitated
sectoral and social redistributive efforts benefiting industrial development.
We saw that though the content of Peronist policies represented
a continuity with those of the prior period, the policies of 1943-50
increased the magnitude of industrial activity to such an extent that
qualitatively new sets of relationships arose.

As the scope and inten

sity of the manufacturing sector expanded, the quantitative impact resulted
in these interrelated qualitative changes:
1.

The traditional subordination of industrial development to the
requisites of maintaining agricultural production as the economy's
foundation was reversed; surplus derived from the rural sector was
now applied in raising manufacturing to the predominant form of
economic activity

2.

Directly counter to previous policies designed to benefit British
interests, Peronism dismantled the infrastructure of England's
hegemony within the Afcgentine economy

3.

The predominant forms of economic activity shifted from being oriented
to providing external markets to being oriented to the internal market

In looking at the nature of the industrialization taking place during this
period, the data analyzed showed that the First Five Year Plan promoted a
dual, potentially contradictory, development of the industrial sector.
The upcoming chapter examines the importance of this factor in the next
stage which shaped the outcome of the transitional process under considera
tion.
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This chapter noted that the Peronist state filled a vacuum
resulting from the bourgeoisie's failure
developing the forces of production.

to

play

a dynamic part in

The Peronist state acted as a

surrogate for a weak, non-self conscious national bourgeoisie and imple
mented a program serving its interests.
state capitalism.

The result was a tendency towards

Though not apparent for the duration of the favorable

conjuncture within which Peronism came to power, the Peronist state acted
as a functional instrumentality of the national bourgeoisie in fundamental
contradiction to its social base.

The discussion of Peronism's class

base utilized Kenworthy's analysis which essentially portrayed it as a
labor/military coalition.

The military acted as the national bourgeoisie's

substitute with its influence decreasing after the 1946 elections and
that of the representatives of local industrialists rising correspondingly.
One of the paradoxes encountered in this chapter was the fact
that despite the regime's itaplementation of an industrializing program
benefiting the national bourgeoisie, most bourgeois sectors remained either
hostile or at least cool toward Peronism.

One possible explanation may

have been the proximity of the dominant sector of the industrial bour
geoisie to the landowning oligarchy which would also account for the seem
ingly paradoxical espousal by the latter of the industrializing policies
of the thirties.
Opposition from the traditionally dominant groups made it necessary
for Peron to promote and rely on massive popular mobilization.
doctrine appropriated the populist-nationalist critique.

Peronist

Its inclusive

ness and multi-class orientation were well suited and served Peron in his
mass mobilizing efforts.

This strong point in Peronist doctrine arose

from its conjunctural congruence with the transitorily beneficial factors
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for the Argentine economy.

The importance of analyzing the Argentine

variant of populist-nationalism of the period lies in that it provided
Peronism with its class orientation and its programmatic direction.
Peronist policies functioned effectively in preventing class
struggle over the distribution of wealth, brewing from the thirties and
bound to intensify in the expansive economy of the forties, from spilling
from the sphere of circulation to that of production.

The promotion of

manufacturing without altering the relations of production revealed
Peronism's essentially bourgeois nature.

The regime remained reformist,

an outgrowth of socio-economic currents and accumulated grievances that
found fertile soil in the favorable circumstances of the forties.

The

strength of Peronist doctrine lay in that it allowed the regime to pro
mote capitalist growth while also being able to contain its accompanying
contradictions.
But Peronism's strength was also its weakness.

Though the

policies flowing from an orientation confined to the sphere of consump
tion accorded well with the conditions prevailing through the forties,
the very successes of an anti-imperialist but not anti-capitalist program
blinded the regime

to

the shortcomings inherent in its approach.

As

the analysis in the next chapter shows, the limitations arising from the
use of the state and popular mobilization as "pressure," choosing to in
fluence class relations indirectly rather than restructuring state power
on a class basis in order to alter the relations of production, proved de
cisive in determining the nature of the succeeding developmental model.

CHAPTER V
PERONISM'S LIMITATIONS, 1950-5
Introduction
Chapter 5 analyzes the Peronist period as the height of the trans
itional process leading away from the externally oriented growth pattern
of dependency.

In outling this study's theoretical framework, I noted

that shifts occurring during the culmination of a transitional process
prove determinative in shaping the contents of the next stage.

Hence

changes taking place during such periods offer the key to narrowing down
possible outcomes of the process.^

This aspect of the theoretical frame

work is applied in the analysis that follows.
Chapter 5 analyzes the internal and external factors of the
fifties responsible for the reversal of Peronism's successes achieved in
the forties.

Around 1949 Argentina's favorable international position be

gan to deteriorate.
America

European postwar recovery and competition from North

in the industrial area had an increasingly adverse impact after

that date.

In this process, the United States' economic boycott of Argen

tina played a key role.

This boycott included the refusal to supply Argen

tine industry with badly needed inputs as well as the Marshall Plan's
policy preventing the procurement of agricultural goods from Argentina.
Compounding these external difficulties, Argentina's agro-pastoral sector
experienced some of the most severe droughts on record between 1950 and
1952.

As resources available to the government shrank, the limitations

^See PP- 15-23, and especially pp. 15-8 and 21-3.
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in its policies became clearer.

The type of industrialization promoted

in the forties*and the regime's doctrine that inspired its policies,
proved decisive in consolidating the relationships underlying the
pattern of dependent industrialization taking shape in the fifties.
Chapter 5 explores the hypothesis that import substituting
industrialization within a capitalist framework and in the context of
an underdeveloped capital goods sector shifted the traditional pattern
of dependency to a new one based on external sources for machinery and
technology.

The changing relationships between internal and external

groups that this shift gave rise to were themselves but a stage in the
transitional process that culminated in domination of local production by
multinational corporations and domestic monopoly capital.

The analysis

shows how Peronist doctrine's stress on inter-class cooperation facili
tated the development of a dependent industrial economy.

Not only did

the regime leave the economic base of its enemies intact, but it also
narrowed its options because of the hesitancy to use its popular and
working class wing for the decisive confrontations which an alternative
developmental strategy would have required at this stage.

Furthermore,

by opting to maintain the capitalist rather than the socialistic side of
the relationships implicit in its 1943-50 policies, Peronism reinforced
the transformations that were critical in determining the nature of
subsequent developmental patterns.
The analysis finds that Peronism's shortcomings did not lie in
the steps the regime took to confront the external pole in Argentina's
dependent relationships.

In nationalizing the agricultural export

structure and the internal transportation network, in increasing Argentina's
control over the external transportation network, in liquidating
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the nation’s public debt, and in decreasing its reliance on consumer
goods manufactured abroad, Peronism attacked those mechanisms over which
it could exercise control.

Peronism's shortcomings arose from the regime's

failure to extend its campaign for economic liberation to the internal
pole in the relationships determining Argentine dependency.

This chapter

shows how the limitations in the Justicialist program became apparent
once the external factors over which the Peronist regime could not exer
cise control changed from having a beneficial impact on the Argentine
economy-to having an adverse one.

The hypothesis I explore maintains

that if Peronism had moved against the base for dependency within Argen
tina's class structure, a different outcome would have resulted from the
transitional process.^-

The Crisis of the Fifties
The impact of the shift in international conditions affecting
Argentine development began to be felt from 1949-50 on.

This demarcation

point also corresponds roughly with the end of the FFYP which ran from
1947 to 1951.

European postwar reconstruction and especially the protec

tive barriers that provided the foundations for Common Market agricultural
production led to declining exports and a depletion of Argentina's foreign
exchange reserves.

This made it increasingly difficult to pay the costs

for Peronist social reforms and maintain the availability of easy credit
for consumer goods producing industries.

The regime's immediate response

to this burgeoning crisis was to restrict imports.

However, given the

FFYP’s orientation towards industrialization, curtailing imports could not
be taken too far without further aggravating the crisis since this would

^It will be recalled that dependency theory as formulated by
Cardoso and Faletto draws our attention to the internal base on which
dependency rests. See pp. 4-5 and 10-3 above.
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force local industry to reduce production.

Due to the advantageous

conditions of the forties, the FFYP had been able to develop the branches
producing manufactured consumer goods without having to resort to
forceful appropriations to promote the capital goods sector.

This

would most certainly have led to conflicts and thus was contrary to
Peronism's objective of achieving social harmony.
tal goods sector remained underdeveloped.

As a result the capi

In the fifties therefore,

reducing imports meant reducing the raw materials and capital goods
needed for production.

Indeed, the decline in the demand for Argentine

exports in conjunction with the substantial increases in the cost for
imported machinery and industrial goods^ had a severe impact:

the

nation's capacity to import fell by almost 50 percent from 1948 to 1952.
"Except for the year 1951, imports declined steadily and steeply from
1949 to 1953, by which time the volume of imports was less than half
what it had been in 1948."

2

The impact on industrial production was

devastating: "By 1952 industrial production had slumped almost back to
the level of 1946."^
It was the changing impact of these factors on the international
scene, over which the regime had no direct control, that brought the con
tradictions within Peronism to the surface.

After the Second World War

the international terms of trade consistently worsened for Argentina.

As

Argentina industrialized, it came to depend ever more on imported machinery

Taking a base of 100 for 1950, the terms of trade between farm
and industrial goods for 1948 were 117.6, while for 1952 the equivalent
figure had dropped to 73.1. Cited by Rock, "The Survival of Peronism" in
the volume edited by him, p. 190.
2
Eshag and Thorp, p. 11.

3
Rock, p. 190.
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and parts which were scarce and whose prices rose faster than those
Argentina could obtain for its agricultural goods.

Argentina could

only sell rural commodities to Europe but, with the devastation of the
war, Europe could not pay or provide the industrial products Argentina
needed.

Only the United States could, but the United States would not

buy from Argentina.*

Moreover, the situation worsened as Europe recovered

from the war and rebuilt her agrarian sector.

Thus, for example, while

Argentina supplied 35 percent of the world's exports of beef in the 1945-9
period, that percentage dropped to 18.9 for the 1950-54 period.

2

This

decline occurred in spite of the fact that in response to the favorable
climate during the war and its aftermath for meat exports, Peronist poli
cies shifted resources in the countryside from wheat and cereal to beef
production.^
In relation to its exports of wheat and flour, Argentina was
being constrained not only by the growing vitality of Western European
agriculture, but also by increased competition from the United States
and Canada which harmed Argentina's position as a major supplier of these
commodities on the world market.

In the five pre-World War II harvests

between 1934-5 and 1938-9>the United States contributed 4.15 percent and
Canada,25.6 percent of the world's exports in these commodities.^

By con-

*These points are from Fodor in Rock, pp. 149 and 150.

2
Figures are cited in excerpts from Felix Luna's Argentina de Peron
a Lanusse, 1943-73 serialized in the Buenos Aires newspaper Clarxn, Jan. 18,
1973, p. 8.
3
See pp. 225-6 above.

4
From United Nation's F.A.O. Annual for 1951, Vol. 5, 2nd part,
p. 13.
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trast, for the six post-World War II harvests between 1946-7 and 1951-2,
the United States held 49.2 percent and Canada 29.7 percent of the total
world-wide exports.'*’ For the 1951-2 harvest, both countries combined accounted for 87.7 percent of the world’s exports in wheat and flour.

2

To these factors of external origin, one must add the contradic
tion posed by the Peronist internally oriented growth model based on ex
port.

As an unavoidable outgrowth of Peronism1s populist-nationalism,

it further inhibited Argentina's ability to secure the foreign exchange
with which to obtain the capital inputs so critical to continued industrial
expansion.

Recall that the Peronist model was based on the expansion of

the domestic market to be achieved by increasing the acquisitive power of
the producers.

One of the immediate results was the steady rise in the

internal consumption of foodstuffs.

3

Some estimates place the internal

demand that had to be satisfied at 60 percent of the nation's total food
production before the Second World War; by 1952 more than 80 percent of
the total was consumed internally.

4

This trend obviously had a negative

effect on the volume of agro-pastoral goods for export.

Though it insti

tuted some controls— one meatless day per week, for example, and asked for
voluntary abstinence— a regime which based its legitimacy on populist-

■*■According to the Corn Trade News published by The Times of
Argentina (Buenos Aires) in the Dec. 1952 issue.

2

Quoted by Frondizi, 1: 176-8, who also cites the above data on
world-wide wheat and flour exports.
3
Tables 16 and 17, on pp. 227 and 228 respectively, confirm the
increasingly internal orientation of rural production during the Peronist
period.
4
Daniels, p. 6.
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nationalism could ill afford to deprive its popular base in order to
raise earnings abroad. •
v

The inability to

obtain

needed capital goods, both as a result

of insufficiently developed local production and the declining volume of
rural exports which reduced the financial base for the importation of
machinery, equipment, fuels, and raw materials, led to a decline in the
productivity of the manufacturing sector.

With the contraction in the

accustomed rate of economic growth, it became impossible to satisfy con
sumer demands.

And with the decline in the acquisitive power of the

workers the circle was completed, for this contraction of the domestic
market spelled disaster for the hundreds of marginally operating enter
prises that Peronism had fostered in its ascendency.

In brief, it was

no longer possible to provide both increased profits for capitalists and
rising real wages for workers— the formula that made or broke Peronist
populist-nationalism.
Looking at Peronism as the culmination of the transitional
process, the trends described here reveal the contents of the emerging
developmental pattern.

As an expression of the contradictions within the

emerging pattern, these trends were manifested with more frequency and
greater intensity as the pattern of dependent industrialization was con
solidated from the late fifties on.

The basic contradiction already con

tained in the developmental program of the SFYP can be expressed as follows:
a) an internally oriented growth model based on manufacturing founded on
b) an agro-exporting sector; in the context of 1) external dependency and
2) capitalist relations of production internally.

The dynamics in this

contradiction found expression in the cyclical trend of economic growth
that characterized the development of the Argentine economy in the post-
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1955 period.

Oscar Braun provides a paradigm of this cyclical growth

trend.'*' Its essential characteristics are:
1.

A fixed volume of agro-pastoral production

2.

An internal demand for agro-pastoral products not responsive to vari
ations in relative prices but sensitive to changes in the distribution
of income

3.

A demand for imports inelastic with respect to changes in relative
prices and with a high elasticity in relation to changes in the
volume of industrial production

4.

Exports concentrated on non-industrial products

In its ascendent phase, the cycle is marked by a deterioration in the
balance of payments.

It results from the decrease in agro-pastoral

exports which, in turn, comes about through the Increase in the volume
of industrial production.

The latter leads to real wage gains which pro

duces a rise in the internal demand for agro-pastoral goods and thus cuts
into the volume available for export.

As the crisis develops, the Cen

tral Bank’s reserves shrink leading to a stabilization plan which includes
devaluation and restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.

In the end,

there is a transfer of income distribution towards agricultural producers
and high income brackets. This

produces a lower demand for industrial

products which leads to a slackening of the internal demand for agro-pas
toral goods.

Falling demand for manufactured goods reduces investments

in the industrial area.

The slowing of industrial activity in turn,

lowers the importation of capital goods and thus the equilibrium in the
balance of payments is reestablished.

The conditions are now given for a

repetition of the cycle.
Oscar Braun, "Desarollo del capital monopolista en la Argentina"
in El capitalismo argentino en crisis (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno
Editores, 1973) edited by him. The paradigm is adapted from pp. 19-21.
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Returning to the increasingly serious crisis the Peronist
regime faced in the fifties, it is important to note how much it was
exacerbated by the critical need to replace worn-out capital stock
which had been systematically depleted due to the difficulty of obtaining
it overseas &s a result of the upheavals in the international system from
1930 on, including the impact of the depression, World War-II, and the
U.S.'s economic blockade.) "It is estimated that the dollar value of
imports of machinery and vehicles in 1938 was only about half and in
1945 about one-tenth of what it had been in 1929."^

The FFYP primarily

expanded industries producing non-durable consumer goods.

The prior de

pletion of capital stock and the insufficient development of this sector
therefore necessitated vast increases in the importation of capital
goods during this period.

According to Cafiero, a yearly average of 153.8

thousand tons of vehicles and machinery were imported between 1935-9.

The

ravages of the war took this figure down to 48.1 thousand tons per year
in 1940-5.

However, 1946 saw the imports of vehicles and machinery jump

to 129.8 thousand tons, which increased to 430.2 tons in 1947, and to
611.8 thousand tons in 1948.

Significantly, more than half of this amount,

328.9 thousand tons, came from the United States alone.

2

By 1949 Argentina

had depleted the reserve accumulated during the wartime years which had
made this restocking of capital goods possible.

Hence, when these favor

able conditions on the international scene deteriorated, there was no way
to avoid the resulting crisis.
Having experienced the impact of the crisis resulting from the
changed international conditions for two years, the Second Five Year Plan
(SFYP) which took effect in 1953 and only ran half of its course by the
1
Eshag and Thorp, p. 5.

2

Cafiero, p. 56.
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1955 coup, represented the regime's progammatic response to this emer
ging

crisis.

The SFYP specifically addressed those contradictions

implicit in the FFYP which had not become problematic until the favorable
context deteriorated.

"The socio-economic priorities in the sponsorship,

promotion, and state support of industrial productions were listed as
follows:
1.) the production of energy, 2) agro-pastoral activities, 3) explora
tion and exploitation of mineral reserves, 4) the maintenance and
reequipment of existing installations, 5) transportation and communi
cations, and 6) housing.
The industrial priorities as such, the actions related to industrial
promotion, will be adjusted according to the following order: 1)
iron and steel, 2) smelting, 3) aluminum, 4) chemicals, 5) mechani
cal engineering, 6) electrical engineering, 7) building and con
struction, 8) forestry, 9) textiles and leather, and 10) food
products.*
Strikingly, the branches of manufacturing that had been prime benefic
iaries under the FFYP, such as food processing and textiles, were now
placed at the bottom of the government's list of priorities.

With the

SFYP, economic policy makers recognized that the limits of import sub
stituting industrialization producing consumer goods had been reached and
that the critical need for continued industrial expansion lay in the
development of heavy and capital goods industries.
In his study Juan Carlos Esteban discerns a substantial financial
/

commitment to the capital goods sector on the part of the Peron government
and a dramatic contrast with its immediate successors in this area.

Ac

cording to him, thirty percent of all credit in 1954 was extended to in
dustries producing machinery and vehicles which, he states, amounts to a

*Camara de Senadores de la Nacion, Diario de sesiones, Die. 20,
1952, 41a Reunion (continuacion de la Primera Sesion Extraordinaria), p.
823.
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reorientation of economic policies after the 1952 depression.
Assuming a close correspondence between the capital goods sector and
high organic composition of capital, larger concentration of capital,
and bigger plant size, then related findings emerge from a study conducted by Jorge Katz.

2

Katz compares the relationships between produc

tion, productivitiy, growth of the labor force, and wage trends, before
and after 1952.

He concludes that after 1952, middle and small enter

prises stagnated while large, capital intensive undertakings showed sig
nificant increases in productivity and profits
to grant wage increases.

and were therefore able

These finding corroborate a central thesis ana

lyzed in this study: the shift from an orientation in the FFYP favoring
an emerging national bourgeoisie based on producing non-durable wage
goods, to one in

the SFYP beneficial to the sector with a higher organic

composition of capital which was to be the locus for the penetration and
eventual control of industrial activity by multinational capital.
The new conditions of the fifties no longer corresponded with
those which had made the alliance between an emerging national bourgeoisie
and the workers viable for the forties.

As this alliance became increas

ingly unviable and the contradictions implicit in the FFYP became explicit,
the industrialization envisioned by the SFYP represented a substantial
readjustment.

The interests of the small to medium size national indus

trialists were no long the primary focus.

Instead, the SFYP shifted its

^Esteban, p. 66. He cites figures which show that financial
policies for the immediate post-coup years were designed as a kind of
punishment for this sector.
2
Jorge M. Katz, "Caracterfsticas estructurales del crecimiento in
dustrial argentino 1946-61" in Desarollo Economico 7 (July-Sep. 1967).
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emphasis onto the capital intensive side of the dual industrialization
taking place, and sought to promote the sector requiring a high organic
composition of capital.

The crisis situation exacerbated the social con

sequences of this policy shift and these therefore conflicted all the
more severely with redistributive, social justice commitments the FFYP
had expressed.

Previously, consumer aspirations had been promoted with

much fanfare as the visible manifestation of the regime's ties to the
masses; now they were checked in order to stimulate capital accumulation.
• I.A.P.I.'s changed role represents another fundamental shift
brought about by the regime's response to the crisis of the fifties.
I.A.P.I. was now used to provide the landowning oligarchy with subsidies,
hoping in this way to enhance output from the rural sector.

In addition,

a larger volume of agro-pastoral goods was to be freed for export by
restricting domestic consumption through freezing wages and raising prices
for these goods.

Again this penalized lower income sectors and ran

directly counter to the policies of the prior period.

Moreover, the SFYP

placed more emphasis on better economic performance and higher productivity
of workers in the industrial arena than on the social justice the FFYP had
emphasized.

This was consistent with the trend that had been taking shape

since 1949, which had been designated the "Year of Productivity."
Reflecting Peron's shifting relations to the oligarchy, in 1952
the government granted landowners their first substantial price increases
since 1946 and liberalized farm credits.

Moreover, the fifties also saw

a major policy shift towards attracting foreign investments.

Indicative

of this reversal, Milton Eisenhower, brother of the president of the
United States, received an enthusiastic and warm welcome in July of 1953
/

and Peron spoke of his friendship with the United States.
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Most workers considered these shifts daring Peron's second term
to be contrary to their interests.

/■
Peron had led them to believe that

the interests of labor were identical to those of the nation.

The policy

changes of the fifties seemed to contradict this congruence.
The industrial workers resented not only the decline in real
. wages, but also the favoritism shown the agricultural sector
of the economy, the invitation to foreign capital to invest in
Argentina, and the development of more friendly relations with
the United States. . . . By and large, the workers went along
with these programs, but this was because of their personal
loyalty to Peron. They did not fail to notice that participation
in what they thought were anti-labor programs reduced them to
one among several influential elements in society, whereas
formerly they believed they had been the most important repre
sentatives of the Argentine nation.
The regime's new relationship with workers had been incrementally
forged in the prior period during the years of prosperity after Peron
was firmly in power.

From 1946 on, the more independent union heads were

replaced by bureaucrats distinguished by their loyalty to the ruling
couple.

Union officials tended to act more as the regime's representa

tives to the workers than as representatives of the workers conveying

the

proletariat's interests to the government, as earlier leaders with a
strong rank and file base had done.

By 1950 an Extraordinary Congress of

the CGT was convened which modified the statutes of the organization to
✓
adhere officially to Justicialism as its doctrine and to Peron as chief
of the movement.

However, it must be noted that this was not achieved by

manipulating unrepresentative leaders; on the contrary, the years of sys
tematic material gains experienced under Peron up to that point, made the

This quotation and above text summarize Samuel L. Baily's percep
tive analysis in the chapter entitled "Peron Abandons the Workers' Nation"
found in his Labor, pp. 142-3.
2
Waldmann makes these points on pp. 209-10. Recall also the earl
ier discussion on the dissolution of the Partido Laborista after Perons'
elections and Peron's success in capturing the top leadership of unions
on pp. 205-7 above.
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workers quite receptive to this move.

It merely represented an insti

tutionalization of the immense loyalty and affection the workers felt
for the Perons.

At the same time, it is undeniably true that the coop

tation of the CGT's officialdom served to undercut the organization’s
availability to workers to register their disenchantment over the worsen
ing conditions of the fifties.
The regime’s relationship towards the workers began to shift as
conditions on the international scene worsened.

Up until 1949 workers and

unions on strike or in conflict with management could always count on neu
trality, if not benevolent intervention, from the authorities.

Until

that time the government paid no attention to employers' complaints
about absenteism or lack of productivity.

After 1949 the government

seemed to intervene increasingly against workers and on the side of em
ployers in strikes and, significantly, undertook a propaganda campaign
against laxity in work discipline and for increased productivity.

The

government's decreasing support for workers was reflected in the fall of
their real wages and in the decline of their participation in the distri
bution of wealth between 1949 and 1952.

According to Clarence Zuvekas,

average real wages decreased 3.4 percent in 1950, 7.5 percent in 1951, and
11.4 percent in 1952.^

Similarly, Javier Villanueva shows that after the

upswing from 1946 to 1949, the real income of industrial workers declined.
Taking an index of 100 for 1950, total real payments per hour in industry
(which includes fringe benefits, allowances, etc.) increased from 67.2 in
1946 to a high of 102.5 in 1949, declining to 90.4 for 1951 and 82.1

Clarence Zuvekas, "Economic Growth and Income Distribution in
Postwar Argentina, Inter-American Economic Affairs 20 (1966): 27.
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for 1952, then rising again to 90.6 for 1953 and 98.9 for 1954.^
The immediate crisis seems to have peaked by 1952 and the econo
mic picture for Argentina showed signs of a slight recovery towards the
mid-fifties.

Real wages for workers rose again and the inflationary

process slowed down between 1952 and 1955.

According to Cafiero>the

1952 cost of living index for the Federal Capital stood at 579.3, 1943
representing a base of 100.

By September of 1955, this index had reached

689.7, a 19 percent increase over the three year period, or about 6 per
cent per annum.

In the same time period, the gross income per inhabitant,

which had fallen to 3,382 Argentine pesos in 1952, rose to 3,568 pesos
in 1955, a 12 percent rise over three years.

2

However, in spite of this

slight recovery, the impact of the earlier crisis was more lasting; the
programmatic readjustments made to respond to it remained in force and
were decisive in orienting the nation's economic life.

Programmatic Readjustments of the Fifties
What were these readjustments and how were they decisive?
is the key question addressed by the analysis in this chapter.

This

The

answers must be sought by considering various economic aspects in the
determination of social structure.

It is therefore important to emphasize

the discussion here on the regime's changing relationship to the workers.
This discussion involves one of the principal hypotheses examined by this
study: in taking those tentative programmatic steps which moved it in a
direction away from the workers from 1949 on, Peronism exercized a key

^Javier Villanueva, The Inflationary Process in Argentina (Buenos
Aires: Instituto De Telia, 1966), p. 75.

2

Cafiero, pp. 140-1.
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choice which affected its subsequent programmatic choices and was there
fore a decisive factor in shaping the outcome of the transitional process.
The theoretical model followed by this study stresses that a
particular historical period contains within it the relationships that
subsequently become determinative.

Hence policies reinforcing relation

ships among certain social groups or strengthening certain aspects of
the social structure, narrow down the range of patterns likely to emerge
as dominant at the next stage.

Thus the steps which led Peronism away

from a programmatic orientation which would have been closer to its
working class base were implicit in the regime's policies prior to 1950,
particularly those that strengthened capitalist relations of production.
It is within this context that one should understand the Congreso Nacional
de Productividad y Bienestar Social convened in Buenos Aires in March of
1955.

A precursor to the short-lived Gran Acuerdo Nacional presided over

by the Peronist government of the seventies, this congress brought together
delegates from the CGE and CGT— respectively, the employers' and the
workers' organization— under the slogan of

producir, producir, producir.

It represented the most clearly corporatist effort undertaken by,the regime.

Significantly, the Central Organizing Committee convening the
Congress was composed of an equal number of delegates from the C.G.T. and
the C.G.E. In its call for the Gongress, the Central Committee stressed
the need to increase productivity and went on to state that no people's
organization is in a better position to bring this about than the two
organizations participating most directly in the process of production.
They bring together the two basic factors in raising productivity: the
capabilities of the workers on the one hand, and the economic and techni
cal means on the other. In a speech before the Congress, Jose‘SGelbard,
then president of the C.G.E., added a third element: "the worker who must
incessantly adapt his capacities to new requirements, the entrepreneur
who must continually be adapting the organization of the enterprise ac
cording to the needs of the hour, and the state which must always stand
ready to assist in providing the equipment needed for production." Cuneo,
pp. 208-9. See note on Gelbard below.
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In one sense it was quite consistent with and flowed from Peronism's
populist-nationalist doctrine, yet in another sense it was not the only
conceivable outcome of Peronism's relationships to the working class up
to 1949.
Peronism's populist-nationalist thrust during the FFYP period
was expressed in the regime's policies which aimed to provide the basis
for cementing a class alliance between workers and national industrial
ists.

When the changed conditions of the fifties made this an increas

ingly difficult formula to carry out, the regime was under pressure to
choose one of two opposing programmatic directions, both of them arising
from the policies of the 1943-50 period.

On the one hand, the regime could

have chosen to deepen the process of national liberation it had set in
motion with its program for economic independence.

At this point, con

tinuing the struggle against dependency would have led Peronism into a
socialist direction.

Economically, this path would have necessitated the

expropriation of the landed oligarchy and the key industrial monopolies,
while increasing the state sector of the economy.

Politically, it would

have meant sharpening the class struggle, giving leadership of the process
to the working class base of the movement, and purging it of careerists
and opportunists.

It would also have required transforming the armed

forces into popular militias.

In general terms, this line was associated

with Evita just before her death.

Though these conclusions clearly go

beyond Peronist doctrine and were not favored by Peron, they are neverthe-

In 1973 Jose Gelbard became Peron's Minister of Economics. As a
self-made industrialist he represented a continuity in Justicialism's
populist-nationalist orientation towards the national bourgeoisie and, at
the same time, Peron's final futile attempt to bring about a program for
the construction of a viable national capitalism.
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less not inconsistent with elements of Peronism*s practice up to 1950.
It is important to note this programmatic direction for two reasons.
First, it'underlines the significance of the shift away from the workers
after 1949.

Secondly, this line was resurrected in the late sixties as

Peronism*s "true" meaning and provided the ideological basis for Justicialism's mass appeal.
A major reason for the survival and later revival of this
"socialist" thread within Peronism was that the regime's response to
the emerging economic crisis was not an unambiguous one.

To have pur

sued either programmatic direction implicit in the 1943-50 formula headon, clearly and directly, would have resulted in very heavy social and
political costs.

Peron sought to avoid these, relying on his genius to

keep otherwise warring factions within the fold by making each believe
it was the the true object of his concerns.

He postponed a decisive

reckoning which, in the end, proved even more costly.

Nevertheless,

even though incrementally and with much vacillation, by attempting to
resolve the contradictions of the prior period within capitalist rela
tions of production and thus placing the burden of "development" onto
the workers, the SFYP revealed the programmatic direction of the regime's
intended socio-economic readjustments.
Even if introduced with some ambiguity and vacillation, the direc
tion indicated by the policy readjustments of the fifties proved decisive.
Referring to the set of guidelines framed in 1949-50 which took hold with
the SFYP in 1953, Kenworthy states:
Particulary with regard to agriculture, but also affecting organized
labor, this change was pronounced enough to warrant being called a
reversal. Many of the new policies adopted in 1949-50 were followed,
at least in general outline, by subsequent administrations. Writing
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in 1962, the Argentine economist Aldo Ferrer frequently commented
on policies pursued "since 1950," taking no note of Peron's fall
from power in 1955.^
Others, too, date the decisive shift for the Argentine economy to 1949.
In their analysis Eshag and Thorp describe it as "measures aimed at
restraining domestic demand and providing price incentives to the export
sector of the economy"— in other words, attempting to revive Argentina's
traditional role within the world economy.

"The shift of emphasis from

governmental intervention and controls to a reliance on the operation of
the price mechanism and on demand restriction continued throughout the
period, culminating in the International Monetary Fund Stabilisation
Programmes implemented over the years 1959 to 1963."

They label this

approach "orthodox economic policy" and attribute Argentina's current
problems to it.

By locating it to the changes introduced from 1949 on,

they trace the beginning of Argentina's contemporary difficulties to that
date.

2
This interpretation of Peronism also stresses the decisiveness of

the shifts undertaken by the regime after 1949.

However, it diverges

from those who point to 1950 as a turning point in that it does not see
the changes occuring quite so abruptly.

The theoretical model applied

here, by focusing on the social relations promoted through economic
policy, attempts to go beneath surface manifestations and trace these
changes as they were developing within the relationships fostered with
the policies of the prior period.

However, it should be noted that these

shifts remained implicit within the populist-nationalist formula up to

1Eldon Kenworthy’s Ph.D. dissertation, p. 61.

2

Eshag and Thorp, pp. 3-4. •
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1950, became gradually more explicit after the crisis of 1950-2, and
were not pushed to their full potential until after the ambiguities and
encumbrances of populist-nationalism were removed from power in 1955.
Moreover, this was not the only possible outcome contained in the earlier
policies.

Therefore, to understand why the transitional process moved

in the direction of dependent industrialization, the analysis focuses on
the determinative shifts as these began to unravel with the impact of
the policies of the fifties.
The policy shifts encompassed in the SFYP reordered the class
alliance that had been expressed in the FFYP's policies and thereby in
tensified contradictions that resulted in the coup ousting Peronism
from power in 1955.

The FFYP's foundation had been the alliance between

the industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie at the expense of the agro
exporting sector.

In the fifties, the SFYP began to formalize a new

relationship between bourgeois sectors.

The embryonic alliance encom

passed in the SFYP both expressed the increased complexity in the social
structure, and in turn further reinforced the growing weight of the
bourgeois sectors based on capital intensive production.

This new alli

ance therefore revolved around bourgeois sectors involved in the production
of durable and capital goods as well as the landowning oligarchy, at the
expense of urban workers.

Lower wages, it was hoped, would compensate

for increased production costs resulting from the higher prices of imported
capital inputs.

On the other hand, lower incomes meant a reduction in

the domestic consumption of food goods thus allowing more to be exported
which, in turn, would provide the exchange needed to import vital capital
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goods.^

Peronism did not definitively break its ties to the workers,

this emerging programmatic thrust was not fully carried out until after
Peron's overthrow.
Nevertheless, the four major programmatic shifts which proved
decisive in defining the outcome of the transitional process were already
discernable in the SFYP.

They were:

1.

Shifting the cost of development onto urban labor

2.

Giving priority to heavy and capital goods industry

3.

Promoting rural production under oligarchic ownership and

4.

Increasing the role of foreign capital in Argentine economic
development
In the first place, the cost of development was shifted increas

ingly from the surplus generated by the rural sector to that created by
urban labor.

Moreover, it followed from the fact that economic policies

were formulated within the framework of the private ownership of the
means of production and the profit motive as the economic propellant,
that the gains of the entrepreneurial class were not held back while
those made by the workers in the period of presperity were reversed.
Secondly, the SFYP gave priority to the development of the nascent
heavy and capital goods industries.

The Peronist government began to

understand that without a developed sector producing means of production,
its quest for the economic independence of Argentina would remain an
elusive goal.

Even under the best of circumstances, a concerted effort

at developing the sector producing means of production poses serious
problems and difficulties.

For Argentina this was made even more difficult

*These points are made in Rock in his article on "The Survival
of Peronism," in Rock, p. 192.
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because it was the undeveloped state of this sector that provided the
United States with a handle for exercising its dominance.

It was the pol

icy of the United States government to preserve that situation.

In a

telegram to the U.S. Charge^D1Affairs in Argentina on February 3, 1945,
the Secretary of State expressed it as follows:

"Export of capital goods

should be kept at present minimum— it is essential not to permit the ex
pansion of Argentine heavy industry. . .
To the external difficulties one must add the internal ones.
Developing a sector producing capital goods requires amassing very large
concentrations of capital.

This would have been problematic enough at

the time of the FFYP; in a period of economic contraction these diffi
culties were compounded even more.

As suggested above, the Peronist

regime met this problem through an attempt to extract more surplus from
the industrial proletariat, enforcing higher productivity and providing
less recompense.

However, hampered by its populist-nationalism, the

regime pursued this course with a great deal of ambiguity.

Though

delaying for longer or shorter periods, the Peronist government usually
responded favorably to pressure from organized workers.

Certainly,

✓
Peron s government never exercised the kind of brutality against workers
that later military dictatorships employed.

Nor, for that matter, in

spite of all the accusations of fascism and totalitarianism, did Peron's
regime ever subject its political opponents to the kind of repression
later governments levelled against Peronists.
In addition to extracting surplus from the workers, the other
source lay in the agrarian sector.

This brings us to the third of the

determinative shifts in policy responding to the deterioration of the

^Quoted by Fodor in Rock, pp. 159-60.
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favorable international context after 1950.

In this area too, there

were two possible programmatic directions contained in the populistnationalist practice of the forties.

On the one hand, given its anti-

oligarchic stance, the regime could have expropriated large landed
property.

In view of the deterioration in the terms of international

trade and the inappropriateness of Peronism in squeezing surplus from
workers, the further expansion of the internal market was an essential
step if there was to be any advance in the sector producing means of
production.

A comprehensive agrarian reform was the only means through

which the domestic market could be immediately enlarged.

Expropriating

the oligarchy undoubtedly entailed heavy political risks and would have
forced the regime to rely on class mobilization and militancy so intense
that it very likely could not have been contained within populist-nationalism.

On the other hand, the programmatic direction Peron embarked on

had political costs which, though perhaps not as immediate and direct,
were severe enough to result in his overthrow.
After 1950, Peron chose to promote the agrarian area under oli
garchic ownership as the way to enhance Argentine exporting capacities.
Given its commitment to the private property framework and the social
relations of capitalism, in order to promote the productivity of the agrar
ian sector, the regime had to win the oligarchy’s trust.

Thus, from 1949

on, the state provided technical help and made special financing available
for the purchase of farm machinery.

In a step that clearly indicated

which programmatic direction the state intended to pursue in the area of
social relations of production, the regime lifted its regulations which
had prohibited the help of family members in field work (child labor and
superexploitation of women).

Further, to promote rational planning, the
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state set in advance the prices it committed itself to pay for rural
goods.

Finally, in the last years, I.A.P.I. was transformed from an

institution which skimmed off surplus from the agrarian sector to one
which subsidized agricultural production.*

This transformation indicates

how far-reaching the reversal in the policy shifts of the fifties was.
"Guaranteed farm prices and retail food prices were raised in successive
stages.

By 1953 these measures had raised the price paid to the farmer

for wheat to 2.5 times its level in 1948, while food prices had more than
tripled."^
Hence, the shift towards promoting the oligarchy’s material
interests, translated concretely into erosion of gains that had accrued
to the workers in the prior period.

For its part, the Sociedad Rural

publicly expressed its appreciation for this shift.

Referring to the

SFYP, the president of the SRA wrote in an open letter to Peron:
It gives us great satisfaction to express to the President
the Republic our active agreement with the direction that the
implementation of said plan will lead to, and we can be sure
that we are not only expressing our personal point of view but
that of the members and Board of Directors of the Sociedad
Rural Argentina. We are certain of being faithful interpreters
of the thinking of the great mass of the nations's agro-pastoral
producers, among whom we have already detected the positive
sentiments produced.
The letter goes on to enumerate reasons for approving the SFYP:
The policies announced on the question of expropriation will
calm and reassure owner-producers whose support is fundamental in
the process of production, and it means their greater efforts to
perfect it with the introduction of improvements on their property
and equipment.
The policy of setting positively encouraging prices will
largely neutralize high production costs and undoubtedly bring
about larger crops.

*0n this point see Di Telia and Zymelman, pp. 241-2.

2

Eshag and Thorp, p. 11.
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The elimination of limitations restricting the labor of family
members and the possibility for the producer to mobilize his own
resources according to the rhythm of his crops, will give producers
the greatest satisfaction.1
However, it must be noted that in spite of the regime's promotion
of the oligarchy's material interests and the latter's public stance
moving closer to Peronism, the oligarchy did not abandon its enmity
toward Peron and its opposition was in fact instrumental in his over
throw.

Thus, in retrospect, it is not at all clear that the economic,

social, and political costs were any lower than if Peronism had moved
programmatically in a socialist'direction.

The regime was unable to win

over bourgeois sectors opposing it while it probably succeeded in damp
ening the enthusiasm of its working class support, which historically
has been closely related to the rise and ebb of Peronism's political
fortunes.
Turning to the fourth shift expressed in the policies of the fif
ties which determined the contents of the emerging developmental pattern,
let us examine the role of foreign capital.

On the one hand, the SFYP

reaffirmed the orientation in the FFYP which sought to loosen Argentina's
dependent economic ties to Europe and North America by strengthening rela
tions with Latin America.

The SFYP formulated it as follows:

The foreign commerce of the country in
American nations will be guided by the
riding need to complement the national
manner . . . with the aim of achieving
Latin America.^

relation to the Latin
recognition of the over
economies in a mutual
the economic defense of

This approach remained an important component of Peron's foreign policy.

^Frorn the Anales de la Sociedad Rural. April of 1952, as cited by
Cuneo, pp. 216-7.
2 '
Camara de Senadores, p. 833.
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Efforts were made to create a South American economic union.

In 1953, the

"Act of Santiago" was signed which set forth the foundations for an
economic union with Chile: creation of a mixed commission to oversee the
process, gradual lifting of customs barriers, exchange of products and
financial resources, etc.

That year Peron convinced his friend Alfredo

Stroessner of Paraguay and Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua to subscribe to
the principles of the agreement.

Shortly thereafter the Chancellors of

Argentina and Ecuador signed a similar act in Quito which specifically
referred to the Santiago Act.

The following year the Bolivian government

signalled its agreement to the principles enunciated in Santiago.

However,

though specifically invited to,the governments of Uruguay, Peru and Brazil
refused for different reasons and the "economic union" never got much bey
ond the stage of principles.*
While the SFYP committed Argentina to building economic links to
Latin America as a means of countering dependent economic relationship to
more advanced industrialized nations, immediately after the clause cited
above comes the following, whose implementation undid Peronism1s achieve
ments in the direction of economic independence:
It is the permanent objective of the Nation to favor the inter
national exchange of technical knowledge and to stimulate the
entry of productive capital that desires to cooperate in the
economic development of the country.
Clearly, the implication of this commitment for the flow of Argentina's
economic relations is that these would not develop in the direction of other
Latin American countries but would rather be predominantly oriented to more

*For a brief discussion on "the Act of Santiago" and subsequent
developments, see Ciria's Peron y el .lusticialismo, pp. 164-6.
^Camara de Senadores, p. 833.

289
industrialized nations.

The above statement is quite consistent with,

and represents the cornerstone of, the policies promoted by the desarollistas following Peron*s overthrow.

As we shall see, once those populist-

nationalist elements in the Peronist program which contradicted dependent
industrialization were removed from the scene, the process of linking
Argentina to the industrialized world assumed particular intensity.
Like their counterparts in today's Third W&rld nations, the Per
onist laws on foreign capital sought to achieve the contradictory aims
of, on the one hand, stimulating and attracting the entry of foreign
capital, while regulating it and protecting national capital on the
other.

Thus Law 14,222 of 1953 attempted to protect the interests and

status of national capital while also providing benefits to foreign
capital in order to attract it.

In essence it declared foreign capital

equal to national capital under the law.

That is, once established in

the country, it was subject to all national laws, regulations and privi
leges.

The executive was authorized to waive customs and duties on capi

tal as it entered the country.

A maximum return of eight percent could

be repatriated annually and the principal could not be touched for at
least ten years, after which it could be repatriated at ten to twenty
percent per annum depending on the agreement reached at the point of
entry.^

In the two years this law was in effect it attracted $512,232,780

dollars of which $8,197,146 went into the automobile industry.

1

9

In view
/

Paraphrased from Felix Herrero, Aspectos legales de la promocion
industrial en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato De Telia,
1962), p. 96.

2

Ibid., p. 90, 73 percent of the total was of U.S. origins, followed
by 14 percent from Germany.
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of the subsequent importance of this sector and of the role of U.S.
based multinationals within it, these initial investments were of
obvious strategic value.
After the removal of Peronism's populist and nationalist encum
brances, the laws on foreign capital became much less restrictive and
regulatory.

For example, Law 14,780 placed no limitations on repatria

tion except those stipulated in the original agreement allowing entry.
The contradictory nature of Law 14,222 was lessened as the concern became
less with -protecting national capital than with attracting foreign
capital.*

By 1964, foreign investments totalling $535,999,924 dollars

had been approved with the United States accounting for 58.8 percent of
this amount, followed by Switzerland with 10.2 percent.

2

/

Another example of the ambiguity in Peron's shift towards foreign
capital is presented by the controversial negotiations over concessions
to award Standard Oil.

Argentina had the distinction of possessing the

oldest state owned oil company on the continent——the
f eros Fiscales (YPF) .

Yacimientos Petroli-

When word leaked out in 1955 that the Peron

government had been engaged in talks with a foreign oil company that would
/

break YPF's monopoly, Pelron s anti-imperialist supporters were outraged.
This outrage is often cited as one of the factors producing disillusion/•
ment amongst the Peronist rank and file at the critical time before Peron's
overthrow.
Antonio Cafiero, who had been the Minister for Foreign Commerce
between 1952 and 1954 and Commerce Minister in 1954-5, includes an inter
esting Appendix in his book,where he records the substance of responses
1
Herrero, pp. 105-6.

2

Ibid., p. 107.
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to questions directed at Alfredo Gomez Morales— who had been Peron's
Minister of Finances and Secretary of Economic Matters— by fellow inmates
while they were both in prison after the 1955 coup.

Gomez Morales justi

fied the contract with California Argentina de Petroleo because no inter
national agency would finance YPF's explorations.

Argentina did not pro

duce enough to meet its needs and the idea was to expand local production.
The foreign company was required to sell to the YPF refinery and would
thereby, be unable to make inroads into the domestic market which, accord
ing to Gomez Morales, was really what the multinationals were after.*
Once again, what emerges here is the assigning of a greater role
for foreign capital in Argentina’s development as the Peron government’s
response to the crisis of the fifties.

The regime attempted to bring in

foreign capital, but also to regulate it and protect national capital, in
this case YPF.

It proved difficult to maintain these contradictory aims.

Peronist militants were unhappy with what they perceived as compromising
Argentine sovereignty, and foreign firms felt cheated of the rewards for
their investments.

Result: one more link in the chain leading to the coup

that removed one of populist-nationalism’s conflicting poles.

*0n another occasion Alfredo Gomez Morales differentiated the
Peronist approach to foreign investments from that of its desarollista
successors-, notably Rogelio Frigerio's "open door to foreign capital"
under president Frondizi's administration. The proper approach, according
to Gomez Morales, was to proceed investment by investment, with great care
for details. Otherwise, book increases in capital rather than real
business would be attracted. Tariff and exchange protection would be
required.
It is necessary to attract foreign capital, but also to act with
great perspicacity, thinking that foreign capital will not come
here as a benefactor; on the contrary, it will extract from the
country all that it can. It is a question of finding conditions
so that it can come to do business, yes, but dirty business, no. . . "
(Cited by Randall, p. 235.)
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Indirect to Direct Dependency: The Transition
From British to U.S. Hegemony

International Context
In looking at the process involved in undermining the hegemony
of the United Kingdom's interests within the Argentine economy and their
eventual replacement by United States interests, we may begin by consid
ering the impact of the Second World War in the reordering of positions
within the international system.

Recall that the "British, who controlled

approximately 60 percent of. the foreign investments in Argentina, had long
been accustomed to treating that country as a species of sixth dominion
in their economy."^

Wartime conditions seriously eroded the United King

dom's' position as a world power and also undermined its dominant role
within Argentine economic life.

We saw that an analogous situation had

developed in the previous major disruption of the international system
during the Great Depression.

In contradistinction with the policies of

the thirties which attempted to salvage Argentina's economic ties to
Great Britain, Peronist policy-makers deliberately set about to ensure
that England would not again emerge as the major power in Argentine
economic life.
World War II hastened the decline of the British Empire and led
to political independence of former possessions and economic independence
for Argentina which, in turn, accelerated the Empire's irreversible disso«

lution.

By itself, Argentina breaking out of the international network

controlled by the United Kingdom,played a considerable part in the disin-

1George Blanksten, pp. 239-40.
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integration of Great Britain’s position as a world power.

For example,

Juan Carlos Esteban cites figures*- that show a decline of some 400
million pounds sterling in British foreign investments from 2,400 million
in 1945 to 2,000 million in 1953.

During this period Argentina national

ized the railroads which according to the same source, by themselves
accounted for 150 million pounds sterling.

2

of the figures involved may be controversial,

Though the exact magnitude
3

there can be no doubt of

the prominence of the railroads in determining the relationship between
foreign interests and the specific types of economic activities prevail
ing at the time.
It is worth reiterating that the measures dismantling the infra
structure of Britain's hegemony within the Argentine economy constituted
one of Peronism's most impressive achievements.

The final departure of

the United Kingdom's presence was not a necessary outcome.

Another group

in power might have lacked the courage to attack the United Kingdom's
position, or if might have chosen to foster and reinforce a different set
of relationships which could have revived England's presence in the Argen
tine economy or at least preserved a minimal role for English interests.^

*From Eugenio Varga's Problemas fundamentales de la economxa y
de la polxtica del imperialismo.

2

Esteban, pp. 77-8.

3

Esteban maintains that the railroads amounted to 38 percent of
all foreign investments in Argentina in 1945. For a more detailed discus
sion of the financial aspects of the nationalization, and also of the pro
gressive aspects of the nationalization in view of the railroads' function
in assuring a dominant role for foreign capital, see above on pp. 250-3.
^Skupch, pp. 68-70 makes this point and also provides a good sum
mary of the conditions leading to the deterioration of British hegemony
within the Argentine economy and the ascent of U.S. interests, and of
Peronist measures dismantling England's presence.
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Of course it is true that Peronism acted in a conjuncture in which
Britain’s power had been weakened considerably.

The point, however, is

that Peronism chose to take advantage of the situation.
Just how much the international situation strengthened Argentina's
hand in the wartime years can be seen in a dispatch England's Prime Minis
ter Winston Churchill directed to President Roosevelt of the United
States.

The context was that the United States had tried to get the

United Kingdom to use its influence in Argentina, assuming Britain's
economic position as a lever, to prevail upon the new government that
came in with the G.O.U. coup to break its realations with the Axis.
In their response, the English made it clear that it was Argentina that
possessed leverage.
If the Argentine beef supply were cut off, Churchill asked,
how are we to feed ourselves plus the American Army for 'Over
load' (the Normandy invasion. . . ) The joint examination by
the Combined Boards in Washington of the supply aspects will show
you how much these people have us in their hands. An immediate
cessation of the Argentine supplies, our Chiefs of Staff consider,
will disrupt military operations on the scale planned for this
year. . . .Before we leap, we really must look. We can always
- pay them back when our hands are clear.*
In punishment for

Argentina's insistence on maintaining her status

as a neutral, the United States also worked hard to isolate her within
Latin America.

Because of Argentina's strength at the time, the campaign

did not prove to be as successful as the United States had hoped.

Being

closely tied to the Argentine economy, Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay felt
they could not afford to abide by the United States' request that they

■'‘Cited by David Green (Memo by Hull of conversations with the
British Ambassador, Jan. 23, 1944 in Folder 216 Hull MS.) in his The
Containment of Latin America: The History of the Myths and Realities of
the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 155. The
analysis presented here follows that found in this excellent book.
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break their relations with Argentina.

"Major Villarroel, the Provi

sional President of Bolivia, had told a U.S. Embassy staff member that
'if Argentine retaliation were aroused, Argentina could totally starve
Bolivia out in thirty days, due to Bolivian dependence on Argentine food
supplies."

Within days "Under Secretary of State Stettinius told Hull

that the Paraguayan Ambassador in Washington had warned that 'his country
was completely under the domination of Argentina economically and that
his Government had no choice on the question of recognition."'^

A few

months later, in August of 1944, President Roosevelt imposed economic
sanctions on Argentina.

"Four hundred million dollars of Argentine

assets in the United States were frozen, exports of steel and chemicals
curtailed, and Argentine ports declared off-limits for U.S. shipping.
The blow was blunted by London's refusal to go along."
was dependent on Argentine supplies.

2

England too,

That year, two fifths of all

Argentine exports, principally meats, were destined for British markets.
In spite of this offsetting pressure, the United States' sanctions were
sufficient to aggravate Argentina's serious problems in obtaining inputs
needed for the rapid industrialization underway.
tina declared war on Germany and Japan.

In March of 1945 Argen

Shortly thereafter the United

States lifted its economic sanctions and recognized the Farrell government.
The hostile posture adopted by the United States State Department
toward the principals in the 1943 coup solidified and entrenched the posi
tions of those among them with more overt axis sympathies.

The U.S. ac-

^(Woodward to Hull, La Paz, Mar. 6 , 1944, in 835.01/ 210; memo
fromStettinius to Hull, Mar. 9, 1944,
in 835.01/ 271, both in DSA, NA)
in Green, p. 157.

2

Kenworthy's Ph.D. dissertation, p. 198.
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tions reinforced the already strong anti-British feelings prevalent
among nationalist circles at the time.

In this context it took some

courage on Peron1s part to declare war on Germany.

Even pro-Allied

sentiment did not approve of a declaration of war on an already defeated
enemy.

In spite of its unpopularity, Peron faced this step resolutely

because he understood the necessity of keeping Argentina within the
/

U.S. mainstream of the post-War world.

To a Uruguayan journalist Peron

declared:
Our little country is not suspended in space as our nationalists
would like to believe, but an integral part of a world undergoing
transformation. We must advance with the tide if we do not want
to sink.*
Initially the United States opposed the architects of the 1943
coup on the grounds of their Axis sympathies.

However, as events unfolded

and Peron began to implement his policies, the fundamental reason for the
attempt.at isolating the new regime became the potentially far-reaching
implications of social revolution for the rest of Latin America contained
in the developing Argentine model.

It was not so much that Argentina re

presented a potential industrial competitor, although this factor undoubt
edly played a role.

Mexico and Brazil, with their more developed heavy

industrial sectors represented a more immediate economic threat and yet
they were not singled out as targets with the vehemence that Argentina
was in U.S. foreign policy at the time.

More important was the fact that

in 1945 Argentina seemed to present "a clear portent of the dawning of a
new day in Latin American political economy and socio-economic relation
ships."^

^Cited by Luna, El 45, p. 17 (my translation). Luna also makes
interesting observations surrounding Argentina's declaration of war around
pp. 24 and 54-5.

2

Green, p. 240.
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United States policy makers were unhappy about "the new day"
that seemed to be taking shape in Argentina.

They did not appreciate the

international implications of Peron's "Third Position" foreign policy and
found his aggressive pursuit of economic independence particularly irk
some.

Already in 1945 "Peron was playing off the industrial countries

against each other as they bid for the Argentine markets."

For example,

he "was negotiating an agreement with the Swedes for purchase of agri
cultural machinery, in direct violation of the United States-Argentine
oilseed agreement, which contained exclusive machinery supply provisions
scheduled to run through 1946."^
Peron's mobilization of the working class as the social base for
his regime and the potential for upheaval and disruption of ongoing social
relations must have presented an even more threatening picture for the
United States' position in Latin America.

Thus, for example, statements

like Peron's. reply to a 1945 manifesto against the new regime signed by
virtually all Argentine business, industrial, and banking associations,
to which Peron responded confidently by saying "that he now had enough
forces in the regular army and 'in that other Army of labor' to put
down any insurrection"
ment circles.

2

must have caused apprehension within State Depart

Serious consequences for the social groups on whom the

United States' presence in Latin America depended would result if other
regimes like Getulio Vargas' in Brazil were also to threaten working
class mobilization against bourgeois sectors.
However, there was disagreement within the State Department on
just how much of a threat the Argentine model really represented and on
whether the attempt to isolate the Peronist regime was the most effective
1
Green, p. 245.

2
Ibid.
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response.

Apparently, Nelson Rockefeller, then Assistant

Secretary of

State for Latin American Affairs, was the chief advocate for the position
:of winning Peron over from.within rather than antagonizing him further.
For this-Rockefeller was relieved of his duties on August 25, 1944.
State Department official Carl Spaeth privately told a member
of the U.S. Embassy staff in Buenos Aires that Rockefeller had
been "blown through the roof" of the State Department by the pub
lic attacks of two major newspapers... The (N.Y.) Times and the
(Washington) Post, Spaeth said, felt that Rockefeller had aided
the forces of Argentine fascism by his overenthusiastic support
of the Farrell-Peron regime at the San Francisco Conference of
the United Nations.*
In the long run however, as David Green also notes:
the tactical approach which- had been worked out in the spring
of 1945 by Nelson Rockefeller, Senator Vandenberg, and other
like-minded policy-makers ultimately carried the day. Peron
was to be wooed— and won. The fly-swatter approach had not
worked; there was nothing left but to try the flypaper. 2
With this approach United States policy makers achieved their aims in a
relatively short time span.
Peronist Policies

Peronist policies delivered the final blow to the hegemony
of British interests within the Argentine economy.

The measures which

systematically undid the foundations for the United Kingdom's domination
included-the nationalization of the railroads and utilities, state mono
poly over agricultural export structures, creation of the Central Bank,
and expansion of the state merchant marine to the point that it effec-

According to a memo of a conversation, in Washington, between
Carl Spaeth and Charles Burrows of the Buenos Aires Embassy staff (June
24, 1946, in Messersmith MS), Green, p. 244.
2Ibid., p. 254.
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tively cut into profits realized in overseas transportation.*

Seen in

the context of a long process of decline in Britain's hegemony, these
measures represented the definitive culmination of that process.

With

these steps the Peronist regime prevented any possibility of even a
partial resurgence for English interests through economic policy, as had
been the case in the thirties.

The Argentine case thus presents a cri

tical episode in the reordering of the relations defining the international system.

2

It was a key component in the process of global trans

formation from a system based on Britain's position in the international
division of labor as "the world's workshop" to the new world order centered
around the North American multinational corporation, a process which
reached its climax in the post World War II era.
The policies mentioned here directly attacked the structures upon
which British hegemony was founded.

Other policies, those which promoted

industrialization, indirectly aided the predominance of United States
based multinationals by hastening the development of the infrastructure
on which their presence rested.

The experience of the twenties had

As a part of its campaign to isolate Argentina economically,
the United States made a concerted effort to attack the expansion of the
Argentine merchant marine. In a memorandum in August of 1947, the State
Department's Division of American Republics Affairs states:
Argentina is actively attempting to build up a merchant marine through
a system of preferences and discriminations. By virtue of its newly
acquired position as a creditor nation, Argentina is exerting extreme
pressure in countries requiring loans of foodstuffs to include a
shipping clause in agreements covering such needs whereby each country
shall take necessary measures to assure that the transportation of
merchandise originating in that country shall take place preferably
in vessels of the two contracting countries on an equal
fifty-fifty tonnage basis. . . . Our policy should be to
aggressively attack methods used by Argentina in the way we
have been doing, and particularly watch the sales of ships to
avoid furnishing Argentina with the means with which to
implement this discriminatory policy.
Escude, p. 385.
Recall discussion above on pp. 292-4.
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already shown the differential effect resulting from the growth of
manufacturing activity: it

was advantageous for U.S. interests while

it impacted adversely on the interrelationships underlying the Anglooligarchic connection.

Hence, though it certainly was not their intended

aim, Peronist policies which pushed import substituting industrialization
based on producing consumer goods, expedited the conditions that ulti
mately led to the hegemony of United States interests within the Argen
tine economy.^
We saw that Peronist industrializing policies did not represent
a fundamental departure from previous efforts and that, indeed, their
substance represented a continuity with the industrialization sponsored
in modifying the externally oriented growth pattern in the thirties.
Peronism departed fundamentally from its immediate past in the quantity
of industrialization it promoted.
leading to qualitative changes.

It was a case of quantitative change
The very fact that manufacturing re

placed agriculture as the nation's predominant form of economic activity
meant a shift in Argentina's relations with external groups determining
the direction of economic life for the next stage.

2

^These points summarize the conclusions of Skupch's analysis on
the decline of the United Kingdom's hegemony over the Argentine economy.

2

See pp. 231-3 above for data showing the reversal in the positions oc
cupied by manufacturing and agriculture as the predominant forms of econ
omic activity. Daniels (Part II), p. 11 shows that this relationship
prevailed during the next stage.
Percentages for Sectors of Economic Activity of Gross Internal
Product at Factor Cost and 1960 Prices for Selected Years
1955

1957

1960

1962

1963

1964

Agriculture-livestock

19.9

17.4

16.8

16.4

16.8

16.8

Manufacturing

30.3

32.0

32.4

32.3

32.0

33.7

SOURCES: Based on data published in the Yearbook of Current Accounts
for 1955 and 1957. For other years the Annual Report of the Central Bank.
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As we saw

the corollary to import substituting industrialization

based on production of consumer goods was a tremendous rise in the demand
for capital goods.

Daniels summarizes the impact on the importation of

industrial goods: "Imports of manufactured goods fi.e., consumer goodsj
diminished significantly (from 39.1 percent to 11.8 percent of the total
imports between 1945 and 1952), while imported capital goods rose from
13.3 percent to 41.5 percent of the total imports between 1945 and 1950."^
This increase betrayed the fact that local producers were unable to meet
the sharply heightened demand for machinery and equipment resulting from
the rapid growth of manufacturing.

Development of the capital goods pro

ducing sector would have required massive concentrations of capital,
whether from foreign or domestic sources.

Obtaining capital through for

eign investments was not a realistic option as long as wartime needs con
sumed the economies of the advanced industrial nations.

Moreover, it ran

counter to Peronism's quest for economic independence in the immediate
post-war era,.though as we saw, this was one of the significant shifts
that took shape with the readjustments of the SFYP.

On the other hand,

mobilization of local capital and utilization of foreign exchange reserves
cut into the consumer goods producing sector's ability to complete the
circuit necessary to its reproductive cycle.

In other words, capital used

for the immediate purposes of replenishing capital inputs, would instead
have had to have been diverted for investment into developing means of
production for producing means of production.
Though clearly insufficient to meet the demand for machinery and
equipment, basic industries controlled by the state and private groups
nevertheless developed under Peronism.

^"Daniels (Part II), p. 6.

Herein lies a fundamental difference

302
between the industrializing effects of previous regimes and Peronism 1s
accomplishments: while the industrialization of the thirties was largely
confined to light industry producing non-durable consumer goods, its
further expansion' under Peronist auspices caused spill-over into the more
rapid development of the capital goods oriented sector.

This represents

another manifestation of the dynamic of quantitative change leading to
qualitative changes.
However, this argument should not be pushed too far because de
spite the rapid development of the capital" goods producing sector and of
the sector with a higher organic composition of capital generally, this
expansion was still far from adequate to free industry from dependence on
foreign suppliers.

This dependence played a vital part in the movement

from an indirect to a direct form of dependency.

The lack of a developed

capital goods sector is key to this analysis of Peronism as the culminat
ing transitional stage in the process from an externally oriented growth
pattern to a dependent industrial economy.
Tripartite Trade Pattern as the Transitional Form:
Indirect to Direct Dependency, I

The model of dependency theory applied in this analysis stresses
shifts in the predominant combination of national and foreign interests
as decisive in shaping the outcome of a transitional period.

The favorable

wartime conditions and the independence enjoyed by the Peronist state from
both foreign and national economic groups highlighted one aspect and ob
scured another of the shift taking place during this period.

Peronism’s

nationalist and anti-imperialist policies clearly dismantled the structures
of British influence; less clear was the movement toward the ascendancy of
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North American interests.

Peronist policies, especially after 1950, re

vived the trend toward the increasingly central role of North American
interests within the Argentine economy that had already been discernable
in the twenties.
Before analyzing the specifically Argentine role in the transi
tion from the hegemony of British to that of North American interests,
it is interesting to note the United States' efforts to take advantage
of the United Kingdom’s weakened position during the war and post-war
period.

The following memorandum from the files of the Office of Inter-

American Affairs was indicative of the State Department's thinking on
the subject of British holdings in Argentina:
There are some good properties in the British portfolio and we
might well pick them up now. There is also a lot of trash which
Britain should be allowed to keep.l
Various deals proposing to use English assets as collateral for financing
its war effort were never actually carried out.

However, one of the con

ditions for the Lend-Lease Program was that the United Kingdom consume
its own exportable goods and this did result in a significant reduction
of Britain's exports to the area.
United States policy during this period was to help the United
Kingdom in negotiations which undermined the Anglo-Argentine connection
while adopting obstructionist tactics and sabotaging any possibilities
that might strengthen Anglo-Argentine ties.

The British were aware of

the situation and understandibly unhappy about it, as indicated in the
following Foreign Office memorandum:

1Hanson to Will Clayton, Nov. 2, 1940, OIAA: 30: Foreign Trade
in Other American Republics, cited by Green, p. 140.
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The fundamental difficulty, as Sir David Kelly [the English Am
bassador in Buenos AiresJ points out, is that the U.S. Govern
ment are hostile not so much towards (the present Argentine gov
ernment) as towards Argentina herself, whatever government she
has, because, with her profitable economic links with Great
Britain, she can afford to pursue a comparatively independent
policy vis-a-vis the dominant influence of the United States in
the western hemisphere. The United States are, of course, jeal
ous of our influence and position in Argentina, and in attacking
the Argentine Government they have a latent hope that they may at
the same time succeed in reducing our own position in Argentina, ,
which has helped the Argentines stand up to them. From this vi
cious circle it is difficult ... to see any escape.^
J. V. Perowne, the head of the Foreign Office's South American Department,
offered the following assessment in 1945:
One cannot escape the feeling that the "Fascism" of Colonel
Peron is only a pretext for the present policies of Mr. Braden
and his supporters in the State Department; their real aim is to
humiliate the only Latin American country which has dared to
brave their lightning. If Argentina can effectively be cowed
and brought to patent submission, State Department control over
the Western hemisphere (so the State Department imperialists no
doubt think) will be established beyond a peradventure. This
will contribute at one and the same time to mitigate the possible
dangers of Russian and European influence in Latin America, and
remove Argentina from what is considered to be our orbit.
It will be recalled that these favorable wartime conditions also
strengthened the hand of the nationalistically inclined regime of the
forties in implementing its anti-imperialist policies.

It was the favor

able conjuncture of internal and external factors of the forties that
provided the independence and room for maneuver which allowed the Peronist
regime to be "above class forces" and to contain the contradictions inher
ent in its class conciliation program.

Hence, up to 1950 the Peronist

state was able to provide national entrepreneurs the conditions and incen
tives for expanded production while also achieving a redistribution of
wealth benefiting labor, and, at the same time, it lessened the influence
1
Escude, p. 80.

2
Ibid., p. 241.
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of foreign interests on the Argentine economy to an all-time low.
In the favorable conjuncture of the forties, the dismantling of
the structures on which British hegemony rested was quite clear while
the dynamics leading to their replacement by North American multination
als was not.

Table 23 shows the shift in the influence of English and

North American capital within Argentina's economy.

TABLE 2 3 — Long range private foreign investments (using millions of 1950
dollars and the base year of 1945= 100)
Years

United Kingdom

United States

Other Countries

Total

value

index

value

index

value

index

value

index

1931

4,294

189

1,436

158

1,910

176

7,640

179

1934

3,481

153

1,536

169

1,903

176

6,920

162

1940

2,938

130

108

12

1,504

139

5,570

131

1945

2,271

100

907

100

1,082

100

4,260

100

1949

338

15

447

49

955

88

1,740

41

1953

357

16

494

54

1,019

94

1,870

44

1955

402

18

558

61

900

83

1,860

44

SOURCE: Esteban, p. 79.
Peronist policies clearly discouraged foreign investments until
1952.

The slight upward trend in the figures on Table 23 for the last

years of the Peronist decade accord with the shift in policy orientation
toward foreign capital incorporated in the SFYP.'*'

Table 23 shows the most

dramatic drop in foreign investments to be those of British origins and
also shows that this took place during the height of Peronism's indus
trialization between 1945 and 1949.

^Blanksten, p. 246, also perceives a 180° turn in the policies
of economic independence around this time. He sees an about face leading
to a sudden sympathetic orientation towards U.S. interests..
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As Juan Carlos Esteban notes, this drastic reduction in the parti
cipation of English capital led to the proportional, though not actual,
increase in that of U.S. capital during the Peronist decade, as Table 24
shows.

TABLE 24.— Percentage of participation of investment capital by country
of origin
Year

United Kingdom

United States

Other Countries1

1945

53.3

21.3

25.4

1955

21/6

30.0

48.4

SOURCE: Esteban, p. 80.
Esteban aptly remarks that it was not at that time, a case of new U.S.
investments displacing British capital. Rather it was a case of North
American capital not being harmed as much by the closed market and Peronism's nationalistic industrializing policies generally.

Restrictions on

the repatriation of profits forced U.S. capital to reinvest.
The lessening influence of foreign capital was one of the most
notable consequences of Peronist policies.

Table 25 shows this trend as

well as some other distinguishing features of the Peronist period.
The data showing the decline in the percentage of GDP comprised by
exports indicate the increasing shift in the orientation of economic activ
ity towards the internal market.

In showing the dropping percentage of

imported consumer goods in the total consumed, Table 25 also provides an
indication of the growing capability of national industry to supply the
domestic market.

The tendencies expressed by these data on Table 25 are

^This category probably masks many multinationals in fact based
in the United States through the use of subsidiary firm's with corporate
offices in Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and elsewhere.
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generally consistent with the. movement toward an internally oriented
growth model based on import substituting industrialization.

TABLE 25.— Relative weight of foreign capital and impact of foreign
trade on Argentine production
Average
1900-13

Average
1919-30

Average
1931-9

Average
1946-55

Fqreign-Capital as Percentage
of Total Capital

47.7

32.0

20.4

5.1

Imported Consumer Goods as
Percentage of Total Consumed

15.7

13.3

6.8

1.2

Exports as a Percentage of
Gross Domestic Procuct

24.6

24.3

20.0

8.1

SOURCE:

Cafiero, p. 180, based on E.C.L.A. figures.

Table 26 provides additional corroboration for these points.

The

data in Table 26 reflect the growing capability of national
industry to supply the domestic market.

Almost all categories show the

TABLE 26.— Merchandise imports as percentage of aggregate supply, 1900-691
1900-4

1925-9

1937-9

1946-9

1950-4

1960-1

1969

6

5

5

2

2

2

2

Textiles and Apparel

55

45

44

15

5

4

5

Chemicals

45

38

40

19'

14

15

19

Metals

87

65

46

37

21

22

16

Machinery, Vehicles
and Equipment
(excluding electrical)

92

79

49

43

23

25

27

100

98

56

22

8

9

26

Foodstuffs

Electrical Machinery
and Appliances

SOURCES: U.N., Yearbooks of International Trade Statistics: B .C.R.,4
Origen del producto y distribucion del ingreso. From Randall, p. 117.
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most dramatic decreases in merchandise import as a percentage of their
aggregate supply for the Peronist years.

To anticipate a point developed

in the next chapter, it is interesting to note that the sharpest drop
for the 1946-9 period is shown by "textiles and apparel"— a category
representative of the light industrial sector producing non-durable con
sumer goods— while the two categories showing the greatest declines for
the 1950-4 period— "electrical machinery and appliances" and "machinery,
vehicles, and equipment"— are more representative of the heavy industrial
sector producing durable consumer and capital goods.

These data support

our hypothesis about the shift in Peronist industrializing policies
between the forties and fifties.
The success achieved by Peronist policies in lessening the direct
presence of foreign capital obscured the relatively growing influence of
North American capital that was also taking place.

Therefore, in order

to clarify the dynamics involved in the process that resulted in United
States based multinationals assuming a hegemonic position within the
Argentine economy, it is necessary to focus the analysis on the nature of
the industrialization taking place in the Peronist period, and particularly
on its underlying contradictions.
At the height of their success, Peronist policies aiming to liber
ate the Argentine economy from foreign domination went a long way in undoing
the pattern that underlay economic life: the exchange of agro-pastoral
commodities for manufactured, non-durable consumer goods.

The traditional

predominantly two-way flow between Argentina and the United Kingdom was
increasingly replaced with the tripartite pattern the policies of the
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thirties had attempted to stem.

1

As noted above,

2

the corollary to the

type of import substituting industrialization carried out under Peronist
auspices was the need for the importation of capital goods.

Since the

United States was the primary source for capital goods, it became necess
ary for Argentina to realize a surplus from her agricultural exports to
Europe in order to cover the deficit in her trade with North Anerica.
This tripartite pattern functioned even at the crest of Peronism's
achievements, in 1947, when "The U.K. bought 30 percent and the U.S. took
10 percent of Argentina's exports for that year; and 45 percent and 8.4
percent, respectively, of her imports came from the United States and
Britain ."3

TABLE 27.— Argentine trade with the United States and Great Britain (aver
age for five year periods in millions of dollars at current prices)
Imports

Exports

Total

U.S.

G.B.

G.B.

U.S.

Total

1946-50

1,127.2

337.0

135.8

326.6

268.4

1,340.8

1951-5

1,121.2

188.6

75.6

180.8

163.2

987.6

1956-60

1,182.6

251.6

91.8

228.4

111.2

1,000.2

1961-5

1,214.6

309.8

98.2

177.0

101.2

1,289.6

SOURCE: Compiled from Diaz Alejandro, pp. 461, 465-6, 476- 483.
Peso/dollar conversions effected in accordance with exchange rates which
appear upon p. 485. Adapted from Lewis in Rock, p. 121.

Table 27 shows the tripartite pattern that defined Argentina's foreign

The tripartite permutations between Argentina, the United States,
and the United Kingdom during this period are extensively analyzed in the
following Ph.D., theses: Carlos Andres Escude, "The Argentine Eclipse: the
International Factor in Argentina's Post World War II Decline, Ph.D. disserta
tion, (Yale University, 1981) and D.B. Easum, "The British-Argentine-U.S.
Triangle," Ph.D. dissertation, (Princeton University, 1953).
^See p. 301.

3Blanksten, p. 243.
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trade during this period.

The figures show a consistently greater amount

of imports from the United States than exports to it and, conversely, a
larger amount of exports to Great Britain than imports from it.

It is

interesting to note that from 1945 to 1960 exports to England almost ex
actly balance the imports from North America.

The figures for the six

ties seem to indicate a shift in this pattern in that other markets dis
placed the importance of the United Kingdom for Argentine exports.

The

data in Table 27 also exhibit an overall tendency for imports from Great
Britain to decline, a departure from the traditional model of Argentina's
foreign trade.

The significance of the consistently diminishing value of

exports to the United States will become apparent further on.
The most interesting figures on Table 27 for the purposes of this
analysis of Peronism are those for the 1945-50 period.

The fact that

total exports were at their highest during those years shows that the tri
partite pattern was at its strongest.

The fact that imports from the

United States were at their highest in turn, shows that this was a key
point in the U.S. displacing Great Britain as Argentina's major trading
partner.

Recall also that 1945-50 was the period when Peronism achieved

its greatest successes.

Taken together, these facts support the view

taken in this analysis that the Peronist model, one of its key features
being the tripartite trade pattern, represents the pivotal stage in the
transitional process from externally oriented growth to dependent indus
trialization.

In continuation, I explore this central hypothesis in more

detail: we must look more closely inside the tripartite pattern for the
key elements in the transitional process toward dependent industrialization.
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The tripartite trade pattern grew out of the corollary to the
import substituting industrialization pursued by Peronism: the increased
need to import capital goods.

As we have seen, the substitution of local

production for the importation of manufactured consumer goods benefited
U.S.-based multinationals at the expense of British economic interests.
Thus the largest deficit in U.S.-Argentine trade for the period between
1946 and 1952 coincided

with the year in which the output of the indus

trial sector was the highest.

According to a government agency, Argentina’s

imports from the United States in 1948 amounted to 2,296 million pesos,
while her exports to the U.S. for that year reached 537 million pesos.
According to the same source, the importation of machinery and vehicles
constituted half of total imports for 1948.^
Table 29 shows how strong a by-product of Peronist industrializa
tion the importation of machinery and equipment from the United States
was.

It is interesting to note in these figures that increased importa-

taion of machinery and equipment was not confined to those for the indus
trial sector alone, but also extended to agriculture.

Table 28 shows

this concern with mechanizing agriculture through the importation of
equipment, the trend being especially pronounced for the period of
the SFYP.
TABLE 28.— Importation of tractors

Units
Imported

1920-3

1925-9

1,037

2,207

1930-4

446*

1935-9

2,035

1940-4

280*

1945-9

1950-4

3,360

6,339

SOURCE: Cafiero, p. 233
*These lows reflect the impact of crisis in the international sys
tem: the Great Depression in one case, and World War II in the other.

^E1 intercambio con los Estados Unidos (Buenos Aires, 1951) and
S:£ntesis estadistica mensual- de la Reptiblica Argentina (Buenos Aires,
July 1953), both published by the Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos.
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Contrary to conventional allegations that Peronism failed to pro
mote rural productivity, it appears that there was interest in the mech
anization of agriculture.

This would conflict with the simplistic inter

pretation that the regime’s major failure lay in its neglect of the
agrarian sector

and would be consistent with the argument that Peronism's

problems stemmed from a complex combination of international factors,
beyond its control, and its refusal to alter fundamental social relations
underlaying the productive process.

TABLE 29.— Importation of capital goods from the United States (thousands
of dollars)
1937

1939

1947

1948

4,946

3,234

35,668

32,048

Motors, Turbines and Accessories
Accessories

367

347

4,272

10,282

Machinery for Metallurgical
Industries

368

432

9,657

8,211

3,041

3,743

9,394

7,395

817

615

9.942

14,846

2,037

1,568

19,475

16,289

Machinery and Electrical
Apparatus

Machinery for Mining and
Petroleum
Textile Machiner
Miscellaneous Machinery
(refrigeration, compressors,
etc.)
Machinery and Agrigultural
Implements

11,053

6,498

20,616

14,152

SOURCE: "Recent Developments in the Foreign Trade of Argentina,"
United States Tariff Commission (Washington, D.C.: 1950). From Cafiero,
p.59.

313

Tripartite Trade Pattern as the Transitional Form:
Indirect to Direct Dependency, II
Above I examined the increased dependence on imported capital
goods as a corollary to the type of industrialization promoted by the
Peronist regime.

I began to show the relationship of this by-product

of Peronist industrialization to the process whereby the United States
displaced Great Britain as the predominant influence on and in the
Argentine economy.

I noted that Peronist economic policies were a case

of quantitative change leading to qualitative change so that what began
as promoting internally oriented growth to salvage the traditional
externally oriented growth model by modifying it, ended up by subordi
nating the foreign trade infrastructure to further internal growth.

I

pointed out how this internal orientation undid the foundations upon
which the British presence rested while not fundamentally harming
North American interests.

However, while the former tendency could be

readily observed, the latter was not quite so visible.
In this section I continue to analyze data that allow a more
detailed look inside the tripartite trade pattern with a particular view
to discerning the movement from indirect to direct dependency.

The trend

from indirect to direct dependency lies at the core of the transitional
process from externally oriented gorwth to dependent industrialization.
Table 30

shows this trend.

Though in U.S. dollars, the figures shown

in Table 31 establish the basic continuity of the trends displayed in
Table 30.

Hence, we may surmise that the relationship developing in the

Peronist years were not transitory and, indeed, solidified in the subse
quent period.

314
TABLE 30.— Value of merchandise imports in million paper pesos and the

Germany, Italy
and France

Total

U.S.

U.K.

1943

942

179

195

0

1944

1,007

172

80

0

1945

1,154

159

116

2

1946

2,332

665

308

89

1947

5,349

2,431

446

434

1948

6,190

2,287

775

692

1949

4,642

689

722

1,218

1950

4,481

787

569

1,147

1951

10,492

2,199

788

2,551

1952

8,361

1,537

509

1,487

1953

5,667

965

355

1,226

SOURCE: Annuario del comercio exterio, several issues.
Alejandro, Statistical Appendix.

From Diaz

Two trends stand out clearly in Tables 30 and 31 : 1) the displacement of Great.Britain by the United States as the major source of imports,
and 2) the apparent competition faced by the United States from three na
tions that were to become a part of the European.Economic community.

This

TABLE 31.— Value of imports in million current dollars, and main suppliers
Total

U.S.

U.K.

1955

1,173

154

76

204

1960

1,249

327

113

297

1965

1,198

273

73

236

Germany, Italy
and France

SOURCES: Comercio exterior and Boletin de estadistica, several issues.
From Diaz Alejandro, Statistical Appendix.
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second trend raises a complex topic since the national origins behind
the capital of many European multinationals is unclear.

How widespread

is the involvement of U.S. capital in particular European firms such as
Olivetti or that of General Motors in Opel, for example.

Nevertheless,

considering the Argentine case illustrative of trends in the dependent
industrial world, these data indicate that the subject of competition
between advanced capitalist nations deserves serious study in analyzing
the dynamics of dependency.
Tables 30 and 31 indicate the directions in which Argentina's
external economic relations developed; Tables 32 and 33 provide data on
the contents of those relationships.
Table 30 showed the largest increases in the total values of
annual imports to have taken place in 1945-46, 1946-47, and 1950-51;
in each case their value more than doubled that for the previous year.
In Table'32 the columns for "Durable Consumer Goods," "Fuels and Lubri
cants," "Metallic Intermediate Goods," and particularly those for "Indus
trial Machinery and Equipment" and "Transport and Communications Equip
ment" show dramatic rises for the years between 1947 and 1948.

These

systematic increases, making up the biggest value of imports in the
period which corresponds to the high point of Peronist industrialization,
bear out the hypothesis on the type of industrialization promoted by the
FFYP: dependence on the importation of capital goods.

In addition, com

paring the figures in these categories for 1945 through 1948 with data for
this time period on Table 30, bears out the hypothesis on the differing
contents of British and North American trade, the latter centering on cap
ital goods.

It will be noted that the highest annual increases in the

total value of imports corresponds with the highest annual increases of

TABLE 32.— Value of merchandise imports in paper pesos at 1950 prices, by major categories (million pesos)
Industrial
Metallic
Machinery
Intermediate
Goods
and Equipment

Transport and
Communications
Equipment

Durable
Consumer
Goods

Fuels and
Lubricants

596

48

82

108

75

20

2,008

636

49

78

113

55

7

1945

2,205

513

190

99

171

76

17

1946

4,307

548

772

330

453

309

266

1947

7,901

1,357

735

403

809

925

1,245

1948

8,147

983

722

586

818

1,394

852

1949

5,468

584

290

475

641

865

258

1950

4,821

434

202

593

656

652

168

1951

6,123

435

608

661

925

625

233

1952

4,106

253

221

680

500

480

319

1953

3,590

266

109

654

301

403

421

Year

All Merchandise
Imports

1943

2,034

1944

Non-Durable
Consumer
Goods

SOURCE: United Nations, E.C.L.A., E.CN. 12/429/Add. 4, Mimeographed Statistical Appendix
to El desarollo economico de Argentina, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1954), p. 109. From Diaz Alejandro, Statistical
Appendix.
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imports from the United States.

This relationship is congruent with

the hypothesis that the Peronist model of internally oriented growth
depended indirectly on U.S. based economic interests.
The consistent decreases in the annual values of imported non
durable consumer goods, except for the sharp rise in 1947-48, indicates
the success of the Peronist policies promoting import substituting indus
trialization in this area.

Bearing in mind that the rise in real wages

from 1947 to 1948 was the highest for the entire Peronist period, the
increased value of imported non-durable consumer goods for those years
provides evidence for an important aspect of this analysis of Peronism
as a transition towards dependent industrialization: the expansion of
the domestic market outdistanced that of local production, creating a
vacuum that could be filled either by the further development of pro
ductive forces under local control, implying a change in the prevalent
social relations, or by increasing dependency on external forces.
More directly germane to this interpretation of Peronism are the
figures for the durable consumer goods category.

The sharp increases in

the annual values of imported durable consumer goods for 1946, 1947, and
1948, in the context of the general decline in the annual values of im
ported non-durable goods, corroborate the argument presented here.

What

was said in connection with the increased importation of non-durable goods
from 1947 to 1948 applies all the more to durable consumer goods.

Although

strides were being made in the heavy industrial area during those years,
this sector was relatively undeveloped compared to the light industrial
sector producing non-durable goods.

Therefore, dramatic increases in the

purchasing power of the economically active population produced an in
creased demand for durable consumer goods that national production was
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Incapable of filling; hence the increases in the values for those types
of goods in the years when real wages made their largest gains.
inability of the heavier industrial sector 'to

meet

The

the need of

local industry can be seen from the fact that while the annual value of
of imported non-durable consumer goods declined by almost one-half from
1943 to 1953, that for metallic intermediate goods almost tripled in
the same period; this in spite of advances made in the area of steel pro
duction and processing.

The annual values of imported machinery and in

dustrial equipment provides the most dramatic indicator for the dependence
on foreign sources for capital goods that underlay the Peronist formulas.
Note the sharp contrast with 1943 when the value of imported non-durable
consumer goods surpassed that for metallic intermediate goods and that
for the imports of industrial machinery and equipment.
Table 33 again shows the basic continuity of these trends with
the results of post-Peronist policies.

The thrust of the data accord

with the hypothesis that the major trend after 1950 was toward the direct
form of dependency characterized by economic control exercised by mono
polistic multinationals producing locally.

Indicative of this movement

is the fact that the highest annual values of imports for almost all
categories occur in 1948, and all of them, save one, had higher values
of imports for 1948 than they had for 1964.

When compared to the figures

in Table 32, the annual values shown above reveal an important shift in
the nature of imports.

The decline in the values of imported durable

consumer goods is more substantial than that for non-durable consumer
goods.

In general, while the annual values of imports for the two cate

gories tended to approximate each other in the previous period, in the
latter period a gap emerged between them, with durable goods generally

TABLE 33.— Merchandise imports, in dollars at 1955 prices, by main categories
Year

All Merchandise
Imports

1948

1,906

144

144

1950

1,203

69

1955

1,173

1960
1964

Metallic
Intermediate
Products

Industrial
Machinery
and
Equipment

Machinery and
Equipment for
Transport and
Communications

199

177

333

217

47

176

157

177

58

73

34

207

209

111

66

1,392

79

92

189

190

241

115

1,274

80

49

109

149

157

149

Non-Durable
Consumer
Goods

Durable
Consumer
Goods

Fuels and
Lubricants

SOURCES: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Statistical Bulletin for
Latin America, vol 3, no. 1, pp. 110-8; and unpublished E.C.L.A. worksheets for 1948-54. From Diaz Alejandro,
Statistical Appendix.
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having a lower importation value.

This is congruent with the hypothesis

that the multinational corporate presence begins in the area of capital
goods and durable consumer goods.

Their increased role within the Argen

tine economy would enable them to provide for a greater part of national
demand through local production, thus reducing importation of these types
of goods.

The even sharper downward trend in the annual values of imported

industrial machinery and equipment provides additional indirect evidenct
for this point, especially given the fact that machinery and equipment
for modern communications and transportation is highly sophisticated and
produced for the most part by a few multinational giants.
Conclusions
We have seen that the corollary to Peronism1s intensified indus
trialization was the increased need for imported machinery and parts.

In

its foreign trade aspect the new model represented no more than a modifi
cation of the traditional one in that, even though the predominantly twoway flow had been decisively replaced by the tripartite pattern, it still
depended on the export of rural commodities.

However, the new model

departed fundamentally from the traditional one in that the benefits
derived from Argentina's external links were used to promote the interests
of groups whose economic activity was essentially contradictory to exter
nally oriented growth.

That is why I have chosed to conceptualize the

form taken at this pivotal stage in the transitional process as indirect
dependency.

The interests promoted by the state, although dependent on

the surplus derived from economic activity oriented to external markets,
were nonetheless tied to productive activity oriented to the internal
market.
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The favorable external circumstances prevailing up until 1950
allowed Peronism both to stimulate production within capitalist relations
and also develop the internal market through a redistribution of wealth
benefiting labor.

The populist-nationalist coalition Peronist policies

sought to cement

happened to be congruent with the positive conjuncture

prevailing in the immediate postwar period.

This favorable situation

therefore, obscured the contradictions within Peronism1s developmental
pattern (internally oriented growth dependent on exports) and it enabled
the regime to contain the contradictory interests (capital and labor) in
the class alliance it was seeking to promote.

Hence, when that situation

deteriorated after 1950, Peronism had failed to move in the one area it
had some measure of control over— altering the social relations of produc
tion— at a time when conditions were the most advantageous for such poli
cies, which even then would have been rough going indeed.
Essentially, Peronism's problems flowed from the concern in its
populist-nationalist doctrine not to directly attack the fundamental
social relations of capitalist production.

Thus, in the agrarian sector,

while it exerted indirect pressure on the oligarchy by monopolizing trade
structures, the regime left the material base' of its avowed enemies intact.
To be sure, nationalizing large landed property would have created tremen
dous, perhaps even insurmountable, difficulties for the regime; but in the
end they might have proved less costly than the inaction which was one
of the chief reasons for Peron's overthrow.
This chapter analyzed the regime's programmatic response to the cri
sis of the fifties.

The policies expressed in the Second Five Year Plan

indicated that the regime had opted for the capitalistic rather than the
socialistic side of the relations implicit in the policies of the 1943-50
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period.

In comparing the Second with the First Five Year Plan, four

shifts were found which promoted relationships among groups whose interests
determined the post Peronist developmental pattern.

Shifting the cost

of

development onto urban labor, giving priority to heavy and capital
goods industry, aiding rural production under oligarchic ownership, and
increasing foreign capital's role in Argentine development— all proved
key in orienting the outcome of the transitional process towards a de
pendent industrial economy.

Since 1950 particularly, and increasingly

since then, Argentine industry has become technologically dependent on
U.S. corporations.

It was through this more modern industrial sector that

U.S. based multinational interests began their extensive penetration of
the Argentine economy.

It was also the bourgeoisie in this sector which

became the backbone of the "internationalized national bourgeoisie."

This

barrier of technological inadequacy has been one of the most formidable
problems confronted by less developed nations which have sought to
break out of dependent relationships.

As in the Argentine case, it has

led to a restructuring of dependency rather than a radical change toward
a developmental pattern guided by the interests of the poorest sectors of
the population.
Related to the technological factor was the fact that developing
and operating the sector producing means of production requires an exten
sive accumulation of capital.

Massive and rapid accumulation of capital

meant eroding the foundation of the alliance Peronism was seeking to pro
mote; it contradicted the commitment to provide higher profits for indus
trialists and also a higher standard of living for the workers.

The

social relations promoted by Peronist policies were a fundamental component
of its doctrine.

Thus it was that though populist-nationalism had aided
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Peronism in its ascendancy, corresponding with the favorable conjuncture,
it now proved to be a definite inhibiting factor preventing the regime
from moving forcibly and consistently in one direction or the other.
The Peronist government enacted policies designed to strengthen
the bargaining position of national groups in the process of economic
development; it did not aim to alter the social relations of capitalist
production.

It thus neglected the internal foundations that were to re

verse the trend toward economic independence and autonomous growth.

The

cases of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and others have shown the tre
mendous difficulties of promoting a progressive growth model from an un
developed or underdeveloped technological base.

In this effort, in order

to achieve control over the processes of the accumulation of capital and
gain the maximum degree of maneuverability and the greatest possible resis
tance to external influences, it was necessary to radically alter the
social relations in the process of production.

By stressing the cooperation

of social sectors with diverging interests in the distribution of surplus
value, Peronism facilitated

the development of a dependent industrial

economy.
Economic development was to be pursued within the framework of the
private ownership of the means of production.

The state reserved the right

to interfere in those properties that "served a social function," but this
potentially far-reaching formula was never applied systematically, serving
more as an admonition to political enemies than anything else.

Capital was

supposed to "humanize itself," to see its own self-interest, with some
prodding from a popular government; but only Evita seemed determined to
force it in that direction.

Economic privileges were decried rhetorically,

but the class struggle was not advocated as a means to rectify injustices.

'!
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It was here that Peronism drew its clearest line of demarcation from
Marxism: it advocated "social justice," not class struggle.

The mobiliza

tion of labor as a pressure group was actively pursued, but
leadership of the developmental process by the working class was out of
the question.
Attempting a program of economic recovery within the framework
of capitalist social relations pushed the contradictions within indirect
dependency to the direct form of dependent industrialization.

The conse

quences of depending on imported capital goods and technology intensified
between 1950 and 1955.

The pressures from the advanced capitalist suppliers,

though still indirect, mounted.

The reigme's intention to surmount economic

difficulties at labor's expense set the conditions which led in the decade
after Peron's overthrow to an industrial periphery economy based on the
domination of local production by monopolistic multinational corporations.

Peron's Overthrow
The coup of 1955 should be understood in the context of the
policy shifts encompassed in the SFYP.

It will be recalled that the latter

was an attempt to resolve the contradictions in the alliance promoted by
the FFYP between the industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie at the expense
of the agro-exporting sector.

The SFYP addressed those contradictions by

promoting a new relationship revolving around the landowning oligarchy and
the bourgeois sectors involved in the production of durable and capital
goods, at the expense of the workers.

The SFYP thus reinforced a set of

social relations underlying a developmental pattern that was not fully
implemented until the state was rid of the last remnants of its working
class orientation.
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Though promoting the oligarchy's interests, the regime's policies
failed to elicit oligarchic support beyond the rhetorical level.

Indeed,

not only did the large landowners retain their enmity toward Peronism,
/

they were also a key force in Peron's overthrow.

Meanwhile, the Peronist

government distanced itself from the social base that had constituted its
most solid foundation.

In retrospect, one can easily observe the intimate

correspondence between the rise and ebb of Peronism's political fortunes,
and the degree and intensity of the support it enjoyed from its proletarian
wing.
In his analysis of the social forces involved, Arthur P. Whitaker
provides the best account of the events leading up to the coup that over
threw Peron.

The surface issue involved Peronism's growing hostility

toward the Catholic Church.

In fact, all concerned understood the Church

to symbolize the traditional ruling groups in general and the oligarchy
in particular.

By 1955 the oppositon to Peron's government found its

most visible expression in a few of the more outspoken conservative Catho
lic clergy. Their immediate resentment stemmed from the legalization of
divorce and prostitution and the resecularization of education; but they
quickly served as a rallying focus for all of Peronism's opponents.

The

response by some of the Peronist rank and file in vandalizing and commiting
arson on the churches of well-known oppositional clerics added fuel to the
fire.

As Whitaker points out, these forays were perceived by the oligarchy

as an indirect attack and caused it to fear that a real assault might be
in the making, thus precipitating its role in the coup.*

*Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentine Upheaval: Peron's Fall and the New
Regime (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 75. This section follows his chronology
and interpretation of the events leading up to the September 1955 coup. How
ever, the analysis of the reasons why the coup succeeded is not from Whitaker.
It derives from the understanding of Peronism as an example of populistnationalism.
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Very key to the success of the coup against Peron were his prior
actions which discouraged active support from the movement's working class
base.

In this regard the events around the abortive coup of June 1955

(just three months prior to the final coup), which was timed by the naval
air force and a few armed civilian bands to commence a few hours after
the announcement of Peron's excommunication for expelling two prelates
from Argentina, proved to be critical.

When word got out that navy

planes had attacked Casa Rosada and other government buildings as well as
the headquarters of the CGT, workers swarmed into the Plaza de Mayo and
stormed the headquarters of the rebellion in the Navy Ministry where they
were repulsed by machine guns.

The army remained loyal to the regime;

the opposition forces were isolated in the air and forced to land in Uru
guay when their fuel ran out.
Church after the revolt.

Significantly, Peron sought peace with the

He forced the two men in his inner circle who

were most closely identified with, the anti-clerical campaign— Angel Borlenghi, Minister of Interior and Justice, reportedly the number two man
in the regime at the time, and Eduardo Vuletich who was the SecretaryGeneral of the CGT— to resign.

Since these men also represented the

descamisado wing of the movement, their resignation meant a shift toward
the army as the regime's support base.

"This view gained support from

Peron's speeches in the week following the revolt, in which, while praising
the descamisados for their loyalty, he gave the Army virtually all the
credit for smashing the revolt."^

In the three month interval between

this abortive coup and the overthrow, the army took advantage of the situa
tion and seized the remaining small arsenal of some five thousand rifles
1
Whitaker,

pp. 10-1.
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and revolvers the CGT had in its possession and rejected the CGT's offer
to turn its six million members into a civilian militia.
When the final coup came, the army did not prove to be a reliable
base of support.

The opposition forces had spread from the navy to army

units stationed in Cordoba and the army command did not decisively move
to crush this revolt.

In retrospect, what was perhaps the most important

factor in the success of this coup, was the fact that the workers were
not mobilized.

The revolt had been the work of only a part of the armed

forces with practically no civilian support outside of Cordoba.

At the

point of Peron's resignation,forces loyal to him still controlled Rosario,
the second largest city, most of the provinces, and metropolitan Buenos
Aires which contained a quarter of the nation’s 19 million inhabitants.*
At this critical juncture, a mass mobilization undertaken by the CGT would,
in all likelihood, have ensured Peron's stay in power.
Several factors combined to prevent the Peronist regime from
calling for a mobilization of workers, a step which would have moved it
closer to being organically bound to its proletarian base.

There was the

incipient disillusionment of the working class militants, not only on
account of the recent events surrounding the abortive coup and the Standard
Oil contract, but also going back to the shifts of the fifties that led to
the feeling that Peron's identification with their cause in his speeches
was a poor substitute for the active protection of their interests they had
enjoyed in the forties.

There was also Peron's abhorrence of civil war

which was both a result of his background as a professional soldier and,
more importantly, Peronism's populist-nationalist doctrine with its emphasis
1
Whitaker, pp. 29-30.
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on class conciliation and harmony.
Marxism.

Peron identified class struggle with

His refusal to arm workers was quite consistent with his fear of

the worker’s susceptibility to the influence of Marxist ideas.
When the final revolt was not crushed after four days of fighting
and it became apparent that only a class showdown would save Peron, he
resigned pith an open letter to the army and the people saying he wished
to spare the nation a civil war and Buenos Aires a naval bombardment.
This rationale expressed in Peron's resignation represented his sincerely
felt convictions and not, as has often been alleged, Peron s cowardice.
In an interview with Felix Luna almost fifteen years later, Peron made
some interesting observations on those critical days.
I could have taken repressive measures and crushed that distur
bance: it would have been sufficient to have declared a state of
siege and put the workers into the barracks. ... But what would
have happened if we had taken those measures? Those things never
end the way they start. That would have cost the country a million
dead, like in Spain. And I was not prepared to have that happen
to Argentina, simply on account of my presence or absence in the
government. I thought the process would continue more or less
unchanged, with some modifications, even without my being in
power. Now, if I had known then what I know now, I certainly would
have fought even though that decision cost a million dead like in
Spain!^
It is worth noting that these declarations were made at a point when
Peron was assuming his militant posture, being out of power and in exile
while the movement was militantly laying the groundwork for his return to
power.

X

^

M

Felix Luna, El 45: cronica de un ano decisivo (Buenos Aires: Jorge
Alvarez Editor, 1969), pp. 59-60.

CHAPTER VI
/

THE DEPENDENT INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY AND PERON'S RETURN TO POWER
Introduction
The developmental pattern characterized as dependent industriali
zation can be defined by its two essential features: 1) manufacturing con
stitutes the predominant form of economic activity, and 2 ) the industrial
sector gravitates around the presence of monopolistic multinational firms.
The firms which become the major influence in economic life share these
distinguishing characteristics: they are large enterprises with vast
financial resources, utilize modern technology, are administered by bureau
cracies responsible to a central office located overseas, and are in a
position, either on their own or in conjunction with similar firms, to
control the market for the goods they produce.
A dependent industrial economy requires the existence of several
conditions, the most important of which are:
1.

The centrality of the industrial sector in the economy

2.

The consolidation of a viable domestic or overseas market

3.

Development within the framework of the private ownership of the means
of production and the social relations underlying it (there must also
be a significant state sector, but it remains subordinated to the
requirements of the private sector)

4.

The general prevalence of industrial peace and a certain degree of
political stability

Prior chapters noted how the configuration of internal-external circum-
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stances aided Peronist policies from 1943 to 1955 in achieving these
results.
Peronist policies of the 1943-55 period promoted the interests
of the classes whose alliance the regime sought to forge.

The material

basis for satisfying those interests depended internally on being able
to expand and supply the domestic market which, in turn, was related to
the disruption of foreign sources of supply as a result of the World War
and its aftermath.

In analyzing the 1943-50 period I showed that the

Peronist regime pushed import substituting industrialization within a
capitalist framework based on an expanding domestic market to its limits.
In the analysis of the 1950-5 period we saw that when the favorable con
juncture deteriorated, the contradiction posed for a capitalist model of
accumulation by a distributionist developmental strategy could no longer
be contained .*1 I argued that one direction for attempting to resolve this
contradiction was taking shape during the 1950-5 period.

Accumulation at

the expense of the working class was carried out on the policy level through
redistribution benefiting large landowners and the bourgeoisie associated
with large-scale industry, and, in the sphere of production, through the

^Here I follow Monica Peralta Ramo's analysis in "The Economy: Lib
eration or Dependency?," Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974): 85.
She sums up her argument noting that
the strategy necessary to extend the limits of capitalist accumu
lation enters into open conflict with the distributionist strategy
(the politics of full employment and redistribution of incomes)
that characterized the Peronist period covering 1946-55. That is
to say, the need to increase the organic composition of capital
under conditions of technological dependency leads to an orientation
of the productive process, of the labor market, that is the anti
thesis of a policy aimed at a conciliation between the immediate
interests of capital and labor.
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more intensive exploitation that results from a higher. organic
composition of capital and its accompanying capital intensive methods.
This chapter concerns the consolidation of this process in the decade and
a half after Peronism’s removal from power and examines some of its conse
quences .
In following pages I show that the process associated with a higher
organic composition of capital— greater concentration and centralization
of capital— did indeed take place in the period after Peron's overthrow.
This process can also be termed "the denationalization of the industrial
economy" since foreign capital extensively penetrated those branches with
the highest organic composition, which are also the most dynamic sectors in
terms of productivity increases.

As Laura Randall points out in her study,

"foreign firms increased their participation in the 100 largest manufactur
ing firms from 14 percent in 1957 to 50 percent in 1966;" and, she adds
significantly, "these were the most rapidly growing sectors of industry."^
However, due to political contradictions resulting from aspects of the
Peronist heritage, this sector was not nearly dynamic enough for a suffi
ciently healthy performance during the ascending phase of the boom-bust
cycle of capitalist growth.
Much of the tragedy of the Argentine crisis can be traced back to
the fact that Argentines have endured the costs of capitalist development
with few of its benefits.

Both the national bourgeoisie and the working

class paid a heavy price in the consolidation of the pattern of dependent

^Randall, p. 236.
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industrialization.^

On the one hand, the branches with the lowest organic

composition of capital, the small to medium-sized firms constituting the
backbone of nationally-owned industries
bankruptcies and long-term stagnation.

suffered an increasing rate of
On the other hand, the capital

intensive methods of the multinational sector meant a worsening in the
unemployment/underemployment problem, an intensification of the exploita
tion of workers within the productive process, and a general deteriora
tion in the proportion of income allocated to the poorer sectors of the
population.

Adding to the deterioration in the position of national

entrepreneurs producing non-durable wage goods and of working class con
sumers

is the fact that the multinational sector produces the types of

commodities that depend on the upper income market and thus require a
greater concentration at the higher income levels.
In this analysis of the 1955-73 period I focus on the economic and
political contradictions which ultimately led to Peron's return to power.
Due to the strength and resilience of the Peronist mystique, the economic
project based on the interests of the multinational sector and its local
allies
between.

proceeded with stops and starts as well as minor setbacks in
A series of civilian and military regimes succeeded each other

as they failed to come to grips with Peronism's remnants.

The brief period

which saw the clearest expression of foreign monopoly capital's project in

✓
the industrial sector did not take place until a de.cade after Peron's

^This statement holds at the level of classes. In other words,
individuals may not have been affected so adversely. This is especially
true for those members of the national bourgeoisie who were integrated
into the orbit of foreign capital. In many cases their individual positions
improved considerably.
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overthrow with the 1966 coup that brought General Ongania's government
into being.

However, while this project, the Krieger Vasena Plan— named

after the Minister of Economics under whom it was formulated— began by
stripping away the encrustations grafted onto its predecessors' policies
by past contradictions, it actually succeeded in aggravating these contra
dictions further.

The Ongania regime's capacity to dismantle

the populist

nationalist pattern in the economic sphere was far superior to its ability
to achieve a new form of social integration under the aegis of the multi
national firms' interests.

In the end, Peron was brought back to resolve

the intensifying crisis.
A key theme the analysis seeks to establish is that, below the
surface of ups and downs in the hegemonic economic project and the ongoing
political turmoil, the pattern of dependent industrialization continued
to be consolidated.

This understanding is brought to bear in the final

part of the chapter in order to explain why Peron's populist-nationalist
formula, only slightly modified from its expression in the forties, was
bound to fail in the changed conditions

of the seventies.

In the first

Peronist period, the principal cleavage

had been that between the populist

state and the landed oligarchy as a result of Peronism's determined efforts
to appropriate the surplus produced in the sector controlled by the oli
garchy.

In the post-Peronist period, the main contradiction was that be

tween the mostly foreign monopoly capital and the popular classes affected
by its expansion.

*Juan E. Corradi develops this thesis in "Argentina* Dependency
and Political Crisis," Monthly Review 25 (Dec. 1973): 28-42.
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Denationalization 'of the Industrial Economy
Chapter 5 argued that the direction in which the contradictions
within Peronist development were being resolved, particularly in the latter
half of the 1945-55 decade, proved determinative in setting the subsequent
developmental pattern.

In other words, the relationships among and be

tween national and foreign groups underlying the predominant trends of
the post Peron era were already taking shape in the Peronist policies of
the fifties.

For example, analysis of the SFYP showed that the regime’s

attempt to resolve contradictions in its earlier developmental program
in the direction of the heavier and capital goods sector had an adverse
impact on the small to medium sector constituting the backbone of the
national industrial bourgeoisie.

Here we shall see that this trend became

much more pronounced in the years after 1955.
A key hypothesis examined in the previous analysis of the move
ment from indirect to direct dependence'*' was that United States based
interests were gaining a greater foothold within the manufacturing sector
during the first Peron period.

Because of the paucity of data on the

subject, the analysis had to rely largely on inferential evidence for this
hypothesis.

Other analysts who take the position that U.S. influence became

stronger during the populist-nationalist decade of 1945-55 such as Juan
Carlos Esteban and Luis Sommi, present more direct but also more contro
versial evidence.

The veracity of their findings is open to question on

the grounds of their leftist orientation.

Hence, though inferential, the

analysis in Chapter 5 served an important purpose in confirming their basic
conclusion.

By contrast with the earlier period, the data on the U.S. pre-

*See above on pp. 302-20.
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sence within the Argentine economy in the 1955-65 decade is more readily
available and it will therefore be unnecessary to make logical extrapo
lations .
There is no doubt that U.S. interests became the major investors

✓
in the Argentine economy in the decade after Peron's overthrow.

For exam

ple, according to one survey conducted in 1966 by the Oficina de Estudios
para la Colaboracion Economica Internacional, an organization funded by
Fiat Concord, the United States led with 55 percent of all new foreign
investments between 1958 and 1963.

European countries combined had 39

percent of this total, while other countries individually had less than one
percent.*
The increased foreign, investments from the late fifties through
the mid-sixties consolidated the external presence within manufacturing
and led to the increasing dependence of industrial production on facilities
owned or controlled by these foreign interests.
translates into control of the market.

Control of production

The virtual take-over of the domes

tic market proceeded with amazing rapidity.

According to one analyst,

already in 1960 "five U.S. companies accounted for 18.8 percent of Argen
tine corporate sales in foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco; 13 U.S. companies
accounted for 15.5 percent of sales in chemical products; eight U.S. companies
accounted for 22 percent of sales in vehicles and machinery and seven U.S.

^"Cited by Guillermo Martorell, las inversiones extranjeras en la
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1969), p. 107. On page 290
above, I cited similar figures from Felix Herrero. It is worth noting once
more that this type of data probably errs on the conservative side since
what are recorded as European investments may actually be those of North
American firms with European offices or European firms with substantial
participation of U.S. capital. David Rock in his article on "The Survival
of Peronism" in the book he edited, cites other sources that put the per
centage of foreign investments coining from the United States at around 70
percent of the total (p. 198).
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companies accounted for 19.2 percent of sales in electrical equipment."'*'
Given that the electrical equipment producing branch had shown one of the
highest growth rates during the Peronist period,

this latter percentage

assumes added significance as an indication of the extent of the denation
alization of the industrial sector.

The rapid take-over of the domestic

market by the monopolistic multinational corporations thus signified the
end of the Peronist project of promoting the interests of national
capitalists through their ability to supply the demands of the local mar
ket.

Table 34 which rank orders total sales grouped into entities by

adding together those of the same national origin of the majority of
capital held in the firm, provides an even stronger indication of the
success of foreign companies in capturing the domestic market.
The fact that the annual sales of U.S. based multinationals far
exceeded those of their Argentine counterparts in the private sector, shows
how far they had gone in cornering the domestic market.

Moreover, if we

contrast these figures for 1967 with those presented above on percentages
of corporate sales controlled by U.S. firms in particular branches of pro-

2
duction in 1960,

while they do not tap the same information and are not

strictly comparable, we may nevertheless infer that U.S. companies were
rapidly gaining increasingly larger shares of the Argentine market in the
sixties.
Table 34 also underlines the considerable strength of European based
multinationals in the Argentina of the sixties.

In spite of the qualifica

tion that the North American presence is to be found behind much of the

^Victor Testa, "Significacion de capital internacional en la
industria argentina: el capital norteamericano" in Fichas 1 (July 1964); 61.
^Ibid.
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capital designated as European, it would be a mistake to underestimate the
latter's influence on Argentine development.

Nor should the importance of

the competition between Western European and U.S. based corporations be
underestimated. For

example, according to Juan Corradi, Italian capital

played a key part in aiding an enterprise belonging to Jose^Gelbard,
Peron's Economic Minister, in its fight -against Kaiser Aluminum.

TABLE 34.— Relative control of national and foreign groups of the market
for industrial commodities in 1967
National Origins of Majority Stock
Held in Firms
Argentine State

. Combined Total Annual Sales

Exceeding 396 Billion Pesos

U.S. corporations

"

260

"

"

Private Argentine firms

"

186

"

"

"

344

"

"

European companies

SOURCE: Special report by Julian Delgado in Primera plana
(Buenos Aires) 6 , No. 6 . From Martorell, pp. 122-3.

In competing with North American interests, European capital has shown
more flexibility and a greater disposition to enter into joint ventures
with state and private firms, as well as a greater tolerance for political
reforms.

"These observations should not be construed, however, to imply

that European monopoly capital offers an alternative developmental model
or necessarily better terms of dependency for Argentina."

Nevertheless,

as Corradi goes on to note, this inter-capitalist rivalry is vital to
understanding and "assessing the real meaning of Peron's 'anti-imperialism'
£Ln his second regime^ which has amounted to no more than a mild defiance
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of American corporations, and a preference for European monopolies."^
Table 34 also shows how important a part the state sector played.
The figures are however, somewhat misleading since a good portion of the
annual intake was in the area of public services and some of them, the
railroads for example, were run on a considerable deficit.
strength of the state's presence cannot be denied.

Even so, the

The Argentine case

thus tends to confirm those who argue that a strong interventionist role
on the state's part becomes a necessity in a situation of dependency.

The

weakness or non-existence of a national bourgeoisie makes it imperative for
the state to assume many of the functions traditionally associated with
the bourgeoisie in developing and consolidating the industrial sector.
Moreover, the political sphere becomes of strategic importance in ensuring
policies sympathetic to the interests of non-national groups within the
economy.

We saw that the Peronist state functioned in part as a surrogate

.for a weak national bourgeoisie.

It was because of its ambiguity and con

tradictory performance in this regard that it was overthrown.

Peronism

had to be overthrown because its populist-nationalist side had begun to
impede the hegemony of external interests in the national economy.

In

the period after Peron's overthrow, the consistent theme echoed by those
who occupied important economic policy-making posts, whether under civilian
or military auspices, was that economic well-being required not only for
eign investments but also giving foreign capital free reign within the
economy.
The figures in Table 35 show how far manufacturing had been de
nationalized within the decade and a half after Peron's overthrow.

They

J. E. Corradi, "Argentina and Peronism: Fragments of the Puzzle"
in Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974): 12.
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also show the considerable strength of the state sector in the economy.
Table 35 summarizes the conclusions drawn by the staff of the North Ameri
can Congress on Latin America from a survey which ranked the top 120 com
panies producing in Argentina by the volume of their sales for 1971.

TABLE 35.— Nationality and sales of top 120 corporations producing in
Argentina in 1971
Nationality

Number

Percentage of
Total Sales

Percentage of '
of Private

Foreign

66

48.5

67.0

United States

31

21.5

29.7

European

19

15.1

20.9

Other

16

11.9

16.4

Argentine

54

51.5

33.0

State

10

27.8

Mixed

2

1.0

1.4

Bunge y Born

5

3.3

4.6

Dependent Co.

13

7.8

11.0

National Co.

24

11.6

16.0

120

100.0

100.0

Total

—

SOURCE: Mercado 4, No. 157 (Buenos Aires, 1972). Adapted from
N.A.C.L.A., Latin America and Empire Report 7 (Sept. 1973): 9.

Table 35 reflects one of the key components of the process leading to a
dependent industrial economy: the concentration of industrial production
into a diminishing number of corporate giants.

The combined sales of these

top 120 companies for 1971 amounted to 22 percent of the Argentine Gross
Domestic Product and was 2.4 times greater than the government's entire
budget for that year.
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According to the results of the survey shown on Table 35 , 66
of the top 120 corporations were owned or controlled by foreign groups and
together they generated 67 percent of the sales of privately owned firms
in the survey.
groups.

Moreover, 31 of these companies were dominated by U.S.

Of the 54 corporations in which Argentines held majority equity,

10 were state owned or managed and 2 were mixed private-state operations.
In addition, 5 of the privately owned Argentine firms formed a part of
the complex controlled by the Bunge y Born holding company.

Although

formally a national corporation, it is part of a much wider network closely
integrated to U.S. and European capital.

Another factor diminishing the

national character of the Argentine owned private sector arises from those
enterprises, 13 in the above survey, which are closely linked to foreign
interests through patent rights and licensing agreements, joint research
ventures, international public or private financing, and/or foreign
minority equity participation.

Indeed, the process of denationalization

in this period involved the increasing subordination of the small to
medium size plants to the foreign monopoly sector.

This took place not

only through the payment of hefty royalties for patent rights by the
"national'' firms, but also through technological dependence in general.
Oftentimes, they became directly tied to the multinationals in the produc
tive process itself by virtue of being transformed into suppliers of parts
or components.
The small to medium size national sector did not fare well as
manufacturing came to be increasingly centered on the activities of the
monopolistic multinationals.

The period when foreign capital was making

its largest gains in industry was also the time when the bankruptcy rate
of small firms rose dramatically.

"Commercial and private failures, which
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numbered 800 in 1960, rose to 1300 in 1961, 1800 in 1962 and to over
2500 in 1963."*

The close correspondence between increased foreign

investments and rising bankruptcies lends credence to the assertion that
these failures represent the reverse side of the process of denationaliza
tion.
Table 36 shows the extent to which multinational companies
monopolized production.

2

TABLE 36.— Foreign control of branches of production in 1972
Number of Foreign
Firms

Branch

Percent of
Production

5

100

16

48

Cosmetics and Toiletries

5

44

Paints

4

70

Automobiles

8

97

Engines

2

60

Non-Ferrous Metals

2

85

Compressed Gases

2

60

Cigarettes

5

100

Fertilizers

1

100

Tires

3

83

Petrochemical
Pharmaceutical

SOURCE: Consejo tecnologico del Movimiento Nacional Peronista,
"Bases para un programs peronista de gobierno," Economia (Buenos Aires)
5 (Mav 1973): 14. From N.A.C.L.A., Latin American and Empire Report 7
(Sept. 1973): 6 .

*Eshag and Thorp, p. 33.
Plate (Buenos Aires) for 1963.

Their source is The Review of the River

2
This subject has been treated at various points above.
example, pp. 335-6 and 339-40.

See for
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The figures in Table 36 can be questioned because of their Peronist source.
The general point can, however, be substantiated with other data that show
how closely linked the increasing concentration of capital and the ever
tighter foreign control of manufacturing was.

For example, citing a

variety of sources,* David Rock notes that in 1948 one half of all produc
tion in the manufacturing sector was controlled by .83 percent of the
total number of firms.

By 1964 that figure had dropped to .69 percent and

of that fraction 41 percent came from firms where foreign capital had
a majority holding.

2

Similarly, Guillermo Martorell points out that of

the 100 companies with the highest value in their sales for 1956, 75 of
them were Argentine owned.

Ten years later that figure was down to 50 and

by 1970, only 39 of these companies were Argentine.

At the end of 1967,

at a time, as will be seen, when the most clearly pro-multinational indus
trializing project was carried out, only 20 of the 50 largest companies in
3
Argentina were owned domestically, and of these five were state operated.

Denationalization and Its Social Impact
The Peronist vote was decisive in getting Arturo Frondizi elected
to the presidency in 1958.

To gain this support, Frondizi had pledged

that the social and economic gains achieved in the Peron period would not
be sacrificed.

^lauricio T. Arcangelo and H. Carlos Quaglio, "El imperialismo:
el caso argentino, " Los libros 26 (May 1972): 10-4; Pedro Skupch, "Concen
tration industrial en la Argentina," Desarrollo economico, 11 (Apr.-June 1971)
3-15; Julian Delgado, "Industria: el desafio a la Argentina," Primera plana,
Sept.3, 1968.
^Rock, p. 198.
3
Martorell, p. 128. His source is the special report published by
Julian Delgado in Primera plana (Buenos Aires) 6 (Sept. 3, 1968): 71-5.
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Frondizi’s real aim, enunciated in the doctrine of Integralism,
was another class' alliance where the urban working class and unions
would be drawn into supporting the capitalist-developmentalist
orientation of Frondizi*s party, the Union Civica Radical Intransigente (U.C.R.I.).
To cement this relationship in the second half of 1958 Frondizi
increased monetary wages by 60%, an amount significantly above
the rate of increase in the retail price index. But this gesture
was immediately undermined by the problems directly emerging from
economic stagnation and the economic cycle. In the absence of signi
ficant growth an inflationary spiral developed. It was accompanied
by a major deficit in the balance of payments. Frondizi's develop
ment objectives, and his pressing need for external financial assis
tance to alleviate the crisis, proved more powerful commitments than
the political calculations stemming from his links with the unions .1
The different international context did not allow Frondizi to avail him
self of Peron's populist-nationalist formula for providing benefits to
both workers and capitalists.

Having failed in this attempt, the Frondizi

government pinned its hopes on the IMF recommendations and eventual salutory effects that would result from the expected upturn in productivity
and employment.
The pattern of dependent industrialization assumed particular
intensity during the presidency of Arturo Frondizi in the context of
"desarrollista" policies influenced by Raul Prebisch.

The basic notion

incorporated in these policies was the idea that foreign capital would
provide a way out of the profound structural crisis by spurring on the
development of the industrial sector.

Hence foreign capital was to be

given free reign in the economy and legal and other restrictions inherited
from Peronism were to be removed as the primary obstacles to economic
recovery.
This was the period, 1959 to 1963, that Eshag and Thorp designate
as the "IMF era of orthodox economic policy" because of the closeness with

^Rock, "The Survival of Peronism" in Rock, p. 203.

which the government followed the International Monetary Fund's recom
mendations.*

The IMF "concurred in general with Prebisch's reports in

recommending the dismantling of governmental controls and the establish
ment of a free market.

They differed, however, from the proposals of the

Prebisch reports in containing no mention of specific development projects
and in placing considerably greater emphasis on curbing the growth of
demand and on use of monetary instruments."

Following the IMF's recom

mendations, the government's policies curbed consumption with restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies and through wage restraints.

It was believed

that the operation of market forces would do the rest, that internal
price stability and balance of payments equilibrium would be the eventual
outcome.

Thus it was hoped that after a period of adjustment, a sound and

durable rate of growth in production and employment would be achieved.
In one sense the policies of the Frondizi period succeeded remark
ably well.

"The curtailment of consumption was such that by 1963 total

private consumption was some 10 percent lower than it had been in 1958.
If allowance is made for the increase in population, the per capita level
of consumption must have declined by nearly 20 percent between 1958 and
1963."

The heaviest burden from these IMF inspired policies fell upon

the shoulders of the industrial working class.
some 15 percent from 1958 to 1963.^

1

Eshag and Thorp, p. 19.

Their real wages had fallen

The situation improved somewhat in

2

Ibid.

3
Eshag and Thorp, p. 37.
4
Ibid. According to E.C.L.A.'s Economic Development and Income
Distribution in Argentina (New York: United Nations, 1969) urban real wages
had already fallen by 20 percent in the decade from 1949 to 1959 (p. 10).

345
1960 and 1961, when there was a recovery in income levels and a more
progressive distribution of income as a result of a better performance by
the export sector and an inflow of foreign capital.

However, since the bulk

of foreign investments continued to-be funneled into the capital intensive
sectors, though there was increased productivity there was no improvement
in the unemployment situation.'*'

Despite slight cyclical improvements, the

relative share of income going to the working class dropped compared to
what it had enjoyed at the height of the Peronist period.

2

In another sense the policies of the Frondizi period proved to be
a dismal failure.

Though they succeeded in curbing consumption and reducing

employment, "instead of ending inflation the markedly depressive impact of
these measures served to accelerate it and to induce a minor catastrophe.
In 1959 the retail price index increased by a monumental 133.5%, as against
an increase of 31.2% in 1958."

3

Not only did the "free market" oriented

economic policies fail to achieve internal price stability, they also
failed to ease the nation's balance of payments difficulties.

HenCe,

falling production and rising unemployment,^ directly traceable to the
orthodox economic policies of the period, could not even be justified in
terms of curbing inflation

and achieving a favorable balance of payments.

■''Rock, p. 204.

2

See Portnoy, p. 10, for data showing income redistribution to the
detriment of laborers in post 1955 period.
3
Rock, p . 203.
4
As we saw, the smaller nationally owned manufacturing sector
producing wage goods for the lower income market, was particularly hard
hit. See pp. 340-2 above.
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In addition to juridically facilitating the entry of foreign
capital in the decade after Peron s overthrow, the state s policies
determining income allocation provided a key component in the business
climate multinational corporations look for.

The developmental program of

the period increasingly shifted the cost onto wage earners and lower in
come sectors.

Income reallocation took place through lower wages and

unemployment and

underemployment, which were exacerbated by increased

bankruptcies and

the general decline of marginal national industries. It

became impossible under the zero-sum conditions imposed by protracted eco
nomic stagnation to reward different class groups simultaneously as had
been done in theprior period.

Government policies became the singlemost

identifiable factor in the distribution

of income.

Hence the economic

struggle for better wages and working conditions became radicalized poli
tically and the stage was set for the upheavals that eventually led to
Peron’s return in 1973.
The close relationship between the policies seeking to attract
foreign capital and the deteriorating conditions for lower income groups
was firmly established in the minds of the working class in this period.
Indeed, the anti-working class stance of the various regimes at this time
was the key factor making, not just for Peronism1s survival, but for its
resilience and growth.

At best, only token gestures were made by govern

ments in the post-1955 era to win working class support; next to nothing
was done to promote their interests.

Even the Frondizi government which

came in on Peronist support by promising not to sacrifice the workers' so
cial and economic gains, was nevertheless forced to undermine them and thus
discredited

what non-Peronist leadership might have emerged.
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Overall, the decade between 1955 and 1965 was marked by continual
oscillations, beginning with draconian measures restricting the working
class’ ability to consume, followed by short intervals of liberaliza
tions.

The stage had been set at the end of 1955 by the Aramburu govern

ment when it attempted to freeze wages.
Collective wage contracts agreed under Peron were prorogued.
The government also dismantled the main organs of the Peronist
state's control over the economy, in line with the demands of
both industry and agriculture.
In returning to a more laissezfaire system, one of Peron's more significant fringe benefits from
the early 1950s, the state subsidy to basic foodstuffs, was abol
ished. This brought about the first major redistribution of income
against the working class .1
"Between 1950 and 1955 wage income accounted for an average 41.8% of
GNP.

In 1956-8 this dropped to 39.6%, and in 1959-61 to 35.8%.

These

figures were not representative of a permanent trend, but they illustrate
o

the extent of short-term fluctuations."

These were the circumstances

that provided such fertile ground for the Peronist mystique of the "golden
age" of the forties.

Even the depression period of the early fifties could

now be compared favorably with the present by Peronist union leaders.

In

this they took their cue from Peron himself who was able to capitalize on
this rather convincing argument.

Using official statistics, he was very

adept at showing how much more socially just and also how much less infla
tionary his government's economic policies had been.

Writing in exile in

the book in which he pins the label of vendepatrias on his successors, he
states:
History cannot be refashioned with words. ... In the twenty
months prior to the coup, the index for the cost of living increased
21 percent, while in the following twenty months that increase had
already reached 36 percent. Food, which is the most important item
1
Rock,

p. 201.

2
Ibid., p. 195.
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in the popular budget, increased by 19 percent in the period prior
to September of 1955, while beginning with that month the increase
had reached 41 percent.
jPeron demonstrates what a critical impact rising food prices
have particularly on living standards of workers and, by extension,
on the economy as a wholej
People can reduce their expenditures for other things, but
they cannot stop eating every day without harming their existence.
The purchase of a shirt can be postponed for better days, but hunger
cannot wait. ... When the population has to spend most of its income
to feed itself, little is left to spend on other goods which though
they might be necessary are not essential. That is why, rapidly
rising food prices tend to contract sales in other sectors and pro
voke a decline in production that parallels falling consumption.
Once again, the people must bear the burden for these misguided
economic policies since unemployment and misery are the final con
sequences of this process of industrial and commercial paralysis.!
The attack on the working class' living standards was accompanied
by a severe repression of the Peronist movement, not only on the political
level, but on the economic too with the mass arrests of Peronist union
leaders.

Along with this "came a series of clumsy attempts by anti-Peronist

union leaders, Communists and Social Democrats, to take over the unions."
These attempts and the repression against' the movement only served to
"unite the workers in a spirit of solidarity and to rehabilitate Peronism
as the focus of working class allegiance.

The Communists and the rest

came to be regarded as traitorous collaborators of a reactionary government."
The repression of Peronism came to take on the character of an intense
class struggle between the workers, on the one hand, and their employers
and the state, on the other.

The working class' experience during this

period made it crystal clear that the state was the instrumentality through

Juan D. Peron, Los vendepatria: pruebas de una traicion (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Freeland, 1972), pp. 103 and 106. My translation. It is
worth noting that the latter part of the argument speaks not only to the
working class, but also to those sectors of the national bourgeoisie based
on the production of wage goods. This approach was used most effectively
to lure these sectors back into the movement, resulting in Peronism's
resounding electoral victory of 1973.
2
Rock, p. 201.

2
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which their bosses sought to raise the rate of exploitation in both
absolute (lower wages) and relative (layoffs and speed-up of production)
terms.
In the decade after Peron's overthrow, the workers 1 economic
struggles of necessity took on a political nature and were explicitly
linked to Peronism.

Wage raises, when they were obtained, came as a re

sult of strikes and these were almost always bitter and protracted affairs
in which the government usually intervened directly in attempting to crush
them through military force, often declaring them illegal and instituting
mass arrests.

For example, the metal workers' strike of 1956 lasted for

six weeks during which time the government distributed leaflets in working
class districts urging shopkeepers not to extend credit.
dismissed.

Thousands were

Tanks and troops patrolled neighborhoods around the plants.

Police entered bars and ejected strikers.

The strike committees were forced

to operate clandestinely and their members lived like hunted men.

The

contrast with the bygone Peron era, when the state would have been sym
pathetic and probably have intervened positively on their side, could not
have been starker.
As a reflection of the income redistribution toward the wealthier
sectors, the workers’ share of gross national income consistently declined
in the post-Peron decade whereas in the previous decade it had generally
gone up, even during those times when their real wages went down.

Signi

ficantly, the decline in the workers' living standards in the late fifties
and into the sixties, occurred in the context of a steady, even if slight,
growth of the economy.

The workers could see that their declining living

standards were a direct result of the government's attack on the unions
and of government imposed wage freezes.

Again, this was in sharp contrast
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to their experience under the Peronist state.
The concurrence of the attack on workers' economic position with
the political repression of the movement led to, and hastened, the pro
cess weakening Peronism's populist class alliance features, while accen
tuating those aspects that stressed class solidarity and militancy.

In

the 1955-65 period, Peronism became a doctrine of working class struggle.
As the government's role in income allocation became more central, the
economic struggle was politicized more and more.

Since the material con

ditions making a.populist coalition possible no longer held and the gains
of one group increasingly came at the expense of those of another, and since
the groups controlling government had moved politically against Peronism,
even the economistic struggle of workers for better wages was closely as
sociated with the Peronist struggle for political power.

Even the "up"

segments of the cycle, when workers were able to reverse the diminution in
their share of income distribution, all were achieved at the cost of bit
ter and protracted struggle.

Hence, though workers' real wages actually

rose at several points during these years, rather than decreasing, this
trend intensified class militancy.

For the reasons just mentioned, this

class militancy came to be expressed politically through that side of
Peronism that tended in the direction of a socialist resolution of the
contradictions of dependent capitalist development.
Overall, the struggle of different groups to maintain their real
incomes "spawned a Hobbesian

world of strife and competition."*

The changes which occurred in the distribution of income were
particularly felt. They meant not only changes in relative income
positions, but also that the losing group was likely to suffer a

*Roclc,

p. 195.
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decrease, often of a substantial nature, in its absolute income
as well. The struggle for relative shares was also a struggle to
maintain absolute positions, and in any given year there were
always important groups which could point to a deterioration in their
real income level. In such circumstances the conflict is likely
to be a bitter one.*
Not only did this situation lead the workers to rally ever more firmly
and in a united way around Peronism as their arm in this struggle, but
also in this chaotic context of constant ups and downs, Peronism assumed
a relative coherence and stability that disguised its intrinsically eclec
tic nature.
With the defection of the military and the industrialists into the
new coalition in power in the decade after Peron's overthrow, Peronism was
stripped of its multiclass character and left as a workers' movement.

At

first, the workers represented the only significant opposition to the pro
cess of denationalization.

Thus at their plenary meeting held in Rosario

in 1959, the grouping of Peronist unions known as the "62 Organizations,"
through their coordinating committee issued a policy document rejecting the
Frondizi government's economic program?
. . . we resolve to energetically oppose this economic policy which
signifies a retreat in our country's advance... . They are trying to
take us back to a nation exporting raw materials and importing manu
factures which until 1944 placed us in a position of a colony. We
reject the economic system supported by the IMF. . . since it signifies
quite plainly the exploitation of man by man.^
Peronist doctrine, as expressed by Peron, remained a multi-classoriented nationalism.

However, the workers were the only class to remain

^Rock, citing E.C.L.A., Economic Development and Income Distribu
tion in Argentina (New York: United Nations, 1969), p. 136.
Documents of the Plenario Nacional de las 62 Organizaciones
(mimeographed).
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consistently loyal to the populist-nationalist project.^- Deserted by
their bourgeois "allies" in the darkest hours, it is not surprising the
Peronist workers should have interpreted the ambiguities and contradic
tions in Peronism's populistic anti-imperialism in a socialist direction
and that the movement should have gradually evolved towards a Marxist per
spective.

Significant elements within the industrial working class had

moved quite far along in this direction, a fact which translated into one
of the key contradictions upon which Peronism1s second tenure in power
foundered.

Perhaps the most combative and class conscious to emerge

among the industrial proletariat were the automobile workers, an impor
tant sector in the dependent industrial economy that developed after 1955.
The following excerpts from a statement issued during the occupation of a
Fiat factory in March of 1971 are illustrative:
The seizure of the plant is also a measure of struggle which
reflects high combativeness, an act of recovering what is ours,
what has been built with our sweat and sacrifice. With each occu
pation we advance a little toward what will be the culmination of
this struggle: the total recovery of what has been expropriated
from us by the oligarchy and the imperialists— our labor, the
means of labor, and its fruits. . . .
We must set forth our form of struggle for ourselves, which
naturally does not mean confrontation before we have sufficient
strength. We must strike where and when it hurts, where the enemy
is weak, and little by little, along with the armed vanguards such
as the Montoneros, the FAP, the ERP, the FAL, and the MRA,* we will
proceed to exhaust the regime, destroying this system on all sides.
We must never lower our guard. If Lanusse** has declared the imper
ialist and capitalist war on us, we declare revolutionary war. . . .
We must bear clearly in mind that this struggle is a long one,
that no battle is the final one. Our struggle is not to win
crumbs, but for final liberation through the seizure of power by

Trotskysts have pointed to this fact as justification for their
position that the working class' interests are the only ones to truly
coincide with the nation's interests in a dependent situation. Among
the Peronists, Juan Pablo Franco also argues this position. See his "Notas
para una historia del peronismo" published as a monograph by Envido:
(Buenos Aires— Revista de Politica y Ciencias Sociales, n.d.).
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"the workers' class and the exploited people in order to bring about
a free, just, and sovereign fatherland, an Argentina with neither
oppressors or oppressed, in other words, a national and socialist
revolution. *■
This statement shows an important aspect of the radicalization of
Argentine workers in this period.

Expressed through strike waves and fac

tory occupations, their demands were generally Of a political nature that
went beyond "bread and butter" issues.

As we may have seen, the militance

and political consciousness of Argentina's workers had been evolving pro
gressively from the late fifties on.

For example, some of the components

in the program of the Peronist unions articulated by the mesa coordinadora
of the "62 Organizations" on August 23, 1963, included:
exchange controls and tariffs to protect Argentine industry
diversification of exports
agrarian reform to eliminate latifundios
nationalization of transport, means of communication, basic industries
and all sectors which might lead to the formation of monopolies
nationalization of bank deposits and severing ties with the IMF
repudiation of all contracts with foreign oil companies
rejection of all agreements granting privileges to foreign capital
controls on repatriation of profits
policies promoting full employment
fixing of maximum prices and limits on profits
priority for social investments in housing and education
socialization of medicine.^

^Reproduced in Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1974) edited by James Kohl and John Litt, pp. 377-8.
*The Montoneros, FAP and MRA were Peronist guerrilla groups. The
ERP was the armed branch of the Trotskyst Partido Revolucionario de los
Trabajadores, while the FAL was a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group. Another
guerrilla group, not listed in this communique, but which was active at the
time, was the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). It attempted to expli
citly synthesize the Marxist and Peronist amalgam by defining itself as
Marxist-Leninist-Peronist, Marxism-Leninism being considered an instrument
for social analysis and Peronism an expression of the experience of the Ar
gentine masses.
**Alejandro Lanusse was the last general to rule before Peron's re
turn, which he negotiated as a means to end the socio-political and economic
turmoil threatening to spill over into socialist revolution.
2
Justicialismo (October 1963).
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This type of orientation and the demands that flowed from it condemned to
failure the attempts of the more liberally inclined regimes to co-opt
the CGT by winning over key leaders with promises of better wages and
benefits for their rank and file.

Instead, these "leaders" found them

selves thoroughly discredited and alienated from their consitutency.

In

this way, by resting on a working class whose adherence to the movement
was founded on a politicized class loyalty, Peronism was strengthened.
This was the secret behind the solidity of the Justicialist^ movement in
its years out of power and constituted the chief reason why the movement
was not hopelessly splintered by shifting political situations and appeals
to moderation or pragmatic compromises, often engineered by Peron himself.
The workers' militance reinforced the position of those who fa
vored a hard line approach.

Despite the severe repression however, Justi-

cialism continued to grow and remained the major political force in Argen
tine society.

As a result, though the multinational corporate and inter

nationalized national bourgeois sectors were dominant within the state
apparatus and had their interests implemented in policy, they lacked a
significant political base among the masses.

This contradiction took the

form of an unending wave of strikes, factory occupations, urban riots, and
finally urban guerrilla warfare.

These were the conditions that finally

forced Argentina's rulers to call Peron back from exile in 1973.

^Though Peron coined the term "Justicialismo" in 1949, it did
not gain currency until the late sixties. Then it came to stand for the
movement’s commitment to social justice.
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Political Failure of Dependent Industrialization and the
Reemergence of Populist-Nationalism
The disjuncture between the economic predominance of the multi
national corporate sector and its inability to command the allegiance of
a stable political coalition strong enough to translate economic predomi
nance into a generally accepted, coherent developmental project, provides
the key to unravelling the common thread underlying the chaotic events of
the 1955-73 period.*

As we saw, the Peronism of the fifties generated the

conditions that led to a new economic stage centered around multinational
corporate interests.

In the first decade

following

/
Peron's overthrow,

these interests successfully consolidated their economic predominance but
failed to achieve political hegemony.

On the level of controlling and

using the state apparatus for its purposes, "the so-called 'Liberating
Revolution' of 1955 was, perhaps, the last organic attempt on the part of
the agrarian bourgeoisie to maintain its hegemonic role in the dominant
bloc.*

Following this failure, Frondizi's alternative appeared in 1958."

According to Portantiero, the economic project of 1958-62 in turn, failed
because it attempted to "simultaneously maintain levels of protection for
national capital, . . . transfer revenue to the agrarian bourgeoisie and
. . . guarantee high profits for monopoly capital."

The Onganxa coup

*1 am paraphrasing Juan Carlos Portantiero's excellent Gramscian
analysis of the Argentine situation between the two Peronist periods. See
Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974 issue devoted to "Argentina: Per
onism and Crisis"), 95-120.
*It was not to be the last attempt. After the second overthrow of
Peronism in 1976, Argentine history once again continued on its cyclical
path. General Videla's Economic Minister, Martinez de Hoz, rebuilt the
economy on the interests of the agro-exporting oligarchy with the strong
participation of the multinationals as junior partners.
2Ibid., p. 103.
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sought to salvage the situation by narrowing its economic policies to
an unhampered pursuit of monopoly capital's interests.

In this way

"the armed forces completed in 1966 a political cycle whose first version
had broken out in 1955 with the defeat of Peronist popular nationalism ."1
The Ongania government represented the most cogent attempt to
forcefully push aside all residual nuclei of oppositional groups.

"It

now appeared that the complex competing 'horizontal' and 'vertical' pres
sures from the past had been finally superseded by a united and purposeful
military dictatorship."

2

/

The Krieger Vasena plan promulgated by Ongania's

Minister of the Economy was the clearest and most unencumbered attempt to
implement policies favoring the interests of the multinational corporate
sector.

However, though it was economically predominant and though the

state promoted its interests, because it lacked a significant social base,
the multinational sector was unable to extend its economic predominance
into political hegemony.

The generals could no longer overlook this fact

when students and auto workers protesting the government's economic poli
cies seized control of the city of Cordoba in May of 1969.

Troops had to

be brought in, and it was only after several days of fierce fighting that
this insurrection known as the

cordobazo

was finally brought under con

trol.
The Krieger Vasena program's impact went beyond adversely affecting
the working class' living standards.

With its aggressive orientation to

wards creating the conditions for a "competitive society" free from the
constraints of "outmoded" economic and social structures— i.e., protection
ism— it also hurt the position of the smaller national entrepreneurs.
1

Portantiero, p. 102.

2

Rock, p. 209.

On
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the political level this was coupled with an across the board attack on
all political parties as the corrupt remnants of the old order standing in
the way of a clean sweep.

All parties were thus "placed on an equal foot

ing in the ranks of the opposition" and, for the first time, "Radicals
and Peronists found themselves in the same camp."*

In this way, economi

cally and politically, the conditions were set for the reemergence of the
viability of Peronism's class alliance formula.
In the years before Peron's return, these conditions reemphasized
the ambiguous nature and the contradictory role of Peronism..

On the one

hand, it became the expression of working class struggle against multi
national capital which was evolving into an increasingly class conscious
opposition to capitalism; and, on the other hand, it also reappeared

as

the residual populist-nationalist formula of class alliance between the
national bourgeoisie and the working class and popular sectors.

This was

the internal contradiction that tore Peronism apart within less than two
years from when Peron resumed power.
It was also in the period after the cordobazo that guerrilla war
against the regime became a real factor.

As noted above,

Peronist and Marxist groups were active in those years.

2

several

On the Peronist

side the most significant of these came to be the Montoneros who first
gained national notoriety with the capture and subsequent execution of
General Pedro Aramburu who had been the architect of the most severe
anti-Peronist repression of the fifties.

The Montoneros took their name

from the legendary Gaucho hordes that had provided the military backbone
for the independence war and later the many caudillos from the interior

1

Rock,

p. 210.

2

See p. 353 above.
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who sought to extend their authority.^

On the Marxist side the most sig

nificant group was the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), the
armed wing of the Trotskyst

Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores.

The Peronist left of the late sixties and early seventies had
moved in a Marxist direction to the point that they agreed with the Marxist
left on ultimate objectives, but not enough

to overcome tactical differ

ences over how to relate to the bourgeoisie and over the role of the van
guard.

The Peronists believed in taking advantage of divisions within

the bourgeoisie.

Concerning the role of the vanguard, they believed it

necessary to adjust to the level of consciousness reached by the masses.
To go beyond this level, would push the movement into a position where it
would be alienated from the masses.

The ERP, on the other hand, believed

it essential to take "advanced positions" in order to educate the masses
and thereby forge their combativeness into an effective struggle.

They

argued that there was no national bourgeoisie to speak of and that the
sectors usually referred to under this category, were in fact mere appen
dages of international capitalism.
Before 1973, these differences were secondary and the guerrilla
groups actively cooperated with each other often mounting joint military
operations.

Indeed, before he returned triumphantly, Peron did not openly

criticize the ERP, much less the self-professed Peronist guerrilla groups.
Not only did he refuse to discourage guerrilla activity, which he termed
merely a tactic in an overall strategy, he let it be known that such actions
had his blessings.

In exile Peron

masterfully applied the same techniques

^Probably derived from the word amontonar, to pile up. That is,
the helter-skelter gathering together in one location of these "cutthroats"
and "brigands" who otherwise led solitary and isolated lives in the vast
ness of the pampas.
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that had served him so well to gain power and then retain it for over a
decade.

With ambiguous statements he led diverse groups to believe that,

deep down, he was the true champion of their interests.

He appealed to

the inclusiveness of Peronism’s populist-nationalist tradition to project
the image that only a Justicialist regime could peacefully mediate between
the forces

tearing apart Argentina's social fabric.

In forging a broad-

based, multi-class coalition around his movement, Peron was both aided by,
and in turn, further intensified the severe repression of the military in
the Ongan^s period which succeeded in pushing the bourgeoise opposition
towards the Peronist front.
With their reentry into the Peronist led coalition, the sectors
comprising the national bourgeoisie completed the cycle that began with
their defection from Peronism in the mid-fifties.

Their tacit approval

had been one of the factors ensuring the success of the 1955 coup.

Far

from being beneficiaries however, their interests came under almost immedi
ate attack in the economic policies of the various anti-Peronist regimes.
The CGE which had represented the interests of the smaller producers was
dissolved in December of 1955 while the UIA, in April of 1956, praised
the "liberating revolution" on the grounds that it would reject "indiscrim
inate and absolute" protectionism. ^
Looking at the 1955 coup in class terms, the military had acted as
the instrument of a bourgeoise-oligarchic alliance directed against Peronism
because of its inability to definitively strip itself of its working class
ties.

Once working class interests were removed from official policy, the

alliance fell victim to its internal contradictions.
1
Cuneo, p. 231.

It
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had been originally held together by the recognition on the part
of the industrialists that to achieve further industrial growth it
was necessary to increase agrarian production and exports, and
thus escape the balance of payments constraints on capital goods
imports.
But during the latter 1950s and the 1960s the terms
of trade problems showed few signs of improving significantly. At
the same time agrarian production failed to respond adequately to
price incentives. As a result this development strategy increasingly
lost adherents .1
Within the industrial bourgeoisie itself, contradictions between
its national and multinational sectors prevented it from remaining a
secure base for anti-Peronism.

Indeed, the inability to resolve these

divisions became one of the key factors in Peron's return.-

Initially,

the post-1955 regimes were quite antagonistic toward some of the small
business sectors, particularly those from the interior, which had consti
tuted an important part of Peronism.
ignore their interests.

By 1958 Frondizi could no longer

Responding to a campaign by regional groups from

Northern Argentina to have their special needs recognized, he revived the
CGE.2 .
Complex and contradictory political and economic developments
characterize the eighteen year period of Peron's exile.

In the end Peron

was brought back because the attempts to forcefully resolve the contradic
tions between and within classes failed.

The working class was brutally

suppressed but its resistance developed into a combativeness that could
not be contained.

The multinational sectors of the bourgeoisie made tre

mendous gains and took control of the dynamic branches of industry but the
national bourgeoisie, far from disappearing, remained a significant part
of the economic picture.

Indeed, it may well have been their lack of suf

ficient "economic predominance" which prevented the multinational sectors

^Rock, p. 197.

^See Cuneo, pp. 233-42.
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from achieving full "political hegemony."

And, in turn, lacking sufficient

"political hegemony," they were unable to impose the conditions needed to
achieve full "economic predominance."

Hence, when the most clear-cut,

unemcumbered monopolistic multinational project was set in motion after
Ongania*s coup in 1966, the groups whose interests were in contradiction
to it, coalesced and the regime was increasingly unable to cope with their
opposition from the cordobazo of 1969 on.
Peronism*s survival and growth, both as an expression of working
class resistance and militance and, after 1966, as a revival of the popu
list-nationalist alliance between the workers and the national sectors
of the bourgeoisie, was a chief reason for the military's inability to
transform economic predominance into political hegemony for the sectors
of the bourgeoisie centered around the multinationals* interests.

Condi

tions just before Peron's return forced the military to invert the model
it had been pursuing. The

assumption had been that, since the interests

of other sectors could be ignored, impressive economic results would be
achieved through the use of the military's coercive power behind a project
facilitating accumulation for the monopoly and multinational sector.

These

results could then be used by the multinationals as the material basis for
cementing a new coalition under their hegemony.*

Instead of achieving the

hoped for results, the repression necessary to imposing this project in
tensified working class militance and brought the bourgeois sectors back
into the Peronist opposition.
reversed its strategy.

With repression backfiring, the military

With General Alejandro Lanusse taking the reins of

power in March of 1971, the thinking now was that only if political stability

*Juan Carlos Portantiero makes this point in "Dominant Classes and
Political Crisis in Argentina Today," Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974),
p. 106.
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could be achieved, would economic development take place.*

This was the

/
reasoning behind the negotiations that eventually resulted in Peron's
triumphant return.

2

The return of the petite bourgeoisie, national capitalists, and
other bourgeois sectors into the coalition grouped around Peronism was
one of the key factors which made Peron's return possible.

Promoting

their interests, at least initially, played a very significant part in the
policies that reformulated populist-nationalism to the new context of the
seventies.

Once again, the attempt to simultaneously promote the interests

of the working class and the national sectors of the bourgeoisie proved to
be an untenable venture.

Again the experience of the second Peronist period

replicated that of the first: as the contradictions in its populist-national
ist formula intensified, the regime's policies were increasingly oriented
toward the interests of the monopolistic multinational bourgeoisie.

The

next section explores this dynamic further.
It is important to note that though the reentry of bourgeois sec
tors into the Peronist coalition was an important factor making Peron's
return possible, they were not the driving force behind it.

The single

most important factor behind Peron's being brought back into power was the
workers' militant opposition which generated such turmoil that it undermined
industrial peace and tranquility.

As a result of their militance therefore,

the workers undermined one of the essential conditions for a dependent in
dustrial economy: the general prevalence of industrial peace and a certain
degree of political stability.

3

^Portantiero, p. 117.

2

See Alejandro Lanusse, Mi testimonio (Buenos Aires: Lassere, 1977),
Chap. 6 , for his version of the Pe'ronist restoration.
3

See p.

329 above.

363
/
Political stability and industrial peace was the promise Peron
held out to the groups in power.
1973 with their approval.

Thus the stage was set for his return in

They had not been able to achieve "normalcy."

Their need for the displacement or reformulation of increasingly tense
social unrest which seemed to everyone to be leading Argentina in a revolu
tionary direction, was so great that they were willing to take a chance
on Peron.

"Peron is the only one who can quiet things down," was the state

ment frequently heard in business circles before 1973.
that "quiet" seemed further away than ever.

A few years later

Though the political context

had shifted, it was not long before the contradictions of prior years reemerged, and this time, in a more virulent form.

Just as they had been the

main force behind Peron's return, the workers and the militant struggles
they waged provided the chief contradiction which undid the second Peron
ist regime.

Second Peronist Period
The second Peronist regime attempted to recreate the same coalition
of classes around itself as in the first period, only under very different
conditions.

But while Peron had been able to balance-off contradictory

class interests to keep his regime in power for a decade, the second attempt
was short lived, lasting less than three years.

Using the dependency theory

approach adapted from Cardoso and Faletto, what internal and external
conditions were responsible for the disastrous failure in the seventies of
the modified version of populist-nationalism from the forties and fifties?
The attempt to find the basis for an alliance between labor and the
national bourgeoisie was doomed from the outset.

To begin with, Peron

faced a major contradiction with his working class base.

Peron had depended
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on the ■workers' militance to bring him back to power.

At key points be

fore he regained power, his movement had been held together by becoming
a workers’ movement based solely on working class interests.

These were

to be achieved through the militant mobilization of the class towards the
seizure of political power.

However, once in power, Peron's concern was

to solidify an alliance between the working class and the middle sectors
of Argentine society.

He focused the Justicialist movement's politics on

conciliation and integration.

To forge this alliance with the middle sec

tors, Peron had to be able to deliver political tranquility and labor
peace.

He had to suppress the more revolutionary inclined among his fol

lowers who were calling for a socialist Argentina based on their interests
and power.

The fact that more than twice as many leftist militants were •

killed in the two years that Peron was in the presidency than in the eighteen
years that he was in exile shows the extent to which Peron repressed the
left both within and outside of his movement.*

Not only did this campaign

fail, but in the process Peron isolated himself from the people who were
most responsible for his regaining of power and who constituted his strong
est base of support.

This became especially apparent after Peron's death

in July of 1974 when Isabel Peron's government was stripped of the last
element holding Peronism together, Peron's personal charisma.
Contrary to the hopes of the Peronist left, Peron had not changed
his opposition to fundamental changes in the social relations of production.
Again there was an effort to gain the allegiance of the working class by con

*According to Alvaro Luna, "Peronismo: analisis de un movimiento,"
reprinted in Denuncia (New York), July 1976, p. 9. Because of the clandes
tine nature of the antagonists on both sides and the passionate views sur
rounding the subject, there are no reliable figures on the casualties of
those years. However, there is no doubt that the intensity of the struggle
and the numbers involved far surpassed previous levels.

365
trolling the centralized union leadership and providing material benefits
for them to deliver to the rank and file.

The attempt was to replicate

the success achieved in the forties in undercutting class struggle through
redistributive reforms.

Indeed, in this respect the first measures of the

Campora government* in May and June of 1973 bore a striking resemblance

Dr. Hector Campora, standard bearer of the Frente Justicialista
de Liberacion (Frejuli), was elected to the presidency on March 11, 1973,
with 49.56 percent of the popular vote. Only the Union Civica Radical
(UCR) obtained barely over 20 percent of the vote (21.29%), all other
parties gaining less than 15 percent. The Peronists won all the governor
ships, 45 of 69 senatorial seats, and 142 of the 243 seats in the lower
house.
The March 1973 elections thus represented the latest instance in
the series of consistent electoral successes scored by Peronism when it
was allowed to participate. Prohibited from electoral competition in
1958 and 1963, Peronists were allowed to participate in 1962, 1965, and
1973. Because 1962 and 1965 were congressional elections, they were allowed
to compete since Peron would not be running. Nevertheless, the results
were nullified by the military who removed Frondizi and Illia from office
after the Peronists secured a plurality in those elections. In addition,
the Peronist candidate for governor of Buenos Aires in 1962, Andres Framini,
a former textile worker and secretary general of the CGT at the time, won
by a large majority.
Given this record, it is difficult to see the basis in 1973 for
the military's calculated gamble that the real possibility of a Peronist
victory would galvanize a majority anti-Peronist coalition. Of course,
General Lanusse was well aware that his gamble might fail. In the negotia
tions leading to Peron's return and the dropping of outstanding charges
against him, Peron had to agree not to run for the presidency. Instead,
he chose Campora, a devoted and loyal Peronist on whom Peron counted to
follow his orders. As it turned out, he was quite right in this assessment.
When Peron asked Campora to resign shortly after his election, thus allowing
Peron to run for president in the special elections called for September 23,
1973, Campora willingly obliged. In the September elections, Peron received
an overwhelming mandate, gaining 61.85 percent of the vote against Balbxn's
(UCR) 24.34 percent.
For Peronism1s electoral appeal, see Manuel Mora y Araujo and Peter
Smith, "Peronism and Economic Development: The 1973 Election" in Frederick
C. Turner and Jose'*’Enrique Miguens (eds.), Juan Peron and the Reshaping of
of Argentina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1983), pp. 171-87;
and also Lars Schoultz, "The Socio-Economic Determinants of Popular-Author
itarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism," American Political Sci
ence Review 71 (1977): 1423-46.
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to those employed by Peron to consolidate himself in power in 1943 and
1944.

The prices of most essential commodities were actually rolled back

and workers' wages were raised by twenty percent.

In contrast to the

first Peronist period, this was done at a time of the most acute spiralling
inflation.

Shch different conditions made it impossible to replicate the

success achieved with the populist-nationalist formula in the earlier
period.
Just before Peron's return, Peronism was perceived by the left as
a stage in the revolutionary process of social and national liberation,
by the national bourgeoisie as a chance to extend political space and re
cuperate some of the ground lost to foreign monopoly capital, and by the
native and foreign monopoly establishment as a last line of defense against
revolution.

1

'

While favorable economic conditions allowed Peron to build

a broad social base and enabled his regime to contain and postpone the
contradictory interests promoted by his populist-nationalist policies the
first time around, adverse economic conditions rapidly brought out the
contradictions in the populist-nationalist program of the seventies, despite
the fact that this time the Justicialist regime already had a broad base
of support.
Explicitly recreating the populist-nationalist alliance, the Justi
cialist regime sought to base its economic and social policies on the pacto
social signed shortly after the elections on May 30, 1973 by the Department
of Finance, the Secretary General of the CGT, and the President of the CGE.
The CGE, for the employers, pledged to maintain price stability, the govern

^This compendium of perceptions of Peronism by the significant sec
tors of Argentine society is from J. E. Corradi's introduction, "Argentina
and Peronism: Fragments of the Puzzle," to the Latin American Perspectives
1 (Fall 1974 issue on Peronism): 14.
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ment promised long-run economic reforms, and (having obtained limited
increases prior to signing) the CGT pledged to make no wage demands for
two years.*

With this pacto social the Justicialist regime was picking

up where the previous populist-nationalist episode had left off with the
"National Congress on Productivity and Social Welfare" held in early 1955.
As Alberto Ciria aptly notes, they both amounted "to the same idea of a
social pact between labor and management under the state's tutelage."
Interestingly, the CGE's President, Jose^Gelbard, almost immediately became
the Minister of the Economy with responsibility for overseeing the imple
mentation of the pacto.

This was an indication of the rapidity with which

the populist-nationalist state the second time around moved in the direc
tion of the capitalist pole in the contradictory class alliance it sought
to forge.
The continuity in the programmatic thrusts of the first and second
Peronist periods is clearly reflected in the contents of the Three Year Plan
/

(TYP) announced by Peron in late 1973. The

plan, which was to cover the

1974-7period, set out its aims in three general areas.

It emphasized the

full realization of social justice which it defined as an equitable distri
bution between the efforts and fruits of development.

It translated this

aim into a commitment to an accelerated redistribution of income which re-

*The pacto social can be found in the Review of the River Plate
(Buenos Aires), June 19, 1973.

2
Alberto Ciria, "Peronism Yesterday and Today" in Latin American
Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974), 28. For Peronist economic policy of the
second period, see Juan Carlos de Pablo, Econom^a polftica del peronismo
(Buenos Aires: El Cid, 1980).
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suits in a growing participation of wage earners in the national product.*
Specifically, the plan proposed to raise per capita income by 35.5 percent in the three year period.

2

The TYP also proposed establishing

ceiling prices for key goods as a means of preventing the passing along
of increased labor costs and thus the erosion of income gains of wage
workers through inflation.

The plan also spoke of a fundamental modifi

cation of productive and distributive structures towards a new model of
production and consumption.

By this no more was meant than had already

been contained in the previous Five Year Plans.

The existing productive

model was characterized as oriented to satisfying the demands of the high
and medium income markets and this would be changed to producing more and
better quality goods for popular consumption.

4

Like the previous plans, the TYP did not envision any alterations
in the social relations of production.

Its proposals were based on the

same foundation as the programmatic thrust in the earlier populistnationalist formula: to simultaneously provide benefits for workers and
national entrepreneurs.

Hence the second major area in its aims emphasized

a rapid and strong expansion of economic activity.
doubling the growth rate of the previous decade.

The plan called for
This would provide the

necessary base to achieve a high degree of well-being for all Argentines
and the international position that would liberate the country from its
condition of dependence, stagnation and disequilibrium.’’

1
I am paraphrasing this and following highlights of the TYP as they
are contained in a jpopularized version widely available in Argentina at
the time: Juan Peron en la Argentina 1973 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Sintesis,
1974), pp. 260-1.
2Ibid., p. 253.

3Ibid., p. 258.

4Ibid., p. 268.

5Ibid., p. 261.
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The expectation that the TYP would realize the material base
necessary for providing a high degree of well-being for all Argentines as
well as freeing Argentina from external dependency was not quite as fan
tastic as it appears at first sight, though it clearly was a short-lived
hope.

For a brief but critical time, the confluence of factors on the

international scene were advantageous for Argentina.

The United States'

globally dominant position was dealt a serious blow in Vietnam and Cuba and
there was intensified competition from Japanese and Western European
interests for the world market in general,and within Argentina specifically,
particularly by the Europeans.

In addition, the militance of Argentina's

working class, which in recent years had often taken the form of opposition
to the denationalization of the industrial sector, strengthened Peron's
hand in his attempts to gain a more prominent role for national capital,
without even having to raise the specter of expropriations.

Hence, anala-

gous to Peron's severe attacks on the oligarchy on the level of rhetoric
without challenging their material base during the first period, Peron was
now able to preserve his anti-imperialist credentials without having to
confront the interests of the multinational sector within the economy
directly.
Peron very astutely used his "Third Position" on the level of
international relations to strengthen national capital and open up new
markets for Argentina.

In his public pronouncements during his exile,

✓
Peron was fond of stressing how his regime had been a precursor of the
Third World movement.

He pointed to the "Third Position" in his government's

foreign policy which he characterized as a rejection of both Yankee imperi
alism and Soviet communism.
an

In this way Argentina showed the Third World

alternative to acquiescing to the dominance of the superpowers.

Con
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veniently ignored was the fact that Argentina’s Third Position in world
affairs of the fifties was largely confined to the realm of rhetoric.

By

1973, however, the Campora government applied the lessons learned by
Third World nations in playing the cold war antagonists off against each
other.

Among its first official acts, the Campora government extended

diplomatic recognition to socialist bloc countries which, in turn, was soon
followed by growing trade relations.
An important component of the TYP was the attempt to open up new
areas of the international market within the socialist bloc.

Commercial

agreements were signed with Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and North Korea and nego
tiations were initiated with Poland, Romania,and China.

It was in this

aspect of opening up new areas of trade that the TYP showed the only sig
nificant departure from the previous five year plans.

While it was only

a trend, Soviet bloc countries did make inroads "into Argentina's tradi
tional trade flows with U.S. and Western European suppliers, especially in
heavy equipment industries."*

In the early fifties, though with no great

enthusiasm, Argentina nevertheless did dutifully line up on the U.S. side
of the Cold War.

By contrast, the Soviet Union never enjoyed a closer poli

tical and economic relationship than during the second Peronist period.
For example, in May of 1974 the U.S.S.R. granted $600 million in loans to
allow Argentina to buy Soviet hydro-electric generating equipment.
Another example of the use of the Third Position in opening up new
areas for the-Argentine economy were the brief but significant commercial

^Business Latin America, July 10, 1974 as quoted in NACLA, Argen
tina in the Hour of the Furnaces (New York, 1975), p. 45.
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relations with Cuba.

Cuba provided a market not only for agro-pastoral

goods but also for industrial commodities produced by both the national
and multinational sectors.

To circumvent the U.S. embargo, the Cuban

government had expressed an interest in purchasing cars, buses and trucks
produced in Argentina by the subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.

The

Peronist state let it be known that any attempt by the U.S. State Depart
ment to enforce the embargo against Cuba by restricting the deals nego
tiated with General Motors and Chrysler subsidiaries would be construed
as a violation of Argentine sovereignty.

Thus, not only did the govern

ment under Peron fail to confront the multinational presence within the
Argentine industrial economy directly, but it even used its "anti-imperial
ism11 to drum up some business.
Though the TYP represented a departure in seeking access to social
ist bloc markets for "Argentine" goods, it did not differ from previous
Peronist plans in its orientation towards increasing productive output
without contemplating changes in the underlying social relations of pro
duction.

Moreover, it envisioned a continuation of the same dual indus

trial development of the earlier period which would continue to rest on an
export base of primarily agricultural products.

The TYP’s goal was to

double exports in order to be able to import the goods necessary for con
tinued growth and be able to do so while maintaining a favorable balance
of payments.'*'

The TYP stressed at length that the principal emphasis in

its policies for industrial development was to stimulate businesses with
national capital and reverse the process of denationalization.

^ e e Juan Peron en la Argentina 1973. p. 253.

It proposed
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strengthening the role of small to medium size enterprises as well as the
state's participation in basic industry .1

With respect to the latter it

proposed to nationalize and coordinate the public sector through a Corpor
ation of National Enterprises designed to remedy the absence of a cohesive
policy and the dispersion of power in internal and external purchases.

2

At the same time, to promote the sector comprised of small to medium sized
enterprises and assure national entrepreneurs profitability, the Corpor
ation of Small to Medium Size Enterprises would function to make available
the services and facilities enjoyed by large businesses such as replacing
equipment, financing, technology, vertical and horizontal integration, coordination of purchases, and outlets for exports.

3

In addition to the full realization of social justice and the
strong expansion of economic activity, the TYP announced its third major
area to be the achievement of growing participation by all Argentines in
the managing of the state's affairs.

In this connection the plan speaks

of developing the citizenry's decision-making abilities and increasing
their capacity for participating in the process of change leading to a
4
more just and independent society.

While the TYP fell short of achieving

the aims set out in its first two major areas, it failed dismally in
carrying out the goals of this third area.

Indeed as its shortcomings in

the first two areas became apparent, the regime dropped its commitments in
the third area all the more.
The TYP failed for the same reasons that the FFYP and SFYP had
failed.

It attempted to implement a viable model for national capitalist

development within the framework of a basic commitment to the avoidance of

1Juan Peron en la Argentina 1973. p. 267.

3Ibid., p. 271.

^Ibid., p. 262.

2Ibid., o. 270.

class struggle.

Like the earlier efforts it assumed it could find and

nurture the means for a developmental process that would benefit both
workers and native capitalists alike.

It also assumed that indirect

controls on the government's part would be sufficient to counter de
pendency on external interests.

The major difference with the FFYP and

SFYP was that dependency on the international system in the seventies
was present more directly within the Argentine economy than it had been
in the forties and fifties.

The nationalization of the railroads, crea

tion of the Central Bank, and I.A.P.I. were an adequate response to for
eign interests in the externally oriented growth model since these were
largely in the transportation, finance, and commercial sectors.'*'

By con

trast, creation of a Corporation of National Enterprises and a Corpora
tion of Small to Medium Size Enterprises seemed a weak response to the
entrenched presence of the multinationals in the most dynamic sectors of
the industrial economy.
vide a case in point.

The automotive and farm machinery industries pro
There was significant national production in these

areas during the first Peronist period; by 1963,97 percent of auto and
truck manufacturing was controlled by European and U.S. companies, while
they also controlled 88 percent of tractor production.

In 1969 these in

dustries alone employed 11 percent of Argentine industrial workers.

The

dynamism of this sector was revealed by the fact that between 1963 and 1969
its productivity grew at an annual rate of 6.7 percent while employment increased by only 0.7 percent and wages by 3 percent.

2

*Tt must be reemphasized however that the failure to confront the
landowning oligarchy directly through expropriations, constituted a fatal
flaw.

2

Figures are quoted in "AIFLD Losing its Grip" in N.A.C.L.A.'s Ar
gentina in the Hour of the Furnaces (New York, 1975), p. 69.
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According to the TYP itself, its success or failure depended on
two key assumptions, increased exports and increased savings.

Doubling

exports would allow the national economy to obtain the imports needed for
increased production without inducing an unfavorable balance of payments.
Doubling of exports was assumed to be a feasible proposition in the plan
if a) agricultural production increased considerably, b) tendencies in the
world market for Argentine goods made for favorable prices, and c) the ex
port of industrial goods expanded to the point of constituting a signifi
cant component of Argentina's foreign trade.

The latter two premises in

volved factors mostly outside of the Argentine government's control, while
it could only exercise direct control over the former if it were willing
to alter existing relations of production.

According to the second key

assumption, the plan's success or failure would be decided by the savings
of both wage earners and "others."

The consumption of workers was expected

to increase,but in lesser proportion than their contribution to productivity.
The TYP reassured workers by noting that their "savings" would be compen
sated for with increased deliveries of social services by the state.
The TYP rested on the same model of accumulation as the FFYP and
SFYP had and therefore contained the same contradictions.

It basically

depended on a favorable international context for Argentine exports in
order to be able to deliver the benefits promised simultaneously to wage
earners and national entrepreneurs.

Because of the state's inability to

control the impact of the dependency dimension, when the international situ
ation did not conform to the premises on which the first key assumption
outlined above depended, the state was also unable to deliver the social
services upon which the workers' savings in the second key assumption above
were premised.

Within a capitalist framework, asking workers to consume
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substantially less than they produced without any compensation in the
form of private or state subsidized social services, meant asking workers
to accept declining standards of living.

Ergo, a repetition of the con

tradiction involved in Peronism's demise in the fifties: a populist regime
enforcing policies harmful to the interests of the popular sectors com
prising its social foundation.

Just as then, the alternative would have

been the politically very difficult, and socially extremely disruptive one,
of altering the social relations of production.

That, of course, was pre

cisely what Justicialism with its class conciliationist underpinnings,
promised to avoid.
In essence, the Peronist policies of this second period replicated
those of the first by recreating the same kind of balancing act between
contradictory economic and class interests.

Peronism's relations with

the dominant external interests were based on providing a profitable situ
ation by guaranteeing labor peace and political stability.

On the other

hand, the regime sought to enhance its bargaining position with the multi
nationals through its control of a strong mass movement as a countervail
ing power.

In its relations with the popular sectors, in order to keep

them within the ruling coalition and deflect the class struggle against the
monopolistic multinational firms, Peronism depended on its ability to deliv
er material benefits.

Hence, though in a different context, by adhering

to its populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronism once again contained the
basic contradiction between capital and labor and its success or failure
once again hinged on finding formulas that could provide greater profits
and higher wages at the same time.
Given the constraints imposed by capitalist accumulation, providing
real wage increases, and simultaneously, greater profits, depends on the
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ability to achieve cumulative expanded production.

For this reason,

Peronism's success or failure in both the first and second periods, was
determined by the conditions which facilitated or impeded the regime's
ability to find ways of sustaining increased productivity for the industrial
sector.

Indeed, this analysis of Peronism suggests that, as a successful

governing formula, populism only occurs when the conditions allowing for
a period of expanded production are present.

Certainly, as the Peronist

case clearly shows, populism can play a key part in speeding up the pro
cess of rapid economic growth.

However, this study suggests that this is

only true in those limited situations when the confluence of external
and internal factors is favorable.

Such favorable conjunctures can only

obscure, not overcome, the contradiction of a governing formula encompassing
antagonistic class interests which is based on a more equitable distribu
tion of income without altering the social relations of production.

Thus,

while the regime depends on expanded production for its reforms in the
sphere of circulation• it remains committed not to interfere directly in
the sphere of production.
The populist-nationalism of the forties should not be faulted for
its class conciliationist reforms confined to the sphere of circulation.
Under the circumstances and in the context of the times, they seemed appro
priate and they worked.

However, given that the crisis of the fifties

brought out their underlying contradictions, it seems inexcusable for Peron
to have based his second regime on an only slightly modified recreation of
the formulas of the forties.

This was especially true since Justicialism's

left wing had grown on a critique of past mistakes and saw its role as the
movement's conscience in avoiding past inadequacies.

Peron missed a unique

opportunity, seldom afforded in history, to be able to rectify past errors
and limitations.
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In its initial phase, the Justicialist regime of the seventies
was headed towards the socialist side in its populist-nationalist program.
During the Campora period, when Justicialism leaned heavily on the forces
that had brought Peronism back to power, the government relied on repre
sentatives of the left within the movement for carrying out its policies
and encouraged popular mobilizations as an instrument of power.

Indeed,

during this time Justicialism was largely identified with its left and
popular sectors.

So much was this the case that Hector Campora's resigna

tion on July 13, 1973 to pave the way for Peron’s candidacy for the presi
dency can in fact be regarded as an internal coup by the right wing of the
movement.

Though not clearly recognized at that time, Campora's replace

ment culminated the struggle between the right and left of the movement,
the adherents of patria peronista and patria socialists, that had come out
with such ferocity in the shoot

outat Ezeiza Airport upon Peron's would-be

triumphant arrival.

full implications in the rightward process

Though the

set in motion with Peron's presidency were not manifested until after his
death, the handwriting on the wall was already unmistakable within the
nine months that he headed the state.
Illustrative of the differences between the left Peronists espousing
the patria socialista and the coterie grouped around Isabel Peron and Lopez
Rega promoting the patria peronista is a short piece that appeared in Las
Bases.*

It enumerated the characteristics that set Justicialism apart from

^The article is by Domingo Rafael Ianantuoni and appeared in Las
Bases (Buenos Aires) 2 (Mar. 29, 1973). Las Bases was the official organ
of right wing Peronism edited by Jose Lopez Rega. Known as el bru.jo (the
sorcerer), this self professed astrologer was Peron and Isabel's close con
fidant and their Minister of Social Welfare. To gauge the significance of
his official position, one need only recall that Peron used the Ministry of
Social Welfare as his springboard to power. Lopez Rega was also generally
held to be the guiding force behind the AAA (alianza anticomunista argentina),
the right wing death squads.
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socialism.

Among these it notes that

JUSTICIALISM seeks to overcome class divisions in society, helping
the proletarian to improve his condition and rise to the important
rank of "SOCIAL ENTREPRENEUR." It does this through a social stock
holder system, since it recognizes private property as inherent to
human nature, whereas socialism, by not recognizing private property,
maintains the worker in a state of proletarianization, even though it
also favors a single class.1
Needless to say that the position of "social entrepreneur" did not receive
official attention, nor was a system of social stockholdership

ever given

serious consideration.
As evidenced by the TYP, the political assumption underlying the
programmatic thrust of Peron's government in the seventies was his ability
to gain a truce in the class struggle and, moreover, obtain the cooperation
of the antagonists. In turn, the regime's policies were supposed to further
contain class conflict.

Choosing his wife Isabel as his running mate, for

example, not only served the important symbolic purpose of assuring the
Peronist masses that Peron could now carry out even what had been denied
to him in the past,

2

but also played a critical function in allowing

Peron not to side with any of the contending Peronist factions since she
was identified with his person.

For awhile Peron sought to achieve the

kind'of delicate balancing act he had been so successful at in the past.
Under Campora the Peronist left and youth had influence on government poli
cy making and implementation.

Under Peron they no longer had access to

key power posts but were given hope of indirect influence

through debates

^As translated by N.A.C.L.A. in their issue of Latin America and
Empire Report 7 (Sept. 1973), devoted to "Argentina: The Protracted
Struggle," p. 30.

2

^
Recall that the military had vetoed Evita (the CGT's choice) as
Peron's running mate in his reelection campaign of 1952.
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within the party on government policy.

Peron kept them da.ngling mostly in

order to counter the strength of the CGT bureaucracy.
Lacking a favorable international situation to provide the materi
al basis, as had been the case in the forties, Peron's charisma alone proved
insufficient and his attempted balancing act was short lived.

Repeating

the experience of the fifties but telescoping the duration of the process
into less than a year, as the contradictions in the government's programs
sharpened, the regime accelerated its drift toward the capitalist pole
in the worker-national bourgeoisie "social pact."

The central presence of

multinational capital in the industrial economy constituted the major
difference with the process of the fifties.

Hence, conciliation and har

mony came to mean compromise and accomodation to the interests of foreign
capital and the Argentine monopoly bourgeoisie.

Moreover, the greater weight

of anti-imperialism and socialism among the workers' ranks made the repres
sion of working class demands and struggles all the more severe.

The

shift in the government's economic orientation was reflected by the shift
within the CGE.

Originally representative of the interests of the national

bourgeosie, large scale industrial companies began to join and, in 1974,
the UIA, associated with monopoly capital, merged with the CGE.
For their part, the workers responded not with less, but with more
militance.

From the time Peron was inaugurated as president on October 12,

1973 through mid 1974,a wave of strikes swept the nation affecting some of
the largest foreign and national companies in the heavy industrial sector,
such as steel.

Significantly, the demands were not just economic but were

also aimed at the labor bureaucracy's iron grip on the CGT.

The left made

important gains, particularly in heavy industry and the sectors dominated
by multinational capital.

For example, despite a vicious slander campaign
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directed against him, the 20,000 members of the auto workers-union in
Cordoba elected a revolutionary communist, Rene*Salamanca, to lead them,and
they also put a majority of his group on the industry's grievance committee.
Similarly, despite the Peronist right's concerted effort to destroy the
union, including machine gun attacks on its headquarters, Cordoba's elec
trical workers remained loyal to their leader, a self professed Marxist by
the name of Augustin Tosco who eventually died underground.

Given that

some of the more dynamic branches of the industrial economy were located
around Cordoba, the crushing of this center of Peronist and non-Peronist
left wing activity became of strategic importance.

In February 1974, the

police in Cordoba staged a coup and ousted the province's popular elected
Governor, Ricardo Obregon-Cano who was also one of left-Peronism's most
respected figures.

Though subsequently declared illegal, the coup enjoyed

Buenos Aires' tacit blessing and was probably organized and directed from
there.
As the regime moved further to the right, the guerrillas stepped
up their activities.

The Trotskyst

E.R.P., largest and most active of

the non-Peronist groups, never deviated from its critique of the Peronist
government as a bourgeois regime.

Its refusal to call a truce with the gov

ernment drove a wedge between itself and the Peronist Montoneros, thus un
doing the alliance that had become operationally effective in the period
just prior to 1973.

The E.R.P. announced that it would continue its cam

paign against foreign capital and domestic monopoly capital^- as well as
its operations against the state, though it briefly promised to confine its
attacks to the repressive apparatus (police and military).

Its most

*This took the form of kidnappings of executives and sabotage of
plant and equipment in factories owned by companies whose workers were on
strike.
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dramatic action in this period came in January of 1974 with an attack on
the army base at Azul, about 170 miles from Buenos Aires.

As Peron moved

against the left of his movement, the E.R.P.'s intransigence was vindi
cated and it was not long before its alliance with the Montoneros began
to be reestablished.

The two again began to cooperate in military opera

tions even before the Videla coup which overthrew Isabel Peron's govern
ment in 1976.
The attitude of the largest and most active of the Peronist
guerrilla groups towards the Peronist regime was one of critical support.
The Montoneros remained loyal to the person of Peron and maintained that,
in spite of all the contradictions within it, the Peronist movement con
tained the best potential for initiating the revolutionary process leading
towards a socialist Argentina.

According to their analysis at this time,

this goal could only be achieved if the working class became hegemonic
within the movement.

Accordingly, their announced aim was to help the

working class gain hegemony over the middle class in general, and the petit
bourgeois and small entrepreneurial sectors in particular.

The latter

were to be kept as subordinate partners in the movement based on their
common interests in opposition to the oligarchy and imperialism.

In April

1974 the Montoneros cautioned the regime that its weakness might lead to a
coup.

They drew an analogy of the prevailing situation with that in effect

just prior to June-September 1955: the vacillation , of the popularly
elected government, the bureaucratization of the movement's leadership, and
the demobilization of the masses.

In the same document, the Montoneros made

clear how short the regime had fallen
visioned for it by the left;

qjj

the programmatic commitments en
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The immediate tasks of the Popular Government were to control
and plan the economy, expel the monopolies, reject all secret com
promises with imperialism, expropriate the industrial and landed
oligarchy, regulate the participation of medium sized business in
national development and protect the small producers.
The Montoneros maintained that Peronism could not institute fundamental
changes without first turning its attention to the Armed Forces.

It was

imperative to initiate "profound changes in its ranks and doctrines,
through the rise to command positions of officers clearly identified with
national goals, enemies of the monopolies and imperialism and, in the last
analysis, subordinate to the popular will."*

The conclusions drawn by

the Montoneros from their analysis show how close they were to a total
break with the regime at this point:
If the diagnosis of the present situation is obvious to every
Peronist, the future prospects are less clear. Only events will
tell whether the deviation of the process is irreversible, whether
the blood that has been shed is lost and whether it will be necessary
to begin anew as in 1955, ’59, '68, and '70.
The undersigned organizations have good reason to fear that
this is the case, but they are also ready to engage in any serious
attempt to redirect the process and restore liberty, justice and
power to the people.2
The widening breach between Peron and the left of his movement
took its most visible form less than two weeks after the publication of
the above document.

In the course of his traditional May Day speech to

a mass gathering at the Plaza de Mayo, Peron praised the right wing leader
ship of the CGT and lambasted the Peronist Youth and Montoneros.
for their part, had come prepared.

They,

One side of their placards had pro

government slogans and, the other, critiques.

As they were attacked

"A Document for Liberation, April 1974" by the Montoneros and
Peronist Youth, translated from El Peronista 1 (Apr. 19, 1974) by N.A.C.L.A.
in their Argentina in the Hour of the Furnaces (New York, 1975), p. 88.
2Ibid., p. 91.
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they turned their placards around and started chanting, "We voted for a
corpse (Evita), a whore (Isabel), and a cuckold" (alluding to the alleged
relationship between Isabel and Lopez Rega), as they inarched out of the
plaza.

They took more than half of the demonstration’s participants with

them and left Peron on the balcony of the Casa Rosada addressing a rump
gathering.
Exactly two months after this embarrassing fiasco, Peron died on
July 1, 1974.

This happened before the rupture between the mass base of

his movement and the government was completed and before he was forced to
confront the full impact of the contradictions within his populist-national
ist program.

Though considerably more scarred than the first time around,

the mystique surrounding Peron’s person was again preserved.

Even after

the Montoneros had moved underground and declared all-out war on Isabel’s
government in September 1974, they still avoided attacking Peron directly
and confined their criticisms to his regime's policies, the forces behind
them, and the personnel responsible for executing them.

Distinguishing

between Peron and Isabel, the Montoneros attributed his errors to short
comings in Justicialist doctrine: principally that national liberation
could be achieved through an alliance based on an equilibrium between the
working class and the national bourgeoisie.

With Isabel’s government on

the other hand, it'was no longer a question of doctrinal insufficiencies.
Her policies were characterized as directly serving imperialist interests.
As one of the Montoneros' publications put it, "The failure of Martinez
and her entourage of bureaucratic traitors, was the failure of an imperial
ist strategy.’’*

*E1 Montonero, No. 11 (Apr. 24, 1976), p. 6.
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In an interview conducted during July 1976 shortly after the mili
tary coup overthrowing Isabel Peron's government, Mario Eduardo Fxrmenich
then Secretary General of the Partido Montonero, presented his group's
evaluation of the second Peronist period.

Responding to the critique by

the Marxist left of Peron as a leader of the bourgeoisie,* he drew a dis
tinction between leader of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois leader:
Peron was not a leader of the bourgeoisie because his policies
neither guaranteed nor permitted the expansion of that class.
Was his ideology socialist? Naturally not. Curing the period of
the military dictatorship (1966-73) we characterized Peton as a
socialist leader. In 1973(we revised the characterization and in
1974 we formulated a self criticism. Essentially, this characteri
zation was erroneous: Peron was not a socialist leader. In the
final analysis, his "third position," by not calling for socialism,
can be reduced to bourgeois ideology. This does not mean, however,
that he was a leader of the bourgeoisie, a conclusion which would
deny the history of Peronist struggle.
The lesson the Montoneros drew from the second period was that Peronism
had reached its limits.

The conditions of the seventies and Justicialism's

doctrine led to an impasse in the class struggle which neither permitted
the development of the productive forces nor the strengthening of the
popular camp.

"It was impossible for either the working class or the

bourgeoisie to increase their power and their development within the
country.

m

2

In the end, rather than replacing class conflict with conciliation
and harmony, far from even containing it, the Peronist experience of the

^This was the E.R.P.'s line.

2
Reprinted in N.A.C.L.A.'s Latin America and Empire Report 11
(Jan. 1977): 18. In this interview Fxrmenich also asserts his view that
the Montoneros would become the political inheritors of the Peronist
tradition of broad-based, popular and progressive, anti-imperialism. They
will recreate Argentina's equivalent of a worker-peasant alliance; an alli
ance between the workers and the salaried and petite bourgeoisie, but now
with the explicit goal of achieving socialism.
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seventies actually intensified the class struggle.

Given its contradic

tions, once Peronism was in power, it transferred the class war that had
pitted the workers and popular sectors against the multinational sector
and the military, into the very heart of Peronism itself as the battle
raged between the left and right wings of the movement— the former to
lead and the latter to control the masses.*
After Peron’s timely demise, the regime’s rightward drift accel
erated while class conflict intensified accordingly.

The control exer

cised by bureaucratic elements over the government, Justicialist Party,
and CGT, became iron clad.

Even the Economics Ministry which had been

more responsive to the interests of the national bourgeoisie when Jose
Gelbard occupied its top post, was affected.

Its reorientation toward

the multinational sector was completed when Celestino Rodrigo, a close
ally of Lopez Rega's, became Minister of the Economy in June of 1975.
immediately introduced what he termed "economic shock treatments:"

He

wage

freezes, a series of price rises, and a drastic devaluation of the peso.
Because of their dramatic impact, these measures became popularly known
as the Rodrigazo.

Though prescribed by the I.M.F. to improve the deterior

ating balance of payments, their primary result was to speed up spiraling
inflation, increase the decline in real wages, and strangle small to medium
size enterprises even further.

These were the same policies that had been

attempted earlier by Krieger Vasena in Ongania's time; they produced the
same results, and the reaction by the working class was also the same,
only it was swifter and more massive.
no more than a month.

Celestino Rodrigo’s tenure lasted

A wave of strikes and factory occupations forced him

*These points are from Juan E. Corradi's introduction to the Latin
American Perspectives 1 (Pall 1974 issue devoted to "Argentina: Peronism
and Crisis"): 14.
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to resign and then flee the country along with his mentor, Jose Lopez Rega,
in July 1975.
With Peronism discredited and demystified, a military coup was a
foregone conclusion.

All Argentina was poised in expectation.

The only

speculation involved its timing: how long would the military allow Isabel’s
inept regime to discredit itself further?

The military was compelled to

intervene in order to block the left, in the form of the Peronist and
Marxist guerrilla groups, from making further inroads into the working
class.

With the end of Peronism’s ability to defuse and contain the work

ing class, what the military feared most was that the left would continue
to link up with the growing militance of workers on the rank and file level
and thereby increase the viability of a socialist alternative.
Having recognized that orthodox Peronism was rendered superfluous
by virtue of its inability to control the popular sectors or annihilate
the left, revolutionary Peronism based its strategy on the imminence of
a military coup.

The January 1976 issue of Evita Montonera, assessing

the year that had just ended, termed 1975 the year for "confronting the
treason," and looking ahead to the year that had just begun, termed it the
year for "resistance to the Videlazo"— Videla's coup did not actually take
place until the 23rd and 24th of March.

The strategy urged for the year

ahead was the same as the one the Montoneros had followed in the year gone
by: to confront the government of the imperialists, whether in civilian or
military form, by 1) mobilizing working class struggles, and 2) building
the mass base in order to have the "sea" for the guerrilla war.

Indeed,

it was the extent of mass support enjoyed by the Peronist left and its
ideological influence in radicalizing the workers, that provided the chief
impetus for the coup.
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The Oligarchy Makes a Comeback; The Videla Regime
In the economic realm, the coup of March 24, 1976 represented a
rejection of the policy orientation that had predominated since 1943.

As

Martinez de Hoz, the new Economics Minister, began to unfold the regime’s
project, it became apparent that the junta had opted to confront the con
tradictions of dependent industrialization by turning the cycle full
circle back to the traditional externally oriented growth model along with
modifications dictated by the vastly changed conditions operative internally
as well as on the international scene.

Representing the traditional agro

based oligarchy, Martinez de Hoz envisioned a return to the role Argentina
had occupied in the international division of labor prior to the substantial
development of its industrial sector.

In a speech on April 4 of 1976 he

said:
The world debates what has become known as the world crisis in
energy and food. We possess the potential for food production
that gives us extraordinary strength. This can put our country
in a privileged position in the world due to the importance of
food production in the near future.
Martinez de Hoz's economic program had three fundamental objectives:
promote agro-pastoral exports as the foundation of the nation’s economy,
reduce the state's deficit in order to decrease inflation, and provide a
high rate of profit.

2

To promote exports the regime would reverse the

trend imposed by Peronism and turn foreign trade back towards private hands.
Foreign exchange rates would be manipulated to benefit the exporters of

^■Quoted by Liliana De Riz, "Militares y politica en la sociedad
argentina" in Proyectos de recambio v fuerzas internacionales en los 80
(Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Edicol, 1980), edited by J.C'.l Portantiero, et al.
My translation.

2
The analysis of the Junta's economic policies that follows is con
tained in an evaluation of the Argentine situation by the Montoneros as it
appeared in the Peruvian journal Marka of June 1976. See N.A.C.L.A.'s re
print in Latin America and Empire Report 2 (January 1977): 8-9.
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grains and beef, in addition to which, prices for these goods would be
fixed at rates favorable to these sectors.

The state's deficit would be

reduced by drastically cutting back on the number of public employees.
Furthermore, the public sector of the economy would be curtailed by re
ducing the state's participation in jointly owned enterprises, turning
many state owned firms to private enterprise and some even to foreign
capital.

Finally, the rate of profit was to be enhanced by freezing wages

but lifting the freeze on prices.
The impact of the Junta's policies enabling employers to increase
the rate of exploitation of labor was almost immediate.
at a low point, went down even further.

Real wages, already

A month after Martinez de Hoz

announced the Junta's economic prescriptions, the cost of living had
increased by some 40 percent.
zen, increased by

100 percent,

The price of medicine, which had been fro
cigarettes by

percent, and needles by 120 percent.*

100 percent,

rice by 198

So severe were the effects of the

Junta's policies on the sectors which had been Peronism's social base,
that one can speak of economic warfare being waged on them on top of the
military campaign which systematically sought to physically eliminate any
political expression of their interests.

By "1978, the basic wage was

scarcely 36 percent of the level received in 1974 by skilled workers and
less than 29 percent that of unskilled workers."

Indeed, between 1976

and 1983 the wage share of national income fell to its lowest level ever.
The multinationals and local monopoly capital controlling the most
dynamic branches of production took advantage of the assault on the

*N.A.C.L.A., pp. 8-9.

2
Carlos M. Vilas, "On the Crisis of Bourgeois Democracy in Argen
tina," Latin_JjmerI^^
(Fall 1982): 20.
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Peronist unions not only to hold wages down, but also to streamline their
operations closing down their less efficient plants and introducing even
more capital intensive techniques requiring less workers and higher rates
of productivity.

In 1980, for example, the metal workers union complained

that their ranks had diminished by 70,000 workers in the previous year, while
in May of 1981, the automobile workers union (SMATA), working in a branch
entirely controled by multinationals, estimated that the crisis in their
industry had led to 36 percent of all of its workers being unemployed.

The

result of these massive lay-offs was a soaring unemployment rate reaching
levels previously unknown.*
Given the general crisis it already found itself in and the Junta’s
opposition to promoting manufacturing activity, the economic policies of
the late seventies impacted adversely on industry as a whole.

Initially

at least, the general decline in productive output meant an overall drop
in profits, in the absolute sense.

Nevertheless, in relative terms, given

the higher levels of productivity extracted from workers spared unemploy
ment in the more capital intensive, dynamic branches, profit rates for this
sector increased considerably.

"The profit/wage ratio increased from 1.1

in 1974 to 2.3 in 1977, subsequently remaining at that level.

In 1978 the

labor costs in industry were an average of 20 percent lower than in 1976."

2

At the same time, the assault on the working class' purchasing power
could only reverberate negatively on the small to medium sized national
enterprises producing wage goods.

This was a period of unprecedented bank-

*From October of 1980 to April 1981, unemployment went from 10.1
percent to 11.8 percent of the economically active population. In the
latter date, some 1.7 million people were out of work. Ibid.

2

N.A.C.L.A., pp. 8-9.
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ruptcies and business failures.

Along with this sector of the national

bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, which was also linked to the internal
market and popular consumption, saw its position deteriorate as well.
The major beneficiaries of the Junta’s economic program were the
large landowners producing for export and the domestic and foreign indus
trial monopolies catering to the upper income market.

The one aspect of

the Junta's program in which it succeeded were its efforts to redirect
economic activity to regain the preeminence of the agro-pastoral sector.
So successful were its policies benefiting the oligarchy's interests that,
for the first time since the forties, agriculture came again to represent
the largest proportion of the GDP.

Although the regime was certainly pre

occupied with providing attractive conditions for industrial capital, its
major orientation represented a fundamental departure.

In contrast with

the type of economic strategy formulated by Krieger Vasena and his suc
cessors which disputed Brazil's emerging position of industrial hegemony
in the Southern Cone, the new regime retreated from that field and concen
trated its efforts in rooting Argentina's future on her supremacy in agro
pastoral production.

The new approach was thus an abandonment of the com

mitment incorporated in economic policy since the forties, to raise indus
try to the pivotal position in the nation's economic life.

This "new"

approach was analogous to the strategy of the 1930-43 period which modified
the externally oriented growth model: economic activity centered on agro
exporting with strong participation of industrial production for the domes
tic market.

The difference is, of course, that industrial participation

in Argentina's economy of the seventies was vastly stronger and of a sub
stantially different nature.

Rather than an emerging national capitalism,

the contemporary industrial sector revolves around dynamic branches with
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high

organic composition of capital, mostly controlled by multinational

interests.
While it fundamentally reversed the orientation in the previous
developmental model, the Junta did not throw it out altogether.

Though

it spared no extremes in the severity with which it repressed the left
domestically, and despite its adherence to an almost obsessive anti
communist ideology on the international scene, the military learned much
from Peronism and practiced a "third position" in its relations with exter
nal economic groups.

It did not break relations with any socialist country

and maintained the Soviet Union and socialist bloc nations as major trade
partners.

This is not too surprising when one considers that the Soviet

Union was a principal purchaser of Argentine goods in the third quarter
of 1975.

More recently, in the summer of 1980, Argentina played a large

part in circumventing the U.S. grain embargo imposed upon the Soviet Union
after the letter’s military intervention in Afghanistan.

Despite pressure

from Washington, Argentina concluded a deal to ship 22.5 million tons of
corn, sorghum, and soybeans over a five year period.

Hence, while the

Junta’s anti-Communist ideology made Argentina a staunch ally of the U.S.,
the return to a modified oligarchic project placed the economic interests
of Argentina’s rulers in contradiction with those of the United States
since the U.S. is a major exporter of identical agricultural commodities.
The decline of the project promoting dependent industrialization,
led to other conflicts as well.

For example, the Junta demonstrated an

independence from the United States in the nuclear area.

They rejected

United States' conditions for safeguards over nuclear facilities and con
cluded an agreement for construction of a heavy-water plant with a West
German-Swiss group.

They seemed determined to embark on nuclear develop-
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ment with a capacity for reprocessing power-station fuel with separation
of plutonium, which, in turn, could be used in manufacturing nuclear
weaponry.

1

When the Junta seized power it justified the coup by announcing
that it alone was capable of achieving the twin objectives it deemed
essential to rescue Argentina from chaos and guarantee its future well
being: to liquidate subversion and improve the economic situation.

In its

campaign to eradicate subversion, the regime unleashed the most severe
repression ever in Argentina’s historical memory which, as we have seen,
had already experienced more than its share of brutal controls in recent
times.

While it held power, the Junta put to death between 10,000 to 20,000

alleged opponents.

By applying the most extreme methods, the Junta achieved

the dubious success of quieting, at least for a while, its political opposi
tion.

But in the economic sphere "success" was not achieved so "easily."
Two years after the coup the Argentine economy was still in crisis.

The year-end economic indicators for 1978 showed an inflation rate of 169.8
percent, wholesale prices up by 147 percent, annual interest rates between
140 and 200 percent, construction costs up by 125 percent, and, most significantly, industrial production was down 25 percent since 1976.

2

the latter was a testament to the success of the Junta's policies.

Ironically,
The

regime's strategy for fighting inflation was to cut back on the working
class' purchasing power.

It succeeded in lowering real wages to about 50

percent below those of 1977 and thereby weakened the domestic market.

*Juan de Onis dispatch in the New York Times. 17 July 1980, p. A7.

2

Figures from a mimeographed report by the Argentine Information
Service Center and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "Conditions in Argen
tina— 1978-9" (Apr. 2, 1979), p. 5.
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Falling demand hurt the small to medium-sized manufacturers and merchants
of the national hourgeosie the most.

Their problems were further com

pounded by credit restrictions and high interest rates.

The bankruptcy rate

increased by 300 percent to its highest level in Argentine history.

Accord

ing to the Economic Federation of Buenos Aires, sales in most of greater
Buenos Aires1 neighborhoods dropped from 40 to 80 percent.

Many textile

plants virtually shut down in January and February of 1978 when they
announced "extended vacations" for their workers.

The adverse economic

impact spilled over to the more dynamic branches of industry.

Marshall,

a producer of electrical appliances, closed down in January, laying off
700 workers; and, in April, Petroqumica Sudamerica, a major supplier of
polyester fibers, closed.^Even those industrial sectors traditionally associated with multi
national corporations started feeling the crunch, as in the case of
the auto and agriculture machinery industries. Subsidiaries of"
John Deere and Massey Ferguson shut down during the first months
of 1978; G.M. auto plants in Rosario and Cordoba initially closed
operations during February and March and were finally forced to
close down in the second half of 1978, laying off a work force of
34,000 employees.^
Despite such draconian reductions in the level of consumption, inflation
was not brought under control.

Far from it, by 1983 it had again leapt

almost beyond control and was estimated at 430 percent.
Given the magnitude of the impact attendant upon the Junta's re
ordering of the nation's economic priorities and given the degree of poli
tical consciousness and organization prevalent among the population, extreme
and brutal repression was an essential aspect in the Junta's ability to
carry out its economic project.

Herein

Junta's economic and political programs.
1

lay the connection between the
Its political program consisted

Council on Hemispheric Affairs, p. 6.

2
Ibid.
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of two stages, the first being a "military" stage which was then to be
followed by a "political" stage proper.
In the first stage the aim was to physically annihilate the revol
utionary organizations, the underlying objective being the elimination of
the workers' militance.

In fact the military's anti-subversion campaign

was in large part waged at the point of production.

The concept of "the

industrial guerrilla" became part of the official lexicon.

The idea was

that since the guerrillas had taken root in the factories, the destruction
of the Peronist guerrilla forces must mean the destruction of the Peronist
rank and file who harbored them in the industrial centers.

Given the mili

tary's ideology and the interests it was enforcing, it really had no choice.
The Peronist and revolutionary left had replaced the official leadership
of the CGT with coordinadores de gremios en lucha (coordinators of unions
in struggle).

They provided the instrument through which the workers

fought back against the attack on their living standards.

These coordina

dores mobilized the workers in La Plata, Cordoba, and the industrial zone
of metropolitan Buenos Aires,and succeeded in paralyzing entire cities.
The war waged against Peronism and the left took a heavy toll.

In

a lucid and moving "Open Letter to the Military Junta," the noted Argentine
journalist and author Rodolfo Walsh estimated that more than seven thousand
habeas corpus petitions were turned down in the first year after the coup.
In many thousands of cases of others who "disappeared," writs of habeas
corpus were never presented because the futility of the procedure was widely
known.

Moreover, it was extremely difficult to find a lawyer who would dare

present one, since the fifty or sixty lawyers who regularly did so, in turn
had also disappeared.

Another testament to the war of extermination waged

by the regime was the fact that, according to officially released communi
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ques, 600 guerrillas were killed in clashes with the authorities that first
year, while only ten to fifteen were wounded.

As Walsh remarks, such a

proportion is unknown even in the bloodiest of battles in wartime.
According to officially released figures, more than a hundred "fugitives"
lost their lives in "escape attempts" during that time period.

Rodolfo

Walsh himself vanished shortly after he began circulating his "Open
Letter."*

In spite of the fact that the government prided itself in

exercising total security over the nation, few of these "disappeared" were
ever located.^
With the suppression of its opposition apparently completed, the
Junta launched into the second stage of its political program.

Inspired

by the Brazilian model, it sought to institutionalize the new order with
the Armed Forces' role as arbiters guaranteed within the state apparatus.
The military's plan was based on sanitizing the traditional political
parties into a loyal opposition and on controlling a divided and atomized
trade union structure.

The military's political program was first articu

lated by the Army in a document entitled "Bases polxticas para la reorganizacion nacional" (Political Foundations for National Reorganization).

It

begins with the extraordinary assertion that "the government which emerged
on the 24th of March of 1976 is democratic and legitimate."

Even more ex-

*Excerpts from this letter were published by Denuncia in the June
1977 issue, p. 3. This newspaper contains much useful information on events
inside Argentina that are unavailable elsewhere. It was produced by the
exile community in New York and distributed there and in Spain, and through
out Europe.

2

A year later, the situation showed few signs of improving. Accord
ing to "prominent members of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human
Rights, . . . in 1978 an average of five to ten persons disappeared daily."
Argentine Information Service and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, p. 1.
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traordinary, after placing itself squarely among those who understand
that the primary task is to halt the worldwide spread of Marxism, the docu
ment goes on to announce that the "Military Junta will not allow itself
to be drawn into the confusion of theoretical schemes, that it is oriented
toward the absolute respect for the human person, considering this being
to be transcendental in its development of liberty and the full exercise
of private property.

Private property is said to be the economic founda

tion for civil liberties and "true democracy consists in defending private
property at those times when the West is under attack from Marxism."^
Given the regime’s policies and record, it does not seem that these senti
ments were meant to translate into a defense of small property owners or
even the owners of medium-sized manufacturing plants, whose positions suf
fered drastic declines, but rather

were meant to underline the Junta’s

commitment to the interests of the narrow stratum already enjoying the
benefits of large property ownership.

For the average Argentine, far from

enhancing her or his access to property, the regime's policies made it more
difficult to obtain even the essentials of life.
The seven points containing the specific proposals for "national
reorganization" are illustrative of how the military had hoped to maintain
control:
1.

Creation of a dominant political force favorable to the military
government

2.

This force must be capable of dominating from inside the party system.
For this reason it must be assured support from the state apparatus

3.

The leaders will not be imposed "from above" but selected in "pilot"
elections at the municipal level from among independent candidates who
have publicly
accepted "the doctrine and ideas behind the process of
national reorganization"

^Excerpts and commentary on this document are contained in Denuncia's
Feb. 15, 1979 issue, p. 1. My translation.
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4.

These elected candidates will constitute themselves as a base for
the government, but may nevertheless by deposed at any time by the
authorities

5.

These leaders allied with the government will be asked to form two
or more political parties which support the process of national reor
ganization. In time, each of these new forces will acquire "its own
personality "

6.

When the day arrives that these parties are in existence, it will not
matter to the government which one emerges victorious. At that time,
the conditions will be right for holding elections on the provincial
or national level which are not "an adventure"

7.

Consultation on this project must not be sought from current politicians
because that would amount to according them representativeness. Even
less should it be put to the test in a referendum: "this would mean
the demagogic resurrection of the people and attributing to that
word— which is no more than a political myth— sovereignty"!
Unfortunately for the military, its relative success in reorienting

the foundations of the Argentine economy brought to the fore contradictions
that revitalized that "political myth"— the people.

In the end, the Junta

had to abandon its attempt to confine the electoral process within its
strict guidelines.

The military was forced to accept the people's "sov-

reignty" as expressed in their electing the most anti-military of the
"politicians" running.

Raul Alfonsin, candidate of the Radicals, won the

presidency in the 1983 elections.
Though the military succeeded remarkably well in returning the
axis of the nation's economic life back to agro-pastoral production for
export under the policies of Martinez de Hoz in the late seventies, it was
never able to find a political formula that would provide it with a signi
ficant social base of support.

Even its ill-fated attempt to mobilize

patriotic fervor behind the regime for its Malvinas gamble, proved to be
a disaster.

Not only did the military fail dismally at what is its raison

Denuncia, p. 1.
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d ’etre— defending national sovereignty through the force of arms'*-— but in
the process it undid what little had been achieved in the economic realm.
Important gains were made in placing Argentine rural exports on the world
market by taking advantage of Peronism1s "Third Position" in selling wheat
to the Soviet Union, thereby filling the vacuum resulting from the U.S.
embargo after the U.S.S.R.'s military intervention in Afghanistan.

2

These

gains were more than offset by disastrously rising debts incurred to
3
obtain the latest weaponry.
The costly Malvinas campaign was however, only the icing on the
cake.

On the eve of the war the economy was already in a state of near

collapse.

The GDP fell by 6.1 percent in 1981 and continued to decline by

about that rate for 1982.
been a decade before.

The per capita income was lower than it had

Moreover, "industrial output and investment suffered

severe reductions, falling 16 and 21 percent respectively."

There were

"massive closures of factories, a growing paralysis of economic activity,

The Army command's performance was particularly inept. Thus
the most discredited branch was also the otie which has always wielded
the bulk of military's political power. General Jorge Videla headed the
Junta from 1976 to 1981. He was followed by his close associate General
Roberto Viola, who held the post from March to December of 1981. In turn,
he was followed by General Leopoldo Galtieri, the architect of the Malvinas
debacle, who was forced to resign in June of 1982, to be briefly replaced
by General Reynaldo Bignone. All of them represented the Army. Toward
the end, the Navy and Air Force even refused to formally be a part of the
Junta. For an analysis of relationships between the Army and Navy in
earlier years, see Robert Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 194562: Peron to Frondizi (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1980).

2

Balance of payment difficulties were temporarily surmounted for
the first time in years, as favorable surpluses were amassed.
3
In particular the extremely costly French "Exocet" missiles.
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sharp rises in unemployment, a virtual collapse of the financial system,
(an} enormous magnitude of domestic and foreign debt, and the persistence
of one of the highest rates of inflation in the world."'*'

Indeed, the

economic chaos was even more severe than at its worst point before the
ousting of the Peronist government in 1976.

In the long run, the most

damaging byproduct of the Junta's economic policies was the foreign debt
which it catapulted to new heights.

From 1976 to 1982 the Junta "tripled

the volume of accumulated foreign debt contracted by Argentina in its 170

2
years of independence."

At the beginning of 1982 it stood at 34 billion

dollars, a real per capita average of more than $1,200.— one of the highest
in the world.

By 1984, after the humiliation of the Malvinas, Argentina's

foreign debt reached some 44 billion dollars.
The Junta's failure in finding a significant social base of support
for its economic program— ultimately, the reason for its collapse— was in
a dialectical sense the outcome of its successful economic reorganization
(which however, as noted above, did not succeed in achieving economic growth).
Reducing the consumption levels of the popular sectors was an integral com
ponent of the "new" economic model the military sought to implant.
effort the Junta succeeded all too well, with

In this

predictable consequences.

In the first three years of its rule, the Junta had lowered real wages and
salaries by fifty percent.

3

The tremendous social costs of this achievement

^Miguel Teubal, "Argentina: The Crisis of Ultramonetarism," Monthly
Review 34 (Feb. 1983): 18.
2Ibid., p. 23.
3
Argentine Information Service and Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
p. 5'. Writing in the Los Angeles Times of 25 March, 1979, Horacio
Lofredo of The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, states that real wages had
declined by 60 percent from their level in 1975.
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counteracted the regime's "successes" in its campaign of repression of
the revolutionary organizations and the trade union movement.
The worsening conditions for the workers led to what the military's
repression

was fundamentally aimed against— a resurgence of class struggle.

The Junta underestimated the workers' combative capacity, their ability to
absorb heavy blows, regroup, and come back fighting.

The Argentine work

ing class has accumulated a wide backlog of experience in the course of
their long history of resistance under the most diverse conditions.

The

workers' renewed militance made it difficult for the regime to move on to
politically institutionalizing the "new order."

Moreover, the adverse

economic impact on the middle sectors resulting from the reimposition of
an externally oriented growth model, led them to identify with the opposition
in an increasingly open manner.
Indeed the invasion of the Malvinas on April 2, 1982 represented
a desperate effort by the military to gain a popular base by utilizing a
symbol close to every Argentine patriot's heart.

Significantly, the inva

sion was launched only a few days after the largest anti-government demon
stration by trade unionists in downtown Buenos Aires since the coup.
two thousand demonstrators were arrested.

Over

By mobilizing nationalist fervor

behind the war effort in defense of Argentine sovereignty, the military
hoped to deflect the rising tide of social unrest and political criticism
as well as to quiet the mounting clamor for an accounting of the desaparecidos.

By choosing Lepoldo Galtieri to head it in December of the previous

year, the Junta pinned its hopes on this approach.

Galtieri, who had

also been the architect of a near war with Chile over the islands at the
mouth of the Beagle channel, advocated the classic formula of focusing on
external threats to offset domestic criticisms.

However, even before the
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ignominious defeat, it had become clear that the military's strategy for
gaining badly needed support would not work.

The thousands of Argentines

who gathered at the Plaza de Mayo to show support for the Malvinas effort
made it plain they endorsed the nationalist cause and not the military.
Galtieri was consistently booed and the prevalent chants were "Malvinas
si, militares n o !"

Prospects for Alfonsin's Administration
The collapse of the military regime in late 1983 came about more
than anything else because of its inability to surmount the contradictions
posed by an economic program seeking a full scale return to an agro-based
externally oriented developmental pattern in the context of a substantially
developed internally oriented industrial sector.

The most dramatic ex

pression of these contradictions was the burgeoning foreign debt crisis,
and the mounting instability and turmoil resulting from the failure to
find a political formula that would enable the regime to gain a significant
social base of support..

With the reinstitution of civilian rule via

democratic procedures, the AlfonsJn government temporarily solved the
latter.

However, having inherited the full brunt of the former, if the

current government does not obtain relief from this debt crisis it will
rapidly lose its rather tenuous and heterogeneous social base.

The fact

is that Argentina is simply incapable of meeting its international financial
obligations the way they are currently structured.
have to be renegotiated.
is able to obtain.

The foreign debt will

All depends on what new conditions the government

The more stringent these are, the more vehement the

opposition to the "democratic interlude" will be and the more rapid the
erosion of its support base.
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The foreign debt is however, only a part of the much larger econ
omic dilemma that has afflicted Argentina since the fifties.

If the govern

ment fails to formulate a viable developmental policy, the same contra
dictions that undid its military predecessors will ultimately lead to its
demise as well.

Alfonsin's government cannot afford a continuation of the

existing developmental pattern.

Even under optimal circumstances, ser

vicing of the debt alone requires large trade surpluses.

This implies

shifting internal terms of trade in favor of agro-producers with all its
attendant problems which even severe military repression was unable to
cope with.

It will mean minimizing imports and thus manufacturers' access

to imported capital goods and raw materials.

This, in turn, restricts

the ability of the industrial sector to create badly needed jobs.
high unemployment means low levels of popular consumption.

Moreover,

This lessening

of demand and the restriction of the domestic market thus completes the
cycle spelling disaster for local manufacturers.
With the loss of popular support and the mounting economic and
political crisis, the conditions are given for the military intervening
once again.

Thus Argentine politics may well continue on their seemingly

inexorable pendular course.

The tragedy is that the Alfonsin government

enjoyed the best opportunity to break out of this pattern since Peron
redefined Argentina's political landscape in the forties.

Moreover, it is

extremely unlikely that this opportunity will be repeated for decades to
come.

Alfonsin was elected in 1983 largely because he was correctly per

ceived to be a more resolute opponent of the military than his Peronist
rival.

Even Peronist voters defected to the Radicals on this issue.

More

over, with the economic chaos they precipitated topped by the Malvinas
debacle, the military were probably at their most discredited point ever.
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Never had they been more vulnerable and never had there been a more oppor
tune moment to move against the military as a structure.

Instead, Alfonsin

confined his attack to the very top leaders of the Juntas, even absolving
higher and middle level officers of the crimes they committed during "the
dirty war against subversion."

Today, the entire apparatus of repression

down to the death squads remains and is ready to derail the democratic
experiment when the time is right.

Ernesto Sabato, appointed by Alfonsin

to head the President's Human Rights Commission, recently remarked: "We
still get death threats.

The secret services are still largely intact."*

Conclusions
This chapter examined the consolidation and eclipse of the depen
dent capitalist industrial economy in Argentina.

Manufacturing in the form

of industrial activity gravitating around monopolistic multinational compan
ies (mnc's) assumed a central position in the nation's economic life.

The

economic landscape came to be dominated by large enterprises with vast
financial resources, utilizing modern technology, administered by bureau
cracies responsible to central offices overseas, and possessing the
ability to decisively influence the market for their goods..
The analysis showed this outcome to represent a continuity with
the process that took shape in the latter half of the first Peronist decade.
That is, as the favorable conjuncture deteriorated in the early fifties,
Peronism began to resolve the contradictions between its distributionist
developmental strategy— i.e., expanding the domestic market by raising the
income of producers— and the capitalist model of accumulation to which it
remained committed, by shifting its policies in the direction of promoting

*New York Times. 3/26/84, "Civilian Trials for Argentine Officers."
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the interests of the large scale agrarian and industrial bourgeoisie.
The 1955-73 period represents a consolidation of this process.
Analysis of the events characterizing

this period reveals that

the political and economic contradictions generated in this process of
dependent capitalist industrialization eventually led to Peron s return
to power.

Government policies moved toward an increasingly clear and un

ambiguous monopolistic-multinational capitalist developmental project,
culminating in the Krieger Vasena program during the years of "the
Argentine Revolution" under General Ongandfa.

As government policies became

the single most identifiable factor in income allocation away from the
working class, the economistic struggle for better working conditions and
wages became intensely politicized.

Even the securing of economic gains,

usually following upon bitter conflict with political authorities, served
to heighten workers’ militance and also to intensify its political content.
The political repression of Peronism accentuated this tendency all the more.
Peronism became the doctrine of working class'struggle and resistance.

In

conjunction with seizing upon Peronism as their instrument for.struggle,
the workers articulated its socialistic side in resolving the contradic
tions of dependent capitalist development.
Peronism’s populist side receded for a while, but then regained its
vigor as the clearcut predominance of the mnc sector in economic policy
began to adversely affect national capital and the middle sectors generally.
In the 1955 coup the military had acted as an instrument for a bourgeoisoligarchic alliance against Peronism.

Once working class interests were

removed from official policy, this alliance fell apart on its internal
contradictions.

The differences between the industrial and agrarian, and

the national and internationalized bourgeoisie prevailed over their common
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interests.

Though the mnc sector held economic predominance and had its

developmental project imposed by the state, it lacked political hegemony.
Thus, while the dominant groups had their interests enforced through
government policy, they were unable to secure sufficient support from
broad enough sectors to make their project acceptable.

This basic contra-

/

diction was one of the chief reasons behind Eferon's return to power.
The systematic growth of the Peronist resistance was both a result
of and a further cause for the military's inability to transform the econ
omic predominance of the mnc sector into political hegemony.

Finally, the

unrest and turmoil reached proportions that forced the military to reverse
the reasoning behind their exercising power.

Previously they had sought

to place the coercive power of the armed forces behind the unencumbered
economic project of the monopoly and internationalized sectors of the
bourgeoisie.

The assumption was that economic progress would eventually

led to political stability.

Now, however, the military's preoccupation

became to achieve political stability first, since it was viewed as an
essential precondition for bringing about a revival of the economy.

It

was this orientation that led to the negotiations under Lanusse's presidency
to bring Peron back from exile.
Analysis of the second Peronist period showed that by attempting
to recreate essentially the same coalition of classes as during the first
period, under the different conditions of the seventies, Peronism reduced
its longevity in power from a decade in the first period to three years in
the second.

Examination of the Three Year Plan (TYP) confirmed that the

programmatic thrust of the second Peronist regime did not substantially
depart from that of the first.

The TYP failed because it was based on the

same model of accumulation as the First and Second Five Year Plans (FFYP
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and SFYP).

Like its predecessors, it too

depended on a favorable inter

national context for exports to provide simultaneous benefits to workers
and capitalists.

Though this approach seemed appropriate to the conditions

of the forties, as the analysis of the FFYP in Chapter 4 pointed out,
Peronism*s failure to learn from past errors seems unjustifiable, especially
since the Peronist left insistently warned the regime not to repeat its
past mistakes.
Just as in the fifties, with the inability to obtain the earning
needed through foreign trade, the contradictions in the regime's developmen
tal project could not be contained.

Analysis of the events of the seventies

showed how Peronism replicated its experience of the fifties.

Opting to re

main within a capitalist framework, the regime rapidly shifted towards the
bourgeois pole in its worker-national bourgeoisie

social pact.

The dif

ferent conditions telescoped the process of the fifties into less than
one year in the seventies.

Moreover, the much stronger and central presence

of foreign capital within the industrial economy also meant a corresponding
acceleration in the abandonment of the measures protective of national
capital.
Another major difference with the first Peronist period noted in
this chapter, was the much stronger and more widespread anti-imperialist
and socialistic consciousness among Peronist workers.

The workers'

/
struggle was the main force behind Peron s return to power; working class
actions

also

proved to be the chief factor undoing the second Peronist

regime.

While Peron depended on workers' militance to get back into power,

he needed industrial peace and stability to solidify the alliance with the
middle sectors on which his retaining of power rested.

Hence the explosive

ness of the contradiction arising from Peronism's opting to promote the
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interests of the'monopoly-nine sectors at the expense of the workers'
living standards.

Peron and his entourage failed to defuse and contain

the workers' struggles and to block the Peronist and Marxist left from
making further incursions into the working class.

Instead, the regime

succeeded in transferring the class war of the workers against foreign
and domestic monopoly capital into the heart of Peronism itself with
bloody battles between the right and the left.

In the end, the campaign

of repression failed, even though many more militants were killed during
/

the brief span Peronism held power than in the eighteen years Peron was
in exile.
Peronism's failure to contain the militance of its rank and
file working class base, which became even more acute after Peron's
death, led to the military coup of 1976, thus bringing to a close the
short lived and unique opportunity to "remake history."
Finally, the chapter briefly examined the significance of the
Junta's economic program.

The current developmental strategy is shown

to be a return to the type of modified externally oriented growth model
that characterized the 1930-43 period.

For the first time since the

forties, the proportion contributed to the GDP by the rural sector surpassed
that contributed by industry.
By orienting economic policy to the interests of large landowners
producing for export and, secondarily, domestic and foreign industrial
monopolies catering to the high income market, the Junta's project repre
sented an abandonment of the policy orientation that Peronism had success
fully struggled to impose, and which was determinative in Argentine economic
and political life from 1943 on.

Ironically, the Junta's success in re

orienting economic priorities exacerbated the contradictions that led to
its demise.
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Unfortunately, all indications point to Alfonsin*s failure to
seize the unique opportunity to finally break out of the pendular pattern
that has characterized Argentine politics for the last half century.
Unable to find the basis for a developmental model that would benefit the
popular sectors and having failed to dismantle the military’s repressive
apparatus, as the contradictions intensify within the democratic experi
ment, it seems only a matter of time before the military decides once
again to dispense with the need for popular legitimation in the exercise
of state power.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS''
Chapter 1 began with a critical review of major themes and relation
ships found in the modernization/development literature.

The early func

tionalist approach offered little more than a teleological methodology
which asserted truth by definition.

In different ways and with slightly

diverging foci of attention, it posited a

Western=eood system

typology.

Moreover, if functionalism contained any causal analysis at all, it was
the unilinear scheme it proposed whereby societies inexorably evolved from
traditionality to modernity.
As world events repeatedly contradicted the optimistic projections
of the functionalists, a body of literature took shape which attempted to
address the earlier literature's shortcomings.

One tendency, exemplified

by Fred Riggs, moved away from theory to model building.

Within the ten

dency that sought to reformulate theory, which proved to be the more last
ing, one current retreated to

the polity as independent variable — exem

plified by Samuel Huntington's work— and the other saw modernization and
development as a problem of
resources to the hinterland.

diffusing

the right mix of (usually cultural)

However, because they proceeded from the same

fundamental premises, the revisionists merely -succeeded in replicating pre
vious deficiencies, albeit with a variety of models, typologies, and
theoretical frameworks.

Nevertheless, diffusionism represented an advance

in that it abandoned the assumption that the world system was composed of
separate and autonomous units, each traversing the path previously followed
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by the more developed units.

Instead diffusionism recognized the inter

relatedness of the international system as an integral whole with its
central entities shaping events in the periphery.
In surveying the modernization/development literature I found
that it performed an ideological function which was reflected in the litera
ture's

causal

analysis.

The various schemes offered by the literature

all had in common their function of justifying existing power relationships:
the posture of value-neutrality with its implicit espousal of existing
arrangements in the distribution of power as legitimate; behavioralism
with its focus on observed behavioral regularities abstracted from the
socio-economic context within which they took shape; functionalism with its
concern for existing relationships as the

natural

means for performing

the function in question; the fetishism of statistics which treats its
units of analysis as separate and distinct having no connections other than
their numerical relationships; and the consideration of the political
dimension as an independent variable in and of itself, not as the outcome
of particular social processes.

In justifying the relationships between

advanced capitalist and developing areas, the modernization/development
literature had a particularly negative impact on two major areas of inquiry.
On the one hand, in minimizing or avoiding any analysis of dependency
altogether, the literature neglected an integral component in the function
ing of the international order.
factors was also deficient.

On the other hand, its treatment of economic

The economic dimension is either absent from

the analysis altogether or it tends to be "inverted."

That is instead of

analyzing material elements as a principal aspect in the determination of
social reality, they are seen as dependent variables determined by, rather
than determining cultural patterns, norms and values.

411
While the modernization literature suffers from the lack of the
economic dimension, the specifically economic development literature on
the other hand, neglects the political dimension.

It contains, at best,

only a minimal analysis of the impact of social structures on the repro
duction of some, rather than other, economic relationships.
of the issue of

control

is virtually absent.

The discussion

It is particularly impor

tant to establish which social groups control the productive processes and
access to markets, because these groups are also in the position to deter
mine who benefits from economic growth.

Moreover, their connections with

the political structures must be analyzed because they use the power avail
able to them to solidify and reinforce the relationships beneficial to
their interests.
In order to overcome the ideological function of the modernization/
development literature a methodology is needed which focuses on the inter
relationships of economic and political factors in the production and re
production of human life.

An analysis which treats either side to the

exclusion of the other represents an ideological procedure which leads
either to mystification or to obfuscation.
to

inner connections

source of

Such an analysis blinds itself

(interrelationships) and thus cannot get at the

outward manifestations

(structural forms social reality

exhibits); in other words, it obscures causality.
Chapter 1 argued for an analysis that penetrates the exterior
manifestations exhibited by particular social formations, for an approach
that focuses on the process whereby socio-economic interrelationships take
shape.

The review of the modernization/development literature pointed to

the need for a

historical

component in the analysis.

However, in order

to obtain the dynamic element found lacking in the mainstream literature,
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what is needed is not an historical analysis in the abstract, but a con
crete and a dialectical one.

Class structures evolve in the context of,

and give rise to conflicts over the distribution and use of the economic
surplus produced.

Hence, the analysis of the process whereby socio-econ

omic interrelationships take shape, should focus specifically on the strug
gle between different socio-economic groups having diverging interests.
The scientific approach consists in analyzing concretely the ways in which
the participants with their contradictory and conflicting interests, are
linked to each other in the social process under investigation.
This study of Peronism applied a theoretical model that analyzes
the relationship between economic control and political power.

The local

class structure is the expression of the relationships of the various
groups to the structures of production

and distribution.

Therefore, the

class structure contains the issues that political events respond to and
in this way sets the parameters within which politics takes place.

In

analyzing the process whereby the Argentine class structure took shape
historically, the theoretical model looked at the development of the
structures of production and distribution, and particularly at the ways in
which the relationships of the significant groups to these structures af
fected their interests, at the orientations that flowed from these interests
and at the relationships formed among and between these groups.
How then did the theoretical procedure proposed in this study
address the problem of causality?

In the first place, it proceeded from

an understanding of society as composed of a variety of social groups with
diverse and conflicting interests.

These groups and their interests arise

from the manner in which they are related to the structures involved in the
production and distribution of material necessities and rewards.

Secondly,
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this theoretical procedure defined a developmental pattern or pattern of
dependency, conceived as a stage, by the processes through which the
interests of the set of groups that emerges as dominant are promoted.

The

analysis focuses on how these processes reinforce the interrelationships
among and between the dominant groups, and also on the ways in which the
processes undermine the material basis for those relationships.

In accor

dance with the version of dependency theory formulated by Cardoso and
Faletto, the pattern of dependency under consideration must be seen in
its global context and the analysis must therefore specify the connections
that link the foreign and national groups comprising the dominant set.
These connections are given by the interests of these groups which in turn
arise from the groups' relationships to the prevalent modes of economic
activity.
While the groups that make up the dominant set coalesce around the
interests they have in common, they also have varying degrees of actual or
potentially conflicting interests which drive them apart.

These contra

dictions provide the dynamic element that makes for movement and change.
The first limiting factor on the dominant set's power is given by its cohe
sion and stability which depends on the types and intensity of the contra
dictions it contains and on how they are resolved.

The second limiting

factor on the dominant set's ability to impose its aims is given by the
degree whereby the excluded groups coalesce into an oppositional set.

The

oppositional set also contains contradictions which are usually, but not
always, subordinated to the common purpose of counteracting the dominant
set's power.

These contradictions can be used by the dominant set

to its advantage. The ability of the groups controlling the system to
counteract their opposition therefore depends on the resources available to
them to a) either coopt segments of the opposition into

the dominant set, or
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at least nullify their oppositional role

by promoting their interests,

or b) suppress key participants of the opposing set.

Fundamental social

changes, according to this perspective, can only come about through a
process that results in a redistribution of the power relationships of
the groups whose interests are at stake.
The particular ways in which the contradictions between the domi
nant and oppositional sets, and those within each of them are resolved
within each stage or pattern, set the conditions within which the new
pattern emerges.

Hence the causality contained in the theoretical frame

work applied to Peronism is dialectical and not unilinear and determinis
tic, as is the one put forward by positivism.

The analysis of each stage

focuses on process, on becoming rather than being.

That is, in analyzing

the process whereby the relationships defining the stage are being forged,
the analysis examines the contradictions they contain as the basis for
emerging patterns.

Thus each set of arrangements is not examined in a

static, but rather in a fluid and dynamic sense since it contains within
it the patterns that may emerge dominant in the next stage.

As contradic

tions are resolved in the direction of one particular pattern, it in turn
implies a different field of options setting the conditions for the emer
gence of succeeding patterns.
down possible outcomes.

The task therefore becomes one of narrowing

In analyzing the process whereby the links between

groups take shape, the analysis examines the contradictions involved in
order to ascertain, to the maximum extent feasible, which connections are
likely to prevail and which are less likely.
A number of difficulties became apparent in applying this theoreti
cal framework.

On the theoretical level itself, there would seem to be an

almost limitless number of possible outcomes to be considered.

Each com
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bination of groups contains within it a number of different combinations
that could emerge, and each of these in turn, can lead to a variety of
diverse sets.

In addressing this problem, Cardoso and Faletto's category

of the transitional period constitutes an important contribution to depen
dency theory.

It is during a transitional period that shifts in the pat

terns of dominance become most discernible and it is during this time that
the process of different combinations of groups vying with each other to
impose their aims, assumes particular intensity.

It is also during the

transitional period that one of these begins to consolidate its position
vis-a-vis the others.

The transitional process is therefore a dialectical

one involving both the dissolution of the dominant coalition and the con
solidation of the modified or new configuration emerging as dominant.
Hence, focusing on the relative shifts in influence and power among and
between the major foreign and local groups during the transitional
period, provides the analytical handle for narrowing down the variety of
developmental patterns that could result and for ascertaining the most
likely outcomes.
Though outweighed by its benefits, the application of the concept
of transitional period nevertheless presented some difficulties.
we distinguish a transitional period from any other stage?

How do

In analyzing

a transitional process between developmental patterns, what sets it apart?
Where do we begin chronologically and where do we end?

Within the theoreti

cal framework adopted here there is no ultimate resolution to these prob
lems.

Since it contains within it the next stage, every stage is in a

sense a transitional period.

Moreover, a transitional process between

patterns of dependency encompasses several stages, as this analysis of
Peronism amply demonstrated.

Perhaps, because it reconstructs reality more
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faithfully, along with simplicity in causality, a dialectical methodology
must also pay the price of lacking elegance in being able to offer a clearcut demarcation between categories representing aspects of one process.
Nevertheless, four conditions1 extrapolated from Cardoso and Faletto's
formulation and from the Argentine experience, though a priori, proved
useful in specifying the important elements operative in the Argentine
case.
These problems were more than compensated for by the results the
analysis yielded.

Though I had to cover much historical ground and a vast

amount of detail within it, the study's theoretical framework afforded
insights into determinative trends, as these took shape, that could not
have been gained in any other way.

The study's broad scope posed a diffi

cult challenge, but its rewards were great.

Many facets of the Peronist

experience that appeared paradoxical and inexplicable at first, became
clear and understandable as part of an ongoing process.

Looking at the

complex surface reality of each period separately, would never have allowed
us to discern the underlying process tying each of them together.
The theoretical application of the concept of transitional period
may prove useful in another sense.

This analysis of Peronism provides a

case study with which to assess the literature that interprets populism in
Latin America as a transitional phenomenon arising out of the disintegra
tion of externally oriented growth.

A glimpse at some of this literature

on populism reveals some striking parallels to the results of this study.
Indeed, the interpretations of other Latin American populist episodes are
so similar that they come close to constituting a confirmation of the con
clusions derived from this research.

1See pp. 23-5 above.

For example, an article by Jose^
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Alvaro Moises on the Brazilian case, an analysis of the Cardenas period
in Mexico,* and Regis Andrade’s "Perspectives in the Study of Brazilian
Populism,"

essentially argue that populism comes to power in a period

of crisis, as an interregnum when the traditional order disintegrates.
Like this study, they see populism, in the sense of being a successful
formula for state power, as a transitional phenomenon arising out of
the disintegration of externally oriented growth.

The political system

structured around the dominance of the oligarchy based in the primary
export sector is in disarray and populism occupies the vacuum left by the
contradictions within the traditional ruling class.
This literature on populism also shares with this study the conclu
sion that populism in power only remained viable in the favorable circum-

Both in the Latin American Research Unit's LARU Studies 2 (Oct.
1977), entitled "Conflicts Within Populist Regimes, Brazil and Mexico."
Another piece within this perspective is Rene Antonio Mayorga's "NationalPopular State, State Capitalism and Military Dictatorship in Bolivia:
1952-75," in Latin American Perspectives 5 (Spr. 1978). This article's
analysis is especially close to that developed in this study. The theoreti
cal framework applied by Mayorga is also fundamentally the same. The
methodology is not deterministic. Mayorga perceives certain determinative
moments in the socio-historical course of development. Responding to
international and national economic and social forces, the elites in power—
themselves a part of these forces— make some critical choices which set the
parameters for subsequent development. Another article which presents ar
guments very similar to those advanced in this study, is that by Kenneth
Paul Erickson, "Populism and Political Control of the Working Class in
Brazil." Erickson's analysis shows that populist politicians played an
important role in derailing the potential for a more class conscious militance on the part of Brazilian workers. In this way, by undercutting the
possibility of an effective organized resistance along class lines, popu
lism facilitated dependent capitalist development in Brazil. Erickson also
notes that populism can move in a "radical" direction. On balance however,
unlike the Peronist movement when populism was out of power in Argentina,
the integrative dimension prevailed in the Brazilian case.
^A LARP Working Paper, No. 23 (Nov. 1977).
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stances of an expanding economic pie.

The parallels between the Argen

tine and Brazilian cases are remarkable in this respect, as are the dyna
mics of the class relations involved.

In both instances, populism, with

its nationalist and industrializing impulses, was able to assert itself
because the crisis of the thirties had weakened the oligarchy's material
base in the primary export sectors.

As dominance (at least on the level

of policy-orientation) by industrialists began to coalesce, agrarian
interests withdrew their support from the regime, which in turn led the
regimes to appeal even more strongly to their working class base.

Just as

this analysis concluded for Argentina, the literature on the Brazilian
case attributes the fall of populism from power to the contradictions in its
capital-labor alliance which could not be contained once the favorable con
fluence of international-national factors no longer held. *
To maintain themselves in power, populist states must be able to
contain the fundamental contradiction underlying them.

This can only be

done when the economic conditions make it materially possible to both en
gage in the distributive measures necessary to satisfy their popular base
as well as meeting the requirements for internal accumulation posited by a
capitalist industrialization model.

Another major conclusion of this analy

sis of Peronism borne out in the literature on populism is that unless the
regime moves decisively towards the socialistic side of its contradictory
class formula at a time when it does not appear necessary to do so; that
is, if the populist state does not abandon promoting the interests of
industrialists while the economic conditions are advantageous; then the

*LARU Working Paper, No 23. (Nov. 1977), pp. 50-1.
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interests of the popular sectors are invariably sacrificed once the economy
enters its downward phase.*
Another parallel theme with this study, most starkly formulated in
the Andrade article, interprets populism as a kind of de facto form of
bourgeois supremacy, carrying out a program serving the interests of the
national bourgeoisie, particularly those sectors with a base in manufactur
ing.

However, as Andrade forcefully points out, "the agents," those who

take state power and implement the decisive economic policies, are not con
scious of their role and do not even perceive themselves as representing
any particular social sector.
In general, the literature examining the particularities in the
form taken by populism in the Latin American experience

2

confirms this

study’s assessment of the contradictions in the attempt to promote national
capitalism by trying to create an alliance of native capitalists and labor
on the basis of meeting the interests of both groups simultaneously.

This

is one of the powerful insights brought to bear in Liisa North and David

Two recent articles examining Mexico's Partido Revolucionario
Institucional and Venezuela's Accion Democratica as examples of populism,
support this thesis. See Nora Hamilton, "State-Class Alliances and Con
flicts: Issues and Actors in the Mexican Economic Crisis," Latin American
Perspectives 11 (Pall 1984): 6-32 and Daniel Hellinger, "Populism and Nation
alism in Venezuela : New Perspectives on Accion Democratica," Latin American
Perspectives 11 (Fall 1984): 33-59. Interestingly, the authors differentiate
these cases from the Brazilian and Argentine in that populism did not under
go severe crisis and collapse to military dictatorships, because oil provided
them a material foundation their southern counterparts lacked. Similarly,
the analysis of the dynamic which led the two populist parties from, on the
one hand, being defenders of their respective national partimonies to, on
the other, facilitating the entry of foreign interests, also parallels this
study of Peronism.

2

This study adopts the concept of "populist-nationalism" as the most
concise way of expressing these particularities. For a recent work offering
differing interpretations of the populist phenomenon in the Latin American con
text, see that edited by Michael L. Conniff, Latin American Populism in Com
parative Perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1982).
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Raby's analysis of the 1934-40 Cardenas period in Mexico.'*'

Their analysis

not only concurs with the general conclusions reached in this study of
Peronism, but comes amazingly close on some of the details as well.

North

and Raby’s analysis of c/rdenas' political orientation shows it to be
almost identical to Peron's, particularly in the area of capital-labor
relations and in its stance towards national and international capital.

2

Moreover, Cardenas' reliance on mass mobilization and the fact that the
working class constituted his most reliable base, were also very similar
to Peronism.

3

In addition, just as in the 1945-55 decade in Argentina,

Cardena's earlier pro-labor policies were later supplanted with restrictions.
And, just as with Peronism, capital was regulated only to the extent that
it was supposed to "serve the common good.""*

Finally, Cardenas, too, ul

timately hesitated to use his working class base at at time when it might
have made a decisive difference.

^Liisa North and David Raby, "The Dynamic of Revolution and Counter
revolution: Mexico Under Cardenas, 1934-40" in LARU 2 (Oct. 1977).

2Ibid., p. 27.
3
On the role of mass mobilization and the working class, Cardenas
asserted:
Worker organization, the same as peasant organization, is indispensable
for the enforcement of the country's laws. As I have said on previous
occasions, the good will of public officials and the clauses contained
in the legislation which binds us are not sufficient.
It is necessary
for a superior force, which can only be that of the organized workers,
to join in overcoming the resistances which unfortunately oppose the
economic betterment of our people.
(Ibid., p. 30.)
4Ibid., p. 28.

5Ibid., p. 29.
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/

North and Raby's analytical conclusions on the Cardenas variant
of populist-nationalism are almost a carbon copy of those derived from
this analysis of Peronism.

In the first place, the authors point out

that the Cardenas episode cannot be properly understood outside of the
context of both the internal and external factors operating in the conjunc
ture of the Great Depression.-^

Secondly, because of the heterogeneity of

the social forces involved, the Cardenas period represented a fluid situa
tion with a multiplicity of outcomes having been possible.
ultimate limits of the "socialist" direction implicit
not fixed beforehand.

Thirdly, the

in Cardenismo were

In other words, the regime could conceivably have

moved much further in this direction than it did.

And fourthly, Cardenas'

project was ultimately "for the bourgeoisie" which was incapable of
carrying it out on its own.

2

Before moving on to considering the contribution this study makes
toward an understanding of the Argentine situation, some further theoreti
cal observations need to be mentioned.

A problem previously referred to

is the length of the historical time the theoretical framework calls for
the analysis to cover.

I also noted the problem that arises from the

amount of historical detail that needs to be covered in analyzing each

3
period.

How do we delineate what is "significant" from what can be

ignored?

In Chapter 1 we saw that the theory contains some guidelines

and criteria that help to structure the analytical strategy, such as pre
valent modes of economic activity, the structures of production and distri
bution involved, the interests of major groups that arise from their posi

1

North and Raby, p. 25.

3
On pp. 415-6 above.

2

Ibid., p. 26.
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tions within these structures, and the orientations and values that flow
from the particular interests a group seeks to promote or defend.'*'

In spite

of these guidelines and criteria, a good deal of "common sense" judgment
is inevitable— judgments which can only be justified by the results they
yield.
Establishing the connections between material factors— modes of
economic activity, structures of production and distribution, the positions
and interests of the major groups involved— and subjective variables— the
consciousness of the major groups of their identity and the form this
consciousness takes, the perception of their interests and of the other
actors involved,' their actions and the relationships they forge with
other groups— moving from the objective level to the subjective level, and
vice versa, remains-a problem.

In addressing this difficulty, an adapta

tion of Antonio Gramsci's theoretical framework for analyzing "relations
of force" in a given situation

2

was found to be useful even though Gramsci's

framework does not fundamentally resolve the problem.
Gramsci's scheme distinguishes three levels in any given reality.
The objective level is defined by the degree to which the productive
forces are developed and by the relations of production involved.

This

objective level is ultimately manifested in the class structure which is
the subject of investigation.

The objective level leads to the subjective

level, or the degree and type of consciousness of class.

Finally, this

*"See pp. 18-9 above.

2

I have paraphrased and extrapolated from the section in Antonio
Gramsci's Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International
Publishers, 1971), edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith,
contained on pp. 175-85.
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subjective level leads to the activist level, or the political actions of
the actors involved.

Analysis of the first level establishes the type

of society and hence the types of consciousness that can be expected
realistically.

Analysis of the subjective level in turn, establishes the

most likely courses of action.

In turn, analysis of the specific social

relations reinforced and or undermined by political actions establishes
the ways in which the particular actions analyzed both react back on
the objective level as well as influencing the subjective level.

The

causality in this scheme is therefore the same as that in the theoretical
framework applied in this study: it is both dialectical and also involves
a process whereby the options determining a given situation, set the condi
tions that the next set of options must contend with.
Applying Gramsci's scheme involves the not inconsiderable task of
operationalizing these rather broad and abstract categories.

Then

assum

ing a procedure is found that makes this an achievable task, and assuming
it is successfully carried out, we are still left with the fundamental
problem we began with: how do we move from the material to the subjective
and vice versa, what is the exact nature of the connections between the
three levels?

The answer to this methodological dilemma can only be that

the analysis is justified if it clarifies the relationships significant
to a deeper understanding of the social reality under investigation.

Such

indeed, was the case with the theoretical framework applied in this study.
The theoretical framework applied enables us to organize the "signi
ficant" facts without straining either the relationships established by
theory or the empirical contents of the reality being analyzed.

The results

that follow from the model of the process analyzed accord with observed
reality: the outcome that follows from the model corresponded with what
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"in fact" took place.

The problem of course, is that there is a certain

amount of teleological reasoning involved.

The logic remains to a certain -

degree circular and cannot completely free itself of the "truth by defini
tion" stigma.

It could only do so if it were able to "predict" in the

unambiguous manner of an experiment with controls conducted in a laboratory
setting.

The problem that remains therefore, is that the methodology

followed in this study does not allow for "prediction" in the sense that
a positivistic, unilinear model might.
We saw that the theoretical framework applied to Peronism yielded
an analysis that "predicted" at least two major possible outcomes based on
the ways the contradictions within Peronism might have been resolved.
The outcome that did occur could only be "predicted" based on the direction
Peronism leaned in resolving its contradictions.*

Seen from the vantage

point of "grand theory building" or from the optimistic expectations found
in modernization

literature's heyday of the late fifties and early sixties,

the achievements of the methodology applied in this study may seem modest
indeed.

Yet, by the criterion of not contradicting observed reality alone,

the analysis yielded by this study's theoretical framework represents an
important improvement over the mainstream literature.
Ultimately, the justification for the theoretical model used to
analyze Peronism was the "understanding" it produced.

By focusing on the

factors needed to analyze the important relationships, and by clarifying
the contradictions within them, a deeper and more comprehensive assessment
of the phenomena under scrutiny was gained than would have been possible

^This theme is explored throughout, but especially in Chapter 5
above.
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through another methodology.^Though it cannot lead to prediction with any degree of certainty,
this analysis of Peronism can provide an understanding of the dynamic
elements operative below the surface of current Argentine politics.

It

will be recalled that the theoretical model this study relied on conceived
of each stage as, in a sense, the product of the previous stage.

Since

each stage contains within itself the next, a thorough analysis of one
stage provides the insights needed to understand its successor.

For this

reason, analyzing the basic continuities of a developmental pattern with
its immediate predecessor and the ways in which it diverged, proved useful
in specifying and clarifying the contradictions within one stage, and
thereby also helped to provide an understanding of the manner in which
these might be reformulated in the next stage.
Thus, the 1930-43 period was analyzed as a modification of the
externally oriented growth pattern that prevailed before 1930.

The basic

continuity consisted in that the agro-exporting sector remained the founda
tion of economic activity and social and political power.

The contra

dictions within this stage arose from the modifications (departures from
the previous pattern) introduced to salvage externally oriented growth.
Chapter 3 showed the conditions resulting from these contradictions which
made Peronism a viable response.

In the same way, analyzing the continuity

and differences in the Peronist developmental model with that of the 193043 stage, served as an analytical handle in delineating the contradictions

"'‘In this respect, Jean Jordan Kirkpatrick's "Peronist Politics
in Argentina; Composition, Expectations and Demands of the Mass Base "
Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbia University, 1968), though it contains useful
data, falls short theoretically. Kirkpatrick's work is analytically thin
and does not contribute to an in-depth understanding of the subject.

within it; which in turn, led to the demise of the internally oriented
growth model and its reformulation into the pattern of dependent industri
alization.
What then did the application of the dependency theory framework
in this study reveal about the underlying dynamics of Argentine development
What were the insights and understanding derived from analyzing the major
modes of economic activity and shifts therein as these affected the
evolving class structure and particularly the determinative relationships
within and between national and foreign groups?
Chapter 2 began the analysis of the developing class structure in
the context of the predominant forms of economic activity.

Its basic

point was that an oligarchy entrenched itself at the apex of the social
structure through the ownership of vast tracts of land used for raising
and cultivating agro-pastoral goods for export.

The oligarchy used its

economic power to control the state and, at the same time, the state played
a key part in the consolidation of the oligarchy's economic and social po
sition.

Indeed, the state was instrumental in conferring ownership over

thousands of acres of land to the handful of families comprising the oli
garchy.

The state was also instrumental in cementing the relationships

between the locally dominant groups and the representatives of foreign
capital, which provided the foundation for the externally oriented growth
pattern.

The strategic structures for the drainage of capital were estab

lished through regulations that guaranteed monopoly conditions for foreign,
mostly

British investors over export and finance.

Hence the British-

owned railroads, meat-packing plants, port facilities, and their control
of banking.
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In analyzing the externally oriented growth pattern, Chapter 2
also covered the gradual shift from Great Britain to the United States as
the dominant external pole in Argentine development.

Beginning with the

First World War and continuing into the twenties, within the traditional
two-way flow of exchanging rural exports for industrial imports which linked
Argentina to the United Kingdom, a three-way pattern was taking shape.
England’s importance as a market continued, indeed increased, but the
U.S. began displacing Great Britain as the major source for imports.
Increasingly, Argentina came to depend on her favorable trade balances
with England to cover her deficits with the United States.
Chapter 3 analyzed the policies of the thirties which represented
the oligarchy's response to the shifts undermining the externally oriented
growth pattern.

Though these policies succeeded in revitalizing the Anglo-

oligarchic relationship on a modified basis, the contradictions that these
modifications gave rise to in turn provided the conditions that made Peron
ism a viable response.

Even though confined to a limited import substitut

ing variety, the growth of domestic manufacturing was the key factor in
this process.

Industrial activity expanded even as it was kept in a sub

ordinated position; the labor force increased while its demands were sup
pressed.

Thus Peron was able to build a mass movement on labor's demands

while he held out the promise of expanded production for industrialization.
The greatly enlarged scope of action for the state that was
needed to address the threat to the ongoing relations of production result
ing from the crisis of the thirties, meant growth in the size and strength
of the state apparatus.

Homogeneity of the old power structure through

which the interests of the dominant agrarian sectors and their foreign al
lies were expressed was now swept away by the modifications required to
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maintain the equilibrium of the economic structures under stress.

This

led to greater autonomy for the state which, in turn, was further rein-'
forced by the fact that it no longer simply translated the interests of
the ruling class but now had to take into account those around the accumu
lation of industrial capital.

The state became more of a mediator in the

increasingly complex power bloc .
in the Peronist state.

This tendency reached its high point

State intervention and, correspondingly, growth in

the bureaucracy increased greatly in the forties.
represented a continuation of existing trends.

In this sense Peronism

The fundamental difference

was that, ironically, the strengthened state was used against the very
sectors responsible for its growth.
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the first two conditions for the emer
gence of a transitional period.

They analyzed 1) crises in the interna- -

tional system and their domestic repercussions, and 2) the developing
infrastructure for the emerging pattern, the growth of the manufacturing
sector.

Chapters 4 and 5 look at the last two conditions for a transi

tional process to take place.

They deal 3) with the mobilization of a

political force strong enough to counter that of the traditionally domi
nant groups, and 4) with the material conditions necessary to realize the
new pattern.
Peronist policies represented a direct continuity with the poli
cies developed in the thirties in as much as they promoted an import sub
stituting industrialization within a capitalist framework, principally
centered on industry with a lower organic composition of capital.

Peronism

departed from its predecessors in that it sought to resolve the contradic
tions in the limited import substituting industrial development of the
thirties through the full scale import substituting model of internally
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oriented growth of the forties.

The theme in the analysis of Chapters

4 and 5 was to show how Peronist policies transformed existing contradic
tions through an impact that led from quantitative to qualitative change,
and in the process created the contradictions which in turn led to the dis
integration of the Peronist developmental model.
Chapter 4 showed that the quantitative increase in industrial
activity under Peronism produced a developmental pattern that diverged
qualitatively from the modified externally oriented growth of the thirties
in several fundamental aspects:
1.

Peronism reversed the traditional relationship and subordinated rural
interests to promote industrial development

2.

Directly counter to the policies of the previous period, Peronism dis
mantled the British presence within the Argentine economy and

3.

The predominant forms of economic activity shifted from supplying
external markets to being oriented towards the internal market
Analyzing the continuity and differences in the Peronist develop

mental pattern with that of the immediately prior period also facilitated
an appraisal of Peronism 1s strengths and weaknesses.

In that it accurately

reflected the contradictions of the thirties, Peronism's achievements and
limitations can be traced to the populist-nationalist doctrine it appro
priated from the critics of the Anglo-oligarchic connection of the "infa
mous decade."

Chapter 4 showed how the inclusiveness of populist-national

ist doctrine served Peronism well in mobilizing a broad-ranging coalition
to counter the previously dominant interests.

In addition, the simplistic

view of industrialization as a cure-all in populist-nationalist doctrine
provided Peronism a useful impetus since it was in tune with the transi
torily beneficial conditions of the World War II and post-war period.
Externally, the wartime conditions increased the demand for Argentina's
traditional exportables thus making for an accumulation of foreign
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exchange reserves, while the lack of competition from foreign producers
allowed Argentine manufacturers to increase production.

Internally, the

traditionally powerful socio-economic groups were in disarray, which made
the political pressure generated from Peronism*s mass mobilization more
effective and made possible the regime's social and sectoral redistribu
tive policies benefiting industrial development.
This was the favorable confluence of factors that facilitated
Peronism's achievements.

The regime was able to cover the costs for the

two interrelated areas wherein its policies showed the most dramatic suc
cesses.

In the industrial area, Peronism achieved one of the highest

growth rates in Argentine history and, in the area of social welfare, the
most equitable distribution of wealth ever recorded.

The one was tied to

the other in that industrialization depended on mobilization, and mobiliza
tion depended on the material benefits derived from the regime's redistri
butive policies.
The Peronist program, derived from its populist-nationalist doctrine,
was an attempt to forge a multi-class coalition centered around national
industrialists and the urban working class.

The Peronist state acted as

a substitute for a weak and non-selfconscious national bourgeoisie.

By

implementing a program serving their interests, the Peronist state
functioned as an instrument of the national bourgeoisie.

In a fundamental

sense it was thus acting in contradiction to its social base which remained
overwhelmingly working class.

However, in the favorable conjuncture within

which Peronism operated during the first half of its decade in power, this
contradiction remained latent.

Chapter 4 showed that despite the regime’s

systematic efforts to promote the interests of national industrialists, as
a class, they remained in the ranks of the opposition^

The close proximity
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of the dominant sector within the industrial bourgeoisie to the oligarchy
may provide a partial explanation for this paradox.

Such a proximity would

also account for the espousal of a qualified industrializing program in
the thirties.
Consistent with its populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronism
viewed national capitalists as a progressive force and believed that the
promotion of manufacturing activity in and of itself, without the need to
alter relations of production, was sufficient to achieve national libera
tion.

In this sense Peronism was an essentially bourgeois doctrine.

Thus,

though its underlying contradictions contained some revolutionary strains
calling for changes transcending the existing order, Peronism remained a
reformist regime, an outgrowth of the socio-economic currents and accumu
lated grievances that found fertile soil in the conditions of the forties.
A major preoccupation in Peronist policies was to prevent class struggle
from "spilling over" from the sphere of circulation into'that of production.
y

Peron often justified the social welfare measures undertaken by his regime
as means of giving the workers

a stake in the system.

Confining reforms to the sphere of circulation was a source of both
strength and weakness for Peronism.

A source of strength because the re

gime's redistributive measures coincided with the favorable conjuncture
and Peronism was thus able to achieve the major successes that it did.
Following a path that scrupulously sought to avoid class conflict allowed
Peronism to make greater gains

in the area of social welfare and industrial

growth than it could otherwise

have achieved.

As Chapters 5 and particularly

6 showed, the weakness in this approach was that once the favorable context
no longer held, the class contradictions in the Peronist formula made it
impossible to sustain these gains.

Similarly, the inclusiveness of Peronism's
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populist orientation was the positive side that allowed it to undertake
a broad-ranging popular mobilization, providing the regime an effective
political tool with which to counter the power of the traditionally domin
ant interests.

This glossing over of class distinctions was also, however,

the negative side that prevented Peronism from effectively confronting its
contradictions at a time when the conditions were most advantageous.
The survey of Peronism's orientation towards the major social
groups and of the attitudes of the major actors in the class structure
towards the regime in Chapter 4 concluded that the Peronist period was
the decisive stage in the transitional process.

The fact that Peronism

chose to use the state and popular mobilization as "pressure" to influence
class relations indirectly, rather than restructuring state power on a
class basis to use it in altering relations of production, played a key
part in determining the nature of the succeeding developmental pattern.
Chapter 5 showed that in failing to confront its underlying contradictions,
Peronism's populist-nationalist orientation proved a hindrance in making
the readjustments that would have given it a better chance to surmount
the developing crisis of the fifties.
Of course to have moved explicitly to establish a socialist state
and promote accumulation of capital outside of the framework of capitalist
relations of production would have entailed staggering costs.

The oligarchy

and industrial bourgeoisie would most likely have precipitated a civil
war.

The one million dead Peron spoke of may be a somewhat exaggerated

estimate, but clearly the price for a revolutionary confrontation in Argen
tina would be high.*"

Moreover, as every other attempt to achieve a social-

^See p. 328 above.
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ist transformation in the Third World context demonstrates, the internal
upheaval combined with concerted pressure from international capitalist
forces exacts a heavy long term toll.

Like their Cuban and Nicaraguan

counterparts, Argentine workers would have had to sacrifice higher levels
of consumption for decades.

However, given the reality of the three

decades after Peron's overthrow, it is not at all clear that such a price
tag would not ultimately have proven to be cheaper.

In the first place,

Argentine workers did bear the major cost for the attempt to provide a
profitable climate for multinational capital and the agro-exporting oli
garchy.

Secondly, the campaign to repress the forces for revolutionary

change was a costly one in human lives.

Finally, the result of opting

for development within a capitalist framework is an Argentina in chaos
with only the bleakest prospects for the future.
In any event, to weigh the ultimate consequences of the program
matic thrusts implicit in the policies of the 1943-50 period is beyond the
scope of this study.

The methodology pursued by the analysis is less con

cerned with speculating about hypothetical outcomes than it is to highlight .
the dynamics underlying the actual course of events as these took shape in
the prior stage.

It is in this context that the implications of Peronism's

opting to move toward the capitalist pole in its labor-national bourgeoisie
alliance are evaluated.
Overall, Peronism's shortcomings were not found to lie in the steps
the regime took to confront the external pole in Argentina's dependency.
Given the limited control it had over this area, the

Peronist government

moved about as effectively as it could.

creation of I.A.P.I.,

Indeed, the

liquidating the foreign debt and minimizing financial dependency, eliminating
foreign control over the internal transportation network with the nationali
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zation of the railroads and port facilities, the building of a strong
Argentine merchant marine, all represented major achievements in the
quest for economic independence.
over its export structures.

Argentina has never had greater control

Peronism's basic weakness lay in its neg

lecting to alter the internal relations over which it could have wielded
greater control.

This deficiency derived from the social relations Peron

ism' s populist-nationalist doctrine led it to promote.
Peronism delivered the final deathblow to the hegemony of British
interests within the Argentine economy.

In this respect also Peronist

policies represented a case of quantitative change leading to qualitative
change.

The policies of the thirties represented an attempt to salvage

externally oriented growth through its modification by promoting a certain
degree of internally oriented growth.

By intensifying this trend, Peronism

ended up subordinating foreign trade to the exigencies of internally ori
ented growth.

While the nationalistic policies pursued by Peronism in

the industrial area and in relation to foreign investments eroded the
foundations of Great Britain's hegemony, they did not fundamentally harm
U.S. interests.

In contrast to the policies of the thirties, the steps

Peronism took prevented even a partial resurgence of British interests
within the Argentine economy.

This was the visible side of Peronism's

program for economic independence.

Chapter 5 examined the less visible

side of Peronism's import substituting industrialization and analyzed how
it expedited the process whereby the U.S. replaced England as hegemonic
within Argentina's economy.
The analysis showed Peronist policies to be a case of quantita
tive change leading to qualitative change.

Peronist industrialization did

not differ in content, but its magnitude did to the extent that it changed

435
the predominant form of economic activity; which in turn produced a shift in
Argentina's relations to external economic groups.

The corollary to the

accelerated import substituting industrialization promoted by Peronism
was an increased dependence on imported machinery and capital goods.
Examination of the trade patterns for the Peronist decade showed that a
tripartite pattern, whereby Argentina had to realize favorable balances in
its European trade in order to cover the growing deficits in its trade
with the U.S., replaced the traditional two-way flow that had been the
basis for the Anglo-oligarchic connection.

This three way pattern was

conceptualized in this study as "indirect dependency."
In accordance with the theoretical framework which conceived
of Peronism as the pivotal stage in the transitional process between
externally oriented growth and dependent industrialization, the analysis
in Chapter 5 looked inside indirect dependency for the key elements shaping
the next developmental pattern.

The data analyzed showed a discernible

shift from indirect dependency to dependent industrialization.*- This was
especially noticeable as the favorable conjuncture for the Argentine econ
omy deteriorated in the fifties.

European recovery from the war and the

imposition of trade barriers, as well as competition from U.S. and Canadian
wheat exporters, cut into Argentina's financial base for importing raw
materials, machinery and equipment needed for continued expanded production.
Moreover, increased local consumption of foodstuffs due to populist-national
ist redistributive policies further complicated matters.
In addition to examining the external sources of the crisis of the
fifties, Chapter 5 also analyzed the forms the regime's response took and

■^See pp. 313-20 above.
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how its "choices" shaped subsequent developments.

As conditions worsened,

the contradictions within Peronism could no longer be contained.

The

regime had two basic programmatic directions, both of them implicit in
the policies of the 1943-50 period, in which it could have moved.

It

could have strengthened capitalist development or it could have moved in
a socialist direction.
attached to them.

Both had severe socio-economic and political costs

Peron responded slowly and in a vacillating manner which

was a major factor in the survival and resilience of Peronism in the post1955 era.

Hence workers were able to cling on to the myth of "Peron as the

champion of labor" in their fight against regimes that were carrying out
more clear-cut versions of policies the Peronist government of the fifties
was already beginning to implement.
Analysis of the First Five Year Plan (1947-51) showed it to be a
programmatic expression of the attempt to forge an alliance between the
industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie at the expense of the agro-exporting
sector.

With the favorable conjuncture gone, this attempt no longer proved

tenable and. the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) expressed the regime's intended
readjustments.

The SFYP began to formalize a new relationship towards

bourgeois sectors revolving around the land-owning oligarchy and those
involved in the production of durable and capital goods, at the expense of
the workers.
In applying the study's theoretical framework, the analysis found
four determinative shifts in the policies of the fifties which revealed the
direction of the outcome of the transitional process under scrutiny:
1.

The cost of development shifted from the surplus generated by the rural
sector to that created by urban labor

2.

In addressing the dual, potentially contradictory, development of indus
try, the nascent heavy and capital goods branches were favored over the
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light, non-durable goods producing sector
3.

Agricultural output was now promoted by providing material incentives
to the oligarchy

4.

There was movement away from the pursuit of economic independence and
toward a greater role for foreign capital
Chapter 6 showed that these trends were consolidated in the decade

after Peron's overthrow.

In the sense that the 1955-65 policies essentially

sought to promote capital accumulation at the expense of the working class
while also giving foreign capital a greater role in Argentine development,
there was a basic continuity with the 1950-5 period.

As the program of

"economic orthodoxy" incorporating the I.M.F.'s prescriptions during the
Frondizi presidency showed with particular clarity, the extent to which
these directions were pursued in the policies of the post-Peron decade
again made this a case of "quantitative to qualitative change."

The end

result was a developmental pattern qualitatively different from the one that
prevailed during the Peronist years.

Peronism is seen as the pivotal stage

in the transitional process because it promoted manufacturing until it
became the predominant form of economic activity and thus elevated the in
dustrial sector to the center of the nation's economy.
established the infrastructure for the emerging pattern.

Peronism thereby
In addition, the

direction in the regime1s policies which sought to resolve the contradictions
within its populist-nationalist formula, also provided the foundation upon
which the interests of the set of relationships between national and foreign
groups emerging as dominant in the next period rested.

That is, reinforcing

capitalist relations of production and providing a stronger role for foreign
capital guaranteed the emergence of a dependent industrial economy.
Chapter 6 examined the economic and political contradictions in the
process whereby monopolistic multinational firms came to occupy the pivotal
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positions within the industrial sector, contradictions which eventually
led to Peron's return to power after eighteen years of exile.

The attack

on the workers' living standards served to radicalize them politically.
State policies became the most important immediate determinant in income
reallocation away from the lower income sectors.

Hence, even the econ-

omistic struggle for better wages was intensely politicized.

The workers

clung to Peronist doctrine as their link with the past when their interests
had been promoted in government policy.

Severe repression backfired; it

cemented adherence to Peronism and increased working class combativeness.
In the 1955 coup the military had acted as an instrument of a
bourgeois-oligarchic alliance against the working class side of Peronism's
populist-nationalism.

Though united in opposition to the industrial pro

letariat, the agrarian and industrial and the national and international
ized sectors of the bourgeoisie also had diverging interests.

Once govern

ment policies no longer promoted working class interests, their alliance
fell apart on its internal contradictions in the course of the sixties.
In particular, policies favoring foreign capital also hurt national entre
preneurs and finally drove them back into coalition with the workers in
demanding the return of Peronism.
The hear two decades between the Peronism of the fifties and the
seventies were a period of chaos and upheaval.

Though the monopoly-multi-

national sector of the bourgeoisie had their interests implemented in econ
omic policy, they lacked "political hegemony."

Therefore the pursuit of

their interests aroused major and, at times, seriously debilitating, opposi
tion.

The Peronist heritage was the single most important factor in this

opposition.

Concessions had to be made and the monopoly-multinational

project suffered periodic setbacks.

Finally, with General Onganxa's coup in
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1966, the military attempted to overcome the lack of political consent
from important sectors with the coercive power of the state.

The Krieger

Vasena Plan represented the most clear-cut imposition of the monopoly-multi
national project.

It succeeded only in bringing together all adversely

affected sectors into the opposition and thus served to politically isolate
the monopolistic-internationalized bourgeois sectors even further.
military reversed its strategy as General Lanusse replaced Ongania.

The
Pre

viously it was thought that economic development would produce political
stability; now the thinking was that only political stability could lead
to economic development.

The military had to confront the bitter truth:

only with Peronism back in power was there any hope of political stability.
The second Peronist period was an attempt to recreate the same
basic coalition of classes as in the first period.

Analysis of the Three

Year Plan (TYP) showed the basic continuity in programmatic thrusts between
the first and second Peronist periods.

TYP failed because it was based on

the same model of capital accumulation as the First and Second Five Year
Plans.

It depended on a favorable international context (for exports) to

provide benefits for workers and capitalsits.

When sufficient surplus

could not be obtained through foreign trade, opting to stay within a capi
talist framework meant asking workers to accept declining standards.

The

second Peronist regime replicated the experience of the first period: as
the contradictions in its populist-nationalist formula intensified, it
rapidly shifted its policies towards the capitalist pole in its underlying
worker-national bourgeoisie Social Pact. However, the changed conditions
telescoped the process that lasted a decade in the first period, into a
year in the seventies.

Thus, the much stronger and central position of

foreign capital within the industrial economy meant a corresponding accel
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eration in the abandonment of the measures protective of national capital,
and hence a much more rapid policy reorientation towards the interests of
the monopoly-multinational sector.
The most critical difference with the first period however, involved
the role of the workers both in returning Peronism to power and also in
undermining the regime once it was in power.

In the first period, it will

be recalled, Peron built and cultivated his ties to labor by using the
resources at his disposal in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social
Welfare.

The workers played the key role in keeping Peron in power as

the events of October 17, 1945 dramatically illustrated; but they were not
a factor in his original ascent to power.

In the second period, the

workers’ struggle was the main force behind Peron’s return to power, and
their militance also provided the chief contradiction undoing his regime.
During the period of Peron's exile, the correspondence between the govern
ment’s policies attracting foreign capital with deteriorating conditions
for the working class, brought out the socialistic side of Peronist doc
trine for the workers.

As a result, there was a much stronger and much

more widespread anti-imperialist and socialist consciousness, as well as
a heightened level of combativeness, than had prevailed in the forties and
fifties among Argentine workers.

Peron was dealing with a qualitatively

different working class when he attempted to recreate a modified version
of populist-nationalism in the seventies.
In contrast with the first period, the Peronist regime of the
seventies was unable to control the workers' militance.

Peron had depended

on working class militance to get back in power, but his regime’s formula
for retaining power was an alliance with middle sectors which rested on his
government's ability to provide industrial peace and tranquility.

As the

Peronist government began to promote the interests of the monopoly
multinational sector, resulting in declining living standards for workers,
they responded with increased strikes.

Moreover, rather than diminishing,

the influence of the Marxist and Peronist left among rank and file workers
reached new heights. Maintaining its ties with bourgeois sectors, meant that
the Peronist government had to suppress the left and the more revolution
ary inclined in its own movement.

In the two years it held power, the

Peronist regime was responsible for killing more than twice as many leftist
/

militants than were killed in the eighteen years of Peron s exile.

Rather

than minimizing class struggle through conciliation and harmony, as it had
done in the first period, the regime introduced the class war into the very
heart of the movement, with the Peronist right and left butchering each
other mercilessly.

While the campaign of repression failed to stop the

left, it did succeed in isolating the regime from its strongest base of
support.
Unable to stem the wave of strikes and job actions or to erode the
growing Marxist orientation among rank and file workers, the Peronist
regime became superfluous and the military intervened to block the left
from making further inroads into the working class.

Chapter 6 concluded

with a brief analysis of the programmatic thrust following upon the coup
of 1976 and its implications.

In the economic realm the Junta's program

represented a rejection of the policy orientation that Peronism introduced
and which predominated since 1943.

Representing the traditional agro-based

oligarchy, Economics Minister Martinez de Hoz sought to return Argentina
to the role it had occupied in the international division of labor prior
to the substantial development of the industrial sector.

It amounted to

the reintroduction of a modified externally oriented growth pattern with
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the major beneficiaries being large landowners producing for export, and
domestic and foreign monopolies producing manufactured goods for the high
income market.

Once again, for the first time since the forties, agricul

ture represented the largest proportion of the Gross Domestic Product.
The Junta's policies had a devastating impact on the popular
sectors.

In a half a decade the cost of living went from one end of the

spectrum to the other; from being one of the cheapest in Latin America in
the Peronist years,

1

to being one of the most expensive.

2

The devastat

ing social costs of its economic policies made all the more necessary the
Junta's campaign aimed at the annihilation of the left and the subjugation
of labor.
Paradoxically, the very "success" of the Junta's policies in re
orienting the axis of the economy brought about the contradictions that
ultimately led to its demise.

Once again a developmental pattern which

hurt the interests of the national bourgeoisie was imposed largely through
the latter's acquiescence in the repression of the working class.

This

represented the latest episode in one of the most striking characteristics
of Argentine politics highlighted by this analysis of Peronism: the pendu
lar motion in the role of the national bourgeoisie.
The Argentine experience illustrates the basic flaw in the attempt
to achieve an independent capitalist development within a global economy
dominated by advanced capitalist nations.

In order to implement policies

^The streets of downtown Buenos Aires used to be filled with
Brazilian tourists for whom the cost of the trip was offset by the savings
in the consumer goods they had come to shop.

2

In 1980 the cost of living in Argentina was second only to
Venezuela's, where the per capita income is considerably higher.
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contrary to the interests of foreign competitors and their local allies,
national capitalists depend on the working class as political allies:
that is, they require the political force of the class whose economic
interests are in fundamental contradiction to their own.

Thus, in cer

tain conjunctures, the interests of the national bourgeoisie coincide
politically with those of the workers, but the latter remain their econo
mic antagonists.

As we have seen, in favorable international circumstances

this contradiction can be postponed.

However, when this situation no

longer prevails, the bourgeoisie is driven by economic considerations to
abandon its political ties to the popular sectors.

Severing these ties

inevitably results in the increasing subordination of its interests to
those of the international sectors and thus ’
d rives the national bourgeosie
back to seek out a new populist-nationalist coalition.

Hence, the cyclical

pattern in Argentine politics.
In the last chapter we saw that the national bourgeoisie left the
Peronist fold in 1955 and participated in the attempt to remove Peronism
from the Argentine body politic.

As their position worsened through the

pattern of dependent industrialization in the sixties, they became an
important component in the coalition of forces that led to Peronism's
return to power.

During the second Peronist regime the drama resulting

from the tension of the national bourgeoisie's political need of the work
ing class and its economic contradiction with the workers repeated itself.
In the pursuit of its economic interests the national bourgeoisie required
a docile working class. . At the same time however, to counter the power
of the internationalized bourgeoisie, foreign capital, and the traditional
oligarchy, the national bourgeoisie needed a politically active working
class.

The experience of the first Peronist period was replicated, only
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in

a much more intense and rapid fashion.

The workers' demands were

greater and the threat of the working class taking over the government as
an instrument to promote their interests was much more serious.

As a

result, there was less ambiguity and hesitation on the part of the national
bourgeoisie in resolving its contradictory relationship to the working
class by opting for the repression of popular mobilization and militancy.
Again, analagous to its experience under the repressive military
regime of the sixties, after the coup of 1976 the national bourgeoisie
found its interests even more subordinated to those of the sectors most
closely tied to foreign capital.

The dialectical cycle arising from the

contradictory nature of populist-nationalism thus again went full circle.
The political interests of the national bourgeoisie once again coincided
with those of the industrial working class.
For its part too, since 1976 the military traversed a cycle anala
gous to the course it travelled in. the late sixties and early seventies.
It began with an attempt to physically liquidate its political opposition.
This, it hoped, would produce political stability and result in economic
development.

The political opposition was frozen but not silenced; the

Junta's success in reorienting the Argentine economy did not produce
political stability but instead undermined it.
Argentina's foreseeable future does not look bright.

If democracy

is to survive it must build a stronger base among the popular sectors with
which to counter its internal foes when they resort to military power.

In

addition, a strong popular base is also essential if Argentine democracy
is to be able to withstand the pressures, from foreign capital for an ever
greater share of whatever capital the already overburdened Argentine economy
is capable of accumulating in the future.

That is, if the

democratic
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experiment

is to have any chance at all, it must become more populist

and more nationalist.
As we saw in this study of Peronism, populist-nationalism can only
succeed during those periods when international circumstances are favorable
for the Argentine economy.

Once the advantageous conditions deteriorate,

populist-nationalism1s central contradiction surfaces.

As a formula for

exercising state power, populist-nationalism rests on its ability to secure
the material basis for cementing its multi-class coalition centered on the
alliance of national capitalists and industrial workers.

Once it is unable

to find the means with which to sustain improved living conditions for the
masses, populist-nationalism is driven by its commitment not to alter capi
talist relations of production to policies which cut back the working •
class’ levels of consumption.

Such policies result in increased working

class militance which undermines capitalist accumulation.

This brings

the military back to power.
The dynamics of military rule in turn, bring about the conditions
for populism’s return to power.

The military rulers' first priority

is to guarantee the stability of capitalist relations of production.

They

unleash a brutal campaign of repression against working class militance.
Labor peace is enforced through intimidation, torture and murder.

The

generals also use the coercive power of the armed forces to back up an
economic project that promotes the interests of the oligarchy and domestic
and foreign monopoly capital as the basis for recovery.

This restructur

ing of economic activity not only harms the working class and popular
sectors in general, but also erodes the position of the bourgeois sectors
in

the

production and distribution of wage goods.

Thus the stage is

set for the reemergence of the populist-nationalist formula.

Improved
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economic conditions for Argentina on the international scene then provide
the opening for some form of populist-nationalism to regain power.
So the cycle continues as does its underlying cause: Argentina's
dependency on foreign capital.

Whether through the classical model of

agrarian exporter where control is external through forces that determine
the international market, or through industrial production centered on
multinational corporate giants where control is internalized in the manu
facturing sector, Argentina's economy remains dependent on foreign capital.
Until social forces coalesce that are capable of effectively confronting
Argentine dependency, Argentina which possesses the resources to provide
a decent life for all its inhabitants, will continue to be torn apart in
the drama characterized by pendular alternations between some variant of
populist-nationalism and an increasingly fascistic form of military dic
tatorship .
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